

WORLD REVIEW

Volume V. No. 5.

Incorporating
'REVIEW OF REVIEWS' and 'WORLD'

July, 1938

40 CHANDOS STREET
LONDON, W.C. 2

Telegrams: BOOKSTORE, LONDON
Telephone: TEMPLE BAR 0127-9

WORLD REVIEW is the only English monthly review giving an extensive selection of articles from publications all over the world. These articles are chosen with great care, since WORLD REVIEW can only be valuable as its sponsors want it to be, if it avoids all political bias. *The Editor in his own article, and other signed contributors, express their opinions as frankly as they please.* Otherwise the Review would lack force and colour. But the ultimate object of WORLD REVIEW is to perform a useful and progressive service by allowing

THE NATIONS TO SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES

WHY THERE WON'T BE WAR

by VERNON BARTLETT

HERR HITLER is a clever man. Or shrewd, rather than clever. He knows more about shock tactics in politics than any other living statesman, and one of his habits is to spring his surprises on the world on Saturdays, when people are thinking about anything and everything except world affairs. By the time ministers are back at their desks the peak of the crisis is past, and there's nothing for it but to say that it mustn't happen again. And, of course, it does.

But that one week-end in May went all wrong. Rumour spread that German troops were concentrating near the Czechoslovak frontier in connection with the first of the three municipal elections in Czechoslovakia. With memories of the march into Austria in mind, the subsequent European panic was not surprising. The Germans have complained bitterly about it, but without justification. It was, apparently, not true that the concentrations were large, but they were big enough to form the *cadres* for an extensive mobilisation, had it been ordered. I, for one, firmly believe that the rumour was started from Berlin or Munich, in order to frighten as many Sudeten Germans as possible into voting for Herr Henlein—if the Reichswehr was to be in charge of the country in a few days, it would be wise to clamber on the Hitler-Henlein band-wagon without delay.

Then the unexpected happened. The Czechoslovak Government carried through its partial mobilisation with admirable speed and efficiency, and the British Government showed a little more firmness than Berlin had anticipated. That left Herr Hitler undecided. The Reichswehr was all for prudence and patience ; the extremists among the Nazis were all for striking at once—it might be true that control over Czechoslovakia would come to them without a fight as the result of economic pressure, but that was a dull procedure for people brought up to believe in drastic action. Herr von Ribbentrop was ruder to Sir Nevile Henderson than he had ever been before.

So rude, in fact, that the British Ambassador became thoroughly alarmed, and unwittingly gave Herr Hitler the only severe blow he has received in the international boxing-ring. Somebody in the British Embassy made holiday railway reservations for women and children from Berlin. When this was reported to Lord Halifax, he ordered an immediate countermanding of the arrangement, lest it should be misunderstood and provoke the Germans into going to war. When it was reported to Herr Hitler, he ordered an immediate countermanding of any plans against Czechoslovakia, since it looked as though the British at last meant business. And, however bitterly the German Press might attack the British, French or Czechoslovaks for their provocative panic, every German knew that for once—for the first time, indeed—the Führer had suffered a diplomatic defeat.

The Lesson

That is now an old story, but is worth retailing because it is so very significant. There is, in the first place, the difference in the outlooks of Lord Halifax and Herr Hitler which induces the one to fear that the threat implied in the order for a special train will encourage Germany to make war, whereas, in fact, it does more than anything else, with the possible exception of the Czechoslovak mobilisation, to discourage her. Why? For the very simple reason that Germany does not want to make war. There are, as "Floodlight" points out elsewhere in this issue, certain leaders who would rather win a little by fighting than a lot by negotiating, but they can be checked by a little show of determination in other countries. Germany's young men are filled with a militant idealism which, coupled with a regimentation unknown in other lands, arouses deep anxiety elsewhere, but it is stupid to

imagine that these young men *want* to die or to kill. That they *may* die or kill unless the rest of the world behaves sensibly is another matter.

Behaving sensibly, surely, involves acting without panic. And to avoid panic one needs to remind oneself as frequently as possible how poor are the prospects for an aggressor in any but what the Duce would call a "colonial" war. It is, I believe, true that when the Germans occupied Vienna, the strain on their petrol supplies was such that private cars in Munich and other towns near the frontier could obtain none for several days. The German papers are full of lamentations about the scarcity of copper and other essentials. A great German general remarked not so very long ago that you could end a war with food cards, but that you could not begin one with them. What country placed as Germany is could go to war with any hope of a victory which would leave her present rulers still in power?

Unpopular Mussolini

The Duce is in a more sorry state than the Führer. There is very much less of that almost ecstatic devotion among his followers than you find among the younger Nazis—time and ecstasy don't go well together. Herr Himmler, head of the German secret police, is said to have drawn up a memorandum on the situation in Italy, based on the reports of his many agents who were sent to prepare for Herr Hitler's visit to Rome. It gives a devastating report of the situation there. The Rome-Berlin axis is more unpopular than ever; the fear of an intensification of dictatorial methods in the event of war is widespread and deep; the personal popularity of Mussolini has sunk very low; nine out of twelve Italian generals who were sounded on the advisability of a military alliance with Germany were against it; opposition among senior officers, aristocrats and even members of the royal family to the present trend of Fascism is becoming much more outspoken; the economic situation is worse than it has ever been.

The Duce's last three adventures in international affairs have been sterile and unpopular—the "colonial" war in Abyssinia is not yet over, and the pathetic cargoes of sick and wounded are not landed at the ordinary wharves in Naples harbour, but are taken off in secret to hospital lest they should remind the Neapolitans of the contrast between promise and performance in that cruel country. The war

in Spain drags on, but the necessity for carrying it out under the subterfuges made familiar to us by all this bunk about "non-intervention" robbed it of all its glory in the early days; the Duce has made capital out of it at home only in proportion to the timidity of other governments in condemning warfare (one has but to remember the angry Italian denials when Mussolini's message of congratulation to the legionaries was captured at the battle of Guadalajara in March, 1937, and the way in which such messages are now not conveyed in secret orders of the day, but are shouted from loudspeakers on the house-tops, merely because the protests against intervention have been so timid), but there is now no enthusiasm in Italy for a campaign which must again worsen relations with England. The failure to keep the Germans away from the Brenner and, still more, the Duce's welcome to them on their reappearance there, make Italians so angry that one can easily believe the reports about Bologna's riots of protest at the University.

Japan's End as a First-Rate Power

The Japanese who, so short a time ago, appeared to be invulnerable in the Far East are finished as a first-class power. That magnificent dug-out in Canton where, four months ago, I sat and talked with the Governor during a very tame Japanese rehearsal for the raids of the last few weeks, must now be the envied refuge of a million poor and harmless devils who are subjected to the most brutal bombardments in human history. And yet one does not hesitate to write that Japan is finished as a great power—unless, of course, that mysterious bunch of reactionaries known as "the City" comes forward at the critical moment with immense credits which, if given to the Chinese instead of the Japanese, would still save Western commercial interests in the Far East. The Chinese, helped downhill by the most sinister Japanese methods of encouraging drug-taking (which sound like the wildest criminal stories, and yet are true) may lose their present passion for better education and social services, but their new sense of nationalism will flourish, as such senses invariably do, under oppression. Japan lost her chance of controlling this new Frankenstein monster when the behaviour of her troops after the capture of Nanking gave just that necessary extra incentive to the Chinese to remain united behind General Chiang Kai-shek.

Each of these three totalitarian states is a threat to the British Commonwealth—you can't blame the poor for envying the rich, the young for wishing to elbow out the old. Germany, with her energy, planned economy and psychological yearning for colonies ; Italy, with her ambition to turn the Mediterranean into an Italian sea ; Japan, with her desire to push all Western influences out of the Far East—these three between them would destroy the British Empire if they achieved their ends. They may still do so, but they cannot afford to do so by deliberate and open war against us. If we drift into war they will be almost as distressed as we shall. And if only our jittery rulers will get that into their heads, the world will breathe a sigh of relief which will be a tornado. For these men who meet once a week in Downing Street have in their trembling hands the fates not only of the British Empire, but of every European state that has not yet gone totalitarian.

AT THE
FRENCH-
SPANISH
FRONTIER

"It's quite all
right. This is for
my personal use."



"Il Travaso della
Ides," Rome

The great danger to peace is not that we shall be rude to the dictators, but that we shall not be rude enough. One can hardly blame Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini if, knowing how poor are their own resources, they develop perilously swollen heads and ambitions. What young man just making his way in the world does not risk losing his sense of proportion if the older, richer and more powerful show that he terrifies them?

That is what is wrong with the world. We have lost our sense of proportion. If Whitehall cares to play them, it still has most of the trump cards in its hand. It may be slow in offering guns to the people but it still can offer butter, and it is still the man rather than the machine that matters. It may be bad form to boast of one's wealth, but a few millions handed out as credits to states in south-eastern Europe could be more effective than the expenditure of ten times the amount on tanks and guns and aeroplanes. If we must fight to retain our place in the world, why should we not have the choice of weapons?

Use Our Wealth

It may be no bad thing if Germany's economic domination extends to the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. Comfort is the enemy of adventure, and the control of Hungarian wheat and Roumanian oil might possibly put an end to Nazi ambitions to conquer the world. But there is no reason why we in Great Britain should not put up some defence against a political system we do not and cannot like, and one country after another must adopt that system, even against its own will, if we do not use our great wealth to enable them to choose. A Turkish financial mission was allowed to kick its heels in London for months before it was granted a British loan, and yet Turkey's strategic position is almost as important as that of Spain—which we have already done our stupid best to lose. There should be a daring scheme of financial assistance to the poorer European countries, because we cannot retain our position in the world if we make no use of the wealth that position has given us. And it is only when we have made it clear to the most ambitious supporters of the totalitarians that we believe in our system as fervently as they believe in theirs that we shall be able to get together and discuss reasonably how to combine their energy and our possessions for the general betterment of mankind.

BRITAIN ON THREE FRONTS




"L'Œuvre"

Paris

MEXICO

"Oil that will make an Englishman run is something one doesn't come across every day."

Docus, "Haagsche Post"



CZECHOSLOVAKIA



SPAIN

"Surely you aren't going to be more touchy than Mr. Neville Chamberlain when faced by a *fait accompli*!"

"La Lumière," Paris

SO YOU'RE GOING ABROAD

When you hear the Call of Summer on Conducted Wonder Tours,
And plan the Land or Sea Inclusive Cruise,
Some features not included in the Holiday Brochures
May be gathered from the Continental news.

Will your Joy-Week in Gross-Deutschland at the minimum expense
Seem quite worthy of your rapture unrestrained,
When you're plucked out of your Pullman for some currency offence,
Arrested on suspicion and detained ?

Might one even be the victim of some racial mistakes
In the barrack-ground till lately known as Wien ?
Can a pilgrim to Locarno and to Stresa and the Lakes
Dodge one million Axis-Tourists from Berlin ?

On cheap luxury excursions round St. Moritz and Lucerne—
All the Alpine Winter Playgrounds of the rich—
Does the Bureau make a rebate for precipitate return
If Swiss-Germans catch the Pan-Teutonic itch ?

Is a Culture-Cruise to Hellas not unsafe, to say the least,
Till well past Gibraltar's over-rated cliff ?
Might your glamour glimpse of Tangier, mystic gateway to the East
Not include some awful moments with the Riff ?

If a Spa-ha near to Praha should accept your L.S.D.,
Will the next Sudeten Putsch leave time to quit ?
On your Peep-Week in Dalmatia on the Adriatic Sea,
Might Croatians not burst wide open right in Split ?

So despite the local colour and the wonderful exchange
Would it not be really safest in the end
To keep away from Europe where the natives are so strange
And stick to "Bonnie Braeside," at Southend ?

REYNARD.

FOREIGN BODIES

Seen From Berlin

by FLOODLIGHT

Each month particular figures step to the front of the world political stage, joining the dictator stars who move permanently in the limelight. Each month too, British statesmen have to grapple with problems connected with these figures. This month our observer takes us behind the scenes in Berlin to watch the performers in that storm centre

A Student of Germany

TO interpret France to Germany and Germany to France requires the mentality of a chameleon. In spite of a well-covered and placid exterior, M. André François-Poncet, the French Ambassador in Berlin, has all the necessary agility of mind. Whenever Franco-German relations are strained, he comes to Paris to explain the imponderables behind the superlatives of the *Voelkischer Beobachter*; in Berlin he presents the conclusions of French policy with equal logic and firmness. Although coming from the higher ranks of the French *bourgeoisie*, he has none of their traditional narrowness of outlook. He can appreciate events in the light of history and judge them with the experience of to-day.

Fifty-one years ago, André François-Poncet was born in the quiet little town of Provins, near Paris. The son of a well-to-do Counsellor of the Paris Appeal Court, he studied at the *Ecole Normale* and passed his finals with flying colours in German. After publishing a study on Goethe's *Wahlverwandschaften*, he wrote a brilliant essay on the mentality of German youth. At the same time a flood of articles from his pen helped to enlighten French opinion, with almost prophetic accuracy, on the pre-War tendencies across the Rhine.

Economist and Politician

The first public use made of M. François-Poncet's special knowledge came during the War. He was sent by Philippe Berthelot on a delicate mission to Switzerland, where his ability to speak faultless German served him in good stead. At this point he underwent a sudden

transformation: from having been a teacher of literature, he developed an appetite for figures and statistics. Dispatched to Washington in 1919 on an international economic mission, he returned to Paris the following year to found a centre for economic information. He attended the Genoa Conference and, during the occupation of the Ruhr, acted as economic adviser on the staff of General Degoutte.

A few years later M. François-Poncet decided to try his hand at politics. He was twice elected deputy in the Seine Department and in 1928 became Minister of Fine Arts in Poincaré's last government. Under Tardieu and Laval he remained as Under-Secretary for National Economy.

Working for Peace

His diplomatic career only opened in 1931. His first post was that of Ambassador to Berlin, so that for seven years he has been able to follow the rise of the Nazi movement and grasp its underlying conditions ; *tout comprendre* does not in this case *tout pardonner*. During his stay in the palatial French Embassy in the Pariserplatz, French governments have succeeded each other with kaleidoscopic rapidity ; but the essentials of French policy do not change. M. François-Poncet is the symbol of that underlying constant. In Germany the Republic of Brüning has passed through the transition period of Schleicher into the fully-fledged military dictatorship of Hitler ; meanwhile the French Ambassador has worked with only one aim in view, the maintenance of peace. If one adds that he has eight children, his assiduity is explained.

Critical Hours in Berlin


In Berlin to-day diplomatists are living through the most anxious period since Hitler took power. Every day the German Press thunders against the Czechs ; responsible German Ministers are continually telling the world that German patience has a limit ; and the *Unter den Linden* resounds to the booted footfall of soldiers and storm-troopers. The whole German nation has been organised for war ; a reckless hand may at any moment let go the lever ; once the machine is started, no internal force can bring it to rest.

At the end of May Herr Hitler considered invading Czechoslovakia, but the moment was not thought opportune. The Anglo-

French demonstration of solidarity over the exaggerated report of troop movements confirmed the *Führer* in his intention to delay the march. But the idea of a forceful solution is still in the air ; at any moment some incident in Czechoslovakia may be represented as an intolerable provocation to Germany, only to be wiped out in blood. The Nazi extremists, furious at the publicity given abroad to their diplomatic defeat, are only waiting for a moment when the attention of Britain and France is engaged elsewhere.

The *Führer's* Advisers

Considering the economic stranglehold over Czechoslovakia which Germany now possesses, diplomatic circles in Berlin are amazed at the impatience of the extremists. If Germany were content to wait, all she wanted would fall into her lap without a struggle. Autonomy for the Sudeten Germans would probably mean a gradual transfer of population, which would facilitate an eventual *Anschluss*. There would never be a *casus belli*, unless Britain and France were willing



"Marianne"

Paris

THE COMPETITIVE SPIRIT

"What did you say? You did an average of 850!" ...

"Ha! Yes! ... 850 victims!"

FRENCH HOLIDAY PLANS

"We are hesitating between Ax, on account of Franco bombs, and Royan, on account of the measles."

to oppose the principle of self-determination with the sword. Germany's technique would be to allow the bargaining between the Czechs and Herr Henlein to continue until the autumn and then work up a campaign about the inadequacy of the Czech concessions; but, in spite of the promise of a bad harvest, there is absolutely no certainty that the Nazis will hold themselves in. Herr Hitler, who is reported to be in a very agitated state, has only one moderating influence in his entourage, the new Army chief, General von Brauchitsch; now that von Neurath and Blomberg are gone, his other advisers are all fire-brands; the most dangerous of these, on account of his stupidity, is Herr von Ribbentrop. His direction of a great nation's foreign policy at the present moment is as much a menace to Europe as was Berchtold's in 1914.

Dangers of An Explosion

What chances are there then of peace? There is only one, the hope that Germany will gain her objectives without calling the Franco-Czechoslovak Pact into play. The only solution which might satisfy Germany and prevent Czechoslovakia from becoming an Alsace-Lorraine of the east would be the federalisation and guaranteed neutralisation of the Czechoslovak State. A proposal on these lines may seem a betrayal of the Czechs, but at least it might avoid a conflict; and to have settled the problem with Germany on diplomatic lines would set a new and invaluable precedent. In acting as the honest broker between the two countries Britain has given herself an almost impossible task, but one worth every effort to pursue.

The fear of a general war may deter the Nazis from an invasion; on the other hand, the Party hotheads might at any moment take the risk; presumably, after the Nazis had bombarded London for six months, they would be reduced by a blockade. But, at the end of the war, what would be gained? Apart from the general destruction, we should have to give the Sudeten Germans back to Germany unless we wanted them to be the subject of another war twenty years later; there is no hope of scotching for ever that endemic nationalism which seizes on almost all German youth between the ages of 20 and 35. At great cost we might prevent a German hegemony of Central and Eastern Europe for a short time; but it is geographically and

economically natural for Germany to exploit these countries and the *Dranig nach Osten* would soon start again.

Czechoslovakia Must Give Way

In Germany there is widespread opposition to the Nazi regime; many Germans would even like a war in the hopes of upsetting it. But the *Gestapo* are better organised and more repressive than they have ever been. In spite of their crimes, the Nazis have done so much to provide work that they can count on support from many former socialists. The opposition should, in fact, remain a negligible factor in the calculations of foreign countries; nor is it for us to make a war on behalf of German liberalism, which twice now, in 1914 and 1933, has shown itself a broken reed.

Foreign observers in Berlin are dismayed at the shilley-shalleying of the Czechoslovak Government. The Czech Nationalists are apparently obstructing the grant of any effective concessions to Herr Henlein; the Czech partial mobilisation, the calling up of reserves and the talk of prolonging military service, only make the British peace efforts harder, as the Germans were able to claim with some justification that, in listening to British counsels of patience, they were not getting anywhere. It is hoped that, with the elections over, the Czechs will make a real effort to placate their over-powering neighbour; a conflict that broke out through Czech intransigence would not find Britain and France ready participants.

What Can Britain Do?

If, as is clear, the British Government have no wish to fight Germany now and crush her, as they undoubtedly could, what is to happen? Germany is gradually going to consolidate her hegemony of the Continent and we are to be faced with the perpetual difficulty of rubbing shoulders with a great, highly-armed, energetic and expanding nation. Fortunately, thanks to the development of the United States and the self-governing Dominion, the balance of power in the world depends less on Europe than it did fifty years ago. Our policy must be one of hard, but peaceful bargaining; but it is no good clinging to untenable positions. The strategic value of the Czechoslovak frontier is bound soon to be lost; Anglo-French solidarity, which we must on no account relax, may at least have the

effect of occasionally obliging the Nazis to use other means than force. Even that would be to the good, if it gave European nerves a chance to recover from the successive shocks of the past few years. But those who wish the British Government to protest at every increase of Nazi power must be ready for personal sacrifices if the protests are to be anything but futile ; in the opinion of the best informed circles in Berlin the only real guarantee against war would be British conscription.

WHEN CLUBS ARE TRUMPS

They tell the story of Mussolini playing bridge with his Foreign Minister, Count Galeazzo Ciano, against His Majesty the King and Emperor, and Dino Grandi, Italian Ambassador to England.

Grandi opened the bidding with four hearts. Ciano bid five spades. The King looked at his hand carefully, chuckled and bid seven no trumps.

Mussolini glared at the other three players and thundered: "And I, Benito Mussolini, I bid one club."

Grandi said, "I pass." Ciano said, "I pass." And the King? Well, he looked at his hand wistfully, shrugged his shoulders and in a resigned voice said, "Me too."—"Wall Street Journal."

MORALISING BEGINS AT HOME

How they do cackle, those famous men of the United States ! Roosevelt, placing fascism and communism together, calls himself the enemy (Public, No. 1 ?) of both, and promises to defend democracy, menaced by the authoritarian regimes.

Cordell Hull, in his speech, wants to defend, to moralise, to humanise. . . . Why don't they think of defending American children from kidnappers, of humanising their gangsters, of moralising the police who, it seems, protect them ?

With so much to do at home, how can they find time to think of others ?—"Il Travaso delle Idee," Rome.

CONTROL—ITALIAN STYLE

It is expected that the Non-Intervention Committee, which is meeting to-morrow, will decide on the re-establishment of control at the Pyrenees frontier.

Italy proposes to send 80,000 controllers.—"Le Canard Enchaîné," Paris.

BURDEN OF "PEACE"

One of the greatest hidden war dangers in Europe is that the armament burdens of "peace" will become so intolerable that war will no longer appear catastrophic in comparison.—"New York Post."

THE OPEN FORUM



RHODESIA FOR THE JEWS? A Proposal for a Vital Problem

by COUNT R. N. COUDENHOVE-KALERGI

In this section we publish, without necessarily sharing the views they express, articles from men of international fame. Count Coudenhove-Kalergi is well known as the sponsor of the Pan-Europe plan. The problem for which he here suggests a solution is one to which all Empire-owning nations must give their attention before long

THE Jewish problem is essentially a minority problem. The Jews in Europe form a minority of about 2 per cent. West of the Soviet Russian border about 7 million Jews are living, scattered among 380 million non-Jews. This small minority for two thousand years has faced a powerful majority, first as the sole monotheistic people in the midst of the heathen world, then as the sole non-Christian community in the Christian world of the Occident. In spite of all attempts at emancipation the Jews have remained a minority, whether defined as a religious community or as a race, as a nation or as a caste. This fate has developed simultaneously a number of positive and negative qualities in Jewry and anti-Semitic prejudices and antipathies among many non-Jews.

The solution of the Jewish problem can only be one which makes the Jews finally cease to be a minority.

The assimilation solution aims at allowing the Jewish minorities to be absorbed into the surrounding national majorities ; Zionism aims at concentrating Jewry in Palestine, until it becomes the national majority there. Assimilation and Zionism are both logical attempts

at a solution : the dissolution of the Jewish nation by assimilation is just as justifiable a demand as the maintenance of the Jewish nation by the Jewish State. Both paths to-day have led into blind alleys ; the tendencies towards assimilation have come to a halt before the fresh flood of German racial anti-semitism, which rejects Jewish assimilation completely : Zionism is blocked by the rebirth of pan-Arab nationalism which aims at making the formation of a Jewish majority in Palestine impossible.

Two Different Kinds of Jew

This double blow is making the position of European Jewry ever more difficult. The problem demands fresh solutions. Such solutions can only be found if Jews and non-Jews recognise the fundamental fact that European Jewry does not form a single unit, but falls into two completely differing parts : into assimilated Western Jews, who have assumed the speech, culture, customs and clothing of their non-Jewish fellow citizens and have been absorbed into their nations ; and the unassimilated Eastern Jews, who form a nation of their own with their own speech, culture, customs and clothing. In Poland and Roumania alone there are more than 4 million Jews belonging to this national minority who for religious if no other grounds oppose any kind of assimilation and cling to their traditional way of life.

In Western Europe, including Italy and Scandinavia, there are, among 200 million non-Jews, only 1 million Jews, who, for the most part assimilated, feel themselves to be patriotic members of their nations and reject all community with the Eastern Jews. Western Europe can and will completely assimilate this small Jewish minority, just as the Chinese once succeeded in absorbing theirs. But this process is only possible if Western Jewry is not increased to any notable extent by additions from unassimilated Jewry of Eastern Europe, whose character and ways are quite strange to the Western European. For this reason a solution of the problem of the Eastern Jews is in the greatest interest of the Western Jews.

Assimilation of the Eastern Jews within any calculable period is impossible. Single individuals may be absorbed, but not the masses. The Eastern Jews will either remain a minority—or emigrate. Their economic position is already desperate. The burden of the economic crisis here, as everywhere, is being placed on the backs of the politically

weakest, that is, on the backs of the minorities. Their possibilities of existence are being limited more from year to year. They must finally choose between emigration or increasing misery.

It was to America that the first stream of emigrants went. When America closed its doors Palestine became the greatest hope. Palestine became in a critical moment of history the life-boat for hundreds of thousands of human beings. Now the greater part of Palestine is to be withdrawn from Jewish immigration by the Partition Plan. Even the biggest optimists must recognise that the dwarf Jewish state in North Palestine is not in a position alone to settle the Eastern Jewish question. It needs to be completed by the addition of fresh extensive settlement areas.

There are enough empty territories which would be economically in a position to receive the Eastern Jews ; but almost everywhere political misgivings stand in the way. Should, for example, a big stream of Jewish immigration start flowing into any American Republic or a British Dominion, increased anti-semitism would be the immediate reaction locally. For the great mass of Eastern Jewish emigrants, therefore, a settlement area must be found in which they will not remain a minority, but will become a majority.

Suitability of Rhodesia

Such areas, climatically suitable for Europeans, are only to be found in the highlands of Africa. Northern Rhodesia, for example, comprises a territory almost three times the size of Great Britain, with a population of only 10,000 Europeans and 1½ million blacks.

This naturally rich territory, with extensive productive areas for settlement, threatens to be lost to the white race, as it is not to be expected that a larger number of Europeans will colonise it without particular reason as long as other empty areas in Canada, Australia, South Africa and New Zealand stand open to immigration. Were it, on the other hand, to be made available for Jewish settlement, it might be expected that it would be opened up economically within a calculable period and would be won for the white race. For this reason not only the Jews would have an interest in such a colonisation scheme but the British Empire and the whole white race.

Northern Rhodesia's potentiality for settlement lies in the fact that the greater part of this country is over three thousand feet high,

and so habitable for Europeans. On the other hand, settlement would be rendered difficult by the facts that sleeping-sickness prevails in the greater part of the country and that Rhodesia possesses no coast of its own. It would be necessary, therefore, to suppress sleeping-sickness as far as possible, and to create new means of communication. Medical science has already made great progress in the fight against sleeping-sickness ; this progress could without doubt be extended by Jewish colonisers, research workers and doctors. The great successes of the Jewish settlers in Palestine have placed the Eastern Jews in the ranks of the best colonisers in the world.

As regards means of communication, it may be expected that in the next few decades the aeroplane will form a substitute for railways and cars to a considerable extent. When the time comes for the race in rearmament to end, aeroplane factories will be changed over to the production of civil aircraft, with immense increase in civil air traffic as a consequence. In this way Rhodesia will be brought closer not only to the African coastal towns but to the cultural and economic centres of Europe.

Naturally the financing of such an undertaking would form a great and difficult problem. But this problem exists in any case owing to the necessity of Jewish colonisation somewhere ; and it would be better for the large sums necessary to be invested in a single country, instead of being scattered over the whole world, leading to a new Diaspora, with all its harmful and dangerous consequences.

Good Effects Elsewhere

Such generous settlement of Jews in Africa, within the borders of the British Empire and with active participation of the future Jewish State in Palestine, would have qualifications suiting it to be a solution of the Jewish question. The mere fact of such a large-scale plan, which would have to be carried out in co-operation with Germany, Poland, Hungary and Roumania, would without doubt lead to a slackening of anti-semitic tension in those states. At the same time it would hasten the complete assimilation of Western European and American Jewry. It would also lead to a relaxation of tension in Palestine, as the Arabs would no longer have to fear losing that country through increased Jewish immigration.

Basically, this solution would be a reversion to the proposal

made in 1903 by Joseph Chamberlain to the Zionists, when he offered them Uganda as a settlement area. At the time this proposal was rejected by the Zionists, as they placed all their hopes on Palestine. To-day they realise that the possibilities of Palestine are limited. It is, therefore, only logical to return to the offer made previously and make an African colonisation area the completion of, not the substitute for, the Palestine idea. For it is clear that no African territory can offer a substitute for the religious, political and national romance attached to the name of Zion. But it is just as clear that Palestine only represents a partial solution and needs a more extensive completion.

In this way it would perhaps be possible to unite the efforts of the Zionist with those of the Jewish anti-Zionists. For there would be no question: "Assimilation or Emigration?" but an answer: "Assimilation and Emigration." Assimilation of the Western Jews and emigration of the Eastern Jews. It is not a question, "Palestine or Rhodesia?" but an answer: "Palestine and Rhodesia." It is matter for reasonable thought and decided action.

MAKING HISTORY

Nothing can deceive like a document. Here lies the value of the war of 1914-1918 as a training ground for historians. Governments have opened their archives, statesmen and generals their hearts, in time to check their records by personal examination of other witnesses. After twenty years' experience of such work pure documentary history seems to me akin to mythology. For those who still put their faith in it here is a short story: When the British front was broken in March, 1918, and French reinforcements came to help in filling the gap, an eminent French General arrived at a certain army corps headquarters and there majestically dictated orders giving the line on which his troops would stand that night and start their counter-attack in the morning. After reading it with some perplexity, the British corps commander exclaimed: "But that line is behind the German front—you lost it yesterday." To which he received the reply, made with a knowing smile: "*C'est pour l'histoire.*"—Captain B. H. Liddell Hart, "*London Mercury.*"

ALONE IN A WICKED WORLD

The truth is that no country in Europe but our own can conceive it possible that action can be dictated by purely moral motives, entirely regardless of self-interest, and the sooner we recognise that we are the only country in Europe with a conscience the better. . . . We must recognise that our moral stand-point is beyond the comprehension of other European countries, and reconcile ourselves to the fact that it will always be genuinely and quite honestly misunderstood.—Letter to "*The Times.*"



THE RED LIGHT

TRIAL BY PROVOCATION

From the "Münchener Neueste Nachrichten," Munich, 2.6.38

Our diplomatic observer, writing in "Foreign Bodies" from Berlin this month, gives the background against which the following illustrations of the temper of the German Press should be read

ON his way back from Budapest, the Archbishop of Paris, Cardinal Verdier, paid a call on the Czech government which, with the approval of French princes of the Church, was made into a political occasion, becoming an odd demonstration of brotherhood between Czech Freemasons and the French Cardinal. At one of the numerous receptions which were held in his honour, Cardinal Verdier spoke of the Czech mission for world peace, and of his confidence that Czechoslovakia would be splendidly able to fulfil this mission.

If Cardinal Verdier understands by a Czech mission for world peace that their task consists of systematically undermining peace

with the final goal of a devastating outbreak of war, his confidence is certainly justified. Otherwise his remark would be unintelligible, and could only be regarded as cynical encouragement to the Czechs to carry on their game of crises to its fateful conclusion. Proofs enough of Czech interpretation of how to fulfil a peace mission were given just at the time that the Cardinal sojourned in Prague. Whitsuntide was by no means thought by the Cardinal's Czech friends to be too holy for them to desecrate it by fresh bloody acts of terrorism and savage provocation. The Czech government in their expected apologies may save themselves the trouble of maintaining that the Czech gendarmes and the rest of the knuckle-duster heroes acted during a sudden attack of temporary insanity, or were completely drunk. Such excuses, which throw a significant light on the state of Czech executive authority, are no longer adequate to the seriousness of the situation.

Czech Warmongers

The regular man-hunts which are organised on guiltless and defenceless Sudeten Germans, the brutal assaults on peaceful citizens by men who, although paid by the Czech State have long passed out of its authority, constitute one of the worst and most fateful acts of the Czech policy of challenge. They are unmistakable proof that, in spite of all promises, Prague intends to bring to a head the state of permanent crisis which it has caused. There must somewhere be a limit set to the challenge to the Sudeten Germans' disciplined and passive resistance, owing to which the worst has so far been prevented from happening. We know that in Prague they are doing their best to overstep these limits. They are harbouring the intention, by means of intensifying the military state of war and so intensifying the challenge which goes beyond the State frontiers, of bringing the critical state of tension to a point where only hard decisions can be made.

By all means available to her, Germany has pointed this development out again and again to the European powers and drawn their attention to its consequences for world peace. But London and Paris are still supporting Prague's dangerous policy by their attitude. They have apparently still made no serious attempt to bring any permanently moderating influence to bear in Prague. Calming

statements and publications which evade the truth are no longer adequate to the situation which has been created by the Czech policy of oppression.

During the whole course of the crisis Germany has shown by her deeds that she wishes under all circumstances to avoid a solution by violence, that she wishes to go the path of peaceful settlement. That path has not been easy. In London, particularly, everything has been done to strew it with obstacles of all descriptions, which must rouse the suspicion that in Downing Street they are enjoying carrying the test to its unknown limit. For this reason the responsibility weighs doubly heavy which England has taken on herself through her policy to date, and which by her historic forgery about "saving peace" has only been made greater.

The test of strength between Czech challengers and the patience of the challenged has gradually reached a point at which the date for a real salvation of peace cannot be much further postponed.

BALANCING ON BAYONETS

The Voice of Moscow

From the "Berliner Tageblatt," 31.5.38

For the answer to this point of view, we refer readers to the article "Russia the Victor," in our Far-Eastern Section

HOW much Moscow is reckoning on the present Paris government as a factor in the Bolshevik political game can be clearly seen from the fact that the French communists have no wish for a change in the government, although many of Daladier's internal measures in no way fit into their programme.


In fact, it is known that conversations have been held between the French and the Soviet Russian General Staffs regarding "Common action under the mutual assistance agreement binding the two States." What is meant here by assistance? Nothing less than a policy of crises. Czechoslovakia is just suited for this policy. Moscow's war politicians are doing all they can to stage a European conflict from Czechoslovakia. There are reliable witnesses for this fact. The Czech Legionaries' paper *Narodni Osvobozeni* states that the Chairman of the Defence Committee, Davids, has been informed by a member

of the Soviet Supreme Council that the Red Army will find a way into Czechoslovakia.

These are facts which up to now have not only been inadequately estimated by Britain, but one might almost think have been overlooked with intention. However, if they thought in London that by this means the conflict would be faded out, that was their mistake. In Moscow and Prague, on the contrary, British reserve in this direction was interpreted as silent encouragement. Mobilisation measures were not only not cancelled but were extended, so that to-day in Czechoslovakia all classes between 24 and 35 years of age are under arms.

We will not lose our nerve on that account. We can no longer be intimidated. Dr. Goebbels said the right thing in his Dessau speech: "German peace is no longer dependent to-day on the grace and benevolence of the world." Our security rests in our own strength. Germany is a great power again which no longer needs to rely upon the Geneva Union and cannot be woven into a net of intrigue, or swindled out of her vital rights by diplomacy. This applies also to our anxiety regarding the men of our blood living outside the Reich. We want peace, and will have it and maintain it with everyone who is of goodwill and respects our honour, as we do his.

Messrs. Chamberlain and Daladier give safe conduct.



"Marianne,"
Paris

On this basis we have, as Dr. Goebbels emphasised, absolute understanding for international solidarity, and had for this reason no objection whatever when the American Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, reminded the world of the almost forgotten Kellogg Pact, and emphasised that the provisions of this Pact are still in force to-day. Unfortunately, Mr. Hull put no address on this noteworthy reference. There are, however, addressees to whom such a declaration might be very useful. And when Mr. Hull declared further that in America there is great longing for peace, justice and progress, we can here too point out a significant parallel: Dr. Goebbels at the same time spoke of Germany's work of construction, which will extend over decades and is "construction work of peace and not of war."

The Example of Eire

So it is still only the Czech question which remains the sole point of conflict in European politics. Must that be? Can that not be changed? What grounds can be found to justify three-and-a-half million people remaining delivered up to a military terror dictated and organised from Moscow—three-and-a-half million people who have once again declared their adherence to their own race with a unanimity such as no democracy in the world can show, in an election held under the most difficult circumstances? There is a clear path to peace in Czechoslovakia too. Nothing more is demanded of the Czechs than that which was accorded the Irish by the English. Is it against Czech honour to do something that is compatible with British honour? Is the Czech State of to-day only imaginable behind a forest of bayonets, behind the heavy barricades which, in the middle of peace, have been erected? It seems indeed that attempts are being made in Czechoslovakia to-day to conduct internal politics with the Army and to balance Czech state authority on bayonet points. That is a risky undertaking. History teaches that such an attempt has so far always failed.

UNANSWERABLE

The Bishop of Muenster in Westphalia preached in his cathedral about the influence of the church on the education of youth.

Suddenly a uniformed Nazi stood up and exclaimed: "How can anybody talk about youth if he himself has neither wife nor child?"

The Bishop answered in a thundering voice: "In this house, I will allow no offensive remarks against the Fuehrer."—*America.*

HUNGARY AFTER THE ANSCHLUSS

Germany's Friend ?

by COUNT STEPHEN BETHLEN (*former Prime Minister*)

From "The Hungarian Quarterly," Budapest, June

That Germany needs the rich grain harvests of Hungary in her bid for predominance in Central and South-East Europe is certain. Less sure is it what methods she will use to secure them. Count Stephen Bethlen's survey of his country's position indicates that the peaceful path is the one more likely to be followed

IN the past twenty years the unstable position of Austria has always been an essential factor of uncertainty in Hungary's foreign policy. We could never be sure whether Austria would not sooner or later join the Little Entente, especially if social democracy once again got the upper hand, and whether such a step on her part might not compel us, too, though *contre coeur*, to surrender to the idea of a Danubian Confederation. Nor could we know whether Austria would not seek refuge in a restoration carried out with the support of certain Great Powers, which might have been followed by a similar restoration in our country. It was equally uncertain whether the *Anschluss*, if accomplished, would not lead to a European War in which we might become involved against our will and find ourselves in a fatal situation. In other words: *Austria's unsettled situation was teeming with the possibility of grave peril for our position.* The fact that this problem has been brought to a head, and the issue finally determined, has cleared up matters in this respect. The question that must be raised now is this : was the uncertainty of yesterday better for us than the certainty of to-day ? Was it the lesser evil of the two ?

In order to maintain an impartial attitude in enumerating the advantages and disadvantages, I shall begin with the latter.

Looking at the problem from a general or, say, from a theoretical point of view, there can be no doubt that a weak neighbour is always more acceptable to a weak country than a powerful one, even though the latter may harbour a friendly disposition towards it. A weak

country must of necessity adapt its foreign policy to that of its strong neighbour, even if this causes inconvenience to it in other ways. A Great Power always has means at its disposal by which it can exert pressure on its smaller neighbours if the latter should attempt to pursue a foreign policy with a tendency opposed to its own basic interests. Considering our geographical position and the fact that the principal market for our exports will in future be Germany, and that moreover the majority of our exports to other countries will have to be effected via that country, we shall be more dependent on the goodwill of Germany than ever before. On account of the proximity gained by Germany—as a result of the incorporation of Austria—to the other agrarian States of the Danube Basin, and in view of the fact that, in a great number of agrarian products, she will be able to act towards these States as a more or less monopolising factor, she will be in a position to play them off against each other, thus rewarding or exacting pressure on them in turn, in accordance with her own economical and political interests. All these circumstances have, of course, considerably enhanced the dominating role played by Germany in the Danube Basin, at the same time increasing the risk factor in the lesser countries, which latter fact will tend to curtail their freedom of movement to a great extent. All this, of course, is disadvantageous from our point of view. It may even be dangerous unless we take adequate measures to ensure free play in the economic sphere in good time, which it is in our power to do.

An Opportunity Has Come

As against all these disadvantages, whose significance I am far from underestimating, let us now consider the great political advantages that have already automatically developed as a result of the change. If, with a true discernment of the present situation, we are able to exploit it to the full, these advantages afford a great opportunity for us to rise from the humiliation of Trianon, and once again to become an important factor in the Danube Basin—I might even say, its most important factor.

It must never be forgotten that the history of the last twenty years in the Danube Basin has been equivalent to a dictatorship of the Little Entente based on French support. This Little Entente was originally intended by France to act as a set-off against Germany,

but it actually indulged in blockading and mercilessly trying to strangle Hungary.

The rise of Germany's power in Central Europe and the union with Austria have once and for all put an end to this state of affairs.

It would be

an anachronism even to talk of this dictatorship to-day. Czechoslovakia is practically excluded from the ring whose life and soul against us she always represented. This is true at least in the sense that she has become incapable of the activity she displayed until now. Formally, the ring may still exist, but the power that held it together has been minimised. On the contrary, it is Czechoslovakia who has ended up by getting into the circle: if up to now she played the part of pursuing hound, she is to-day endeavouring to escape from the net into which she has unobtrusively managed to manoeuvre herself in the course of twenty years of masquerading as a Great Power.

As a result of this new situation the aggressiveness of our other two neighbours has abated. The time may thus have come to normalise our relations with our small neighbours. Accordingly, there is no doubt that the day is rapidly approaching when the great unsolved problems of the Danube Basin will come to be of critical importance. The Rome-Berlin Axis will undoubtedly have the casting vote in the readjustment, and this fact can only be advantageous to us. Moreover, it is equally indubitable that to-day Italy and Germany are not the only countries in whose interest it will be that Hungary, as a



WHAT HUNGARY LOST IN 1919

"Hungarian Quarterly"

friendly State, should occupy a position of proper significance in the Danube Basin. It is of equal consequence to England and France ; for by now these two Powers must also see how really important it is in the interest of European balance to maintain the independence of the Hungarian nation in the Danube Basin unimpaired, and to ensure its vitality.

There are many who fear that German voracity will not stop at the gates of Sopron, and that we are to be the next victim. The Hungarian public is consciously being frightened in this sense. I would warn Hungarian public opinion emphatically against phantoms of this kind. I know that such tendencies are attributed to Germany with the sole intention of rousing anti-German feeling among the public. In such an atmosphere we might be impelled to anti-German action, and that would be the most short-sighted policy imaginable on our part. For as long as we pursue a policy of loyal and sincere friendship towards Germany, as we have done so far, it must be Germany's sole interest not to disturb this relation without rhyme or reason by arbitrary encroachment or violence.

Friendly Means the Best


If these good relations are maintained and fostered, she can get all that she needs from us by friendly means ; whereas otherwise this could only be achieved by violence and sacrifice, and by adding another one to the already fairly large number of her enemies. All our agrarian and raw material surplus is at her disposal as it is. It is in our interest to sell it to the best customer ; and it is also in Germany's own interest not to cut us off from the West, for the German Empire's shortest route to the Balkans and the East passes through our country.

It is absurd to imagine that Germany might consider our country as a settlement area, when the *Alföld* (Great Plain) or the *Dunántúl* (Trans-Danubian district) with their average population of ninety inhabitants per square kilometre, already show signs of comparative over-population. The fact that there have been sporadic German settlements in this country for two hundred years might give some German fanatics the idea of extending the German frontier to the East. *I am firmly convinced, however, that no such thoughts are harboured by a single serious-thinking German or by governmental circles.* Under these

conditions, when there exists a friendly collaboration in the sphere both of foreign politics and economics, which it is the common interest of both parties to maintain, what could be Germany's object in violating our national independence despite this common interest, or in attempting to annex Hungarian territory? Surely dragon's teeth would be the only crop she could reap from such a conquest.

Common sense cannot fathom any such object ; and so far I have not come across a single sound argument that could show reasons for serious anxiety or alarm.

On the contrary, Hungary has every right to expect that Germany, now that she is once more beginning to have a decisive say in international affairs, should do all in her power to help a crushed and mutilated Hungary to regain her rightful position in the Danube Basin, which she has occupied throughout the centuries. Such a policy corresponds entirely to Germany's interests. Viewed from a historical perspective, a Slav expansion in the Danube Basin might in time come to be a real danger to the German nation from the South-east ; and the surest obstacle in its way is the existence of the



"Kladderatsch"

THE APPLE OF DISCORD

Berlin

Lloyd George, the only one of the Versailles sowers alive to enjoy the splendid fruit.

Hungarian nation and the maintenance of its position of power between the Northern and Southern Slavs, in the region of the Danube and Tisza.

At the end of the tenth century this danger was dispelled for a thousand years by a Germano-Hungarian combination at the battle of Dürnkrut. The Great War revived its actuality. A Slav corridor in the Burgenland was within a hair's breadth of being realised at the time of the Peace Treaties. Had Russia at that time been able to participate in the discussions among the victors to the full extent of her capacity, Hitler's soldiers would have been greeted at Hegyeshalom by soldiers of the vassals of the Russian colossus instead of those of Horthy.

Bismarck, Germany's greatest statesman, thought in terms of centuries. That is why he was avowedly a friend of the Hungarian nation. That is why he joined with Julius Andrassy the elder, in order that the Hungarian nation, as a friend of Germany, might stand on guard on the shores of the Danube as a strong and independent factor within the Monarchy, thus precluding the possibility of the Monarchy being transformed into a Power with a Slav majority and under Slav control.

The consciousness of the community of interests between us and the German nation was developed in the course of many centuries. This community knew dark days only at times when this consciousness became obscured in the eyes of the leaders of the German nation or when they disregarded its terms and, blinded by the desire for power, preferred an abject subjugation of the Hungarian nation to what the latter was ready to give as an independent faithful friend. This community of interests was confirmed in the Great War. After the War, however, it lived for years in the consciousness of the Hungarian nations alone ; it was the only one to make sacrifices for it.

Who would dare to presume, and by what right, that Germany, now that she has regained her national consciousness, could disown all the relevant memories of the past and wish to turn against the friend who, throughout the dark night following on Versailles, never forgot what she owes to herself in the first place, but also to her friends who share the same fate ?

Essential Independence

The last four hundred years of our history afford ample and incontestable proof of the fact that Hungary can only live, be governed

and thrive on the basis of principles corresponding to her national character and rooted in her own individual spirit. Both in the past and at present, every attempt to blend the separate life-principles of the two nations or to substitute one for the other could only have catastrophic consequences on the friendly co-operation of the two peoples, and provoke a bitter antagonism between them.


What was true at that time of monarchic absolutism, holds good without the slightest alteration for the equipment of a modern State. Should an attempt be made either on German initiative or by short-sighted Hungarians with German support to introduce into Hungary the methods and forms of a State system that appears to suit the German nation, but could only bring about a fatal reaction in our country, this would put an end to the co-operation and community of interests between the two countries for a considerable period and set the two nations against each other, as has so often happened in the past.

It is the duty of those who really have the maintenance and strengthening of the friendly relations between the two nations at heart to draw attention to this fact both at home and abroad and to sound a warning against it in good time.

No Imitation

The present leaders of the German nation have rendered immense services to their own country and raised her national consciousness and honour to new heights. But it must always be borne in mind that the true friends of Germany abroad, ourselves as well, are not those soulless imitators, nor yet those who deem it necessary to stress their friendly feelings at the cost of giving up their national traditions and national institutions, but those who remain unswervingly loyal to our Hungarian character, to our national pride and hereditary way of life ; who make no allowances and tolerate none, and who are only prepared to co-operate amicably with the great re-born German nation if the full integrity of the national soul of Hungary is guaranteed.

Unfortunately there exists a number of such imitators in our country. The Hungarian nation will soon discover that they are not Hungarian either in race or spirit, and deny all connection with them. This will be the surest pledge of fertile and untroubled co-operation between Hungary and Germany, which it is the sincere wish of every patriotic Hungarian to realise.



A LINK IS FORGED ~

FROM NORTH SEA TO BLACK SEA

From "Voix Européennes," Paris

THE press is full of news about the German government's plans for the construction of a canal connecting the Rhine, the Main and the Danube. German newspapers, which are firing off a regular barrage of news concerning the extension of economic relations between "Great Germany" and the countries of the Danube valley, describe the Danube as "the greatest German river," and "the line of communication to the heart of Europe." The future Rhine-Main-Danube canal is announced as "the water axis of Europe, the blue link between the North Sea and the Black Sea."

We must consider the actual state of navigation on the Danube before examining the importance of this canal, which, in conjunction with the regularising of the lower and middle reaches of the Main and the upper reaches of the Danube, will constitute, when it is finished (which is expected to be in 1945), an uninterrupted navigable way for river boats of 1,500 or perhaps even 2,000 tons from the North Sea to the Black Sea.

The Danube is navigable for a length of about 2,400 miles, of which about 220 miles are in Austria and 170 in Germany. To realise the importance of this river route it is enough to remember that from Prague to Hamburg by the river route is about 440 miles. The Danube, when the level of the water is favourable, is now navigable for ships of 2,000 tons from its mouth to Budapest. It is only the bridges which prevent small high-sea ships from going up as far as Bratislava or Vienna. . . .

Germany, in 1937, had the following commercial relations with the countries of south-eastern Europe : about 10 per cent of total German exports went to the south-east European states and about 11 per cent of her imports came from them. As for Austria, the corresponding figures are as follows : 22 per cent of exports, 25 per cent of imports. It is obvious that the countries of south-eastern Europe occupy an important place in the German economic scheme. But we must not forget that, after the annexation of Austria, by

feverish extension of relations with the south-east, an extension which is openly part of Goering's four-year plan, by the construction of roads and railways, and finally by the completion of the river route, Germany is doing everything to augment her imports of raw materials from the agrarian countries of south-eastern Europe on the basis of a kind of forced importation of machines and finished articles from Germany by those countries. They depend entirely on Germany, as a few figures show : Germany, including Austria, was responsible in 1937 for 47 per cent of the total exports of Bulgaria, 41 per cent of those of Hungary, 35 per cent of those of Yugoslavia, and 27 per cent of those of Rumania. At the same time the Reich supplies from 35 to 40 per cent of these countries' imported requirements.

New Ports Arising

The extension of navigation on the Danube, which is a decisive factor in the transport problem, is therefore, without any doubt, of great importance to Germany. But what is being carried out at the present moment is not just ordinary extension of navigation. Something else is involved. It is known that near Linz and Vienna work has been started on the construction of ports. The two great junction ports of the Middle Danube have so far been Budapest and Vienna. Before the war, Vienna had a traffic of about 175 million tons, of which, by 1937, she had been able to regain, in round numbers, 1 million tons. The new port of Budapest at Czepel, which was built as a free port, has at present attained a traffic of about 800,000 tons and is a serious competitor to Vienna. The port of Linz registers a traffic of 300,000 tons and the old Danubian ports of Regensburg (Ratisbon) and Passau, whose traffic before the war amounted to a total of 383,000 tons, registered 761,000 tons in 1936 and exactly a million in 1937. The construction of ports at Linz and Vienna shows that the Germans want to build a great junction port for transshipment at Linz for merchandise from the north, that is to say from Czechoslovakia, or else for Styrian minerals, and also eventually for the finished products of the industry of Upper Styria and of Upper Austria (Steyer armament factories) which reach Linz more easily than Vienna. The extension of the port of Vienna leads one to suppose that they want to make Vienna a centre of transshipment for goods from the north, that is to say from Czechoslovakia, and possibly even from Poland (coal from Upper Silesia) as well as for

merchandise from the south (depots of crude oil for the navy, merchant marine and air force) ; and that the Germans want to restart competition with the port of Budapest, for which the managing director of the free port of Csepel recently made an urgent appeal in the newspaper *Vreme*, of Belgrade.

Now comes the question : why is the Reich government making the effort of building these ports with such speed, and, moreover, in direct connection with a certainly very important programme of canal construction ? The Rhine-Main-Danube canal, of which we spoke at the beginning, which creates a great navigable route across the continent, is one of the greatest projects for the construction of navigable routes in the interior of Europe. . . . It creates a direct link between the coal of the Ruhr and Bavarian and Austrian industries, and in particular with all the Rhineland armament works which have been moved, or which are about to be moved into the interior of the Reich. It should be noted that after the *Anschluss* Bavaria is no longer—using the terms of German geopoliticians—in the “dead angle of Germany.” Secondly, Austrian and Bavarian



minerals will be brought by river to the heavy industry of the Rhine-Westphalia district. Thirdly, it creates—if Polish-Rumanian plans for a Danube-Vistula canal and a Vistula-Dniester canal are not realised—a direct link across the continent between the centres of German heavy industry in the west and all the Danubian countries. Fourthly, it creates an ideal backbone to that Central European area which stretches like a great barrier from the North Sea and the Baltic to the Adriatic and the Black Sea, composed of "Great Germany," Czechoslovakia and the Balkan countries; that is to say, to that area which German geopoliticians designate as more or less reserved for Germany by fate. Fifthly, the Balkan countries obtain a link by river, across the continent, entirely dependent on Germany, to which country they are subordinated as a result of the absence of any firm collaboration against aggressors, and the absence of any economic initiative on the part of England and France.

Strength in Wartime

Finally let us consider the purely political and military aspect of the question. In no matter what future European war, the Danube, the mouth of the Danube, the question of channels, and especially of economic hinterland, will play a role important to all the participants. Germany, who is preparing systematically for this war, is therefore working to assure her raw material supplies in south-eastern Europe. The economic dependence of the Balkan countries must lead to political dependence, and hence Germany is assured of Rumanian petrol, Rumanian cereals, Bulgarian cereals, Bulgarian soya beans, Bulgarian and Yugoslavian minerals, Yugoslavian wood and Hungarian maize, Hungarian cattle, Hungarian wheat, while Austrian iron and light metals have been joined to German military economy by the annexation of Austria. A navigation route for large ships, which a German internal war fleet must guarantee, a fleet whose base must be in the centre of this great route, probably at Linz, is therefore to be considered as a vital route. It connects the principal termini of the German region of expansion, the mouth of the Rhine and the mouth of the Danube. It already increases—purely potentially as yet—pressure on the countries situated immediately on the mouth of the Danube, that is to say, Bulgaria and Rumania.

Though the construction of this canal may seem uneconomic at first, the Germans place great hopes on it. The navigation route

for the large ships, Rhine-Main-Danube, constitutes a large part of the axis which leads from Berlin to Bagdad, passing by the Bosphorus. The *Anschluss* has brought about a real Danubian problem. As long as the other Danube powers do not unite to make common front against German expansion and the economic and political strangulation which menaces them, Germany, by her political and economic strength, by the enormous pressure that she already exerts on the countries of south-eastern Europe, by her already predominant part in the navigation of the Danube and her coming construction of canals, will become the decisive factor on that river.

WHAT'S IN A NAME?

A festive little get-together is to be held in Stockholm soon, when Hitler, Goering and Stalin meet for a quiet dinner. The international situation will doubtless be discussed, but the meeting won't have the earth-shaking significance that, at first glance, it might seem to have.

Hitler will be the host; not Adolf Hitler, but a Stockholm sign-painter named Allan Hitler. He has been embarrassed many times by his name, as have his prospective guests: Harald Goering, merchant, and Tom Stalin, truck driver.—*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*.



"Kladderdatsch,"

ROUGE ET NOIR

Berlin

France announces that she wishes to add another 70,000 troops to her black army.

TWO SLAVS APART↪

POLAND AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA

by PAUL SZVATKO (*journalist, of Prague*)

From "Nouvelle Revue de Hongrie," Budapest

If the dispute between Germany and Czechoslovakia is at bottom one between Teuton and Slav, it appears curious that the Reich's powerful Slav neighbour, Poland, should not support her small cousin.

Here we give the explanation

FROM the political point of view it is the Teschen affair which constitutes the most serious problem (between Poles and Czechs); it is the only one, moreover, which is, so to speak, a geographical reality. However, it is well to remember the other point of difference, to understand the different mentalities of the two nations. In fact, it is only against this background that the gravity of the Teschen problem for Central Europe is revealed.

Even in the old Austrian Empire the Czechs and the Poles did not get on. The Czechs were irritated and rendered anxious by the understanding that existed between Vienna and the Poles of Galicia; they saw in it the weakening of their own national policy. On the other hand, the Poles looked askance at the attraction exercised over the Czechs by St. Petersburg, for in Polish eyes the principal enemy was always Russia. It is indisputable that the Vienna government favoured the Poles in relation to the Czechs and did not regret the growth of differences between the two Slav peoples.

Personal contacts between Poles and Czechs were not of a nature to foster mutual understanding, since it is rare to find two natures more opposed. This psychological contrast was apparent every time Slav questions that were common to them both came up. The Poles are an aristocratic people, drawing their ideals from the warlike periods of the recent past. It is their secret conviction that the liberty and grandeur of a nation can only be acquired on the battlefield. The history of the time when Poland was enslaved is full of insurrections, of revolts, and manifestations of a daring spirit. For a long time Polish liberty was identified with the fate of the Polish nobility and its opportunities for asserting itself. The nobility, numerically strong, marched at the head of the liberation movements and was the most

tenacious and bitter in action against the detested oppressors. It is, therefore, not surprising that the main lines of Polish society have always evolved according to the customs, mentality and faults of the privileged class.

Czech society, on the contrary, originated in the lower classes of the people. In the seventeenth century the Czechs were abandoned by their aristocracy, and the new Czech nobility was not able to develop itself on such a large scale as the Polish. As for liberty, the Czechs never wanted to acquire it with arms ; they never revolted nor offered rash resistance ; in their eyes the way of national evolution was by pacific organisation, by the growth of material goods, by the appearance of adaptation, which hid tenacious perseverance and preparation for action ; they retired modestly from social life and engaged quietly in commerce.

Ideals Differ

So it was that the Poles became a warlike people, enthusiastic for ideals in which they believed, but which were unrealisable, while the Czech people organised themselves almost like the Jews, living in dispersal and conserving their essential characteristics. Fiery, pathetic, enthusiastic, visionary and always ready to fight, the Poles have never felt in sympathy with the Czech spirit : cold, commercial, economical, hating violence, paying little attention to forms. The Pole is frankness itself ; he is communicative and does not worry about accumulating riches ; while the Czech is reserved, suspicious and ruthless where money is concerned. The Czech has looked for his ideals to the family, the people, socialising collective organisation ; the ideal of the Pole is grandeur, the extension of the national genius, pathos. The former wanted to live for his people, without being too eager to die for them ; the latter was willing to die for his national ideals, but did not know how to adapt his life to the service of their aims. The former became the partisan of democratic uniformity, the latter of aristocratic individualism.

Despite these differences, the two nations have, in fact, lived for many years in forced association preoccupied by problems common to the Slav under foreign domination. It was natural that the contrasts in their characters should become more and more evident in the discussion of methods of resolving their common problems. The

coldness in the relationship between the two brother nations continued to grow.

Such was the situation in 1918, the great year which brought independence to the two neighbours. Poland and Czechoslovakia were established and each evolved in the manner determined by the character of its dominant race. It was at this period that the real opposition sprang up between the two brothers ; the question of Teschen which, ever since the time of the peace treaties, has intensified the mutual animosity of Czech and the Pole.

The Story of Teschen

The territory of Teschen was part of former Austrian Silesia. The contested region is spread over about 500 square miles. It is very important in spite of its small size, because it is rich in coal. . . .

Since, at the end of the World War, the Czechs and the Poles could not agree to which of the new states the region around Teschen should belong, it was provisionally decided, on the 5th November, 1918, that the contested territory should be cut in two : the boundary line did not last long ; the Poles decreed elections in the entire region of Teschen, whereupon, at the end of January, 1919, as the Poles were engaged elsewhere, Czech troops suddenly occupied the part of Teschen in the possession of the Poles, as far as the river Vistula. If the Council of Ambassadors had not intervened, a war between the two countries would have broken out as a result of this coup. It was then that the serious dispute between them came into being, which repeated semblances of reconciliation have not succeeded in eradicating. Negotiations began in February, 1919, but neither of the two parties wanted the plebiscite, fixed for September, 1919, to take place. On the suggestion of the Spa conference the Council of Ambassadors settled the Teschen question.

The decision of the Council favoured the Czechs, for, contrary to the agreement of 1918, a large part of the territory which they had occupied by force in the beginning of 1919 was given to them ; the city of Teschen itself was divided into two parts following the line of the Olza river. The Poles will never forget this injury, for the population of the territory given to Czechoslovakia was predominantly Polish. Moreover, this territory was also extremely important from the economic point of view. Antagonism has become aggravated in

the course of time by the fact that in Warsaw's belief, the Czechs are unjust in their treatment of the Polish minorities.

According to the Czechs the number of Poles living in the Teschen territory is 80,000 ; the Poles, on the contrary, say there are 250,000. How does this great divergence arise? M. Tapié, who leans rather towards the Czechs, estimates, on the basis of a census taken by the latter, that in the Teschen region there are about 150,000 people whom the Poles can claim as theirs. The Czechoslovak census taken in 1931 counts as a separate nationality the original Slavs of Teschen, the "Slonzak" (Silesians) who from the linguistic point of view come between the Czechs and the Poles, but who always declared themselves Polish, a fact proved by the Austrian census, which, in this district, cannot really be accused of partiality. The Czechoslovak census taken in 1921 reported in Teschen 75,837 Poles and 47,314 Slonzaks, while 24,072 Slonzaks have, according to Tapié, declared themselves of Czech nationality. The Czechoslovak census of 1931, however, registers all the Slonzaks as Czechoslovaks and only recognises 81,737 Poles, which has provoked strong indignation in Poland and has been the cause of many disputes.

Natural Riches

Apart from the situation of the Polish minorities, the possession of Teschen seems to be desired by the Poles because of its immense wealth. Czechoslovakia's coal supply has been estimated by experts at 6,489 million tons, of which 6,143 millions are found in the Teschen region. Powerful industrial concerns are established in the neighbourhood of Teschen which in the course of time have passed from German into Czechoslovak or French hands ; 70 per cent of Czechoslovakia's production of steel and 60 per cent of iron come from this little territory of Teschen, which eloquently proves its huge value. From the Czechoslovak point of view, moreover, the possession of this territory is indispensable because of the fact that the old main Kassa-Oderberg line passes through it—so far the only railway connecting Prague and the eastern part of the Republic.

The conflict which broke out in 1919 and 1920 could not really be settled by the treaty of Warsaw, concluded on the 23rd April, 1925, between M. Skrzynski, Polish minister for Foreign Affairs, and M. Beneš, then Czechoslovak Minister for Foreign Affairs, although it brought a temporary lull. But the antagonism between

the two countries is always kept awake and fed by their divergent views concerning the treatment of the Poles in Teschen. For ten years the Poles have been affirming that the Czechs do not respect the treaty of 1925-1926. In 1930 they recall, for example, the number of Polish children of school age was much less in the Teschen region than it was in 1916, and yet in 1916 the Poles were still living under "Austrian oppression." Generally speaking, the Polish minority possesses fewer minority schools in Czechoslovakia than in the old Austria—although in purely Polish regions the Czechs have installed, one after another, numerous schools where the language taught is Czech, even though the number of Czech students was not more than eight, ten or twelve.

Since Warsaw, in the beginning of 1934, made an agreement with Berlin, while Prague turned towards Moscow, the situation has become much worse. According to the Poles, the condition of the Polish minority has become insupportable in the Teschen region, and the whole of Poland has demonstrated against the Czech "oppressors"

Czechs Uphold the League

From the Czechoslovak side frequent attempts have been made to settle this conflict, whose origins were so relatively unimportant but which has resulted in such dangerous bad feeling, by pacific means. In November, 1935, M. Beneš put forward the proposition that an international organisation and a mixed commission should be entrusted with the settlement of the minorities dispute. After a long diplomatic discussion the Poles refused, insisting on the point that no negotiations could be started until the Czechoslovaks changed their policy with regard to the Polish minority. At that time the differences between the two states were already very marked insofar as methods of international policy were concerned; Prague had made Geneva the centre of gravity of her policy and wanted all differences settled by means of international arbitration, whereas for Poland the centre of Polish policy was Warsaw, and the Warsaw government would not consider any but direct negotiation, on the basis of bilateral pacts, without any external arbitration. At the bottom of the contrast separating the methods of the two states we find a divergence of doctrines and of general policy. This divergence

springs logically from the psychological and historical opposition that exists between the two Slav peoples, an opposition which led them in different directions where world policy was concerned. Seen from this angle the Teschen affair, so insignificant in appearance, reveals its true importance. . . .

* * * * *

In the sphere of Czech-Polish relations, the special Polish-Slovak relations constitute a separate chapter. It is a well-known fact that the Poles feel coldness only towards the *Czechs*, but feel affection for the Slovaks, romantic and Catholic, who are closer to them from the point of view of language and culture. When there was tension between Prague and Warsaw, there were moments when the Slovaks seemed to turn towards the Poles and away from the Czechs. On the other hand, Polish voices were heard proclaiming that the place of the Slovaks is by the side of the Poles and that the political union of the Poles and the Slovaks is a more natural thing than the union of the Czechs and the Slovaks, because it is closer to Slav forms—and to the aspirations of Poland in the South. The Slovak Autonomist Party, sometimes, when it was angry with Prague, was willing to adopt these Polish ideas, looking for support against Czech centralisation. Abbé Hlinka's newspaper, the *Slovak*, has often been confiscated for its admiration of Poland, which was thought excessive, and manifestations of friendship between the Poles and the Slovaks were also viewed with displeasure at Prague.

On the other hand, there exist in Poland classes and geographically determined sections who sympathise with Prague, and if their influence were to become greater the Teschen question would lose its importance. The Polish Left, the fragments of the old Peasant Party (M. Witos, former president of this party, took refuge in Czechoslovakia and it was from there that he stirred up feeling against the Poland of Piłsudski) as well as the extreme German-fearing Right, incline towards reconciliation with Czechoslovakia. Neither is the psychology of the Polish people homogeneous. The "Austrian" Poles differ from the "Prussian" Poles, and these two differ from the "Russian" Poles.

The eastern Poles, hard, with a certain Prussian stiffness and firmness, are rather like the Czechs with whom they sympathise. The eastern Poles do not sympathise with the Germans, a fact which

is explained by their geographical position, and do not approve of hostility towards the Russians. Prague hopes that the democratic Pomeranians will come into power in Warsaw, and that the tension between Poland and Czechoslovakia will so come to an end. But until then the other Poles must be reckoned with, the romantic ones, ambitious of expansion. It is part of the Polish nature to be permeated with the consciousness of a mission among the Slavs. The Poles want to play the leading role in the great Slav nation by developing a central Polish-Slav empire, to succeed where the Russians failed.

HISTORY OF RIVALRY

From the "Gazeta Polska," Warsaw, 8.6.38

The following expresses the official Polish point of view, to which there is considerable opposition within that country.

THE dramatic crisis in the present status and policy of the Czechoslovak state has profoundly stirred European opinion. It was bound to find a lively echo in Poland for at least two reasons: prudence warns us that no serious changes occurring in the immediate neighbourhood of the Polish Republic can leave us indifferent, while varied emotions are roused in our hearts which prompt us to assume attitudes and undertake actions which wisdom does not always approve. The strong hope, however, may be expressed that prudence will hold in check those emotions agitating public opinion which find no justification in actual, past and present, facts and which cannot be reconciled with the essential interests of Poland.

The history of Polish-Czech relations has been characterised by rivalry. The same rivalry became apparent during the world war, when both nations were confronted with the possibility of regaining their independence. In his book, *The Policy of Poland*, Roman Dmowski stated that "it cannot be said that our aims in this war are looked upon with absolute sympathy by the leaders of Czech policy." This lack of sympathy became apparent in Czech views on territorial questions. There are three times as many Poles as Czechs, but in the maps of new Europe, which the master Masaryk and his disciple Beneš drew up at the time, Poland was scarcely larger than Czechoslovakia. According to the Czechs the Eastern frontier of Poland was

to run along the river Bug but without the province of Chelm, while Eastern Galicia was allotted to Russia, which would assure to Czechoslovakia a common frontier with her problematical protector.

Masaryk and Beneš had no doubts that the state in which the Czechs formed but one half of the population would constitute a vigorous and sound organism, but they were very pessimistic in their estimate of the chances of the Polish state with those frontiers within which they desired to contain it. In his very first Memorandum to the Peace Conference M. Beneš wrote that "one cannot speak seriously of a national organism of Poland, normally constituted and capable of development" (*Die Tschechoslowakischen Denkschriften*, Berlin, 1937).

The Czech Coup

However, it was not this comic scepticism, but the fact that all the armed forces of the Polish Republic, so modest at the time, were defending other frontiers, which encouraged the Czechs to attack Teschen Silesia. It is necessary to recall this fact because it illustrates the real value of Masaryk's assurances to the effect that "without a free Poland there cannot be a free Czechoslovakia, and *vice versa*," and that "the common danger existing at present and threatening in the future must unite both nations in a well-planned common action" (*Nova Europa*, Prague, 1929). The attack of January 23rd, 1919 (in which the Czechs seized Teschen Silesia), was a slap in Poland's face, was a violation of the agreement determining a provisional frontier in accordance with the principle of nationality. The plebiscite decreed by the Supreme Allied Council had not been carried out because the Czechs feared its results. M. Beneš took advantage of the most perilous moment of the Polish-Soviet war—in July, 1920—in order to impose on us, with the support of French diplomacy, a frontier which left on the Czech side of the frontier at the time at least 140,000 Poles.

Did the Czechs at least make compensation by granting freedom of transit through Czechoslovakia? Not at all. They held up the trains carrying war material for the Polish armies, and on July 24th, 1920, Masaryk went so far as to warn the Allies—as stated by Lord d'Abernon in his book *The Eighteenth Decisive Battle*—that they need not trouble with organising assistance for the Poles, because "nothing

will help them in their hopeless position." Nevertheless we won that war ; we saved Poland and Europe from the Bolshevik flood. However, M. Beneš would not recognise the frontier we fixed with the U.S.S.R. As late as August, 1922, he declared "Czechoslovak opinion is not prepared to recognise finally that Eastern Galicia should belong to Poland and will never acquiesce in it." For the Czechs continued to dream of an "access to Russia," or of an encirclement of Poland.

A Pact Refused

After the Great Powers recognised our Eastern frontiers (March 15th, 1923) Prague was obliged to agree to the inevitable. A few weeks afterwards the Polish government resolved to forget the past. Looking into the future, M. Seyda (Polish Foreign Minister) attempted to bring about permanent collaboration between Poland and the Little Entente in general, and Czechoslovakia in particular. The Little Entente was constructed on too narrow and too improbable a hypothesis for Poland to be able to "join" this group. M. Seyda, therefore, suggested that the Little Entente should be transformed into a Quadruple Alliance which would jointly guarantee to all the contracting parties all their frontiers. Speaking in the Sejm on July 25th, 1925, M. Seyda asserted that "this can be achieved with ease and speed." However he was grievously disappointed, because Prague rejected his proposal to the jeering accompaniment of the Press.

Three further years passed. The *rapprochement* between France and Germany which appeared possible early in 1925 caused Prague to look with greater friendliness towards Warsaw. M. Beneš arrived there on an official visit, signed an arbitration and "liquidation" agreement and exchanged somewhat vague toasts with the late Alexander Skrzyński. There followed the Locarno Treaties within the framework of which France concluded with Poland and Czechoslovakia *identical* bi-lateral treaties of guarantee (France had already identical political agreements with both states). In April, 1926, Skrzyński paid a return visit to Beneš in Prague. On this occasion he proposed to his Czech colleague the conclusion of a treaty of alliance. M. Beneš *refused*, although this time without the jeers of the Czech Press.

For the second time the Czech government rejected the initiative of the Polish government, aiming at giving definite shape to the general assurances which Masaryk and Beneš gave during the world war. Why? Because of their interpretation of the vital interests of Czechoslovakia. In May, 1927, M. Beneš declared to a number of journalists confidentially that "he cannot be tied up with Poland, as that country will have war with Germany over Pomerania, war with Lithuania over Vilna, and war with Soviet Russia over the Eastern provinces."

On the Czech side the "divergence" of interests was stressed from time to time by no less a person than Masaryk, who declared for "a solution of the question of the so-called Polish Corridor in a sense favourable to Germany." (See Masaryk's interview with the *General-Anzeiger*, of Stettin, of June 6th, 1931.)

This outline of the development of Polish-Czech relations would not be complete if limited only to their diplomatic history. The "climate" of these relations has been and is determined by the lot of the Poles in Teschen. . . .*

At the beginning of 1933 it seemed that Polish-Czech relations were entering a new and better phase. The Four Power Pact, much discussed at the time, threatened the vital interests of both countries. It turned out to be impossible for Warsaw and Prague to agree on common tactics in opposing the trend towards the Four Power Pact. On the other hand, the Polish population in Czechoslovakia continued to be the most oppressed and denationalised of all the racial groups in that country. This population seized the occasion of the fifteenth anniversary of the Czech coup in Teschen in order to begin a more determined defence of its rights, while public opinion in the whole of Poland declared its firm solidarity with the Poles in Czechoslovakia. Two years afterwards, on January 15th, 1936, the Foreign Minister, M. Joseph Beck declared in the Sejm that "the atmosphere existing between our two countries will be determined in the first instance by the actual state of affairs, namely the treatment of the Poles in Czechoslovakia." Since then no visible change for the better has taken place.

Such was the state of Polish-Czech relations when — after the *Anschluss* had been accomplished — it became obvious that Masaryk

* Details of the Polish case have been omitted here as they are given in the preceding article.

and Beneš based the whole safety of their work on mistaken and slender foundations. There cannot be the slightest doubt that the resurrection of an independent Czech state was an act of historic justice. However, we do not think that the independent existence of a morally and materially sound Czech nation is threatened by any great danger. To-day this nation of nearly eight million people is only suffering from a great disappointment. We do not speak of a "Czechoslovak" nation, because such a nation does not and never did exist. There exists, however, a Slovak nation of over two million people. Twenty years ago that nation resolved to unite with the Czech nation as an equal in a nationally dual state, but the Czechs have failed to implement the pledges they signed. The Slovak nation has not thereby lost the right to continue its struggle for an honest execution of existing obligations.

Thus the continued existence of the Czechs and the Slovaks is not threatened. Instead, the fiction of a "Czechoslovak National State" is being dispelled. No one in Europe will defend this fiction, not even those states which are united with Czechoslovakia by alliances. There is no alliance between Poland and Czechoslovakia. But it does not follow that we should conspire against our neighbour. We do not conspire both for ethical and political reasons. We have, however, entered a claim for a kind of "most favoured nation clause" with regard to the Polish national group in Czechoslovakia. It is obvious that its fate can in no case be worse than the fate of the German or Hungarian group. There is nothing in our attitude which we would wish to conceal. The Polish Republic does not apply methods of retaliation. We are a nation conscious of our destiny and always thinking of to-morrow. Fate decreed that we should live and develop between Germany and Russia. This geographical fact determines the methods and the aims of our foreign policy. All our other relations are only a function of this reality.

THE TEST

A new armed conflict threatens to break out, in South America, between Peru and Ecuador.

Which of the two countries is the undoubted champion of civilisation?



Before we say, we are going to wait for the first air bombardment of an open city. It is the side which carries this out which will have the right to the title.—
"Le Canard Enchaîné," Paris.

PARIS ON THE BRITISH ROYAL VISIT

WELL GUARDED

President Lebrun: "But if I assure
you that I have a pass!"

"Marianne"



J. P. MURRO

"DECORATE YOUR WINDOWS"


"Like this I can imagine I have a
window..."

"Le Canard Enchaîné"

THE BRITISH PAVILION

"It'll be all right as long as
one of Franco's planes doesn't
come along."

"Le Canard Enchaîné"



J. P. MURRO

SCANDINAVIA STAYS NEUTRAL

Following are extracts from speeches made recently by Mr. Rickard Sandler, Swedish Foreign Minister, prior to the common declaration of neutrality by Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland

IF, after calm and careful deliberation, a policy of neutrality, applied in all the northern countries, appears to us to be the safest—I do not say the safe—way to guide each of them through a general crisis with as little detriment as possible, then this will constitute the platform for our mutual policy. I cannot discern any other alternative for a northern policy in time of war than this : our common programme will be to keep our countries out of war.

I do not for one moment believe that this simple programme will be sufficient to master our difficulties. But I am convinced that it puts us in a favourable position to surmount them. This programme has the historical background of a long Scandinavian tradition, previous to the entry of Finland into our group of states, and it constitutes, in a situation in which the League of Nations has shown itself incapable of acting, the logical continuance of a policy of independence constantly applied during the history of this League.

No power is to count on having us—or any one of us—on her side. And no power is to count on having us—or any one of us—against her. The northern countries are to be struck out of the calculations of the Great Powers *pro et contra* : the strengthening of the north has only one objective: do not disturb the peace of the north ! . . .

Finally, I wish to point out that, as the world is at this moment, we cannot avoid risks, whichever course we follow. It is just as true to-day as it has always been that the risk can be averted only by a collective organisation of the will to peace of the nations.

This aim must never be lost sight of, even if it appears problematic, and distant in the present situation. If in this darkening hour we retire into our northern abode and fortify it to the best of our ability against threatening storms, we shall still be ready one day—we hope in the near future—to emerge and take part in the construction of a new world organisation for peace which, in spite of all, must come some time. Do not let us camouflage the fact that

what we are now doing means simply that the primitive instinct of self-preservation is making itself felt when we realise the actual state of the world and our inability to make it different. Do not let us say anything better regarding our plans than this, that as far as we understand it we would not be doing a real service to high human ideals by forgetting that our governments are first of all responsible for the future existence of our own free national states.

Mr. Sandler treated the same subject in a recent speech to the Society of Naval Officers at Stockholm. He gave an account of the debate which followed the Swedish declaration at Geneva that the sanctions article of the Covenant could no longer be considered to be of a binding character, and declared :

Two things are clear after this debate. A number of states have expressly reserved to themselves freedom of action. Their characterisation of the actual situation as regards the League's ability to function on this point has not been disputed. On the other hand, a large number of states have distinctly expressed themselves as against any formal endorsement of these declarations through an alteration of the rules of the Covenant.

The more serious risk is a political course of development which might transform the League of Nations into an instrument of a block consisting of a certain group of powers directly opposed to other powers outside the League. It is a Swedish interest to counteract any such tendency.

When in the House of Commons Mr. Chamberlain touched upon Mr. Churchill's proposed alliance between the western Powers and a number of small democratic states, he uttered these words, which are worthy of reflection : " However completely we encase such a proposal in the Covenant of the League, however wholeheartedly the League may be prepared to give an approval to such a subject, as a matter of fact it does not differ from the old pre-war alliances, which we thought we had abandoned in favour of something better." Apart from the fact that there cannot be any question of a general Geneva sanction of such a policy, it is easier for us in Sweden than for people in other parts of the world to realise how rightly it was characterised by Chamberlain. And after the launching of this idea as before it should be said : Sweden intends to be a state unbound by alliances. Now as always this policy constitutes the securest basis for our country's independence.

CANADA LOOKS SOUTH

U.S. MILITARY WARD

by DAVID MARTIN

From an article in "Current History," New York

IN the same measure that Canada's bonds with the Empire have become weaker, her bonds with the United States have become stronger—or perhaps it would be more correct if this were stated in inverse order. Her geographical proximity to the United States, the nature of her economy, the common interests of the two nations, predestined her collaboration with her "good neighbour" to the south. The two nations commonly share the greatest internal waterway system in the world. Canada utilises two transportation corridors through American territory, one through Maine to the Maritimes, the other through the Alaskan fringe to Skagway. The United States has two corridors through Canadian territory, one through Ontario and the other through British Columbia to Alaska. While it has been pointed out by quite logical cynics that Canada could not hope to defend herself against an invasion from the United States, the 4,000 miles of unfortified border still stands as a testimony to the collaboration between the two nations.

As shocking as it may be to idealists, political alignments seem to have a quite tangible connection with trade and investment statistics. American capital has invested in Canada some \$3,990,000,000 out of a total foreign investment (in Canada) of \$6,889,000,000 and Canadian capital has invested in the United States \$1,311,000,000 out of a total investment abroad of \$2,083,000,000. Almost half of Canada's total trade within recent years has been with the United States while scarcely one-third of her total trade has been with the United Kingdom.

It would be wrong, however, to explain the friendship that exists between the two peoples entirely on the basis of the above-quoted figures. The flow of commerce has been accompanied by a flow of immigrants and tourists and ideas and culture. At the present time there are 1,278,000 Canadians in the United States and roughly 350,000 Americans in Canada. It has been estimated that one out

of every seven or eight native Canadians migrates to the United States. Each year some 20,000,000 American tourists and visitors cross into Canada, while several million Canadians cross into the States. The overwhelming majority of the Canadian people (not many can go to Oxford !) receive their *Weltanschauung* from American movies and American radio programmes and American books and magazines. Consequently it is only natural that Canadians and Americans should regard each other more as fellow countrymen than aliens.

In her policy in the Pacific, Canada is influenced by an Oriental immigration problem similar to that which confronts the United States. . . .

The Rift with America

Had British policy *vis-a-vis* the United States been consistently friendly, then perhaps the conflict between Canada and Great Britain would not have assumed such marked forms. Despite the oceans of sentiment about the need for unity between the English-speaking democracies, the cruel facts are that British interests are far from being entirely harmonious with American interests. There has been a continuous conflict between Canada and Britain over the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. It is common knowledge that long after the Washington Conference, the British Admiralty still continued to favour the renewal of this alliance.

In the early days of the Berlin-Rome-Tokio axis, Britain's attitude was, at best, one of friendly neutrality. While Britain has managed to conclude a dubious truce with the Berlin-Rome sector of the axis, the Japanese end seems to have gone entirely awry. The exhausting war in China could hardly be calculated to pacify Britain, or to aid Hitler in his future war against the Soviet Union. However, a German-Japanese war against the Soviet Union Britain was prepared to countenance and even to encourage. But when Japan undertook the military invasion of China, she threatened Britain's entire interests in the Far East. As a result, there has been an unquestionable rapprochement between Great Britain and the United States, publicised by the fact that Britain has granted docking facilities at Singapore and Hong Kong to the United States Navy. Collaboration between Britain and the United States in the Pacific has naturally done much to improve the relations between Canada and Britain.

Nevertheless the sponsors of an Anglo-American fraternity should not be over-optimistic. What has changed before, may quite conceivably change again. British diplomacy is carrying on a parallel policy in Europe and the Far East. In Europe she has bent herself to the task of creating a four-power pact which would align the democracies and the fascist powers ; in the Far East the indications are that she is working towards a compromise with Japan.

It is against this background that we must consider Canada's defence preparations. . . .

Defence Against Japan

It is generally agreed that a Pacific war between Japan and the United States would follow the course of the semi-circle formed by the North American coasts, the Aleutian Islands and the Japanese Archipelago. With the virtual abandonment of the Philippines, America's main line of naval defence may be said to cut across this semi-circle from the Aleutians to Hawaii to Panama. The United States is in fact to-day developing the Aleutians as a base for defensive and offensive action against Japan ; and for offensive and defensive reasons as well, Japan would have to attack along the same route. Canada's position in such a war has already been likened to that of Belgium during the World War.

In the event of hostilities, Canadian collaboration would be imperative to the United States. If the Japanese were able to occupy some inlet along the British Columbia coast and use it as a base for raiding operations, they would be in a position to threaten seriously American shipping and American coastal cities. And should sea communication with Alaska at any time become hazardous, it would be necessary for the United States to have at its disposal a back door route through British Columbia. That is why America is so concerned over Canadian Pacific defences and why, in addition, she has been sponsoring the project of a military highway extending from the American border to Alaska. Canada is beginning to wake up to the concern that their southern neighbour feels. If Canada does not hasten to fortify her Pacific coast, says the *Toronto Star*, the United States will be compelled to intervene and " her 4,000 miles of unfortified boundaries may become a thing of the past."

Within the past two years Canadian defence estimates have been considerably increased. . . .

Even with the recent increases, however, Canada almost tail-ends the world in per capita expenditures on arms. While the lavish British expenditures run at least \$25 per capita and while the United States is spending at the rate of approximately \$12, the Canadian Government feels that an expenditure of \$3 per person is entirely adequate. There are critics of this policy, staunchest among them the imperialists who believe that Canada should prepare to send another army overseas in case Britain becomes involved in another European war. "A bow and arrow army running out of arrows," is how Col. George Drew, prominent conservative, describes the Canadian Army. And the truth is that very little, apart from the cost of maintenance, is being spent on the land forces. The only war that Canada to-day contemplates seriously is a war involving her Pacific Coast, and in such a war large forces of infantry would not be required. Canada is nevertheless maintaining a small standing army of more than 4,000 men, backed by a Non-Permanent Militia of 100,000 men, which could easily act as a nucleus for a greatly expanded army if the occasion should arise. Government munition works are being prepared for full time production and 700 additional plants have been inspected with a view to conversion to the manufacture of arms upon short notice.

Still, Canada's frugality in her armament outlay can only be explained by the assumption that she has definitely broken with European and Empire commitments and is, instead, following a policy of reliance on the United States. Imperialists may lament this trend, but history goes its way despite their laments.

THE BRITISH JOURNALIST

The charge (made by Japan, that British newspapermen in China are bribed) has been the subject of much flippant comment among the generally penurious newspaper community. Who has been getting the money? And how much? Affluence is so unusual in the profession that it seldom escapes notice and a degree of friendly envy. And, besides, there is the ancient and oft-quoted quatrain:

You cannot hope to bribe or twist—

Thank God!—the British journalist.

But seeing what the man will do

Unbribed, there's no occasion to.

So far the only documents produced affect foreign correspondents not at all.—
"North China Herald," Shanghai.

THE FUTURE EAST OF SUEZ PAN-ASIAN PANIC

From "The Straits Times," Singapore, 7.4.38

Far from meaning a future menace from Pan-Asiatic nationalism led by Japan, that country's aggression in China signifies the end of her as a possible leader of the Asiatic peoples, says this important Singapore paper

SIR CECIL CLEMENTI recently made a remarkable prophecy. "When the present warfare is over," he said, "it is probable that solidarity will arise between China and Japan, particularly in their foreign politics. If so, the cry of 'Asia for the Asiatics' will grow more and more vehement. All this adds point to the need for a British base at Singapore that shall be impregnable against every kind of attack. And in addition there must be naval and military co-operation between Britain, France (with her vast Indo-China interests), America (with the Philippines), and the Netherlands (with her Indies). When that is achieved, no pan-Asiatic power will dare challenge the Far Eastern rights of Western civilisation."

Sir Cecil knows the modern history of China as well as any living man, but it would be interesting to know what characteristics of the Chinese people or forces in their political life led Sir Cecil to predict such an astonishing reversal of the present state of feeling. Much more likely is it that the relations between China and Japan will follow the Franco-German parallel, and that just as the rape of Alsace-Lorraine in 1871 led directly to the war of 1914, so is Japan sowing seeds in China to-day which may yield a grim harvest of war in the future.

There is, however, another and more concrete reason for questioning Sir Cecil Clementi's prediction of a challenge to Western rights by a pan-Asian power. Five years ago that was a possibility, and if Japan had pursued a peaceful course it might have become more than a possibility, but if Sir Cecil were to return to the East to-day he would find that the echoes of Japanese bombs and artillery have been heard far beyond the borders of China. Let us take only one example, afforded by recent personal observation. In a town in

central Java, in one of the Native States, air-raid precautions are now being organised, and wholehearted co-operation is being given by the Javanese administration. Two years ago the possibility of bombs falling in the interior of Java would have seemed so unreal and remote that it would have been very difficult to arouse the slightest interest in gas-masks and dugouts, but since then the Javanese vernacular newspapers have reported the activities of Japanese bombers in China. Consequently, the Javanese people now realise that what has happened to civilians in China might happen in Java.

Fear Replaces Admiration

This is typical of reactions to the China war all over south-eastern Asia. Japan is no longer admired but feared by Asiatic races. Her name has become synonymous with invasion, horror and misery for a civilian population, ruthless use of force, and hammer-blows against the new-born unity of the oldest civilisation in Asia. How different all this is from the reputation of Japan before the war started ! The prestige of Japan at that time was great, and steadily growing, among the nationalist elements in all Asiatic countries. In Netherlands India the nationalists admired Japan for the manner in which she had proved that industrial technique and modern armaments need not be a Western monopoly. In the Malay States young rajahs were going from every State to visit Japan and were coming back profoundly impressed by what they had seen of the progress of an Asiatic people. In Siam the influence of Japan was exceedingly strong in the regime which followed the overthrow of the princes. In the Philippines the independence party looked to Japan rather than to America for help in the development of the future republic. Even in distant India the prestige of Japan was very high, both as leader of the resurgent East against the dominant West and as a model for India in the industrialisation of an Eastern civilisation.

And now . . . it is only a few weeks since Indians were demonstrating with Chinese against Japan's aggression in Singapore streets. The demonstration itself was wrong but the significance of it was unmistakable. There was no pan-Asian spirit there—or, if there was, it was a revolt of pan-Asia against one of its members. The truth is that the pan-Asian ideal, of the pan-Asian spirit (which was beginning to be visibly manifest three years ago) has been blown

away like straws before a hurricane. Pan-Asia may yet be a reality. It remains an historical possibility ; but it can have no focus other than Japan, and the Asiatic peoples, having seen the fate of China, fear the future policy of Japan much more than they fear the colonial rule of Western Powers.

JAPAN FACES BRITAIN. Voice of the Business Man

From the "Kaizo," Tokyo

AS to the Soviet Union, Japan's object is fixed. No detailed explanation is necessary on this object, since Japan is definitely committed to the anti-Comintern policy. There can be virtually no Japanese financier who is pro-Soviet. However, few Japanese financiers advocate war with the Soviets, except those interested in the Kamchatka fisheries. Japan's relations with Britain, however, are not so simple as those with the Soviets. Broadly speaking, two factions, one pro-British and the other anti-British, confront each other in Japanese financial circles, and naturally exert an influence on Japanese policy as well as upon Britain herself who, while tending to disregard the views of political "adventurers," is impressed by those of sober business men.

The British government is said to have prepared a list of anti-British Japanese, which is headed by Shingo Tsuda, president of the Kanegafuchi Spinning Company, followed by Soho Tokutomi. Tsuda's views can be gathered from the following statement:

Chiang Kai-shek is riding two horses, the Bolshevized horse of the Soviets and the Economic horse of Britain. He is not driving these horses, but is being driven by them especially the British horse. If an enemy wishes to shoot Chiang, he must shoot the horse first. Pro-British Japanese fear that Japan will be ill-treated economically and politically by Britain for having offended British feelings. Such is an unnecessary fear. First of all, look at Japan's air force. Before the great feats of Japan's "eagle" air squadrons, British warships will be utterly powerless, as far as the Orient is concerned. Britain is not so foolish as to fight Japan. Japan should carry out her own policy, taking advantage of this opportunity, and demand of Britain reconsideration of her insolence. However, I am not a man advocating a "Hate Britain" campaign. My argument is only that Japan should fight Britain, if she does not remedy her cunning policy.

Many Japanese cotton spinners are anti-British. This is natural because they must compete with Lancashire. Even Seiji Miyajima, president of the Nisshin Spinning Company, who has completely stopped political activity since the assassination of Inukai, whom he respected very much, is reported to have declared, when the first Indo-Japanese cotton parley was threatened with rupture, that Japanese cotton goods would have to be shipped abroad on warships. Although not so categorical as Tsuda, Gengo Kodera, president of the Dai Nippon Spinning Company, is known as a pretty vigorous anti-British propagandist, in spite of his having joined Japan's Economic Mission to Britain, headed by Chokuro Kadono, at the latter's request. So much for the anti-British group.

As to the opposing group, Kadono is pro-British from start to finish, as are also almost all Japanese financial leaders. Their attitude endorses a traditional policy of high political circles of Japan. But as the British attitude against Japan has gone so far in connection with the China incident, public opinion in Japan has grown so vigorously anti-British that it has compelled pro-British men in this country to keep their opinions to themselves. The Sino-Japanese conflict broke out during the Mission's stay in England and this caused Kadono to withdraw his plan concerning Anglo-Japanese co-operation on economic development of China, but, according to one of his letters from England, British public opinion was unexpectedly calm toward Japan. The letter adds that this speaks volumes for increasing signs of Anglo-Japanese friendship. On his return home, Kadono, as president of the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, made speeches on various occasions on Europe and America and, whenever he referred to Britain, he spoke well of that country.


Dependent on British Finance

Now Anglo-Japanese relations have been close for many years, both politically and economically. Economically, Japanese financiers have been depending on British capital. They are sullen, therefore, when relentless anti-British opinion is freely spoken. A certain influential financier, who retired from the foremost line of activity, once said that Tsuda should be more cautious in his expression of opinion on Britain. This financier must have thought that such expressions might bring disadvantage to the interest of Japan. To this Tsuda

might well reply that it is because of the dominance of such pro-British financiers that the Japanese economic advance is hampered.

Between the two extremes there are more realistic and sagacious men among Japanese financiers, who have moderately anti-British leanings. Shozo Murata, president of the Osaka Shosen Kaisha, is one of them. He is extremely opposed to British shipping policy. In spite of the great efforts of Kadono, he did not join the Economic Mission, declaring that there is absolutely no chance to effect a compromise as far as Anglo-Japanese shipping relations are concerned. However, when he faces a practical issue to solve, he is not so obstinate as Tsuda. Murata says:

It is decidedly bad that Japan should challenge Britain, even though Japan is challenged by Britain. It is an easy task for Japan to oust British shipping from China waters, if China's resistance to Japan ceases. Let economic matters be left to business men. No weapon is necessary to oust Britain. If it is still impossible for Japan to achieve its objective in the next 10 years or so, she may use force, but, before the country resorts to this, business men should be given a chance to show what they can do peacefully



THE NEW MILKMAN

Japan's Puppet Government collects the Chinese Customs Revenue.

Sapajou.
"North China Herald,"
Shanghai.

Because of this realistic attitude, Murata is not blamed at all by political leaders. Pro-British Japanese financiers are well pleased with such an attitude, while even Toshio Shiratori, who is the most vigorous foreign policy propagandist of the Foreign Office, is now issuing warnings against the growing public opinion favouring war with Britain and making friends with the Soviets, on the grounds that he is a "Britain-knowing" but not "pro-British" man.

CHINA'S STAND

by MADAME CHIANG KAI-SHEK

From the "Birmingham Post," 30.4.38 and 2.5.38

The following are extracts from two articles written for the "Birmingham Post" by the wife of the Chinese Generalissimo

I WONDER if the people of Great Britain realise what is happening here. For their information, it may be said, the so-called invincible army of Japan, which the Premier, Prince Konoye, threatened was going to beat us to our knees in no time, has been constrained not only to revise its ideas, but also to augment itself continuously with reinforcements. Until last month it had thirty divisions, totalling 600,000 men, operating in China, with the whole nation now mobilised on a war footing. Japan's casualties have so far reached an estimated total of 300,000. The cost to her of all this enterprise in "making friends of the Chinese people" can be estimated by using as a basis the *per diem* cost of the Great War to Great Britain, or by watching Japan's appropriations. Yet this full-dress war is but an "incident" according to Japanese Army professions: though to their people at home it will soon reveal itself as a monstrous major calamity, launched without justification and continuing without benefit to anyone except the providers of equipment and munitions. And there's the tragedy!

The longer, therefore, that the obsessed militarists of Japan are enabled to continue with their ruthless destruction the worse it will be for China and for the whole world. Not only will "undeclared" warfare become sanctified by custom, but this potential market will be ruined for many years for the industrial and commercial peoples of other nations.

The Japanese Army officers are purposely bent upon exterminating everything nationally or intrinsically valuable in China so that the survivors shall be poverty-stricken and dependent. Where, then, to be basely material, will be the trade of Britain ; the Birmingham products, the piece-goods of Lancashire, the equipment from a thousand different British factories ? And where, with the deliberate destruction of all reachable institutions of learning, will China's culture be ? . . .

Fight Against Unity

The Japanese were aware that unity was coming to China, and they did not like it. They realised, too, that there were some changes pending that would prove of great detriment to their ambitions if permitted to develop without interruption. It was the fear that these changes would produce reorganisation and consolidate unity that prompted the Japanese to take action before reforms could crystallise. To ensure a proper understanding of the situation it must be pointed out that for years the Japanese have left no stone unturned to keep China disunited and disorganised. They have always hoped that they would be able to achieve a position of paramountcy on the Continent which would enable them to monopolise the exploitation of the natural resources and labour of the country without any difficulty. Eventual dominance, they considered, would be easy after that, and the subsequent establishment of a Japanese Continental Empire could then be contrived with facility. Nor have their dreams been confined solely to China. They have, for a long period, visualised the banners of Japan waving over the whole of Asia. . . .

While we, in China, do not expect any Powers to fight for us ; while we understand their present reluctance to commit themselves to any action likely to be construed as provocative to Japan, there is one thing we do not understand. It is the failure of the Powers to try to force Japan to respect those humanitarian principles which are regarded as being the basis of civilisation. What Governments are reluctant to do, however, peoples can do. They can realistically demonstrate that " undeclared " warfare, with its revival of barbarism, will not be tolerated. They can assist to bring home to aggressors that no nation which descends to murder, rape and rapine can expect to prosper or be respected. The Chinese people view with gratitude

the steps that have been taken in this regard by the people of the British Empire, and we have profound admiration for the spirit shown by those who have, in no unmistakable voice, made their views and feelings known.

RUSSIA THE VICTOR

From the "Nationalzeitung," Basle, 7.6.38

WHILST the German and, recently, the Italian press are trying to make their public's hair stand on end over Bolshevik plans for aggression, the truth is that Soviet Russia is supporting the efforts of the European governments to maintain peace with astonishing conciliatoriness. . . .

That this policy naturally has Germany's isolation as its object does not need to be underlined. But in the Kremlin they are not working for this isolation in order to fall upon the Third Reich, but in order to stop it from unleashing a new world war.

This policy is, of course, not quite as unselfish as it looks. Russia wants to maintain peace in Europe in order to keep her hands free for Asia, for in the Far East a development is becoming apparent, which faces her rather unexpectedly with quite fresh tasks. During the last few years the Kremlin has been making a virtue out of necessity with its policy of peace ; it has had to renounce revolutionary propaganda to a considerable extent in order to maintain itself against the new activity of the " fascist " states. But now Soviet Russia is faced with the temptation of making use of China's military weakness in the struggle against Japan for her specific interests of world revolution. It is one of history's bad jokes that Hitler should have recalled the German military mission in China, which, under the command of General von Falkenhausen, amounted to more than a thousand officers, to whom the surprising capacity for resistance on the part of the Chinese troops is probably partly due. Berlin is the victim of its own ideology ; it can no longer allow German officers to operate against its Japanese allies, but the one who laughs last is Moscow, whose influence so far has been paralysed by this very German mission. The command from Berlin may not have been intended to be quite final ; it was probably only intended to make

the abandonment of the German-Italian-Japanese anti-comintern coalition difficult for the Japanese ; but it will probably have the effect of causing China to attach herself almost unconditionally to Soviet policy. The son of China's national hero, Sun Yat-sen, Sun Fo, has just been to Moscow for the second time, and the English Press states that he has accorded a privileged political position in China to the Soviet Government, who have agreed to send in still vaster supplies of war materials than they have so far. The fact that Moscow has denied the report by no means signifies that it is false.

New Tone from Government Spokesman

This development is all the more interesting since it coincides with the changes in the Japanese Government. The new Japanese Foreign Minister who replaces Hirota is General Ugaki, who counts as a liberal and conciliatory statesman. The statement which Ugaki made at once regarding Russo-Japanese relations has roused hopes that an understanding between the two powers might at last be possible. It is true that Japan still puts settlement of the fishing rights and re-distribution of oil concessions in the Russian part of the Island of Sakhalien as a preliminary condition to a *rapprochement*; it appears to have forgotten about payment of money due for the Chinese Eastern Railway, and does not intimate that it intends to release the Russian ships and aeroplanes which it has confiscated. But, nevertheless, a new tone can be heard in Ugaki's declaration. He no longer refers to the provocative words used by the Soviet Commissar for the Navy, Smirnov, who spoke of the Japanese as "mad dogs," and one might almost think that Japan would even like to discuss the non-aggression pact which Moscow proposed a few years ago. Does Japan want to stop at the last moment a trend which not only leads to war with Russia, but perhaps to the Bolshevisation of China, which might be still more dangerous?

Even a few months ago Soviet Russia would have accepted a serious peace offer from Japan with joy. But is she ready for it now, when she has reason to hope that Japan will gradually bleed to death in China? Up to now the bad will in Russo-Japanese disputes has been more on the Japanese than the Russian side ; but now it may be expected that the Soviets will be pleased to leave matters in

the air in order to continue supporting China's defence and so to come ever nearer to her own two-fold aim : in addition to the exhaustion of Japan's military might, to secure ever-increasing dependence of China on Russia and so increasing political co-ordination between the two countries.

Chiang Kai-shek's anti-communist slogans must fade out if Russia is to be the sole guarantor of Chinese independence. A Russo-Chinese alliance opens up immense prospects for the communist movement once more—prospects which, if we are not mistaken, have surprised the Moscow politicians themselves, but which they would find it extremely hard to neglect. Are they imposing such restrictions on themselves in Europe in order to develop their power in Asia all the more securely ? Retreat from China and a peace treaty with the Soviets—that would be a sensible anti-comintern policy, with which Japan could strike the cards from Moscow's hand. But Japanese imperialism, like European fascism, seems by its own foolishness to be only giving fresh strength to the Bolshevik regime.

GERMAN HELP FOR CHINA

The gift of medical supplies and surgical instruments made by the German Red Cross to China and despatched in charge of two physicians, Dr. Podgursky and Dr. Trautmann, son of the German Ambassador in China, has arrived at its destination and has been received by General Chiang Kai-shek personally.

The Generalissimo asked the two German doctors to convey to the German Red Cross the sincere thanks of the Chinese people for the help rendered at such a critical time and for placing at the disposal of the Chinese people medical skill and medical supplies.—“*North China Herald*,” Shanghai.

GANDHI THE SELF-CRITIC

“When the new education scheme was launched I was full of self-confidence, in which I now feel I am lacking. My words had power of which they seem to be bereft to-day. This lack of confidence is due not to things without but to things within.

“It is not that my senses are paralysed. My intellect gives me good work, for a man of my age. Nor is it that I have lost faith in non-violence. That faith is burning brighter than ever. But I have for the moment lost self-confidence. I would therefore, ask you not to accept anything from me implicitly. Accept only what carries conviction to you.”—*Mahatma Gandhi at the meeting of the new National Education Board.*

INTERNATIONAL BOOKSHELF



The Editor reminds his readers that he does not necessarily share the opinions expressed by reviewers in this section. But this is a free country and knows no censorship

ADVENTURERS' TALES

THE STORY OF "ST 25." By Sir Paul Dukes. Cassell. 15s.

AND NOTHING LONG. By Ranald Macdonell. Constable. 8s. 6d.

THERE IS NO RETURN. By Philip Jordan. Cresset Press. 8s. 6d.

Reviewed by VERNON BARTLETT

SIR PAUL DUKES and Mr. Ranald Macdonell should get on well together. They both worked in Russia during the Revolution, the one as a spy with as many aliases as the most resourceful criminal, and the other as a British Vice-Consul in Baku, where he became involved in adventures such as seldom come the way of men in the very respectable Consular Service. They saw enough horrors during the first year or two of the revolution to drive them into most risky activities on behalf of the aristocratic refugees, and yet they admit that the White Russians whom we used in the hope of destroying Bolshevism were absolutely incompetent, untrustworthy and incapable of ruling their country well. And they have written very thrilling books about a country they never ceased to love.

I knew most of Sir Paul Dukes's story—he told it me years ago, when I was on a sick-bed in Danzig, and he told it so vividly that I remember almost every detail of his amazing attempts to communicate with the outer world and, after serving in the Red Army and the

Communist party, to escape to it again. That his book nevertheless gripped me as tightly as any work of imagination, is high tribute. I should not like his job—and not only because I should not have the courage to carry it out for twenty-four hours—but I am overwhelmed with admiration.

In the days when circumstances drove Mr. Ranald Macdonell to change the diplomatic correspondentship of the *Morning Post* for the control of a general store in a little south coast town, I learned to respect his unfailing good humour. He has certainly needed it, for life has treated him pretty roughly. His story of life in the Caucasus before, during and after the war is so fascinating that it at once puts his book very high indeed in the long list of recent autobiographies. He has seen enough massacre and misery to embitter anybody. He has retained his sense of humour only because he does not expect too much from life. "If a person lets me down," he writes, "I usually find that it is my own fault—that I have been stupid enough to think that a butcher can cut me a suit of clothes."

Philip Jordan is incomparably the best writer of the three authors here reviewed. His book is curiously uneven. At times one is sure one is reading Ernest Hemingway, and then the style changes and one knows one is reading Philip Jordan, and is glad of it. For Philip Jordan is without any doubt one

of the best British descriptive writers. I have room to quote only a few sentences, but they can do far more to show his quality than could an extra column of enthusiastic praise.

"When the bombs fell the women looked like people who have been told a joke whose point they can't see, but who want to be polite."

No sentence could better describe the struggle of people to behave normally in face of fear. The descriptions of the crossing of Brahmaputra and of the pilgrimage by torchlight up the sacred mountain of Ceylon, Adam's Peak, are as beautiful as his descriptions of the British in the more remote parts of their Empire are bitter.

"Almost without exception," he writes, "the English people in Colombo imagine themselves members of a royal family; and the hills are their Balmoral, and as ugly. In a Scotch-baronial club they read out-of-date numbers of the more dreary illustrated papers, so that the whole place is like a dentist's waiting-room; and they laugh at *Punch* because if a fellow can't laugh at *Punch* there must be something wrong with him. And they play a hell of a lot of cricket; and when they discover that you are what they call a 'dab' at golf they are exceedingly kind and civil, and suppose that, after all, they can tolerate the crazy ideas you have; it won't be for long, anyway."

But best of all are the descriptions of visits to the Teruel front in Spain, starting off at dawn in air that was so cold, "it was like diving into dry water."

"Where the planes dropped their bombs the earth rose suddenly in a dark column. When it could go no higher the column split and the top spread out like a fan, and rose again, grew lighter and disappeared like smoke. You could not see it fall. . . . The sounds of the explosions were muffled and it didn't seem as though they had anything to do with the plumes that rose into the sky. Such little sounds could not tear the earth like that. . . ."

I am conscious that I have given no adequate idea of a book which contains much fine writing, and a splendid, passionate hate of injustice. I shall await Philip Jordan's next book with anxious eagerness, for with such gifts his pen should be much mightier than many swords.

TRAVELLER'S JOY

CZECHOSLOVAKIAN YEAR. By Lady Sheppard. Skeffington. 15s.

Reviewed by RALPH PARKER

LADY SHEPPARD has written a complete and enthusiastic account of all that a privileged visitor to Czechoslovakia might be expected to see of that interesting country during a twelve months' sojourn. Her book is undoubtedly the best popular account of Czechoslovakia that has yet appeared; the majority of travel books

Nouvelle Revue DE HONGRIE

DIRECTEUR: GEORGES OTTLIK
RÉDACTEUR EN CHEF: JOSEPH BALOGH
JUIN 1938

Hommage à Babits

La foule et la nation
Souvenir d'Esztergom
Babits le poète
Babits le romancier
Babits l'essayiste
Babits le traducteur
Fogarás

Michel Babits
Denis de Rougemont
Antoine Szerb
Jules Ilyés
Désiré Kerecsényi
Désiré Kerecsényi
Michel Babits

La Hongrie à l'époque moderne Louis de Vienne
Lettres de Roumanie J. F. Kövér
Les perspectives économiques en Hongrie Etienne Bertalan

Le rôle historique de la Hongrie dans la défense de l'Occident Louis Terbe
Une promenade à Budapest Ladislav Szabó
Promenade ethnographique

Claude Edina Zichy Pallavicini

Chronique du mois

Le costume de gala hongrois
(Gabrielle Tápay-Szabó)

La presse et les revues

L'Europe Centrale et Orientale

Nouvelles Economiques et Financières

Subscription rate: £ 1 a year — Post free — Budapest, VI, Vilmos cs.-út 3

dealing with the country are poorly documented or are overweighted with the historical background. Czechoslovakia has not yet built up a strong tourist connection with this country. The union of Bohemia and Slovakia was at first a stimulus to internal tourist traffic rather than to the international, and the industrial workers of the Western parts of the Republic have in recent years been travelling in great numbers to the picturesque pastoral country of Slovakia, to the High Tatras and to the Carpathians of Ruthenia. As a result, the tourist facilities of Czechoslovakia have been greatly improved; new roads, railways, hotels and services have been constructed, festivals and exhibitions arranged, such as the present superb Baroque festival in Prague. The foreign visitor, whom Czechoslovakia is now making efforts to attract, will find Lady Sheppard's book a useful companion. A pleasant feature of the book is the way in which personal narrative is interwoven with general description. The sixteen illustrations are of very high standard.

BOHEMIAN COCKPIT

CZECHS AND GERMANS. By Elizabeth Wiskemann. Published under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. Oxford Univ. Press. 12s. 6d.

Reviewed by C. A. MACARTNEY

THIS volume—the third of a series produced under the auspices of Chatham House, on the more controversial of the problems arising out of the territorial provisions of the Peace Treaties—is extraordinarily timely in its appearance. The controversy on the Czech-German problem which has filled newspapers and reviews in recent months has been carried on largely on an

emotional basis. Here for the first time the authentic facts and figures necessary for intelligent discussion have been collected in a single volume. Miss Wiskemann has covered the whole field. There is a historical introduction, to which she has rightly devoted one-third of the whole book, since the present problem is only the continuation, within a slightly altered framework, of that which dominated the last two generations of pre-war Austria. There is a careful section on the important economic question; an extremely interesting detailed description of the special situation and characteristics of each individual area of German settlement; and finally, the story of developments since the War, to which are appended Miss Wiskemann's own conclusions.

The treatment of all matters of detail is most painstaking, conscientious and impartial. On all such questions as how far the Language Laws have been fairly applied, how far discrimination has been shown against non-Czechs in State or in private employment, how far the complaints of intrusion of Czech schools into German areas are justified, the authoress has clearly taken pains to obtain the most exact information from both sides and has set down the results with scrupulous fairness; coming, as might be expected, to the conclusion that neither side has behaved perfectly. Her treatment of the major issue is less satisfactory. The fundamental difference between the Czechs and Germans is whether the former are justified in making of Czechoslovakia a Czechoslovak national state, or the latter, in demanding that it should be a "*Nationalitätenstaat*," in which all local nationalities should enjoy complete equality. Miss Wiskemann would be free to reject the latter solution, as indeed she does; but she nowhere states with any appearance of understanding the arguments in its

favour. It is discussed, and dismissed, in a single page consisting exclusively of objections. The whole work, indeed, is based on an underlying assumption that although Czech practice may sometimes be wrong, the basic theories of the Czechs are the right ones. This may be true; but it ought to have been proved.

It was perhaps due to the urgency of events that the last chapters are not wholly satisfactory, even within these limitations. The only possible solution is described as "the policy of Beneš and of February 18th, 1937." The serious criticisms made of execution of the February Agreement, not only by the Henlein Party, but also by the German Activists themselves, in the following November, are, however, passed over in silence; only Hodza's justifications are mentioned. More surprising still, the Agreement itself is nowhere given in full, and no reference at all is made to some of its most important provisions. It is to be hoped that if this book reaches a second edition, as it deserves, its end will be re-written to make it more worthy of its beginning.

STRAIGHT FROM THE FOUNTAIN HEAD

THE UNITED FRONT. By Georgi Dimitroff. *Lawrence and Wishart.*
8s. 6d.

Reviewed by C. F. O. CLARKE

It is generally believed that Stalin's preoccupation with the internal development of Russia has led to a general reduction in the activities of the Comintern. Nevertheless it still draws up programmes for the guidance of all orthodox communists in other countries. This book, which consists largely of speeches delivered during the past three

WHAT NEXT IN EUROPE?

THE EYES OF THE WORLD ARE
TURNED ON CZECHOSLOVAKIA

*You cannot afford
to miss reading*

CZECHO- SLOVAKIAN YEAR

by LADY SHEPPARD

An illuminating account of a year spent in this post-war republic, by the author of *A Cottage in Majorca*, given in a series of vivid scenes which stand out against a background of history, legend and folklore.

With 16 illustrations - 15/- net

SKEFFINGTON

The book you simply must read

EUROPE INTO THE ABYSS

VISCOUNT CECIL, LLOYD GEORGE,
MADAME TABOUIS, COUNT WLADIMIR
D'ORMESSON, WALTER HORST-
WEITENAU, COUNT STRACHWITZ
ETC ETC

"... The contributors who have written the essays succeed in giving the reader an idea of the international situation as viewed from their several standpoints. . . ." *Times Literary Supplement*

"... as a collection of essays on the many problems of Europe it should interest the reader with a taste for foreign policy." *Manchester Guardian*

"... sober and objective surveys of the histories and of the political and economical developments of the Nations of Europe. . . ." *Time and Tide*

"... assuredly a most impressive list. . . ." *Daily Telegraph*

"... extremely topical. . . ." *Star*

760 pages

15s net

PALLAS PUBLISHING CO LTD
12/13 Henrietta Street London WC2

A special price concession of 20% is being offered to readers of "World Review" who send orders with remittance for 12s. (post free) direct to "WORLD REVIEW," 91 St Martin's Lane, WC2

years by M. Dimitroff in his capacity as General Secretary of the Comintern, is chiefly concerned with the tactics to be employed in the fight against Fascism. M. Dimitroff, whose independent attitude made him the hero of the Reichstag Fire Trial, uses vigorous language ; but the crude repetitions, the barren rhetoric, the lack of originality or refinement of thought make the book dull reading. Indeed, the spirit behind the words is alarmingly fascist ; M. Dimitroff sticks closely to the tram-lines ; he is a good hater and magnificently disingenuous.

For M. Dimitroff fascism is wholly evil, communism wholly good. Fascism, which spells aggression without and oppression of the workers within, is on the increase ; even in apparently democratic countries it is continually encroaching. Unless all the Left parties unite against it, they will soon go the way of their German and Italian comrades. M. Dimitroff is at pains to explain why the communist attitude towards Social Democracy should change from contempt to friendliness. It does not imply a swing to the Right ; it is only a measure of self-preservation. Nor have the communists any intention of dallying with reformism. In a united front government they will press for the carrying out of "definite and fundamental revolutionary demands."

In another passage M. Dimitroff tries to dispel the Social Democratic anxiety that the communists want more than they are prepared to give. But the assurances are unconvincing ; it is obvious from the general tenor of the book that the communist doctrine does not admit of compromise ; yet unity of the Left, however desirable, can surely never prove lasting except on a basis of give and take. In England the communist insistence on revolution is repugnant to the generality of socialists, who realise that it gives potential fascists the very

rallying-point they require. M. Dimitroff never quite faces up to the dilemma over which should come first, unity or revolution ; and by wanting both, he leaves the communists exposed to snubs such as their recent rebuff by the British Labour Party. Not to mention that for the followers of Stalin to pose as champions of liberty and democracy has by now become nauseating.

PLUS IL CHANGE . . .

MUSSOLINI IN THE MAKING. By Ganders Megaro. *Allen & Unwin.* 10s. 6d.

Reviewed by GEORGE MARTELLI

Most biographies of Mussolini fall into one of two categories : they are either monotonously laudatory or consistently hostile. Mr. Megaro, the author of the latest, avoids both extremes. Although he obviously dislikes the subject of his book, his manner is on the whole quite objective. He is primarily concerned in separating truth from legend, and allows the story to tell itself largely by quotations from a great mass of relevant documents. Many of these form part of the "suppressed" body of Mussolini's earlier speeches and writings, which are no longer accessible to the public. To see them Mr. Megaro had to overcome great difficulties, but the job was certainly worth doing.

Everybody knows that the founder of Fascism started life in the opposite camp. His apologists, however, are inclined to draw a veil over much of that lurid period. They stress the patriot, the reformer, the idealist ; they say nothing about the anti-militarist, the anti-Christ, and the apostle of violence. Their discretion is quite understandable. No leader of men has ever so completely repudiated his own former teaching.

To anybody who has followed the latter career of Mussolini, it is almost incredible that this was the same man who organised a strike to protest against the war in Tripoli; who described the Italian flag as a "rag to be planted on a dunghill"; who insulted the monarchy and denounced religion as the "monstrosity born of the ignorance of mankind."

Part of the merit of Mr. Megaro is to show how the transition was effected from the revolutionary and international socialist, to the reactionary, supernatural fascist. The qualities in common of the two characters were intolerance of others, contempt for democracy, love of power and intense individualism. The truth is that Mussolini has never believed in anything or anybody but himself. This has enabled him to adopt every creed and abandon it as soon as another held out prospects of a personal advancement.

ISOLATION FAN

ENGLAND EXPECTS EVERY
AMERICAN TO DO HIS DUTY.

By Quincy Howe. *Hale*. 8s. 6d.

Reviewed by M. McDougall

ACCORDING to Mr. Howe, "if the rise of the British Empire dominated world history during the nineteenth century, its decline dominates world history during the twentieth." He describes the various causes and symptoms of this decline: the growth of rival Powers, the appearance of nationalistic and independent tendencies in various parts of the Empire and the unrest within the mother country herself. And he says that Britain's only hope is help from the United States. To secure this help she is apparently exerting every effort. In a most startling chapter he discloses the secrets of the "British network," the vast stream of propaganda designed to

bring America into the next war as England's ally, emanating from such sources as the English Speaking Union and institutions like the Rhodes Scholarships. Mr. Howe is indignant at the propaganda he says is being used, but his own writing has itself all the qualities of propaganda; exaggeration and a highly biased point of view.

His conclusions are that America should pursue a policy of strict neutrality and should above all beware of supporting England for idealistic reasons. Speaking, apparently, as a Communist he says the United States may be asked to make common cause with Britain in the defence of democracy, only to find herself defending British interests as much against Communism as against Fascism.

BRAVE EXILE

AUSTRIA STILL LIVES. By Mizzi Hartmann. *Michael Joseph*. 10s. 6d.

Reviewed by VERNON BARTLETT

THE young writer who, in order to save her relations in Austria from difficulties on account of her criticisms, calls herself "Mizzi Hartmann," faces up to a tragic situation with a courage that permeates her book from the title to the last page. She is one of so many thousands of keen young people in Central Europe who have survived the miseries of war and inflation, and who now must consider themselves lucky to have escaped from the town of their own country into the uncertainties of exile. Her straightforward story should put to shame our own defeatists and remind them that, although they are prepared to run so few risks in defence of the liberty of speech and thought they still enjoy, they might at least make a greater effort to help those whose belief in human rights has turned them into penniless refugees.

TRAVEL



We remind our readers that we are always glad to give advice on travel questions, and are in a position to obtain from the right quarters any information that may be required about tickets, hotels, etc.

A CITY WITH ALLURE

By MARIA DE LUKATS

Immediately you arrive in Budapest you feel that here is something different; something you have not met before. And that is so, for Budapest has an atmosphere quite its own. It is difficult to analyse this atmosphere—it seems to be compounded of the charm that is natural to the Hungarians themselves and the beauties of this queen of cities, spiced with a dash of gypsy temperament. The stranger arriving in Budapest seems to undergo a kind of spiritual change; a smile hovers on his lips and a twinkle appears in his eyes, while he adopts for the period of his stay the motto, "Let us eat, drink and be merry, for to-morrow—who knows, who cares?"

Eat, drink and be merry—nowhere better than in Budapest. Hungarian



Photo: Hungarian State Railways.

PAPRIKA SYMPHONY

sit and sip your wine and listen to the strains, now sad, now gay, of the gypsy orchestra. As you sit in your café enjoying the warmth of the summer evening—for summer in Hungary begins early and ends late—you can look across the Danube flowing between to the St. Gellert Hill with the fortress, called Citadella, and the Var-hegy crowned by

cooking is famous for its variety and subtlety, and the Hungarian wines are such as to make the mouth of Bacchus himself water, while there are more restaurants and cafés to entertain the visitor than in any other city in Europe. There are "dancings" as *chic* and exclusive as any in Paris; there are bars and cabarets and, above all, little terraced cafés along the bank of the Danube, where you may

the magnificent Royal Palace, with, below it, the Fisherman's Bastion.

Though this city is the ideal place in which to have the best of times, you must remember that it is also the largest Spa in Europe, and the healing properties of its many mineral springs bring health and happiness to thousands every year. For the swimming enthusiast it is an ideal place; no other city in Europe has so many swimming pools as Budapest. If you like waves they are waiting for you at the St. Gellert bath, where is also the famous champagne bath where you can bathe in bubbling mineral water! Then there is Lake Balaton, the largest lake in Central Europe, where every kind of aquatic sport can be enjoyed. There is no end to the sports you may enjoy in Hungary, shooting, fishing, riding, boating, tennis, golf, polo, racing, all in beautiful surroundings and the lovely Hungarian sunshine.

There is little to match the sight of Hungarian peasants in their colourful national costumes, which can be seen in little country villages on Sundays, and when they gather round the village inn to dance the national dances to the accompaniment of a gypsy orchestra.

Words cannot describe the beauties of this country—just go and see them for yourself. You can spend as much or as little as you like, for Hungary is a surprisingly cheap place in which to spend a holiday.

IN GERMANY

SALZBURG FESTIVAL, 1938

THE programme for the Salzburg Festival Season this year has now been announced. The Festival will open on July 23rd and continue until August 31st.

Performances will be given of Mozart's "Cosi fan tutte" and "Don Giovanni,"

Beethoven's "Fidelio," Wagner's "Meistersinger von Nürnberg" and "Tannhäuser," Verdi's "Falstaff," and Richard Strauss's "Der Rosenkavalier."

Dr. Wilhelm Furtwängler, Vittorio Guy, Hans Knappertsbusch and Karl Böhm will share the conducting between them.

In addition to the opera performances at the Festival Theatre, Goethe's "Egmont" will be given in the courtyard of the Festival Theatre, and Kleist's "Amphitryon"—with scenery by Erich Engel—will be staged in the Cathedral Square.

Details of the concert programme for this season are to be announced later.

HEADQUARTERS FOR TOURISTS

ON June 14th the foundation stone of the "House of German Tourist Traffic" was laid in Berlin.

Here in a vast semi-circular building in modern style, to harmonise with the planned rebuilding of Berlin, will be housed all the chief travel and tourist organisations of the German capital.

The building is intended also to serve as a meeting place for travellers from all over the world.

FESTIVAL AT HEIDELBERG

GOETHE'S "Faust" will inaugurate the famous Open Air Reich Festival plays at Heidelberg on July 17th. Other plays in the programme are Shakespeare's "Taming of the Shrew," Eichendorff's "Die Freier" and Goethe's "Götz von Berlichingen." The Festival will end on August 21st.

MOTOR CAMP FOR BAYREUTH

VISITORS to the Wagner Festivals at Bayreuth this year who go by car will find almost in the heart of the town a new tourist camp with running water, electricity, facilities for cooking and bathing.

THE WORLD OF *FINANCE*

WATCHMAN, WHAT OF THE NIGHT?

by "RAPIER"

It is recorded that the famous Mr. Jorrocks on a convivial occasion, being asked what were the prospects for the next day's hunting, having blundered into the larder, came back with a report that the night "was black as pitch and smelt of cheese." A business man asked what is the outlook for trade to-day, might similarly reply, "murky, with a strong odour of trinitrotoluol." In these circumstances caution is the order of the day, and investors have mainly confined their attention to gilt-edged bonds and gold-mining shares. The turnover of shares on both the London Stock Exchange and Wall Street has been very thin, varied in London by short bouts of speculation in new gold-mining ventures which, while legitimate risks for professional operators, leave the public sadder and wiser when the inevitable reaction takes place. The shares of fully developed dividend-paying gold mines are, on the other hand, a good hedge both against trade

depression and war. Internationally-minded capitalists flit uneasily from their own currencies now into dollars and again into gold, actuated now by fear of a European war and next by fear of dollar devaluation. As an American financier once said, there is only one thing more nervous than a million dollars and that is two million.

Britain is still definitely experiencing a trade recession, but the activity induced by re-armament tends to cushion its full effects. The export industries, such as textiles, are the worst sufferers, being hit both by the American depression and its repercussions on other countries, and by the Sino-Japanese war. But compared with the United States Britain appears comparatively prosperous. Steel production in Britain has declined to 81 per cent of capacity but in America it is only 26 per cent and appears likely to fall lower before it recovers. Despite this and other unfavourable industrial indices, Wall Street



All Classes of Insurance Effected

Branches & Agencies
throughout the World

Chief Administration
7, CHANCERY LANE, LONDON

has kept fairly steady up to mid-June which, perhaps, indicates that the bottom to the current depression has been reached. The market, too, is no doubt discounting the effects of the spending-lending Act passed by Congress which will inject some 3,700 million dollars into the national economy. Whether the spending of these vast sums will do more than check the depression or whether they will initiate the revival they are intended to stimulate, time alone will show. The political atmosphere will not be favourable to revival of confidence with a bitter Congressional electoral struggle to be fought out between now and November. If the primary party elections should show signs that New Deal candidates are losing ground, Wall Street might take fresh heart. A more anti-New Deal Congress which would assert its independence, and not act as a mere rubber stamp to the Administration, would give business men more confidence than any other single factor. President Roosevelt has so far shown no sign of that "change of heart" desired by business men, and still puts "Reform" before "Recovery." On moral grounds there may be every justification for his attitude, but market-wise, this is a bear point.

In France M. Daladier has safely surmounted his first hurdles and now seems securely in the saddle until the autumn. The Treasury is in funds again and there should be no crises either political or financial for the next few months.

The Austrian Loans

An episode which has caused considerable feeling in the "City" was Germany's threatened default on the foreign debt obligations incurred by Austria before its incorporation in the Reich. The case of the foreign creditors is that Germany, having taken over a

From Oxfordshire

"I return to you herewith the warrant £28, being half-yearly dividend on my investment of £1,600. Please add this interest to my investment."

Another very interesting item from our postbag. Full details of this attractive investment will be sent on request.

Reliance PERMANENT BUILDING SOCIETY

Established 1862.

**PERCY STREET
LONDON — W.**

Telephone : Museum 3622.

Member of Building Societies Association.

considerable amount of gold, foreign exchange, and foreign investments, from Austria, is in a favourable position to continue the service of Austria's foreign loans. Germany's answer is that these loans were floated in order to enable Austria to escape from an *Anschluss* with Germany, and that therefore Germany repudiates these obligations. The reply of the creditors is that in view of the orgy of default in recent years the sanctity of contract must be upheld and that if Germany proves intransigent some form of Exchange Clearing must be instituted. All the creditors are unanimous in this view except Italy, which is not surprising from a partner in the Rome-Berlin axis.

Italy's Financial Worries

But Italy has other difficulties to face besides political ones, for its economic situation is giving cause for some misgivings. According to a statement by the Finance Minister, Thaon de Revel, in May, extraordinary expenditure incurred between July, 1934, and March, 1938, on the Abyssinian adventure, rearmament, and possibly incursions into Spain, amounted to 36,000 million lire (£380 millions). This exceptional expenditure was met by various devices, including a compulsory loan, a capital levy, and a revaluation of the gold reserves. In the current financial year which ends on June 30th in addition to a deficit of 3,200 million lire on the ordinary budget there is an extraordinary expenditure of 9,000 million lire (£96 millions). It would appear that annual budgets will in future total about 30,000 million lire (£320 millions), against 20,000 millions (£210 millions), in the pre-Abyssinian years. This is a heavy burden for a comparatively poor nation and it is estimated that taxation takes about a quarter of the whole national income. Nor does it appear that Italy

has so far benefited from its Abyssinian Colony by any access of raw materials. The experience of "Sanctions" has led Signor Mussolini to intensify the campaign for self-sufficiency by encouraging the production of both naturally-produced raw materials and of substitutes. These, however, are costly experiments, as Germany has already found.

Nor does Italy's foreign trade show signs of striking a favourable balance. While exports doubled in 1936-37 imports trebled, and the first four months of the current year show an import surplus of 722.5 million lire against 890.5 millions in the same period of 1937. This import surplus is, however, counteracted to some extent by tourist traffic, which is likely to increase.

On top of its existing difficulties Italy has this year experienced a very poor harvest and it is estimated it may have to import about a million tons of wheat before next spring; it has already had to buy several hundred thousands tons to meet current needs until the harvest is gathered. The prospect of having to use up large amounts of its already depleted gold and foreign exchange reserves is an unpleasant one for Italy but it may be partially avoided by barter trading with Russia or Danubian countries who are likely to have good harvests. In the circumstances rumours have been current that Italy may resort to another devaluation of the lira. But as a matter of prestige Mussolini is likely to resist such a step as long as possible.

NEW DANISH INDUSTRY

A SMALL factory has been started in Jutland for the manufacture of storks' nests.

Danish farmers like to have a stork nesting on their roofs, but they find that the bird is lazy, and unless a nest is provided usually flies south.

Evening Standard, London.

DIARY OF INTERNATIONAL EVENTS: MAY 15—JUNE 14

SPAIN

AIRCRAFT dropped bombs on the French town of Cerbère (May 27th) and in Arièges (June 5th). The French frontier defences were strengthened.

At the end of May Great Britain was persistently reported to be taking soundings with a view to mediation in Spain. France was said to be ready to assist, but doubtful of success unless Italy would co-operate, which she showed no sign of doing. May 29th was devoted in Italy to celebrating solidarity with Nationalist Spain. Count Ciano's speech (June 2nd) extolled Italian-German co-operation against Bolshevism in Spain. General Franco refused outright to accept less than the Republicans' unconditional surrender, and his successes in June, when by a series of swift blows and encircling movements his right wing advanced to Castellon (June 14th), made hopes of a compromise recede.

After Il Duce's Genoa speech (May 14th) the Italian and German Press became very critical of the increased volume of munitions reaching Barcelona in transit through France. The British government sought a solution through the plan of July, 1937, for the withdrawal of "volunteers." The Non-Intervention Committee agreed (May 26th)—the U.S.S.R. dissenting—that the "volunteers" (army, navy, air, civil) on each side, should be counted by two commissions; frontier and maritime control would begin a fortnight after counting commenced; if a substantial number (10,000) were withdrawn within 30 days belligerent rights would be granted to the Spanish parties; otherwise France would regain her freedom regarding frontier control. Each government would repatriate its own volunteers; the costs on land (camps, etc.) estimated at about £1,000,000 would be divided. The U.S.S.R., which said it had no

"volunteers" in Spain, objected to contributing; at a later meeting (June 2nd) it withdrew most of its opposition to the plan.

In May and June aircraft in Nationalist service bombed Republican towns killing hundreds of civilians, notably at Alicante (May 25th) and Granollers—an open market town—(May 31st); British ships were attacked and sunk in ports. The British Agent at Burgos was instructed to protest (June 1st).

About June 2nd Great Britain suggested to the United States, Norway and Sweden that a commission of experts, should be ready to visit scenes of air attacks and report—for publication—on the damage and the proximity of lawful objectives. Norway and Sweden assented; official comment in the United States was guarded, though Mr. Sumner Welles expressed reprobation for such attacks (June 3rd). The Vatican made independent representations to General Franco (June 8th). Meanwhile attacks on shipping in ports were multiplied, bringing those on British ships alone to 22 between April 22nd and June 14th. On June 11th the Burgos government suggested, as a solution, that a Republican port outside the fighting zone should be allotted to merchant ships. Mr. Chamberlain, in Parliament (June 14th), held it impossible to protect shipping in territorial waters—still less to undertake reprisals—without becoming involved in the war.

GERMANS AND CZECHS

With the approach of the Czechoslovak communal elections (May 22nd–June 12th) a European crisis developed. The Sudeten leaders complained (May 19th) of "terrorism" by the Czechs in the German districts and refused to negotiate with Dr. Hodza till order was guaranteed. Herr Henlein, lately returned from

exploratory conversations in London (May 12-14th), left the country.

On May 19th, rumours of German troop movements towards the Saxon frontier became current. The Prague Cabinet took precautions on all frontiers, and on May 21st, after a midnight session, called up 100,000 reservists for training and to keep order. Frontier violation incidents—one (May 21st) involving the deaths of two Sudeten at Eger—increased the general tension. Poland, in view of eventualities, moved troops to the frontier near Teschen. The German Press (cf. *Angriff*, May 21st) wrote, ominously, that Prague was no longer master of the situation which had become "intolerable." In Paris M. Daladier had to contradict (May 19th) rumours of a German ultimatum to France.

During this critical week-end, the British and French governments urged in Prague the need of avoiding incidents and reaching a full agreement with the Sudeten. In Berlin, in successive visits (May 19th-21st), the British Ambassador informed the Wilhelmstrasse of the advice given to Prague, obtained assurances (which Germany also gave to Prague) that the troop movements in Saxony had no political significance, and pressed for Germany's co-operation in facilitating a settlement, in the interests of peace. Herr von Ribbentrop welcomed the British efforts for peace, but emphasised the depth of feeling in Germany. In Paris, as in Prague, the French government re-affirmed its fidelity to its treaties with Czechoslovakia, while urging the latter to make the widest possible concessions.

Appreciating the Anglo-French counsels, President Benes and Dr. Hodza made speeches (May 20th-21st) promising liberal concessions in the Nationality Statute (adopted by the Cabinet on May 19th), but maintaining their resolve to resist violence. The first elections (May 22nd) passed off quietly.

Herr Henlein, returning from abroad, talked with Dr. Hodza on May 23rd,

but his party declined to negotiate till the reservists—called up illegally, in their view—had been dismissed. In a Press interview (May 25th)—which was not endorsed by the Press of his party—Herr Henlein indicated three alternatives: autonomy for the German districts; or a plebiscite for their union with the Reich; or, if this were refused, their forcible inclusion by the Reich. The German Press, now reacting sharply against reports that British firmness had averted war, protested (May 26th) that the Reich had never contemplated a military solution, and charged Great Britain with encouraging "hate news," thus giving Prague a pretext to mobilise and to delay concessions which were more than ever urgent, in view of the votes (92 per cent of the German votes) cast for Henlein. These attacks ceased on May 27th. The Prague Cabinet's decision (May 30th) to dismiss half of the reservists produced a better atmosphere. Allegations of air-trespass were made by both governments.

As regards other states, Hungary observed a moderate attitude, but protested (May 22nd) against the closing of her frontier. The *Pester Lloyd* (May 25th) insisted that autonomy for Minorities in Czechoslovakia was the only solution. The U.S.S.R., through its Press (May 26th) and its Ambassador in America (May 27th), announced that it would aid the Czechs against "fascist aggression." Poland, on the other hand declared semi-officially (May 24th) that she would not be drawn into conflicts occasioned by French alliances with other states, an attitude sharply criticised by the Paris Press (May 26th). In America Mr. Hull warned signatories of the Kellogg Pact of their duty to seek pacific solutions.

The German Press resented the announcement (June 3rd) of a projected extension of army service in Czechoslovakia and, before the final elections, renewed its attacks on Czechoslovakia as an outpost of Bolshevism; at Stettin, Herr Hess (June 12th) denounced her

DIARY OF INTERNS

policy as irresponsible and dangerous to peace. The completed elections showed marked gains for the Sudeten and the Czech Coalition, and meagre support for the Slovak autonomist group, to whose claims, made at Pressburg on June 5th (and rejected next day by Dr. Hodza), great significance had been given in Germany.

On June 8th the Sudeten party restated their claims on the basis of the Karlsbad "eight points" (see June, 1937, number, p. 87). Dr. Hodza, in an interview with the *Sunday Times* (June 11th), said that most of the questions could be settled by compromise; the real problem was the extent of local government (which would certainly be granted) that would guarantee the Germans' liberties without weakening the State's sovereignty and authority.

Discussions opened on June 14th between the Sudeten leaders (not including Herr Henlein) and Dr. Hodza.

THE FOUR POWERS

IL DUCE's statement at Genoa (May 14th) that France desired Barcelona's victory, whereas Italy "desired and intended" that General Franco should win, brought the Franco-Italian conversations to a standstill. France's conditional acceptance of frontier control in the Non-Intervention Committee (May 26th, see above) eased the situation for a moment, and M. Bonnet spoke hopefully in the Foreign Affairs Committee (June 2nd) of a resumption of the meetings. Count Ciano's speech at Milan on the same day, rejecting compromises that concealed mental reservations, was, however, regarded in Paris as definitely ending the negotiations. Apart from Italy's annoyance at the passage of arms across the French frontier, the main obstacle was said to be the suspicion in Rome that France was aiming, through the negotiations, at dislocating the "axis."

In the same speech at Genoa, Il Duce said, referring to the *Anschluss*, that the Stresa front was dead; the Roman and German worlds were in contact. At

Milan, on June 2nd, Signor Gayda admitted that the *Anschluss* and the Main-Danube waterway (decreed on May 18th) might give Germany some predominance in South-east Europe, but this would not lead to a clash between her and Italy. He ridiculed reports of an allotment of spheres between the two Powers in the Balkans. Italy's policy was: "the Balkans for the Balkan peoples"; she would never disinterest herself in the Balkans.

In the House of Lords (May 19th) Lord Halifax said that England's friendship with France was not exclusive, and she would like to remove causes of mistrust and suspicion that prevented a complete understanding with Germany.

SANJAK OF ALEXANDRETTA

AFTER the arrival of the League Electoral Commission (April 15th) grave disorders broke out in the Sanjak of Alexandretta. Martial law was proclaimed on June 3rd. The Turkish Government complained (May 22nd) to the League and in the Komitay (May 29th) that the French were working to prevent Turkey from obtaining the majority which she expected. The French Press observed that there was genuine opposition to Turkey's claims from the Alouites and devout Moslems. After discussions between M. Bonnet and the Turkish Ambassador (June 3rd and 9th) the tension was eased, it being agreed that Turkish troops might co-operate in maintaining order. Negotiations concerning the whole Franco-Turkish-Syrian problem, as a step towards a wider Franco-Turkish settlement, were opened on June 13th with discussions between General Staffs at Antioch.

THE FAR EAST

In view of the prolongation of the war, and Germany's wish to remain neutral, the Chinese government's German military advisers were desired by their government to withdraw from their contracts (May 23rd). A few days earlier a treaty establishing diplomatic

relations between Germany and Manchukuo had been signed at Berlin. On June 1st the Press reported an agreement between the U.S.S.R. and China, whereby the former, in return for special advantages, would supply war material and experts to the Chinese government.

The Japanese government, as strengthened on May 26th in order to attain the "original objectives" of the war, contained five members of the fighting services, including General Ugaki, who replaced M. Hirota as foreign minister.

Pursuing their combined manoeuvre, the Japanese Northern and Southern armies came in touch on the Lunghai railway (May 16th). Suchow fell on May 20th; the whole of the Tientsin-Pukow railway (800 miles) was in Japanese hands by May 25th. The bulk of the Chinese troops made good their withdrawal, abandoning much material. The main Japanese effort was then made westward towards the Pekin-Hankow railway. Kaifeng, the first objective, was taken on June 6th.

Canton was heavily bombed (May 28th, 29th) the population suffering heavily. The Chinese government protested to certain governments and to the League (June 1st). Great Britain protested to Tokio (June 4th) against indiscriminate bombing. The raids were, however, continued with small regard for military objectives, in order, as Admiral Nomura announced (June 7th), to show the futility of resistance. Renewed representations were made by France and Great Britain (June 5th, 6th), and by the United States (June 8th). The British attitude was sharply criticised in the Japanese Press.

On June 10th Japanese forces reached the railway, severing communication between Chengchow and Hangchow. Floods caused by the Yellow River impeded operations along the Lunghai line. Chinese guerillas re-occupied most of Shansi. On June 12th the Japanese commenced an advance by land and water up the Yangtse River towards Hangkow, whence the Chinese began

to remove their government offices to points further inland.

LATIN AMERICA

THE British government having demanded (May 11th) that British claims arising from disturbances in Mexico in 1910 and 1920 should be paid on the same footing as those of the United States, the Mexican government paid the sum of £18,000 and recalled its Minister in London, complaining that the British note had disregarded the division between domestic and foreign affairs. The British Minister in Mexico was thereupon recalled.

In Brazil President Vargas had followed up his anti-Nazi action in March (see May Diary, p. 87) by decrees which affected German schools and the leadership of Germans as exercised in Latin America by the cultural attachés. The Reich Press (April 23rd) condemned this policy as an attempt to denationalise Germans. After the revolt in Rio (May 11th) several Germans were arrested, and an attaché of the Embassy was interrogated. The President stated (May 13th) that the rebels had received "foreign help" and announced measures against "exotic doctrines." The Reich semi-official organs attributed this attitude of the Brazilian Government to American-Jewish influences hostile to German trade, and declared that Germany would not tolerate such chicanery. The Brazilian ambassador in Berlin asked for explanations (May 17th); the question was then overshadowed by the Czechoslovak crisis. The German Press stated (May 22nd) that Brazil now admitted that no Germans were implicated in the revolt.

Owing to the threatening situation between Bolivia and Paraguay, the Peace Conference at Buenos Ayres, which has sought to give effect to the Protocols of 1935 that ended the Chaco war, presented the two States (May 26th) with final "proposals for their common frontier," which President Roosevelt urged them to accept.

WORLD REVIEW

Volume V. No. 6. *Incorporating*
'REVIEW OF REVIEWS' and 'WORLD'

August, 1938

40 WILLIAM IV STREET
LONDON, W.C. 2

Telegrams: BOOKSTORE, LONDON
Telephone: TEMPLE BAR 0127—9

WORLD REVIEW is the only English monthly review giving an extensive selection of articles from publications all over the world. These articles are chosen with great care, since WORLD REVIEW can only be valuable as its sponsors want it to be, if it avoids all political bias. *The Editor in his own article, and other signed contributors, express their opinions as frankly as they please.* Otherwise the Review would lack force and colour. But the ultimate object of WORLD REVIEW is to perform a useful and progressive service by allowing

THE NATIONS TO SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES

WHAT ABOUT GERMANY?

by VERNON BARTLETT

YOU have, in the middle of Europe, nearly eighty million Germans distinguished by their honesty, industry and sense of discipline. They are not, as their leaders claim, a people without space, for there are at the present time some tens of thousands of Italians who have been imported as labourers. But it is true that they support nearly twice as many people to an acre as do the French on a far more fertile soil. They have no colonies, and we in Great Britain have no right to question their abilities as colonists while, as Mr. Lloyd George recently said in Parliament, we are in danger of having a "slummy Empire." A Cabinet Minister said to me the other day that, unless we took a far greater interest in our own colonies they will, in another ten years or so, have "gone Communist." The Germans note our difficulties in Palestine or our mistakes in the West Indies, and their bitterness grows. They are, they convince themselves, still misunderstood and maltreated.

The future of Germany is the greatest problem in the world affairs to-day, and timid or muddled attempts to solve that problem must lead to war which, be it remembered, the great mass of the German people, having sacrificed and suffered so much more than we did between 1914 and 1924, is at least as anxious to avoid as we

are. There are, very roughly, two policies that present themselves. It is my aim to put them forward as objectively as possible.

May 21st is a date that crops up in every political conversation in Berlin. It is one that conveys nothing at all to the average Englishman, although his Government's warning to Herr von Ribbentrop at that time is looked upon as the first serious check to German ambitions. Some people will tell you that the warning against any military move against Czechoslovakia prevented war, that even if there was no unusual concentration of German troops near the frontier every man in every barracks in the Dresden area was ready to march and would have had to do so had the British not taken it all so seriously. Other people will tell you that the Germans behaved with great restraint in a crisis engineered and exaggerated by those elements in Czechoslovakia, Russia, France and England (in that order) who want a war now before Germany becomes too strong. Whichever version you accept, the rulers of Nazi Germany received a sudden and severe shock, and, despite the natural efforts to convince public opinion that it was a victory, the belief that Herr Hitler can get anything he asks for has been shaken for the first time since he became Chancellor.

With the experience of May 21st in mind we have to decide which policy is wise for the future. Should the fist be clenched or should the hand be outstretched? Let *A* and *B* talk it over.

A. You'll admit that the attempts made since the War to encircle Germany and to keep her weak are partly responsible for the alarming situation to-day, and yet you talk of continuing that policy. . . .

B. Yes, very reluctantly I do. I criticised that policy while moderate men were in power in Germany because it played into the hands of the extremists. But now the extremists are in office and the moderates are in exile, and the situation has changed. The leaders are more subdued since May 21st and, perhaps even more, since the British began showing economic interest in south-eastern Europe. When it becomes a little clearer that Whitehall means business the Wilhelmstrasse will be ready to talk.

A. Or to go to war. After all, there is nobody in Germany who dares to talk bluntly to the Führer, and you can't tell how he will react. He most certainly wants peace, but isn't it very probable that

such proofs of British hostility are only going to make him more difficult to deal with later on? He needs two years before his army is strong enough to be confident of success in a short war. Surely it is wiser to show more understanding for his aims now, so that when the army is ready he will be less tempted to use it? For example, we have done nothing to give back the German colonies and now we seek to stop German economic influence in the Balkans. Isn't that so unjust that it must lead to war?

B. But I want to avoid that crisis two years hence. I agree Hitler wants peace, but his youth is being taught to dream of an expansion that can only be achieved by war. If he goes on scoring victory after victory over other powers in foreign affairs his young men will believe they can turn those dreams into realities and they may have won so many strategical positions in advance that they will also win the war. If they dominate Sweden and her iron ore, Czechoslovakia and her munition works, Hungary and her grain, Rumania and her oil, they will be strong enough to threaten and perhaps to defeat the British Empire.

A. I doubt that. Remember that the great strength of National Socialism is that it claims to bring all Germans together. It rejects citizens of foreign race—hence the very harsh treatment of the Jews. If the issue is widened to bring all sorts of other peoples under the German domination the National Socialist spearhead will be correspondingly blunted. Look what is happening in Austria, for example. Although the Austrians are a Germanic people, many of them are so discontented that Herr Hitler has been warned off visiting his native land for the time being. When it comes to Slavs and other non-Germans he will either have to confine his activities to normal economic penetration—helped only temporarily by the cleverness of Schacht's frozen credit policy—or an attempt to gain political domination will involve him in grave difficulties. And in either case the temptation to start a world war will be diminished. Only if you convince him that he must look upon the British Empire as an implacable enemy will he carry out his present re-armament policy to its desperate conclusion.

Besides, there's another point. I've heard you claim before now that the attempts of the British and the French, of Winston Churchill, Poincaré, and so on, to overthrow the Bolsheviks in

Russia did, in fact, strengthen them. Revolutionary fervour is fortified if foreign pressure can arouse a nationalistic feeling. Isn't just the same thing happening in Germany to-day? Didn't it happen in Italy when Mussolini was able to claim that the rich and decadent British were jealous of the young and virile Italians?

B. Yes, one needs to avoid that. But I want a settlement with Germany just as much as you do. I am all in favour of making reasonable—no, generous—concessions about colonies or anything else that sticks in the German gizzard. But I don't believe we can expect to get them to the point of negotiating until we convince them that the policy of tearing up Treaties on a Saturday morning will sooner or later bring retribution on the Monday. You yourself reminded me that nobody dares talk bluntly to the Führer. The foreign minister, Herr von Ribbentrop, in no way fulfills the normal role of a foreign minister, which is to warn his government that such and such an action at home will have such and such an effect in some foreign country. It would be far better if Germans themselves would, for example, let Herr Hitler realise how devastating an effect his ill-treatment of Herr von Schuschnigg for committing the crime of being an Austrian patriot has had in most European countries. But if no German will tell him, then it's our job to do so, because otherwise he will perform some fresh act which will disgust us so much, or alarm us so much, that we shall all be involved in war.

A. The objections to that are that it's very difficult to get your criticisms or warnings to the Führer's ear, and that meanwhile you only convince the Germans who do read them that the whole world is against them. They will appreciate that National Socialism is guilty of many excesses but their pride will make them all the more boastful of their roads and their labour camps and their re-building of their great cities.

And, to go back a little, you must remember that there are no more treaties for Hitler to tear up and, by so doing, to unite public opinion inside Germany and to divide it abroad. The Nazi movement is bound to grow more moderate—unless its bitter opponents drive it into war, or, if you prefer it, give it so good an excuse for making war that the moderates will no longer be able to hold it in check. If we get over the Czechoslovak crisis, where the fate of the three and a half million Germans is a matter of sufficient importance

to justify quite a lot of the Nazi propaganda, there will be no other issue to arouse enthusiasm inside Germany for a dangerous foreign policy. And the utter failure of the last anti-Jewish campaign in Berlin shows the difficulty of finding an issue in domestic politics. In other words, the more moderate voices will be listened to again.

B. I'm afraid I can see no sign of it. The only people to whom the Führer listens are Goering, Ribbentrop and Himmler. The first may sometimes advise caution. The other two, as far as I can find out, are merely "yes-men." I agree that there are no more issues to unite public opinion in Germany when once this Czechoslovak business is out of the way. But that's what makes the next few months so dangerous. The desire of the extremists to retain power will almost certainly lead them to press for some drastic action somewhere (and it's extraordinary how soon some new and minor question can be lifted up by propagandists into a burning injustice which Germany must put right). Only the clearest possible warnings from London and Paris will serve to check extremist pressure. And if we can prevent war during the next six months we shall prevent it altogether—our own armaments will then be growing so formidable.

A. I wish I could believe that. To my mind any sign of bullying now might be effective for six months or even a couple of years, but it would convince the Germans of the next-war generation that they must fight to gain, or maintain, their country's liberty. And you know as well as I the futility of another war. Let us at any rate agree on this. It would be unwise to let the Germans believe we cannot fight and it would also be unwise to let them believe we want to hem them in, to frustrate their legitimate ambitions. Therefore, we should judge every question that arises on its merits, and as objectively as possible. When there appeared to be danger of war over Czechoslovakia, we took firm and effective action against it. But the German case is not without merits. Therefore, we should be equally firm in insisting that the Czechoslovak Government should produce suggestions for a compromise. For the sake of peace, no *parti pris* !

You pay your money, and you take your choice. (And if you don't choose half-way between the two I shall conclude that the Englishman has lost his gift, his passion, for compromise.)

FOREIGN BODIES

by FLOODLIGHT

All the world likes to read gossip about other people. The little human eccentricities that lurk behind the imposing figures officially presented to the world are seldom known. These personal notes aim at giving flesh and blood to the men whose names appear so often in our political articles

Choosing the Heir

IN Fascist Italy all the emphasis is laid on youth. Proud, truculent, ebullient youth. But in the sixteen years which have passed since the March on Rome the Fascist leaders have had time to mature. Signor Mussolini may test the vigour of his Ministers by making them dive over bayonets or jump through hoops, but he cannot prolong their youth any more than his own. Hair turns grey or heads grow bald ; yards and yards more of black silk are needed to swathe the Fascist waist ; and every day the *Passo Romano*, the Fascist high-kick, becomes more of a strain to perform.

Now the younger generation, bred in Fascism, begin to look askance at the elderly juveniles who lead them. All Italians are brought up to believe that youth is in itself a virtue, entitling its possessor to the supreme posts. Those now in power are, in fact, exposed to the effects of their own slogans ; but they do not give in lightly. They cling to their domination, justifying it by the physical antics that delight the evening paper readers here. But Signor Mussolini is not blind to the threat of advancing age ; he knows that one day he will be swept off the board by younger men, and, with due foresight, he has chosen an heir, Count Galeazzo Ciano.

A Successful Marriage

Count Ciano, the 34-year-old Foreign Minister of Italy, has had a far smoother career than the Duce. Born at Leghorn, the son of Costanzo Ciano, an early follower of Mussolini, the young Galeazzo studied law in Rome. There he was a leader of young society and wrote two plays, which, owing to his father's high position in the Fascist party, were never criticised. He also edited a newspaper and passed his Diplomatic exams.



COUNT CIANO

The father, Costanzo, was a figure of some renown. His war exploits against the Austrians in the Adriatic were celebrated throughout Italy. With the rise of Fascism, he rallied to Signor Mussolini and later became Minister of Communications. In fact, Costanzo Ciano is the real person to whom the punctuality of Italian trains is due.

Taking the Count

As a journalist, Galeazzo flooded the newspapers with second-rate prose and at the same time got an insight into methods of publicity which was to prove useful later on. His first diplomatic post was in Rio de Janeiro. From there he returned to Rome and became engaged to Edda Mussolini, the Duce's eldest daughter. The Cianos were very small beer before the rise of Fascism and, although Signor Mussolini did not want to ally his family with the old and rather decadent aristocracy, he jibbed a little at such an apparently unambitious marriage. The solution was to ennoble the Cianos, and Costanzo was made Count Ciano of Cortellazzo.

The "Young Eagle"

As Signor Mussolini's son-in-law, young Ciano found the way made easy for him. He was first sent to China as Consul-General in Shanghai, where he learnt to dislike the English. Though his wife was very popular among the British community, Count Ciano made a bad impression. His ability was recognised, but struck those he met as being riddled with malice and *arrière-pensées*. His vanity seemed to British eyes contemptible. But, for failing to take him at his own value, the British had a heavy price to pay in the future strengthening of Signor Mussolini's policy of blackmail.

After attending the London Economic Conference in a subordinate position, Count Ciano blossomed out as head of the Duce's Press Bureau. This post, which later developed into that of Minister for Press and Propaganda, gave him control over the whole of the Italian newspaper world. But, when the Abyssinian War broke out, Signor Mussolini decided that his son-in-law must become a hero; Count Ciano went to Africa as a pilot and the Italian Press rang with the praises of the "Young Eagle." The outlook of the "Young Eagle" himself was expressed in an interview given to the Press after a successful air attack; the glee with which he described the flight of the defenceless Abyssinians before the pursuing bombers was cynically callous.

Foreign Minister and Confidante

That Count Ciano was destined for great things first became obvious on his return to Rome. There were several experienced candidates for the office of Foreign Minister, which Mussolini had himself held since 1932. Such were the Deputy, Polverelli, Suvich, now Italian Ambassador in Washington, and Dino Grandi. But it was the young Ciano who got the job and embarked on a brilliant career of visits to Berlin, Budapest and Vienna. Probably it was his wife's influence which carried the day. Countess Ciano is the only one of Signor Mussolini's children to have inherited a large proportion of his forcefulness and intelligence; she is his favourite daughter and is always in close touch with him. Bruno and Vittorio, the Duce's two sons, have had to be written off. At their school in Rome, the Ciceo Tasuo, they were quite undistinguished. Since

then, one has entered the Air Force and the other writes film scenarios. The fact that the latter, Vittorio, was allowed to make a comparatively humble marriage shows that is he completely out of the succession.

Although there is no denying Count Ciano's cleverness, his choice as successor to the Fascist throne seems open to several criticisms. There is nothing to prove that he is a man of real character ; he has never taken a knock or been through a rough-and-tumble ; many people think him superficial and dangerously inexperienced. One cannot help feeling that, should Signor Mussolini disappear from the scene, some Sulla with bigger guns, such as Count Grandi or Marshal Balbo, would return and drive the trivial Marius from the field. But the Duce may be right on one point ; Count Ciano, as his son-in-law, is about the only one among his 44,000,000 fellow-countrymen whom he dares to trust.

The Spanish "Settlement"

Italian foreign policy to-day, like Mr. Chamberlain's, is suffering from the effects of a miscalculation. Both in Rome and in London, when the Anglo-Italian Agreement was drafted, it was expected that General Franco would win the war in Spain within a few months. Now an end seems unlikely before next year. But, until a settlement in Spain is reached, the British Government are pledged not to recognise the conquest of Abyssinia or to ratify the Agreement. Fortunately the Prime Minister has never defined a "settlement" in Spain ; probably he is waiting to take advantage of any lull in the conflict which he can reasonably present to the House of Commons as constituting a "settlement." So far the only hope seems to be provided by the Non-Intervention Agreement with its regulations for the "substantial withdrawal" of volunteers.

The Need for Patience

But a long time may elapse before volunteers are withdrawn. It is the Italian and German aviation which is battering the Spanish Government into submission—both by air raids over cities and by attacks on British merchantmen bringing supplies. Until the victory is won, will Signor Mussolini be prepared to deprive General Franco of so indispensable a weapon ? Yet, in the meanwhile, the Duce sees his other line of policy, his *rapprochement* with Britain, indefinitely

thwarted. It is no longer the Machiavellian triumph he would like it to appear. Staleness breeds impatience, and it is natural for the Fascist temperament to blame the delay on other nations. That is the danger now. If Signor Mussolini can hold his hand, the Anglo-Italian Agreement will duly be completed without any sudden renewal of tension ; but, if, on the other hand, in a fit of pique, he launches forth into some fresh adventure involving his prestige, the most important card in Mr. Chamberlain's appeasement programme will fall to the ground unplayed, and perhaps never to be played again. So far Count Ciano, in his recent conversations with Lord Perth, has shown little restraint or helpfulness. But it is his father-in-law who has the last word, and there is a chance that the Duce at least may remain unruffled.

THEY'RE OFF !

British Plan for Spain : Official

British plan for withdrawal of volunteers from Spain, published in White Paper to-night, will require five months to carry through, writes " Evening Standard " correspondent.

It will take 45 days to set the machinery ; 50 days for the evacuation of volunteers apart from sick and wounded and prisoners of war ; 49 days will be spent in a search for stragglers, and whole scheme will be completed in 164 days.

Volunteers will be transferred to evacuation areas at the rate of 2,000 men per day.

Evening Standard, 11.7.38.

If any non-Spaniards are fighting in Spain,
The Powers engaging in non-interference
Their numbers (if any) will now ascertain,
And adopt Britain's plan for immediate clearance.

For foreign assistance (if any) is due
To the non-recognition of non-observation,
Which our Draft Resolution will tighten anew
(If the rumour just mentioned receives confirmation).

A Board the Committee will summon with speed,
 The Board in a trice will dispatch two Commissions
 Which will to the scene of the conflict proceed
 To count volunteers and (if any) technicians.

Both Spanish Headquarters will straightway appoint
 Officials to furnish the relevant data,
 Whereon both Commissions will merge in a Joint,
 Effecting withdrawal for both sides (pro rata).

The new Joint Commission will forthwith afford
 Due time while the stragglers are found and surrounded,
 Then Committee, Commission, Headquarters and Board
 Get the whole foreign army (if any) impounded.

If the war's hoped-for settlement meantime delays,
 While men and material (if any) are sorted ;
 Then barely one hundred and sixty-four days
 Will see foreign assistance (if any) deported.

And though Franco must wait on the fortunes of War,
 Great Britain again wins a peaceful extension,
 Enabling the Powers to rely, as before,
 On the non-application of Non-Intervention.

“REYNARD.”

1838

Lord Brougham directed their lordships' attention to certain instructions alleged to have been issued by the Lords of the Admiralty to cruisers off the Spanish coast, to prevent the approach of Sardinian or Dutch vessels with munitions of war. The noble and learned lord considered such instructions (if issued) as a palpable infraction of international law ; in short the noble and learned lord said that “ he was forced to take for granted that we were at war, though it was not necessary that we should be so, though we assisted one party.”—*Sunday Times*, July 15, 1838.

THE OPEN FORUM



THE WATCH ON THE DANUBE

by DOUGLAS REED

In this section we publish, without necessarily sharing the views they express, articles from men of international fame. Mr. Douglas Reed, whose recent book, "Insanity Fair", has rivalled the success of "Inside Europe", writes this article from Central Europe. As the representative of a great British newspaper, he has exceptional opportunities for supplying that information which is essential if our readers are to pass wise judgment on the Danubian situation

THE Danube for long to come will dominate the political picture of Europe. The name, for most English people, has meant ballet girls in blue, dancing a Strauss waltz, afternoon coffee at Coblenz with the Danube curving by below, evenings in the open air restaurants of the Margaret Island at Budapest, with the river swiftly flowing past. In 1938 it has a soberer significance. It is the symbol of the direction in which the German urge to expand will now move.

The Rhineland has been recovered and all is well in the west. Austria has been annexed and the south is secure. Inevitably the battering-ram that is German policy, backed by the energy of 75 million people, slews round and points down the Danube, the waterway leading to the Black Sea. It is conceivable that the next immediate German move might be in Danzig, because progress on the Danube is difficult at the moment and Danzig offers spectacular success cheaply. But the main drive will be down the Danube. Its aim will be to achieve political and economic ascendancy over the Danubian States, to ensure that they will produce predominantly for Germany in peace and not be among her enemies in war.

A Natural Link

To the German mind this is a natural process, supported by all arguments of sound trading and geography. The Reich is a great industrial country, but cannot grow all it needs to eat: the Danubian States are predominantly agricultural: the Danube links them all; therefore let the barge convoys toiling laboriously upstream bring their foodstuffs and livestock to Germany, the barge convoys slipping swiftly downstream bring German farm machinery, locomotives, and motor cars to them.



DOUGLAS REED

It is a powerful argument, difficult to confute. The capacity of the Reich

to consume the products of the Danubian States is enormous, the Danube is a convenient thoroughfare for the exchange of goods. The strength of Germany's position on the Danube is so great that she should be able to obtain everything she wants in Danubian and Balkan Europe by peaceful means, by merely leaning her weight south-eastward. For that matter, Germany in 1914 looked as if she could achieve paramountcy in Europe by peaceful means, in virtue of her geographical position, her large and fecund population, and her efficiency in manufacturing and marketing what her neighbours wanted.

Dangers to Independence

For the small Danubian States close political and economic relationships with the Reich carry great advantages. They also contain a danger : that their dependence on the consuming capacity of the great militarist Reich might bring a threat to their own independent existence. All these States have known Turkish or Germanic domination, or both. Freedom from foreign rule, won at such cost, is dear to them. The prospect of new subjugation is terrifying. But economic dependence on the Reich itself makes some inroads on their independence, for the following reasons :

These small States are predominantly agricultural not because they love tilling the fields, but because, being under alien rule when the mechanical age began, they lagged behind. Perhaps they would be wiser to-day to keep to agriculture and shun industry, who knows ? But for better or worse, they long to have their own industries, to mine their own coal and iron, to make their own cheap silk stockings and tooth-paste, to building their own locomotives and tanks and aircraft. The urge towards industrialisation is strong in them. In Yugoslavia, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria new industries are constantly taking root.

Economic dependence on Germany, which does not want manufactures from them but only agricultural products, tends to check this process of industrialisation and tie them to the land. It is, in effect, a form of subservience ; might it not be even the shadow, cast before, of coming political domination ? All of these states, save Czechoslovakia, now send 40 per cent. or more of their exports to Germany and receive in return, not cash, with which home industries could be developed, but German manufactures.

Will London take a Hand ?

For such reasons the news from London that a Government Inter-Departmental Committee has been set up to study means of extending financial and economic relations with the Danubian and Balkan State was welcomed on the Lower Danube, though this pleasure was not loudly expressed. Why ? The reason is again to be found in the Reich, which was suspicious of this announcement and saw in it a new move to strengthen the resistance of small states to the spread of German influence in an area where Germany feels herself predestined and entitled to be paramount.

The Danubian States, for their part, would gladly increase their sales in the western markets, where they can obtain negotiable currencies in payment, but their dependence on the Reich is already such that they have to be circumspect. How far London is actually prepared to go in this direction is a question. The feeling in Danubia is that the potential British support is not so much contemplated for the inland Danubian countries, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria, which are felt to be already so near to the shadow of German domination as to have been more or less written off in London, as for the more southerly countries, with a seaboard, where British influence could more easily, more naturally, and less pointedly make itself felt. For London, it is believed, the real first line of defence against German economic expansion is probably Yugoslavia-Greece-Turkey. The recent announcement of the British arms credit to Turkey seems to support this view.

A Purely Danubian Commission

At the seizure of Austria, Germany made a mighty jump down the Danube, from Passau to Bratislava. A long stretch of the river is now under her exclusive control. She would like the other Danubian States to withdraw, like herself, from the International Commission, set up at the peace conference, and to join her in a purely Danubian Commission, to the exclusion of powers which use the river but do not live on its banks.

Such a Commission would be under predominant German control, and would give a picture in miniature of the regime in Danubian Europe which Germany envisages as the right and proper one for this area. Soon the other International Danube Commission—that which was charged by the Paris Conference after the Crimean War to take its seat at the mouth of the Danube for two years and see that this was kept navigable, and is still sitting there to-day, eighty years after—would be ousted. Its status is certainly anomalous and it has never been loved by the States which live on the Danube, least of all by Rumania, in whose territory it sits.

The Rhine-Main-Danube Canal

Meanwhile the construction of the Rhine-Main-Danube Canal, a gigantic project which has lain dormant for many years and which

Field Marshal Goering has now commanded to be completed in four years, by opening up a waterway for ships right across Europe from the North Sea to the Black Sea will vastly increase the importance of the Danube and of Germany's position on the Danube. In conception it is not much inferior to those other continental short-cuts, the Suez and Panama Canals. It will similarly increase the dependence on Germany of those Lower Danubian States which would largely use it.

Czechoslovakia the Obstacle

Altogether, many omens are propitious for the consummation of the great customs union idea, linking the agricultural Danubian States with the mighty industrialised Reich, in which Germany sees an ideal unit for the exchange of goods and services and an ideal market for her wares. There is one great obstacle—Czechoslovakia. This, rather than the cause of the Sudeten Germans, may be the real reason for the relentless siege of that young Republic.

Czechoslovakia is the only Danubian State that is not predominantly agricultural. She has a large and efficient industry. She is thus less dependent economically on Germany as a purchaser of her exports than the other Danubian States. She is an efficient self-contained unit, with agriculture well balanced against industries. Politically, she is, through her alliances with France and Russia, equally independent of the Reich ; she feels herself nearest to the threat of renewed German domination and is resolved to resist it rather than yield to it. The other Danubian States, farther away, look non-committally on. Czechoslovakia is the first of them to feel that the drive down the Danube immediately threatens her existence.

On the outcome of this struggle depend the pace and extent of Germany's expansion down the Danube. Since May 21st the Czechoslovaks have had their defences manned and are busily strengthening them, so that any attempt to overcome this obstacle by a quick swoop on the Austrian model would mean heavy fighting and the danger of a general European war. Germany's means of extending her orbit of influence by non-violent methods, once she can find some way round the Czechoslovak difficulty, are so great that this risk does not seem worth her while.

Alternatives to War

What are the other possibilities? Will the Czechoslovak Nationalities Statute give the Sudeten Germans concessions that can be used to undermine the structure of the Czechoslovak State from inside, on the model of Austria, Herr von Schuschnigg and Herr von Seyss-Inquart? Can Czechoslovakia be induced by unrelenting pressure to break with her French and Russian allies and, consoled possibly with a vassal independence, be brought to fall into the German line, so that the way would be clear to Budapest and beyond?

All down the line of the Danube men are asking these questions and waiting on the outcome of the Czech-German struggle, for they know that the destiny of the rest of Danubia hangs upon it. They know that some change has got to come and cannot foretell what it will be. Will Czechoslovakia disintegrate? Will there be war? Is there any hope of some compromise solution? Everybody ponders these alternatives, and nobody can find the answer.

Whatever solution the future holds, Hungary seems to stand and fall with Czechoslovakia. If Germany succeeds, in one form or another, in subjugating Czechoslovakia or in bringing her into the German camp, Hungary will also pass irrevocably into the German orbit, to which she is in any event, by all her interests and traditions, strongly attracted. She would presumably retain that independence of self-government which she so long strove after and eventually won from Austria, but the mighty Reich, once at her door, would never be satisfied with anything less than the complete customs union and full military co-ordination which existed between Austria and Hungary in the old German-Magyar Empire. Rumania and Bulgaria would hardly be able to offer much more resistance. Yugoslavia is a question mark: there the tussle between German and Slav in Danubian Europe might begin again.

All this turns on the result of the tug-of-war between Berlin and Prague. The issue, as men instinctively feel, is not "Home Rule for the Sudeten Germans," but the future of Danubian Europe.

CRACKS AT THE DICTATORS ~


THE ELYSIAN FIELDS



"Le Comard Enchainé,"

Paris

"Napoleon's gone completely nuts. He thinks he's Mussolini!"




"Le Comard Enchainé,"

Paris

THE NEW GERMAN CHURCH

"And as a penance, you will say three 'Our Führer's' every night, and read *Mein Kampf* ten times."



"Marianne,"

Paris

"What will give us peace in Europe at last?"

"It's enough, if Stalin dies of grief on hearing that Hitler has committed suicide on the tomb of Mussolini!"



"Marianne,"

Paris

A BAD TIME FOR SCHOOLBOYS

"You must admit, with this chap Hitler, learning geography's not even funny!"

DANGEROUS AGE ~



"New Masses,"

New York.


THE HISTORY OF A TORY
WHISKER



"Le Canard Enchaîné,"

Paris

"Excuse me, your hat has been the victim
of a bombing-pigeon!"



"Sartreballo,"

Rome.

"Thank God! Civilisation again at last!"



TOWARDS PEACE IN SPAIN?

“The Brothers”

There have been suggestions in the British Press that the moment for mediation in the Spanish civil war was approaching. Unfortunately, such premature announcements merely have the effect of checking tendencies towards peace and driving those who are working for them into feverish assurances of loyalty to the Republic or the Nationalist cause. The extracts printed below come in a different category. Dr. Negrin, the Prime Minister, and General Yagüe, one of the most important generals on the Franco side, are at one in insisting that Spain is for the Spaniards, that there must be great social reforms and that there must be freedom of worship. General Yagüe's speech was delivered in Burgos on April 19th and his obvious preference for Spaniards who happen to be “Red” to the foreigners in General Franco's army has led him into grave trouble.

Little has been heard of him since his army played so great a part in breaking through to the Mediterranean coast, and according to reports confirmed in the Italian Press he has since been placed under arrest. But his view is shared by an ever-growing number of General Franco's supporters. It is not improbable that by now a large majority of them would subscribe to Dr. Negrin's claim that there can be no peace while foreigners are on Spanish soil, but that there can be peace the moment they leave

Extracts from a speech broadcast from Madrid by Dr. Negrin, Prime Minister of Spain, on June 16th

WE are fighting for the independence of Spain. If this were not so we would not be prepared to see the war last a moment longer nor another drop of blood shed. We would not allow the pain and suffering to increase. But the very existence of Spain as a free country is at stake, and that being so there can be no limit to the sacrifice.

While there is one inch of our land remaining, and while there is one Spaniard living, we will fight to the death if the future of our country is at stake, and we will conquer.

Fascist Schemes

What was meant to be an insurrection became a civil war, and very soon a war of invasion. . . . Do you believe that the Italians and Germans who are destroying our cities and our people, devastating our riches and murdering without pity our women and children—women and children of Spain—do you think that they feel any interest in our war? that they show sympathy for our people? They take advantage of the situation, but they despise you.

They lack the heart to understand us. They have too little generosity to judge us. This and no other is the reality. Will you consent that those who to-day consider themselves lords and masters, and who imagine our country mortgaged in their favour, divide us into zones of influence, and that they exploit the work of our fathers and the labour of our sons? Do you not see that they will not object, if need be, to satisfy others with part of the booty, cutting the country into pieces, converting it into a defeated land or a mandated territory?

We are the victims of the uncontrollable ambition of some and of the mediocrity and cowardice of others.

We are fighting to save Spain from foreign domination and from possible seizure by nations abroad, and we will win. The certainty of victory inspires Spain with the invincible desire to attain it. . . .

Spain is not an isolated rock in the world. Every day of resistance is a battle won in the international field in favour of our cause, for the heroism of our soldiers has shattered the plans made at our expense.

We have reason to be confident in victory. When a Government asks its people to resist to the utmost in the face of great afflictions and sacrifices, it must be in support of principles held by the people themselves. Such sacrifices cannot be demanded in the name of any specific ideology, or any group or party ; we must seek a common denominator of aims, the sum total of obligations contracted during the country's history, which are debts to be paid to posterity.

We are fighting to ensure the absolute independence of Spain, an independence without obstacles or limits other than those imposed by a common right to establish bonds between the peoples. . . .

Independence means liberation from invaders, means also rejecting guardians, means giving the worker the right to enjoy the fruits of his own lands instead of being the victim of foreign plunder, means a political life and economy directed, regulated and exploited by and for the Spaniards.

A Free Spain

We are fighting for the integrity of Spain, and we will not countenance any dismemberment of her territory, her coastline, her cities. Neither in the Peninsula nor in her islands, neither among her possessions nor in her protectorate. We are fighting for the democratic Republic of the people, since the Monarchy lost all touch with the national feeling and so brought about the decadence of Spain and the loss of her institutions. . . .

We are fighting so that the will of Spain, to be expressed in a plebiscite as soon as the war is over, may determine the political and social life of the Republic.

We are fighting so that the State may ensure full rights to the

citizen, and respect to conscience and creed. There must be no intervention on the part of the Church as an institution in the life of the State, nor any interference by its priests in civil disputes. But, on the other hand, there must be guarantees of full freedom of worship. We owe this to our principles. We owe this to the countless Spaniards who practise a positive religion ; we owe it to the thousands of Catholics who are fighting on our side. But were there only one such Catholic—even if there were none—the State could not countenance the persecution of ideas. It would be a tremendous error. Persecution creates martyrs, and martyrs revive beliefs. In all religious feeling there is something of the noblest of the human spirit, and were it not for a deep religious sense it would be difficult to find courage to support the hard trials which our country is now enduring.

We are fighting so that the fruits of the land may be for the man who works it. We are fighting to suppress the shameless exploitation of the individual by a wealthy class which in its turn converts itself into the ruler of the State and loses sight of—and almost always goes against—the collective interest. Let him who wishes to be an owner become one by his own efforts and let him submit the enjoyment of his possessions to the supreme interest of the nation. . . .



"Le Canard Enchaîné,"

Paris

"The wheat harvest looks like being bad, but I'm quite pleased with my Spanish crops."



"Le Canard Enchaîné,"

Paris

"What authority have you for believing that I have any influence over this fellow Franco?"

We are fighting for the establishment of international relations founded on a regime of law, but founded also on a basis of equality. In order to attain this no sacrifice should be spared.

Peace after the Strife

If, while the war lasts, we have to be stern and inexorable with the declared or the hidden enemy, yet we long for peace in order to unite all our countrymen who sincerely wish to carry out their duty, to which all of us are called, in the tremendous task of building Spain afresh and making her a great country.

Is there anyone who believes that after this bloody struggle it will be possible merely to classify Spaniards as victors or vanquished? Is there anyone who thinks that in the rebuilding of our country we can dispense with any worker in any branch of State activity because of the regimental badge he wore? Must this fratricidal struggle go on in peace time? No! And though this may be unwelcome to many of you I say it will be easier to come to an understanding with the enemy of yesterday, the enemy of to-day and perhaps the collaborator of to-morrow, than with the cautious spectator who



"The Daily Worker."

wishes to be on good terms with everybody ; who from a lofty position far removed from the dust of the arena is awaiting the moment when he may take his place in the triumphal car and who, when there is no longer any risk, will damage your work with a cold and soulless criticism.

Cursed be the ruler who does not realise that when the fight is over his first duty is to bring about conciliation and harmony so as to render possible the fellowship of all citizens. It will be a sorry thing for Spain if after such suffering and humiliation she is unable to find the leaders who see that the interests of their compatriots lie away from the hatred and revenge which civil war engenders. It would be the end of Spain.

The fighters at the front must wage war with courage and bravery. The conquest that lies ahead of us merits all sacrifices. We are fighting—heed my words—so that Spain may belong to the Spaniards, and this we shall achieve.

*Extracts from a Speech delivered at Burgos on April 19th, by
General Yagüe*

I pray that God will inspire me so that I may impress upon those men who are cold of heart and who lack faith, that at this time Spain needs the efforts of all her sons ; that it is a crime not to form part of the national block, and far worse to try to produce rifts for the sake of personal ambition, grudges, or small spites ; that such conduct is criminal at this juncture and might also prove a dangerous pastime.

I wish that these men whose hearts are cold might see our soldiers when, worn out by endless marching, their bodies bruised from battling through thickets and over crags, their nerves strained by exposure to danger for hours on end and day after day, their minds saddened by the vision of their noblest comrades fallen at their side, they meet a group of Red prisoners. At that moment, when any brutality would be excusable and all acts of vengeance understandable, the first thing our fellows do is to offer them their water-bottles and cigarettes, and after they have watched them satisfy these material needs they hold out their arms and clasp them in a brotherly embrace. (*Loud cheers.*)

Courage of the Reds

There at the front these men would learn that there is also no truth in the reports, so current at many miles' distance from the firing-line, to the effect that the Reds run away the whole time without stopping—a story which, apart from its utter falsehood, serves to belittle our own men. The Reds fight doggedly, they defend every inch of the ground and, when they fall, they die with courage. They were born of this blessed land that strengthens muscles and tempers the heart ; they were born beneath this blazing Spanish sun of ours that kindles the passions and makes them impetuous—born in Spain, they are Spaniards and therefore brave. (*Cheers.*)

There they would see, these cold men—and perhaps it would make them think—that when the Blue soldier, always gallant, meets the Red soldier, who is also gallant, he opens his arms to him and in their embrace these two begin to understand each other, and maybe they guess the presence of their near and common enemy, and at the front itself, on this blood-soaked Spanish earth, they experience the need to unite.

It is a year to-day, comrades, since the *Caudillo** with keen political intelligence, decreed the union of all true Spaniards. But for this to be more than the dead letter of a decree, more than a mere page in the *Gazette*, it will have to be based on firm and solid foundations, it must be endowed with human warmth, it must be quickened by love.

Social Justice

Firm and solid foundations. The first, the most urgent of all, though it may not be the most important, is social justice—a generous social justice. So right is it, so reasonable that the Spaniards who are conquering Spain with their life's blood, the sweat of their brows, the ache in their hearts and the sorrow of their souls, should afterwards enjoy the Spain which they have won, and which contains nothing of their own, that indeed it admits of no argument.

The *Caudillo* has promised that there shall be bread and warmth in every home. He is a man of determination and a Spanish gentleman of his word. All who fight and suffer on the several fronts feel the same, and the immense majority behind the lines holds that

**Leader*

opinion too. Social justice there shall be. The only point to be discussed is the measure of its generosity—but bear in mind that the warrior who is fighting for Spain without any possessions of his own to defend, if he returns home and finds his elementary needs neglected, will demand justice of his fellow-men, and, should they refuse to listen to him, he will call on Heaven for justice. And I am positive than Heaven will grant that he take it into his own hands. . . . (*Prolonged applause.*)

In the new Spain it will suffice to be a Spaniard, an honest man and willing to work, for all essential needs to be fulfilled—without the fear that unemployment or sickness or old age will lead to utmost poverty. In the new Spain the bearing of many sons will be a blessing from on high rather than, as hitherto, a curse of the devil. . . .

In the new Spain there will be no drones, no invited guests. The Phalanx has never allowed them—but now they are more than ever unwanted. It would be criminal for us to let parasites batten on the weary body of anguished Spain, increasing her distress and prolonging the lengthy convalescence which our country will have to undergo after giving her blood so freely and magnanimously.

After the War

. . . The war will soon be over, my friends, and then all must get to work. To work—each man with his first requirements assured. It is quite possible that the powerful will have to give up a part of their wealth ; but this, if they are right-minded, they must willingly do, realising simply that if the Reds had won they would have lost everything, for, if those who are in Red territory have lost the whole of their possessions, it is not too much to ask of these gentlemen that they should surrender a little of what they have for the benefit of those who are risking their lives to defend them and their fortunes. . . . (*Loud cheers.*)

. . . But if we build our happiness on love of our country and its greatness, the more ambitious we are for her, the greater and richer and stronger and finer we wish her to be, the happier shall we ourselves be. We shall live contented, we shall know that she will not attain to the perfection we desire for her in our lifetime ; but no matter, we will labour unceasingly that our children and grandchildren may reach that goal as speedily as possible. Then,

gentlemen, our single destiny will have become a fact, real unity will have been achieved without need of any law or regulations or anything, and love of country will have joined all Spaniards together in a common effort, a common sacrifice—even unto death, if necessary.

These are the roots from which unification must spring, in order that it may bear the fruit desired by our Leader and by every one of us. Social justice—genuine justice, patriotic fervour, the spirit of self-sacrifice, and a military and heroic attitude to life.

The Necessity of Mercy

But that is not enough. To imbue this unity with living warmth, to make it truly felt and cherished in every home, we must forgive—above all, forgive. There are thousands and thousands of men languishing in prison, comrades. Why are they there? Because they belonged to some political party or syndicate. Among them there are many who are hard-working and honourable and who, with a very slight effort, with a little kindness, could be won over to our cause. There are many of their number who were inveigled or forced into subscribing to some revolutionary trade union. I do not think that this is a worse offence than was committed by those bankers and businessmen who gave their advertisements and their money to the Socialist newspapers. (*Applause.*)

We must be merciful, comrades. We must be large-hearted and know how to forgive. We are strong and can afford that gesture; but, above all, we must follow the *Caudillo's* ordinances. Many months ago our Leader promised the Reds—and he continues to make and to fulfil the promise—that those of them who are innocent of any common crime can come over to our lines, surrender their arms, and find among us peace and pardon.

Now, if that is how we treat men who for twenty months have been fighting against us in the field, what law, what justice is it that keeps these people still in gaol for the sole crime, already forgiven by the *Caudillo*, of having belonged to some political society? Have these men been guilty of a graver offence than those who have been shooting at us for the past twenty months? And if we do not set them free, will they not suspect that we forgive those others because we are afraid of them?

I am asking the authorities to re-examine dossiers and crime-

sheets, to look into these men's previous records and release them, that they may bring back confidence and calm into their homes, and that we may begin to cast out hatred ; so that when we come to preach all the fine tenets of our creed, we shall not be confronted with sceptical smiles and even looks of loathing—for it is clear that bitter resentment is bound to be harboured in the bosom of a family which, although guiltless, has had one of its members sent to prison.

And if I ask pardon for these misguided or contaminated individuals, enemies of mine that were, comrades of mine to be, you can imagine with what fervour, with what humility and anxiety I shall plead for those Blueshirts of the old guard who, if they are in prison, must be there because—undoubtedly—they have erred, yet did so in good faith. These companions of ours were already pardoned by the *Caudillo*, with his unfailing honesty and kindness, when the National Council was formed.

They are now awaiting the reconsideration of their cases. I beg the responsible officials not to sleep, not to rest until they have investigated afresh the charges against them. Let them remember that those Blueshirts in gaol are the men who, when Spain lay writhing under every indignity, sprang to her aid rousing others with the call of "Arriba España !" (*Loud and prolonged cheers.*) They are the men who, when Spain's sufferings were greatest, proved that they had most love for her, hazarding their lives and liberty in her defence—for which they have already been subjected to imprisonment and persecution.

NEW DEAL FABLE

Once upon a time, there was a farmer who sold two chickens. With the proceeds he bought two shirts.

So the farmer had two shirts and a city man had two chickens.

Then came along the New Deal, and told the farmer he should get more money for his chickens by making them scarcer . . . he must not raise so many, and then he would get more income. The New Deal also told the working man in the city that he must work fewer hours and get more money for making fewer shirts. That, of course, caused shirts to cost more.

Then the farmer brought one chicken to market. He got as much money for it as he had previously gotten for two chickens. He felt fine. He wanted to buy some shirts, but he found that shirts had also doubled in price. So he got one shirt.

Now the farmer had one shirt, and the city man had one chicken, whereas without the New Deal, the farmer could have had two shirts and the city man could have had two chickens.

This, boys and girls, is called "the more abundant life."—*The Detroitian*.

VIENNA IS NO LONGER WHAT IT USED TO BE

From Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, Berlin, 5.7.38

Many details have appeared in the British Press about the disillusion experienced in Austria since the annexation. They have been met by unconvincing Nazi denials going so far as to claim that Jewish shopkeepers have thrown all their stock into the street and have then got themselves photographed for propaganda purposes. Here Dr. Silex, the able Editor of the "Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung," gives a more reasonable and reasoned account of the difficulties which the German Government has to overcome


ISN'T that a pity? Vienna is no longer what it used to be. Dear old Vienna; well, it has ceased to exist. The experts whisper it to each other with knowing looks; with long faces people speak of the good old times; and in the English Press appear letters from people who write for or against travel to Austria. Some want to boycott Austria; others want to demonstrate their unchangeable sympathy for "the ill-treated Austrian people" by parading the English number-plates of their cars condescendingly on the Austrian roads. Only a few sensible persons advise a trip to Austria so that as many English people as possible may gain their own impressions of the situation, instead of being taken in by tales of atrocities. Whether for or against—they are all unanimous on one point: that Vienna is no longer what it used to be, and in this respect we entirely agree with them. Perhaps the rumour has at last got round that Vienna was not meant to remain what it used to be.

The Need for Change

There are various opinions as to what Vienna used to be. The musical comedy conception of this city, of the whole Austrian scene, was full of charm, and the human reality was usually even more charming. But there were other realities. A people, suppressed and violated under the terms of the Peace, exhausting itself in internal conflicts, without opportunities for work, without future; a metropolis which tried to hide many an inner untruth under a cosmopolitan veneer. A capital which was less suited to the German people in

Austria than globe-trotters can comprehend. Now we have brought about the *Anschluss* of Vienna. Nobody has ever disguised the fact that Vienna did not come up to the ideal of a German town in the Third Reich. Vienna must not remain what it was. Austria has, after all, had a revolution, but that is easily or frivolously forgotten or overlooked. In a few days and weeks she had to catch up with a five years' start. We well remember the time when the old forms—unfortunately only in the old Reich at first—were broken up, although the new forms, which were to take their place, were not quite ready. We remember the doubts and scruples which were then current in the old Reich. We saw that mistakes were being made and acknowledged ; that not every experiment was successful ; but that not every experiment was stubbornly pursued. We in Germany know very well that there have to be rifts and cracks in times of revolution, and we can only smile if anyone tries to take us to account for the rifts and cracks in Austria.

The foreign Press has been swamped by a flood of false reports on Austria. Those who pretend to understand these things, or



THE JEWS IN VIENNA
Before—



Der Stürmer, Nürnberg
—and after the Anschluss.

36 VIENNA IS NO LONGER WHAT IT USED TO BE


even more, to criticise them, will have to base their conclusions on certain fundamental principles : firstly, Germany will not rest until the fresh breeze has penetrated Austria and the German people who live there ; secondly, it is not news for us to be told that the inclusion of Austria into the Reich sets a task in many respects more difficult than the return of the Saar district ; and, thirdly, Austria with the rejuvenated city of Vienna will be led towards the fulfilment of her destiny as the Ostmark, the Eastern Province.

Anybody who has any experience of revolutions will not be perturbed by the information that a dozen of self-appointed commissars have moved (or, rather, have been moved) from Vienna to the concentration camp at Dachau. When the Reich Commissar arrived in Vienna, these commissars were already there. It was quite natural, even necessary, that, during the first days of the revolution, there should have been men in readiness who, on their own initiative and without regular orders from above, concerned themselves with the continuation of business enterprises. Some who felt the call were unsuitable and stumbled over matters of accountancy. The achievements and merits of the others are all the more praiseworthy. August 1st will see the disappearance of the entire system of commissars in so far as it was unregulated. Buerckel is no respecter of persons, and many a foreign government would feel privileged to have such a man at its disposal when a task of this kind suddenly presents itself and has to be tackled. There are not twenty thousand, nor sixty thousand political prisoners in Austria, but 3,780, including those that are Jews. The subject of political prisoners leads us to the second of the above-mentioned points.

More Formidable than the Saar

The inclusion of Austria is naturally a more formidable task than the return of the Saar. It is for that reason that it is so valuable that the Reich Commissar has all the experience which his previous task has given him. The fight which the Saar fought was directed against outside forces. It is true that there were a few emigrants and communists in the district, but that did not constitute any difficulties because these elements left hurriedly over night. In Austria, however, there raged an internal fight during the last five

years. Internal conflicts are distinguished by greater bitterness ; Spain is the example. That Austria has, after all, been spared the fate of Spain is, apart from the aggrandisement of the Reich, an additional claim to Adolf Hitler's fame. But whereas with the return of the Saar the internal political history that went before could be reckoned as almost entirely liquidated, with one stroke, Austria has remained burdened with the memory of the five unhappy years. With the exception of the escape of some of the ring-leaders, the German people of Austria came to us, such as they are, united with us by the common stock, but divided by memory. It is not the economic task which presents the greatest difficulties (although that side of the *Anschluss* does already present more problems than the return of the Saar which had always belonged to the Prussian-German economic and administrative sphere). These problems are being solved by a programme of facts, which has been drawn up authoritatively and is being carried out with the utmost effort by the rank and file. This comradeship of work contributes much towards spread-



L'Ordre, Paris

CHORUS OF AUSTRIAN NAZIS

"Oh, how lovely the Anschluss was, till March the eleventh this year!"

ing the fresh breeze, but it is, of course, not sufficient. Buerckel does not need to be taught from abroad that his position is not always easy. How could it be, with such a task before him? He does not insist that everything has been accomplished, but he has been able to state in Graz that the people of the Ostmark "make the greatest possible efforts" these days to become faithful vassals of Hitler. The way to this fellowship will not remain permanently closed to anyone, not even to former opponents. Of the entirely hopeless cases there can be, in Buerckel's opinion, "probably only a very limited number."

To make the greatest possible effort—nobody can ask more from anyone.

Germans in Austria

We only find it ridiculous if someone discovers that the positions have not all been filled correctly, or that there are rival candidates in various groups. We are told that there are too many Germans from the Old Reich. In this respect, too, things are naturally more complicated than they were with the Saar. There, old warriors did not have to leave their country in masses, and there could be no question as to who had acquired greater rights—the illegitimate fighters within the country or those who had been driven abroad. The hunt for posts is always an evil, but if anyone has risked his life, his health, or his post in the fight, then his claims do not necessarily come under the heading of "evil"; yet there remains the conflict between wish and requirements, because certain posts demand certain abilities, and no-one will deny that there is a certain amount of "discontent"—it is all too human to be mistaken about one's capabilities. To try to accomplish the *Anschluss* without any influx from the North would have been a piece of stupidity almost bordering on a crime against the people. If, during this process, any of us from the North are infected by the Viennese attitude to life, we shall not be displeased, and all well-meaning critics of Prussianism in the world should also be pleased.

We now come to third point. If people abroad spread rumours of our wickedness—why this anger? To have re-established the old German Ostmark on the Danube has without a doubt strengthened our influence, enlarged our "sphere." Those who recount the

difficulties to us, would like to see us wrecked on them. Only when the Foreign Press has resigned itself to the new German position, will it have any chance of becoming objective. As long as that is not the case we can, at any rate, not consider it as objective. At every opportunity we are shown how far Europe still is from acknowledging the new German position on the Continent. Hardly has England granted a loan of 16 million pounds to Turkey, when everywhere the English Press demands that the same method be employed all over Europe in order to counteract the threatening German penetration. Even the Sanjak Treaty between Turkey and France has had to serve as a pretext in the French Press to make the public appreciate it as a bolt against German expansion towards the East.

If only Vienna had remained what it used to be!

AIR
REARMAMENT.

"Those are
your colleagues
to-day, Madam."



*Die Brennessel,
Berlin*

CZECHOSLOVAK STRENGTH

A Hard Nut to Crack

by COLONEL STANISLAV YESTER

From "New Masses," New York, 21.6.38

Colonel Yester is a member of the Czechoslovak General Staff and a professor at the Military Academy in Prague. He is the author of many works on the problems of national defence and the wars in Spain, China and Ethiopia. For obvious reasons, Colonel Yester has used German sources of Czech army strength, as he says, "for guidance." It is revealing no confidence, however, according to the Editor of "New Masses," to add that the German estimates do not represent the full ability of the Czechoslovakian defence machine

LIKE Switzerland, Czechoslovakia is a continental state. It lies as far from the Baltic as from the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. In size, it is thirteenth of the twenty-seven European states. In 1938 its total population was 15,500,000 which places it eighth in Europe. Its powerful industry ranks Czechoslovakia immediately after Italy in Central Europe in this respect.

The fact that Czechoslovakia lies along the water-shed of the Sudeten and Carpathian Mountains—where the West Slavs, under the pressure of the Germans from the west and the Mongols from the south, were alone able to hold out—has given it a peculiarly elongated form and a very long frontier. At its widest point, Czechoslovakia measures 188 miles across, but it is nearly 625 miles long. More than half of its frontier borders on Germany. With its ally of the Little Entente, Rumania, it has a common frontier of 94 miles at its extreme eastern end. Germany, which is four times as large as Czechoslovakia and to-day has almost five times the population, surrounds Western Czechoslovakia far more completely than Russian Poland was enclosed before the war by Germany and Austria-Hungary.

Czechoslovakia can be involved in war against Germany on the west and Hungary on the south. Against Hungary, the country is protected by the treaties of alliance between the states of the Little

Entente. Against a German attack, it is protected by the treaties with France and the Soviet Union.

A military clash with Hungary is improbable. Against Hungary alone Czechoslovakia has a double superiority.

The Odds

A conflict with Germany is something different, for Germany is many times stronger than Czechoslovakia and, furthermore, encloses half of Czechoslovakia as though with mighty jaws. It goes without saying, therefore, that the Czechoslovak General Staff and government are exerting themselves to create the best possible military, political and economic conditions for a *temporary* struggle against superior force.

This superior force will, at the beginning, have to be met by the Czech forces both on land and in the air. The Czech air force and air-defence forces must expect a number of difficult days until the aerial assistance of our French and Russian allies arrives and gives us superiority in the air for the continuation of the struggle. The land forces, as a matter of fact, will have to stick it out some weeks longer before the allied armies push forward into German territory and force the German high command to turn its main forces against them. The decisive battle, *which will begin on the Rhine in the third or fourth week of the war*, will transform the Czechoslovak battle area into a second-rate area.

Czechoslovakia must therefore reckon with the following facts :

- (1) two or three days of resistance against superior forces in the air and on the land ;
- (2) two or three weeks of resistance against superior force on land.

There will, of course, be no declaration of war. The enemy will attempt, through a sudden attack by fast army units and air squadrons, to break through our frontier defences and to render our mobilisation and concentration of troops impossible.

Germany's Two Fronts


Germany with three fronts—the Franco-British western front, the Czech-Polish-Russian eastern front, and the Italian-Yugoslav southern front—will attempt, on the one hand, to demoralise each of these fronts politically, and on the other, to dominate them in

a military way. In actual fact, in a war against Czechoslovakia, Germany will have two fronts : a western front, France, and an eastern front, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union.

If there were no air armies to-day, 1914 and a new edition of the Schlieffen Plan would be repeated : an offensive in the West and a defensive in the East. In 1914, Austria-Hungary wanted to make a punitive expedition against Serbia, but the Russian intervention turned Serbia into a second-rate scene of operations. For Austria-Hungary, the Russian front became the principal theatre of operations ; for that was the direction from which powerful forces threatened to break into the empire.

Czechoslovakia as an Air-base

Aerial warfare, however, has changed certain formerly valid conditions. Attacks by the land forces gain new bases for the air armies. The Czechoslovakian area, which protrudes like a wedge



Prager Presse

MORNING JERKS





"Excuse me, what was the end of Exercise Two?"

Marianno

"Shocking extravagance ! A lipstick only lasts her a day !"

into the German Reich, represents a splendid offensive air-base, lying right in the middle of the German area. If, therefore, as far as land armies are concerned, the present eastern front is the less dangerous one for Germany (the Czechoslovakian army being too weak and the Russian too far away), nevertheless, *in respect to air attacks the opposite is true.* That is why, before the main land operations begin, the question of the "airplane carrier" in the heart of Germany, that is, the question of Czechoslovakia, must be solved.

The German General Staff will exert itself, as quickly as possible, to capture the air bases in the western part of Czechoslovakia before the clash of the main forces of the two coalitions occurs. The Czechoslovak General Staff, on the other hand, will do its part to resist the first attack of a superior force against the air bases in the western district—that is, to gain time.



Das Schwarze Korp

SNOB'S PROGRESS: a skit on the development of German workers' cars.

We know, from the experience of the World War, that a well-organised defence can resist successfully a double superiority of attack. At that time, the larger tactical units were not so lavishly provided with automatic weapons as to-day. If, in land fortification, a double superiority of force can be successfully resisted, to break through those fortifications would require more than a double superiority. An attack against such fortifications cannot proceed without very thorough preparations.

The Problems of Defence

Czechoslovakia, with half of its area enclosed by Germany, has had to solve a number of complicated defence problems : (1) She must prevent a sudden land and air attack. (2) After resisting this attack, she must prevent new attacks by land and air which would throw her mobilisation arrangements into disorder. (3) During the period of troop concentration, which will already be protected by the allied air forces, Czechoslovakia must make sure its land forces are not divided and that the troops in Bohemia and West Moravia are not encircled and cut off from Slovakia.

Although Czechoslovakia is able to call every man capable of bearing arms to the colours, there is the possibility that the mobilisation might come too late and that, in the meantime, the German jaws would close on Eastern Bohemia. It was for this reason that the Czechoslovakian General Staff assumed as its main problem the question of preserving continuous connection between the Western and Eastern commands. This was achieved by the construction of excellent fortifications along the north and south borders of Moravia. These fortifications will have to hold out for weeks, not only for days.

The remaining frontiers are so fortified that they can hold out as long as the mobilisation and concentration of troops are in progress. At the same time, all the frontier fortifications are so arranged that they can serve as points of support for the army once it is mobilised and concentrated. Thus, just as in 1914, the French frontier fortifications on the Marne protected the eastern flank of the French army, so will the frontier fortifications in Moravia and Eastern Bohemia protect the flank and rear of the Czechoslovakian troops against an attack from the west. One advantage of this will be that during this

period of the conflict, Czechoslovakia, combined with its allies, will already have achieved superiority.

The latest German figures give France an air strength this year of 5,000 ; Czechoslovakia, 1,400 ; Soviet Union, 9,000. It is therefore no exaggeration to assume that approximately 3,000 Soviet machines will come to the direct assistance of Czechoslovakia. Since the modern median-bomber is approximately equal to a long-range gun in battle, this in itself would be a highly important addition to our volume of fire.

Supported by their frontier fortifications and a powerful allied air force, the Czechoslovak army will attempt to manoeuvre so that it is not surrounded and, at the same time, as far as possible, to protect its own area from the enemy attack. The execution of these tasks will be assisted by the mountainous character of Czechoslovakia. In many districts there are very great natural impediments to fast-moving attacking units, and wherever the terrain is easily passable, fortifications are already established.

Czechoslovakia's Strength

For reasons which will be understood, I cannot give exact data of the strength of our armed forces. I quote, for guidance, figures taken from German military papers.

According to the German specialists, our peace-time army numbered 180,000 men. On mobilisation 1,500,000 well-trained soldiers could be called to the colours. Since our air army is principally designed for defensive purposes (we leave the offensive tasks to our allies), the air army is a part of the land forces as in the United States, and not an independent air force. The Germans assert that the mountain and cavalry brigades can be counted as divisions ; hence, the peace-time army of Czechoslovakia represents twenty-two divisions, which would be approximately doubled by mobilisation.

The majority of German military experts are agreed that Czechoslovakia could put forty well-armed divisions into the field.

Czechoslovakia has inherited 75 per cent of the heavy industry of the old Austria-Hungary. In the World War, Austria-Hungary provided, from its own industry, an army of about ninety divisions. Czechoslovakia can support not only forty division from its own industry but also at least thirty divisions of its allies.

Assuming that the enemy is able to damage or seize a part of our industry, there will, nevertheless, remain a very large economic and productive basis, especially since, in the last few years, the most important branches of industry have been moved from the dangerous frontier-areas far into the hinterland.

By virtue of a far-reaching law for the defence of the state, government agencies in time of emergency will take over control of all branches of industry essential for the national defence. This permits us to be confident of the proper mobilisation of the war industries. As far as foodstuffs are concerned, Czechoslovakia is self-supporting in grain, meat, sugar and alcohol and has, in fact far more than it needs of the latter two. Oil will be imported from Rumania.

Already in the World War, the Czechoslovak armament industry, especially the Skoda works, were dangerous competitors of the German industry. The 30.5 cannon produced by Skoda was superior in its operations and effectiveness to the well-known 42-cm. gun of the Germans, the Big Bertha. Thanks to its excellent industry, the Czechoslovak army is the best armed in Central Europe, next to the German and Italian. In 1935 its light machine-gun, under the Bren patent, was imported into England. According to German figures of March, 1938, the Czechoslovak army has more heavy guns than the Polish (450 against 420) and only fifty less than the United States. Moreover, the whole of our heavy artillery is motorized. The German military paper, *Deutsche Wehr*, asserts that in war-time the Czechoslovak army will have 400 mortars, 1,500 light field-guns and 600 heavy guns.

The Germans assert that we have 9,000 light and 3,500 heavy machine-guns and approximately 400 tanks, made and produced in our own works. The arming and maintenance of the army since 1919 has cost a total of 50,000,000,000 kronen. Half of this was used in the last five years for state defence measures. The ordinary military budget for 1938 amounts to 2,100,000,000 kronen and the extraordinary budget to 2,400,000,000 kronen. The total state budget for 1938 is 10,000,000,000 kronen.

Our own industry has not only provided the army with its equipment, up to the heaviest field-guns, but it has also provided our aerial armament. According to German estimates of February of this year we had 1,350 airplanes, divided as follows : 320 recon-

naissance planes ; 130 fighters ; 180 pursuit planes ; 120 daytime bombers ; 130 night bombers. According to the same German figures there are 90 squadrons, each with between 10 and 14 machines. The heavy machines are constructed under French licenses ; all the light machines are of our own construction. The engines are also of our own production under the Walter patent. The number of aerodromes is estimated by the Germans as 66.

Immediate and Total Mobilisation

The Germans, for example the late von Ludendorff, teach us that the so-called *successive* mobilisations of war materials is wrong. War ought to be prepared in advance for a definite prearranged moment and, at that moment, one must go into the struggle with the maximum of all forces. In 1914 the Germans took the field with 120 divisions. In the course of the following three years, they doubled this number through the mobilisation of their total war potentials. According to the new theory, the Germans would have to raise 240 divisions right at the beginning of the war. Such an arming demands quite exceptional economic preparations and a great straining of financial and moral forces. Some articles in German military papers disclose that the Germans would like to be able to put 300 divisions in the field. We know that a modern tactical unit requires a large working hinterland. An army of 300 divisions needs 6,000,000 men in the field and 12,000,000 workers in the hinterland.

Although we are not ourselves partisans of total war, we must nevertheless take measures in advance against an enemy which will employ the methods of total war. Therefore, our state defence law puts all civilian men up to sixty and women from seventeen to fifty in the service of national defence. The aim is to free as far as possible all trained men for the front. The pre-military education which begins with six-year-old boys and ends at twenty, before the beginning of military service, facilitates training and offers large reserves for work in the hinterland and for air-raid defence. In war, the president of the republic is the supreme commander of the armed forces. The government appoints the commander-in-chief of the armies in the field. From a political-strategic point of view, the war is directed by the Supreme Council of National Defence, in which the principal ministers and the prime minister are represented. The economic

organ of the Supreme Council is the Ministry of Economy, which will represent, in the widest sense, a ministry of munitions.

The Czechoslovak General Staff is proceeding with defensive preparations, by which its main object is to strengthen the defence against attacks from the air and to carry out the widest possible motorization. Motorization permits a quick answer to attacks and the speedy shifting of reserves.

Every one of our citizens is aware of the difficult position in which our country stands. They remember the fate of Belgium and Serbia in the World War ; they know the fate of Rumania in 1916. They believe, nevertheless, in the final victory ; for final victory is always on the side of the strongest battalions, and the strongest battalions are on the side of our allies.

CHINESE HORSE MAKES FASHION

Before I finish I want to tell you of my last day in China, about a year ago, when I saw there the one and only specimen of millinery. We don't wear hats in China, you know, but this was a marvellous thing with a high crown and a brim and lovely red flowers on it, and it was being worn by—a horse ! Well, imagine my amazement when I arrived back in San Francisco and found all the fashionable ladies wearing exactly the same kind of hat.—*Miss Rose Quong, addressing the China Society, London.*



UNION ! " At last, a cabinet capable of uniting all Frenchmen ! "

IS ENGLAND AGEING ?

by KURT VON STUTTERHEIM (*London Correspondent*)

From the "Berliner Tageblatt," 9.6.38

OLD nations, like old men, in their days of decline, face themselves with the question, how much longer is life likely to be granted them? In this respect England is no exception, conscious as she is of having reached the apex of her power, from which no further ascent is possible. But how long can this peak position be maintained, now that England has lost so many advantages of her former history, such as her insularity and her industrial lead? Will the coming generations of Englishmen be strong enough to keep up with young, fresh nations? In other words, do the English show symptoms of exhaustion?

It is a sign of the times, how often this question crops up in conversations with Englishmen. They grant unreservedly that England would not have recovered from a defeat such as that of 1918 as rapidly as Germany, while France would probably not have survived a similar collapse at all. Twenty years after Versailles, England sees the French victors shaken by internal confusion. In Paris a ruling class of parliamentarians and Stock Exchange operators manoeuvre up and down, without being capable of giving the country any lasting balance. Nevertheless, the French people remains healthy. On the fields of France a hard, tough peasant race is at work, which has not forgotten the virtues of its fathers. In the same way, the French industrial worker can stand comparison with any other in the world. Even the much-discussed French birth-rate figures are not bad, and would be still better if France were to reduce infant mortality by improving national hygiene. If signs of decadence are to be observed anywhere in France it is in the upper levels. The foundation is very firm, as every fresh crisis shows.

Strength of the Middle Class

Quite a different state of affairs exists in England, which has known how to keep her upper classes efficient by means of constantly bringing in fresh blood, quite apart from the political and social

sense of responsibility which has remained inherent in them. Pleasantly though the Englishman may arrange his life, the rich idler is a much rarer phenomenon here than in, say, Russia, Austria or Italy of pre-war days. An additional factor is that the women of these circles, too, in spite of all their pleasure-hunting, take part actively in the life of the nation. There is hardly any political or social organisation in England, in which women do not show astonishing activity.

Here and there a clique of spoilt young men may be absorbed in aesthetic trifling, but generalisations should not be made from them. For every over-bred dandy there are dozens of men who are doing excellent work in the army, in parliament, the City or out in the colonies. Just as in the days of Queen Victoria, the well-off middle

Churchill on
the warpath
against
Germany :
"England expects
me to produce
another
Dardanelles."



"Die
Brennerei,"
Berlin.

class, which merges into the nobility, forms the backbone of the nation.

England's foundation, on the other hand, is in worse case than France's. In this country the early change-over to pasture, together with centuries of emigration of farmers overseas, has led to a thinning-out of the native peasant element, which every sensible Englishman regards with deep anxiety. In the South, particularly, a peasant family in the Continental sense has become a rarity. Instead of working on the family farm, the peasant girl is serving cakes and lemonade in a near-by tea-room, while her brother is occupied on a sports ground or at a filling-station. The North is less urbanised, but here agriculture suffers from being badly paid. Industry needs cheap foodstuffs, while the Dominions make their purchase of English foods dependent on their being allowed to flood England with their food products. In consequence, even a government well-disposed to farmers cannot do much more than prevent the further decline of agriculture ; hopes of its recovery have been almost given up.

The Toll of Urbanism

How does it stand then with the industrial worker, to whom England is sacrificing her peasantry ? From the end of the eighteenth century on, industry in England has claimed a disproportionately large part of the population, with the result that whole sections have already been industrialised to the fourth or fifth generation. What this means from the hygienic point of view can be ascertained in any old-established industrial city, and not least in London, where one can practically measure to the inch whose cradle rocked in the West, and whose in the East End. It is among the peculiarities of England, that the well-built, athletic Englishman belongs in nine cases out of ten to the upper classes. Although height and vitality are no' synonymous—the London Cockney was among the best soldiers of the World War—it cannot be disputed that long industrialisation is beginning to take its toll, and this all the more since no fresh blood is being brought into the town population from a peasantry.

Serious though this urbanisation of the English people is, its effects are alleviated by a number of factors. In the first place, England, apart from rheumatism, is a healthy country. The tuberculosis figures for England are, for instance, less than Italy's. In

addition, the sporting activities of all classes has its effect, as well as the efforts, made possible by modern means of transport, to spend week-ends in the open air. But, above all, the English have learnt the secret of husbanding their strength, which they injure neither by overwork nor heated arguments. The peaceful course of English life is a source of strength to England, which has been able to maintain her people's good nerves even in the agitated world of to-day. In consequence, England is never stronger than in times of crisis.

Britain's Belief in Herself

It is another question how things will be after two or three more generations. Possibly the shrinkage in its solid peasant substance, the decline in its birth-rate, and its lack of capacity to supply the Dominions with immigrants will then cause the World Empire to be faced with serious difficulties. On the other hand, it would be wrong to-day to build on the theory that the end of its ascent must coincide with the beginning of its descent. A conservative people like the English can also conserve their power, particularly if it has fashioned, in centuries of hard work, a framework of life which is firm enough to defy many a storm. England's weakness should not be overlooked, but no more should her strength—her responsible upper class, her efficient and tough middle class, the healthy commonsense of her working class, and, as joint asset of the whole nation, the conviction of possessing a mission, which only England can fulfil. Only when the English lose this belief in themselves will shadow fall over the World Empire. But that day is not yet.

THE OLDEST NEWSPAPER IN THE WORLD

Peiping Bao, the oldest newspaper in the world, which has been appearing for 1,500 years, has just been suppressed. This newspaper was founded in 400 A.D. by Sou-Choung, and was printed up to the time of its disappearance with wooden type.

In the course of centuries 1,500 editors of the *Peiping Bao* have been beheaded.

After their occupation of Peking, the Japanese banned this paper. Then they allowed it to appear again, but as the *Peiping Bao* remained faithful to its ancient tradition they have now suppressed it once and for all.—*L'Ere Nouvelle, Paris*.

CHEERS FOR ALCOHOL!

Wheat for Shells

by MARCEL LAYRAC

From "La République," Paris


CHEERS for alcohol! Not, of course, the kind that is drunk. I will say nothing in favour of that kind, since I am afraid to rouse the anger of temperance societies, nor too much against it, for fear of annoying the many who produce or sell it.

The alcohol which interests me and which I intend to praise is the kind which is used by internal combustion engines.

Here is what I have just read in an official communiqué :

"The Minister of Agriculture has been authorised to prepare a decree law to modify the law of 1931 concerning alcohol. It will have a double object. On the one hand it will aim at increasing the stock of alcohol necessary for national defence ; on the other, to reabsorb the excess wheat harvest."

For we are "menaced" by an abundant wheat harvest. Since the consumption of flour and bread is diminishing, we must export an important part of our excess production. But, because of the collapse of the world market, a quintal of wheat is worth 90 francs



"When you've extracted the petrol from the wheat, couldn't you make a sort of synthetic flour out of the petru..?"

*"Le Canard Enchaîné,"
Paris.*

in Chicago, less than half what it costs in France. Even if the State allows special prices for exportation there would still be a considerable loss involved, for the foreigner would not want to pay more for our wheat than he would have to pay in the world market.

But here is where distilled alcohol comes in. Alcohol will be made out of wheat, so the excessive wheat will be reabsorbed.

"The distilling of excess harvests has been practiced for many years with wine and beet. Thanks to this method it has been possible to assure a certain stability in price and production for these two essential products of our agriculture. The same policy must be used for wheat."

All the same we shall have a great deal of alcohol made from wine, beetroot and wheat. Shall we not have too much?

Not at all! Moreover this possibility has been foreseen. For we have many other demands to satisfy.

"The war services have a continual need of alcohol, for the manufacture of powder as well as to constitute a stock of fuel, composed of a constant mixture of petrol and alcohol for motorised units."

If there is too much wheat, wine and beet, alcohol will be made from them. And if there is too much alcohol they will make powder out of it. You must admit that all this is simply marvellous!

Wheat will save the franc, said M. Chéron. Wheat will save France, we say, since wheat brings us fuel for our motorised units and explosives for our shells.

When Mr. Roosevelt has too much wheat he stores it, for he could not spend money in making, at great expense, a chemical substitute for the petrol which his country possesses in such great abundance. We have little petrol. All the better, since that allows us to have neither too much wheat, nor too much wine nor too much beet.

SHOWS YOU HOW

Every journalist worthy of the name must have thrilled with pride at the news which hummed over the wires from Rome last week.

Average birth-rate for all professions—excepting journalism—in Italy is 22 per 1,000. But is that good enough for your newspapermen? No, sir, it is not!

Last year your Italian confrères, spurred on by Mussolini's offer of prizes for journalist-fathers, achieved the astonishing figure of 80 per 1,000.

And the prizes, which were to have lasted for several years, have been exhausted in 15 months.

Think of that, you carpers, when next you decry the regimentation of the Press. Where did freedom get you?—*World's Press News, London.*

DISUNITED CANADA

Fascism in Quebec

From a Canadian Correspondent

ONE frequently reads or hears that "Canadian opinion is . . ." or "Canada's position is . . ." etc., giving the impression that Canada may be regarded as a one-minded unit, and there could be little objection to such statements if a majority of the people felt or thought along the lines indicated. It is worth remembering that this may be far from the truth. In a country whose vast extent brings so many different problems it is inevitable that there should be great differences among the people on many points. This is particularly true of a young, sparsely settled country.

From many points of view Canada cannot be regarded as a whole. The political viewpoint is one of these. On the contrary, one is forced to regard it as the sum of the Maritime provinces, Quebec, Ontario, the Prairie provinces and British Columbia. Stretching more than three thousand miles from the Atlantic to the Pacific, Canada possesses not only a wide variety of geographic and climatic conditions but also a very varied population. Consider the effect of this if the electoral mind has to be made up in the event of Britain being involved in a major war. Approximately eighty-five per cent. of the population of the province of Quebec is French, and the Roman Catholic Church has very definite views on the question of war. No little trouble was experienced on this point in the World War, and Quebec, it must be remembered, is the second most populous province in the Dominion.

The Prairie provinces contain a substantial proportion of lives of Central European origin, many of whom have been in Canada for less than a generation. British Columbia, moreover, contains a good number of Japanese.

There are other reasons why so many differences of opinion exist across the Dominion. One of the most important lies in the nine provincial governments which this much-governed country supports in addition to the Federal government. Bickering and doubt can easily arise, and have arisen, as to the precise point where provincial jurisdiction ends and Federal jurisdiction begins. Take the case of

unemployment relief. A city may complain that the economic depression has caused an influx of the unemployed and unemployable. When the city authorities seek some solution with the province, the provincial government may pass the responsibility on to the Federal government ; and so it goes on till finally some compromise is reached. While this confusion exists no real co-ordination of the Provinces is possible. At the present time a Royal Commission is investigating Dominion-Provincial relations. It is to be hoped that the Commission will succeed in making the necessary recommendations and that these will be implemented. Until this has been done no really national policy can be developed.

But not only does the present Dominion-Provincial confusion prevent national unity. In addition it would seem that, as a result, the provincial governments are assuming responsibilities which they were never intended to assume. Mr. Aberhart and Alberta need no mention here. A more recent example is to be found in Quebec, where the situation at present is disturbing, to say the least.

The Racial Issue

It is perhaps natural, in this day of racialism and economic nationalism, that the racial cry should once more be heard in Quebec. When the Liberal Taschereau regime was beaten at the polls by Duplessis after an unbroken period of almost forty years of Liberalism (really die-hard Conservatism), Premier Duplessis and his government went to work with a very new broom and uncovered many items which certainly did no credit to the former regime. The platform of the Duplessis government is none too clear, but vigour and enthusiasm are two of its characteristics. Whatever the reason, the phrases "Quebec for the French," "secession" and "autonomous republic on the banks of the St. Lawrence" were being heard for some time. Electioneering, of course, is much the same all the world over and it is only natural that many French-Canadians should be willing to listen to the old doctrine that they are being exploited by the English in their own Province of Quebec.

The situation has now taken a new turn. Some time ago students (French) of the University of Montreal staged a demonstration before the Mayor of Montreal and made it clear that if a certain Communist meeting were permitted they would wreck it. Instead

of providing ample police protection the Mayor simply gave orders that the meeting must not be held. Premier Duplessis's so-called "padlock law" whereby a place may be padlocked or closed if it is believed to be used in the interests of Communism, has a very Fascist tinge. This law was first put into effect with the closing of the offices of the paper *La Carté*. This paper is a French Leftist weekly. Soon after this action was taken copies appeared in Montreal, having been printed in Ontario, with a notice of defiance to Duplessis and a picture of the padlocked door on the front page. They have been coming into Montreal steadily since then in spite of all the efforts of the provincial police, including seizure of train and truck deliveries. But this was only the beginning. Since then scores of raids have been made in Montreal and Communist literature seized. Even an allegedly Communist schoolroom was raided, afternoon classes broken up and some thirty young pupils sent home, textbooks and pamphlets being seized. In many of these raids books have been seized that have no connection with Communism whatever.

The Padlock Act has raised an outcry from one end of the Dominion to the other. Its opponents claim that it is unconstitutional and that it is *ultra vires* of the Quebec Government's jurisdiction—especially since the Supreme Court has upheld the Federal Government's disallowance of the Alberta Aberhart Acts—but as yet no action has been taken by the Federal Government. All in all, Quebec would seem to be more Fascist than democratic. Premier Duplessis maintains he is fighting Communism. The cry sounds familiar.

East v. West

In addition to problems within the confines of provinces like Quebec and Alberta there is also the old East *versus* West cry, St. James Street, Montreal, against the Western farmer. This, of course, is Mr. Aberhart's theme, but it contains many points that require immediate and serious consideration. Nowhere is there greater need for a truly national outlook. The truth of the matter is that the people in the industrial and financial East know little of conditions in the West and *vice versa*. Years of drought and depression have made the situation of the Western farmer serious to a degree. Organised relief providing food, clothes and books is only a palliative. Strong Federal action is required and this can only come through the

co-operation of the provinces, but this co-operation would seem to be far distant for Quebec and Ontario loudly proclaim that they are the milch cows of the Dominion and that they are tired of being milked for the benefit of the West.

If further evidence is needed of the weakness of Canada's present position, the Canadian National Railways problem should be sufficient proof. The ever-increasing deficit of this railroad and its mounting interest charges are a millstone round the necks of every man, woman and child in the Dominion. Unification of the two railroads, the C.N.R. and the C.P.R., has been advocated by outstanding and impartial authorities both in Canada and the United States, yet the situation has been allowed to drag on year after year, notwithstanding the fact that the C.N.R. is costing the taxpayers of the Dominion more than £50,000,000 a year and the C.P.R. stockholders are receiving no return from their investment. An inquiry is being held at present in the Senate, but little has been revealed except that cut-throat competition has prevented any real co-operation. Duplication of services is still the rule, and once again it has been proven that business and politics do not mix. The larger viewpoint of a truly national consciousness is absent.

It is impossible to say that Canada is politically conscious as a nation. The word "Canadian" from many points of view has no meaning whatever. Strife and disintegration are the tendencies rather than unity. Only when her own house is in order can Canada develop in a truly national way and formulate a truly national policy.

HONOUR FOR GODLESS

The Soviet-Russian Association of the Godless in the Ukraine have decided to give a Flag of honour to the Godless in South Africa. This flag is of red silk, embroidered with golden letters on one side in Russian and in English: "Proletarians of all countries Unite", and on the other side, "Religion is opium for the masses." The Godless of other sections will also be honoured by such a flag: those of U.S.A., Mexico, etc.—*Agence d'Informations de l'Orient, Boulogne.*

JAPS SELL "ROOSEVELT" PENCILS

Disabled war veterans in Japan are selling "Roosevelt" pencils at 29 cents a dozen in a case bearing the following inscription: "Roosevelt—Best new lead pencils of the P. of the U.S.A., for bankers, artists, teachers." An American in Tokyo recently sent President Roosevelt a case, which has proved quite a curiosity to the White House family.—*Wall Street Journal, New York.*

WHY INDIA SUPPORTS CHINA

British and Japanese Imperialism

From a broadcast issued by the Foreign Department of the All-India Congress Committee, Allahabad

by PANDIT JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

INDIA'S sympathy goes out to China for a variety of reasons. India is aspiring and fighting for national freedom as China is. The forces of national freedom in both countries extend to each other the hand of sympathy and support. They must band themselves together against the imperialist life-urge of exploitation and conquest. They must swear to prevent the use under imperialist control of their nationals and soldiers in each other's territory. They must mutually defend themselves by refusing economic relations with the imperialist invader. They must prepare themselves for the day when they can strike a simultaneous blow at all imperialism. They must send each other, in event of need, monies, medical supplies and all manner of other possible help. India has a four-fold task to perform: (1) She must ceaselessly condemn the despatch of Indian troops to China and demand their withdrawal as also that of the Indian people attached to British consulates in China; (2) She must organise an effective boycott of Japanese goods; (3) She must ceaselessly train the people never to give men and supplies to the British Empire in its wars; (4) She must pay to China till it pinches. The ancient friendship of the two peoples of China and India must now be reinforced by the new camaraderie of the two freedom-loving nations.

The Meaning of British Democracy

While we condemn Japan and support China, we must not err in assessing the true role of Britain. Mighty machines of propaganda are in motion and we must withstand them. British commentators are rejoicing through our own talkies, radio and press at Britain's rearming to curb the "cynic's violation of right." The inference obviously is that Britain is a democracy, just and peaceful,



JAWAHARLAL NEHRU IN CONVERSATION WITH GANDHI

and can be relied on to stand with her arms by humanity against brutality. The addresses of the United States President are also likely to cause confusion. In his insistence on the capacity of the democratic Powers to protect the peace of the world, one might see in British armaments a factor of justice and peace.

One thing must be clear. There is, of course, the danger of war in the boast of the Italian spokesman who calculates the Fascist bloc to contain 200 million men and to own 2 million tons of battle-ships. But we would be foolish if we pitted against these the 3 million tons of the American and British navies. Britain is as much a part of the imperialist system as Japan or Italy and, far from ranging their armaments against each other, we must regard them as one solid bloc against progress and peace. Against the armaments of fascism, India can only pit the desire of her people for national freedom. She eagerly welcomes the co-operation of all democratic and socialist forces throughout the world but considers that the

formal democracy of the British State is only a shabby smoke-screen and British armaments are surely no part of the world's democratic forces.

If Britain rearms, and until British monopoly capital is destroyed, she does so to secure her own interests. And her interests throughout the world are large. Even in the East, where Japan is hurling bombs over China, Britain is still the owner of the largest territories. In India, Australia, Malaya and other colonies, she owns over one-tenth of the world's territory and one-fifth of its population. Under Britain's protecting wings, Holland and France own between themselves another 2 per cent of the world's territory and 5 per cent of its population. On the basis of Asia and Australia alone, Britain is responsible for the daily humbling of nearly one-fourth of their surface and one-half of their population.

The enforced satiation of British imperialism and the fascist conquests of Japanese imperialism differ only in the extent of their unmasked brutality, but are alike in the damage they cause to human peace and progress.

The Answer to Fascism

One might also relevantly enquire if British arms have stood by peace and democracy during the eighteen months of the Spanish war and the six months of the fresh Japanese war on China. Day after day cities are being destroyed and human life killed. British monopoly capital is so tied up with Japanese monopoly capital that, unless its own existence is imperilled and a war is forced on it, it must just look on. The answer to the challenge of fascism to seize the whole world does not surely lie in British arms. Britain will not fight and, even if that were to happen, how does it fundamentally matter if the fascist brutality of Japanese imperialism were exchanged for the steady blood-sucking of British imperialism?

Who can fight the fascist menace of reaction and war? There are the national freedom movements of India, China and other similar countries. There is Soviet Russia which has definitely discarded imperialism as the basis of its State policy. There are the democratic and socialist forces throughout the world such as the Popular Fronts and the World Committees for Peace and Democracy. In the unity of these forces lies the answer to the fascist challenge.

RICHES GERMANY LOST

A Pacific Phosphate Isle

by ERNEST OSBORNE

From the "Austral-Asiatic Bulletin," Melbourne, April-May

The complaint is made by Germans that they are told, when they demand the return of their former colonies, that these possessions are not worth anything anyway. This, as the following shows, can hardly be said of the fertiliser island of Nauru, of which little or nothing has been heard in public discussions over the colonial question

FORTY years ago four small islands in the tropical Pacific, previously visited only at rare intervals by ships in search of copra, suddenly became very important. They were found to be immensely valuable deposits of phosphate of lime.

That accidental discovery came first on Nauru (Pleasant Island) and then on Banaba (Ocean Island), Angaur, and Makatea (Aurora Island). Nauru and Banaba lie a few miles south of the Equator, only 147 miles apart. Angaur and Makatea are far from these two largest oceanic phosphate deposits, and very distant from each other. Angaur is in the Pellew Group in the North-west Pacific, north of New Guinea and handy to Japan; Makatea is in the south-east Islands, on the outskirts of the French Tuamotus—the Low Archipelago, or "Cloud of Islands." Operations began first on Banaba, then on Nauru, Angaur and Makatea. . . .

Banaba and Nauru phosphate is of the purest and richest grade known. Even the thin cuticle of black soil is as rich as the bottom layer held between coral pinnacles in pockets of irregular depth, which for the whole surface on Ocean Island (Banaba) averages about eight feet, and on Nauru more, in thickness.

These two equatorial Central Pacific island-deposits, wherein Australia, together with Britain and New Zealand, is an active partner, contain an estimated quantity of one hundred million tons of phosphate: forty millions on Ocean Island (my original estimate), and sixty millions on Nauru. Although the phosphate is being steadily

removed, these deposits will supply Australia and New Zealand for generations with fertiliser—unless political trouble intervenes. Nauru is held under a "C" type mandate, but Ocean Island is British. Phosphate rights on both were purchased from the Pacific Phosphate Company.

Yet these great deposits are exceeded by those in Florida, U.S.A., where the annual output exceeds three million tons ; by the mines in Tunis, North Africa, where, at Gafsa, one and a half million tons of phosphate are won annually ; and by the phosphate deposits in Russia. Nothing has been heard of the Angaur phosphate deposit since, in the post-war distribution of Germany's Pacific possessions, it was allocated to Japan under mandate. Subsequently it was annexed to serve Japan's urgent need for a large deposit of high-grade phosphate of lime. The war presented Japan with a ten-million-ton phosphate deposit, effectively equipped and operating. By the merger of Ocean Island and Nauru under the British Phosphate Commissioners, Australian agriculturists enjoy about 50 per cent reduction in the price of superphosphate. . . .

Ocean Island is roughly kidney-shaped and measures about 1,360 acres. It is all phosphate land, pinnacles excepted, and is mostly steep, along a fringing-reef of varying width. Nauru is appreciably larger than Ocean Island, yet is small. A palm-decked narrow strip of coastal land encircles the elevated phosphate area which, although containing large trees, is poor in food-trees other than pandanus. Ocean Island is of about the same elevation as Nauru's phosphate area.

Under the Phosphate Commissioners the peoples of Ocean Island and Nauru receive an increased royalty per ton of phosphate mined. These Micronesians are cared for in civil life and health by their white overlords. White employees on both these phosphate islands are provided with civilised comforts, equipment and recreation. Facilities surpass those in some modern dwellings in Sydney suburbs.

The ownership of Nauru probably is secure until the phosphate is depleted. It is too valuable to be considered as a pawn in any possible colonial " mandate " adjustment between mandatory nations and Germany.

A VOICE FROM BLACK AFRICA

Crowning Iniquity

From the "Nigerian Eastern Mail," Calabar

IN the WORLD REVIEW of January, 1938, the Editor of the *Sunday Express*, Johannesburg, South Africa, airs his views as to a likely settlement of Germany's demands for colonial possessions. He is of the opinion that the views of South Africa will carry great weight at any council table of Powers and that her statesmen enjoy great prestige at Geneva and elsewhere : even, or shall we say, especially in Germany and Italy. Anyway, it is his opinion that this question of a stake in Africa for Hitler's Germany will finally be decided by negotiations between Germany, Great Britain and the Dominions, and he takes it for granted that the Dominion of South Africa, being the only African Dominion, will have a determining voice in the final solution arrived at.

He then goes on to make the following prophecy :

It is more than likely that the territories that will be handed over to Germany will be Togoland, the Cameroons, and probably the Negro Republic of Liberia with certain rights and privileges in the Northern portion of the Portuguese territory of Angola.

So there is no doubt about it that at least one Dominion regards us as so much livestock on the imperial farm, to be bought and sold and bartered at the convenience of our White owners. It will not add to the confidence of African natives to realise that such people will have a voice in apportioning African soil and the African natives thereof.

But, knowing full well South Africa's idea of justice for *blacks*, we cannot let ourselves believe that the Mother Country, that has always stood for justice and liberty for all, irrespective of race or creed, could possibly be a party to such an iniquity. The idea of handing back the unfortunate inhabitants of Togoland and the Cameroons to "their former masters," as though Africans and the land of their birth were so many stock farms in which certain European powers had absolute proprietorial rights, is one inherently offensive to all self-respecting Africans. But the crowning iniquity,

that the Free Republic of Liberia should be *dashed* to Germany, leaves one speechless with horror. However wicked those who sit in the seat of authority may or may not be, we do not believe that the Great and Justice-loving British people would tolerate such an iniquity. They allowed Sir John Simon and others to betray Manchuria ; in spite of their repudiation of Hoare and Laval they were persuaded into letting Eden and others betray Abyssinia, they let their government shirk its moral responsibilities in China and play the fool at Non-intervention Meetings on Spain ; but this crowning abomination they would never tolerate.

THE RIGHT SPIRIT

You have let your correspondent aged 60 and now your rather safety-first person of 56 have their word. May I say that I was 70 this month, that I went to Burma in the 52nd in 1889, and after two frontier expeditions and years of fever in the Indian Army and Political Department, where I was sometimes 400 miles from the nearest railway, over great mountains and rivers, came home in 1905. I commanded two battalions during the War, was at the Dardanelles and in the Serbian Retreat, saw service in Macedonia (70,000 cases of malaria), marched through the desert to take Jerusalem, and ended up fighting in France and Belgium till the march through to Cologne. I am under the weather just now with a go of pneumonia, but until then have been doing two and three days' hard shooting a week, followed by several sets of badminton or an A.R.P. course. In July I drove my car 856 miles in 10 days on business. I am a magistrate, member of the Territorial Association, Income Tax Commissioner, member of the County Records, Rating and Standing Joint Committee, and a vice-president of the Bi-County and local British Legion. I can jump a tennis net, and always do everything hard. I have worked a pick and shovel for weeks on the frontier as an example to the chiefs road-making, and been so tired sometimes that I thought I could not get up again. Still, in comparison with my father, the late Major W. H. D. age, 52nd Infantry, I look upon myself as a weakling, as he used to wait for duck flying up to his knees in water at 80, and he lived to be 93. His last words were about shooting.—*Letter to "The Times,"* 16.7.38.

STAND-OFFISH

There seems to be a prevalent belief that Englishmen are a trifle diffident, but this is all nonsense. We know a lad who once rowed on the Oxford eight, and he got to know all the other rowers quite well—all excepting the little fellow who sat away back in the stern.—*Union Oil Bulletin, U.S.A.*

INTERNATIONAL BOOKSHELF



The Editor reminds his readers that he does not necessarily share the opinions expressed by reviewers in this section. But this is a free country and knows no censorship

AUSTRIAN POST-MORTEM

AUSTRIA AND AFTER. By Dr. Franz Borkenau. *Faber & Faber.* 8s. 6d.

THE LAST FIVE HOURS OF AUSTRIA. By Eugene Lennhoff. *Rich & Cowan.* 8s. 6d.

TWILIGHT IN VIENNA. By Willi Frischauer. *Collins.* 12s. 6d.

Reviewed by DOUGLAS REED

HERE are three books about that Austria which has gone, and is unlikely ever to return: one a succinct and scholarly study of Austria from its beginnings to its end; the second a newspaper man's staccato account of the last convulsions; the third a picture of the Vienna of defeatism, inertia and hopelessness that developed after the World War, the last period of Austria's decline.

For my part, I very much like Dr. Borkenau's book. For a few years to come there will be some people, like myself, who knew Austria, that Austria; and there will be an ever-increasing number of people who never knew Austria and who in course of time will ask "What is Austria?" or "Where was Austria?" just as I myself, all too much wrapped up in the things I knew and know, even to-day sometimes find myself suddenly pulled up short by people who ask, "What was the thirtieth of June?"

I think people of both these classes will for a long time to come be able to

read *Austria and After* with profit and enjoyment, for Dr. Borkenau really knows his subject and writes with the detachment of the sound craftsman. He analyses, in few and telling words, the complicated interplay of political, racial, nationalist and religious forces that made Austria great and brought Austria down. He clearly explains such intricate movements as the devout but anti-clerical Catholicism that made Austria so difficult to understand for masses of people in distant lands who thought that Catholicism and Hitlerism could not grow in beauty side by side. In short, he helps you to understand the Austria that produced Hitler—and that is something worth understanding. I particularly like his careful prognosis that, while Austria is finished and while Austrian youth may find militarism much to its liking, Hitlerism may in the long run find itself fighting hard in Austria against the ghost of Austria's traditions—and you can't put ghosts in concentration camps.

Herr Willi Frischauer sets out to describe the twilight of the gods that so many people loved, and I myself not least among them. It was indeed a sad Vienna—that of 1918-1938—with all the brilliant pre-war uniforms gone and the Prater Avenue, with its magnificent chestnut trees, all empty and forlorn, and the inertia of the people—once the great working-class movement which in 1918 set out to build a newer and better Vienna on the ashes of the old that had

been destroyed by Austrian armies awfully arrayed. In the outer circles of the city you had masses of people living below the Plimsoll line of a bare subsistence, and in the centre you had a chattering few, with nothing particularly Austrian about them, who always seemed prosperous and dominated the scene. Business morality, in that Vienna, sank to the lowest depths, young men saw no hope of a future worth working for, the exploitation of women was one of the few thriving trades, and all these things were made the more repellent by the background of a noble city set in incomparable surroundings. Between 1918 and 1934, when the Socialists carried out their great housing schemes, these things were offset by the great improvement in the conditions of the masses which they brought, but under the Dollfuss-Schuschnigg regime, which stopped this process of betterment, apathy became general. The foreign lover of Vienna was continually depressed by these conditions and longed for some miracle to change them.

Herr Willi Frischauer describes at length the conditions which existed and the types, like the amateur prostitute and the gigolo, which they produced. Towards the end of his book, written before the invasion, he seems to have come to the conclusion that the Dollfuss-Schuschnigg regime would cure these evils, and that their Clerico-Fascist dictatorship therefore justified itself. I fear that I saw little sign of this. In a last chapter written after Hitler's swoop, however, he says bitter things of the anti-Semitic dictatorship that now rules Austria. But will it not cure at least some of the things he saw in that twilight Vienna?

Herr Lennhoff was editor of the *Jewish Telegraph*, a Vienna evening paper hated by the Nazis. After editing the edition of Friday evening, March 11th, he made a

quick getaway by one door as the Nazis came in by another; the next day's edition bore the swastika. He gives a vivid account of the fear-laden last days before the German swoop, of the panic among the Jews, of his own flight to the Czechoslovak frontier, his failure to cross there, and his last-minute success in getting into Hungary, from where he came to London. One thing that surprises is the way the situation seems to have been completely miscalculated in such an office as that of the *Vienna Telegraph*, where the possibility of a lightning German swoop was apparently held to be fantastic right up to the last. Yet I remember that from the day, five weeks earlier, when Schuschnigg went to Berchtesgaden, the conviction was general among the more competent diplomats and foreign newspaper correspondents that Austria's end was imminently at hand.

The "Evening Standard"

Book of the Month

SHAW

DESMOND'S

greatest novel

CHAOS

This magnificent new novel, by the author of *London Pride*, etc., is a drama of love and death which, keeping the man and woman in the centre of a stage that is our world of the Transition Period, touches the vital problems of our time — especially that of War. 8/6 net.

HUTCHINSON

APOLOGIA

GERMANY SPEAKS. By Twenty-one members of Party and State. *Thornton Butterworth.* 10s. 6d. net.

Reviewed by POWYS GREENWOOD

THIS is a composite work addressed to British readers on the aims, methods and achievements of the new Germany, written by a number of the most eminent personalities in the Reich. Thus Dr. Frick, the Minister of the Interior, deals with the constitutional problems of unification, Dr. Schacht writes on economics, Dr. Ley, of the Labour Front, on social policy, the Reich Sports Leader on German sport, and so on. The publishers are probably justified in claiming that it is a unique book in that never before have the members of the Government of a Great Power united in addressing the public of a foreign country, and it may certainly

be taken as an indication of the stress laid in Germany on the importance of good relations with Great Britain.

But although German policy and principles could scarcely be more authoritatively expounded, I am not sure that the method employed is the most suitable to enable English readers to understand the people and the movement which, whatever we may feel about them, are likely to prove the most powerful influence on European politics for many years to come. Not only is the element of propaganda very evident, but the idiom of National Socialism is not easily understood by the people of a Western democracy, and there is a good deal of question-begging. When Herr Reinhardt, Secretary of State in the Finance Ministry, declares, for example, that the public budgets have been balanced and that the German financial situation is thoroughly sound, one would like to ask for his definition of "balanced" and "sound." That the German economic system works is certainly true, but its methods would scarcely be described as sound in the City of London, and Dr. Schacht, in a valuable chapter on the German economic position, is quite frank about its heel of Achilles—foreign trade.

There are two interesting chapters on "population policy" and "racial thought." The conviction that the principal object of national policy should be to improve the race and to maintain or increase its numbers is at the very root of National Socialism, and Germany can claim considerable credit for pioneer work in a matter which, as Dr. Gütt and Dr. Gross show, is of real importance for the future of the Western peoples. The methods and aims of the compulsory Labour Service, one of the most successful of Nazi institutions, are well described, there are sections on such diverse matters as justice, education,

THE NEW IRELAND

J. B. MORTON
(*"BEACHCOMBER"*)

"This is a book full of hope as well as of information. It will sweep away much error."

G.K.'s Weekly

"... he performs a signal service to the cause of Anglo-Irish friendship."

Irish Press

"... contains a useful exposition of the new Constitution... helps to put controversial matters in a clearer light."

Universe

Cr. 8vo.

3s. 6d. net.

THE PALADIN PRESS
15 King St., Covent Garden,
W.C.2

the place of women, culture and literature, the Press, and the German case for the return of the colonies is well and forcibly put by the Chairman of the Colonial League.

Finally, Baron von Rheinbaben contributes an important chapter on Anglo-German relations. Unfortunately, though comprehensibly, he confines himself largely to generalities, but he is certainly right in insisting that in spite of goodwill on both sides, common ground has not yet been found. Yet somehow it must be possible to reconcile "the world power England . . . the having and possessing . . . and the great continental power Germany . . . the not having enough and demanding." That this is the central problem of European peace there can be no doubt, and this book is at any rate a contribution towards it.

VANISHED LINES

HOMAGE TO CATALONIA. By George Orwell. *Secker & Warburg*. 10s. 6d.

Reviewed by JOHN MARKS

Books about the Spanish war naturally fall into two classes—political surveys by propagandists, and eye-witness accounts by volunteers. The former category is large, the latter small; they overlap slightly—journalists come under fire, theorists take arms—but the distinction between them remains almost as clear as that between the books written from opposite sides. Perhaps the best of all, the most informative and convincing, are three that belong to the former group, though their authors are, of course, historians rather than propagandists. Hardly any of the others in this larger group—half a dozen at most—were worth printing; whereas, for obvious reasons, the records of personal experience given to us by articulate Left-Wingers who have returned from various fronts in Spain

have all been more interesting and readable than the arguments of the doctrinaires. Their advantage lies in greater vividness and truth. Romilly, Pitcairn, Scott-Watson and Sommerfield have produced war-books of merit; but the author of *The Road to Wigan Pier* has now written a very fine book, which is far and away the best of this kind and, both as literature and for its human and political honesty, one that will rank among the five or six minor classics of this war.

Mr. Orwell can write. In these days everyone writes; but the lucidity and strength of Orwell's superbly straightforward style are phenomenal. He saw six months' fighting of an intermittent, unimportant sort; he went to Spain knowing nothing of the country; as an I.L.P. volunteer he was drafted into the P.O.U.M. militia, caring little for what these initials meant, with the simple desire "to kill one Fascist"; he had found revolutionary Barcelona "queer and moving," there was much in it he did not understand, in some ways he "did not even like it," but he "recognised it immediately as a state of affairs worth fighting for"; he got a bullet through the throat; he left Spain after the "Trotskyist" party to which he so vaguely belonged had been suppressed and traduced by the Communist-Republican Right in June of last year, as a sequel to the inner revolution that had taken place in May. This he proves to have been no such thing, but a spontaneous outbreak of street-fighting, in which he took part. Two of his fourteen chapters are devoted to a careful analysis of the political situation behind the lines: trouble brewing between the extreme Left, which wanted to wage the war and the revolution simultaneously, and the moderate Left, including the Communists, determined to fight first for "democracy"; then,

following the defeat of the Anarchists, the campaign of fantastic abuse and savage persecution levelled against them—and the P.O.U.M. in particular—by their Communist comrades. The author reasons fairly and clear-sightedly that there was a great deal to be said for both views and shows—at greater length than necessary—that there is nothing at all to be said in defence of the vilification, by the Communist press throughout the world, of its “Trotskyist-Fascist” scapegoat. Messrs. Pitcairn, Langdon-Davies and Bates and the Duchess of Atholl receive neatly administered fleas in the ear, which the reader, when he has studied Mr. Orwell’s sane summing-up of this affair, will consider thoroughly justified.

Party faction is not, however, what primarily concerns the author, and it is for his sympathetic and mostly shrewd observations of the Spanish character, his kindliness, the brilliant simplicity of his descriptive writing, that this book should be read by anyone interested in the real feelings of his fellow-men.

BRITAIN AND THE DICTATORS.

By R. W. Seton-Watson. *Cambridge*. 12s. 6d.

PEACE WITH THE DICTATORS.

By Sir Norman Angell. *Hamish Hamilton*. 7s. 6d.

Reviewed by GEORGE MARTELLI

OF these two books, both dealing with identical problems, Professor Seton-Watson’s is the more important and the more interesting. Professor Seton-Watson writes as an historian with his eye on the past, but with also a message for the present and a warning for the future. His main thesis is that Britain has never succeeded in isolating herself from the continent and cannot disinterest herself in European movements, without endangering her own safety and the integ-

rity of her Empire. His opening chapter on the essentials of pre-War policy illustrates the fact, “which no serious student of modern history can fail to grasp—that hitherto, while Britain has often enough held aloof from secondary conflicts in Europe, she has never yet held entirely aloof from struggles of the first magnitude, and that in such an event she has invariably thrown her weight on to the weakest, not on to the strongest side.” The inference drawn from this is “that she has hitherto regarded the hegemony of any one Power over the continent as incompatible with her own interests; and there is absolutely nothing to suggest that she is likely to abandon this attitude in the near future.”

Starting from this premise the author sketches the course of European history since the Armistice, examining in turn the attitude of Britain to the Peace Settlement, the League of Nations, Locarno, the three Dictatorial Powers, the problem of the small States and the more recent developments in Abyssinia and Spain. He considers that the key to peace rests with Germany and if the “triangular relations of London, Paris and Berlin can be placed on a more or less permanent footing the continent will have peace for a considerable period and all other problems will fall into their proper places: if not Mr. Baldwin’s prophecy will be realised and European civilisation will fall into ruins.”

Of the Chamberlain policy of detaching Italy from Germany Professor Seton-Watson is extremely sceptical. “It is high time for us to realise,” he remarks, “what Mussolini has realised long ago, that Britain is the main obstacle to every section of his total design and that it is useless to hug illusions as to his friendship or to trust his word. With Russia under Stalin our interests need not collide: with Germany under

Hitler a compromise is difficult but by no means impossible : with Italy under Mussolini there can be nothing better than armed neutrality and perpetual vigilance." His chief recommendation is that we should tell Hitler where to stop, even if it implies abandoning the British policy of avoiding commitments in advance. For this purpose he would band together all pacific elements and organise an alliance of the peace-loving nations, not excluding Russia, sufficiently strong to deter any would-be aggressor.

It will not surprise any reader to find Sir Norman Angell reaching the same conclusions. In *Peace with the Dictators* the author opens with a symposium in which the German, the Italian and the Englishman speak in turn. The psychology of dictatorship, the case for surrendering to the dictators and for isolation, are each discussed with the objectivity which we have learned to expect

from Sir Norman Angell. With Prof. Seton-Watson he believes that we must abandon our policy of no commitments and take certain risks if we are to avoid war. He would base his alliance of Peace-loving nations on a reformed League, but does not mind much about the form as long as the result is an effective deterrent to aggression. For this he thinks the people of England would fight, who would not fight for the Empire. We may question this view, but it is difficult to deny the logic of the main argument.

EMBARRASSING

An American vacationing in Europe bought one of these diminutive foreign cars, made a motor tour of Germany, and was so embarrassed by the dachshunds looking in the windows that he sold it before he came home.—*Union Oil Bulletin, U.S.A.*

SUBSCRIPTION ORDER FORM

If you would like to receive WORLD REVIEW regularly, fill up this form and send it to your Bookseller or Newsagent, or direct to:—

WORLD REVIEW
40 WILLIAM IV STREET,
LONDON, W.C.2

Please enter my subscription to "World Review" for $\frac{\text{six months}}{\text{one year}}$ post free commencing with the.....issue. I enclose remittance for $\frac{7/-}{14/-}$

(Canada 13/6)

Name

Address

Published on the first of each month.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

The Editor welcomes letters from readers, which should be kept as short as possible

JAPAN 'FINISHED'?

SIR,—In the current issue of your interesting magazine the editorial by Mr. Vernon Bartlett contains the statement that Japan is "finished" as a first-class Power.

It would have been helpful to those who seek objectively to follow the moves in the Far East if a pennyworth of evidence to support this extraordinary assertion had been advanced. On what grounds does so prominent a journalist as Mr. Bartlett make this statement? Japan's stringent domestic rulings to put the country on a war-basis economically does not even remotely hint at economic decline; and as a naval Power Japan's influence is sufficiently marked to have adjusted the new tonnage agreement among Great Britain, France and the United States; the last-named being clearly the nation to insist upon a 45,000 tons level because of her anxiety over Japanese naval expansion.

We seem to be getting rather too much opinionated political writing to-day in which the wish is father to the thought. I, too, would like to see China repulse the Japanese forces, but despite certain articles in the British Press assuring us that "China will win," I can see no reason for optimism. The Chinese have been losing ground steadily for a year, and although it is possible that generations hence China will assimilate the invader, as she has done in the past, there seems to be no sign that she will defeat the present advance.

Political bias is warping much contemporary political judgment. Apart altogether from the lamentable Madame Tabouis, many well-known writers have been prophesying from the wrong side

of the fence (in the name of democracy) ever since they assured us in 1935 that Italy could not survive that rainy season in Abyssinia.

RAYMOND BURNS.

Press Gallery, House of Commons.

The Editor's Reply:

Mr. Burns raises a very pertinent issue—there is a lot of opinionated political writing to-day. But I do not agree that there can be too much of it. When so great a proportion of our news reaches us through the (necessarily) objective medium of the microphone or through great newspapers that have forgotten how to lead—as a well-informed parliamentary journalist, Mr. Burns must himself have noticed how often even a paper like *The Times* waits (as it did in the Duncan Sandys case) until it sees which way the political wind is blowing before it expresses an editorial opinion. Let us, for democracy's sake, not be afraid of our opinions.

That the wish sometimes colours the opinion is, alas, true. This Review, or its Editor, has doubtless been guilty in this respect, although there has almost always been a saving "unless" or "if"! For example, in the Abyssinian war we attached very much more importance to man-imposed oil sanctions than to the ungentle rains from heaven.

And in the case of the Sino-Japanese "incident" I asserted that Japan was "finished" as a first-class power because (1) it was the opinion of most diplomats and business men (often very unsympathetic towards Chiang Kai-shek's China) whom I met in Shanghai, Hong Kong, Hankow or Canton that Japan lost the war when the Kuomintang government survived the fall of

Nanking ; (2) the Japanese advances are along the few roads and railways and do not extend more than a mile or two from these lines of communication, and Chiang Kai-shek's failure to defeat the Communists after years of campaigning shows how effective guerrilla warfare can be in a country like China ; and (3) the shortage of money in Japan and the abundance of manpower in China are likely to be decisive factors.

And I can only hope that, in putting forward these few of many arguments I am not allowing my political bias to warp my political judgment.

VERNON BARTLETT.

INTERNATIONAL TRAMPS

SIR,—No-one who has given more than a casual glance at my book would accept Mr. Saunders' indictment that "in its spirit and atmosphere it is an insult to Nansen's name." Even experienced reviewers, not sharing my views on the League, have recognised the book as a well-deserved and generous tribute to that great man's humanitarian work.

Furthermore, Mr. Saunders should remember that the views and criticisms contained in *International Tramps* are, in general, those to which Dr. Nansen gave frequent utterance and were faithfully echoed by Mr. Saunders when acting as his secretary.

Mr. Saunders' complaint that my book is "exceedingly dull when it is not scurrilous" exposes him to two obvious rejoinders. In the first place, it was the events recounted, over which I had no control, which were scurrilous. In the second place, emerging, for the first time, from the hectic atmosphere of Francis Beeding literature Mr. Saunders must necessarily find even the strangest truths exceedingly dull reading.

T. F. JOHNSON.

Mr. Saunders writes :

It is all a question of taste. Mr. T. F. Johnson may, perhaps, have intended to pay a "generous tribute" to Dr. Nansen's humanitarian work. Good intentions, however, are no excuse for failure. He is working in a medium evidently unfamiliar to him, and this is one reason why his book is so dull. The events he describes are not in themselves dull, it is only his method of presenting them. Whatever his motives are, all he has succeeded in doing is in portraying a great man in such a way as to make him as small as some of his surroundings. Literary inexperience may explain, but cannot excuse this.

My memory may be at fault, but I cannot recollect Dr. Nansen indulging in monotonous diatribes against Governments in general and the Government of France in particular. Dr. Nansen worked through the League and through the Governments composing it, and he retained his faith in the League to the end. But then, Dr. Nansen was a great man.

In *International Tramps*, Mr. Johnson has not confined his attentions to Dr. Nansen, he has seen fit to make certain allegations against an unspecified and nameless—for he has been very careful—group of his former associates in Geneva and on the Secretariat of the League.

If these allegations are not scurrilous, then that word has no meaning.

H. A. ST. GEORGE SAUNDERS.

JOURNEYS END . . .

SIR,—Why don't you advertise your paper? It is what is wanted, and cost me an 800-mile journey to get acquainted with it.

F. M. HOLLANDS,
Tsime, Buta Buta, Basutoland.

THE WORLD OF FINANCE

HOPE REVIVES

by "RAPIER"

WHEN I wrote last month the economic and financial outlook was still very uncertain and caution was the order of the day.

Recovery in Wall Street

In the latter part of June, however, the whole picture was lightened by a sudden and largely unexpected revival on Wall Street which within a fortnight had carried the Dow-Jones index of industrial securities to the highest point this year with a rise of 25.30 points, and even advanced the extremely depressed railroad and utility indices to new peaks for the year though the rise in these securities was much less spectacular than in industrials. Such a rapid advance naturally induced profit-taking which, however, was well absorbed and at the time of writing the market, though somewhat hesitant, shows no sign of slipping back into its former despondency. What, however, everyone is asking is whether this advance is justified and what is its basis. There seem to be two schools of opinion on this subject even among Americans. The uncompromising and irreconcilable critics of President Roosevelt maintain that Wall Street's ebullition of strength is evanescent and after a few months will die away again through lack of any solid basis of trade recovery. They attribute the stock market revival to discounting the effects of the pump-priming which inevitably must increase

the purchasing power of the community and lead to an increased demand for "consumption goods" such as textiles but, they say, will not revive the "capital goods" industries such as steel. The President, they say, is determined upon a re-distribution of wealth and in the process is taxing capital out of existence, and in these circumstances no revival of business confidence is possible. Another school of thought sees indications of a real trade revival in the autumn and attributes Wall Street's rise to a justifiable discounting of such a revival. They maintain that, apart from the irreconcilables of Wall Street, there is a better feeling among business men and a new spirit of co-operation with the Administration.

New Deal Prospects

Viewed in perspective from London the American scene presents several confusing elements which are difficult to evaluate. If the President's critics are correct in their diagnosis then the best hope for trade revival will be the defeat of New Deal supporters in the November Congressional elections on the largest possible scale. By no possibility can the complexion of the Senate be changed, as only one-third of its members must seek re-election and even in the House of Representatives a Republican victory is out of the question, but the defeat of a considerable number of pro-New Deal Democrats

would clip the President's wings and force him to go slow with his reform programme. The results of the primary elections, where the two parties choose their representatives for the November elections, will therefore be watched with the greatest interest over the next month or two to see which way the wind is blowing and upon the result the behaviour of the market will to some extent depend.

Non-political Factors

Apart from politics there are other factors which are of vital importance. Congress adjourned without passing any legislation to help the sorely pressed railroads, and, short of a Special Session Congress in the interim, nothing can now be done until next January to help them in their plight except a general trade revival. The companies are pressing for wage-cuts which the labour unions are resisting and this issue is still in the balance. The steel companies have cut prices and are now operating at a loss and they, too, are pressing for wage reductions. At the same time the price of copper has risen, perhaps too rapidly, and it has yet to be seen whether consumers will buy at the enhanced prices. Until the price and wage structure is brought more into harmony there must be some hesitancy as to the soundness of the predicted trade revival.

Wall Street the Barometer

The effect of America upon the rest of the world is reflected in the behaviour of the London security and commodity markets. When Wall Street rises securities and commodities rise in London and vice versa. Wall Street is still the barometer upon which all eyes are fixed and when Wall Street is strong London ignores its own indices of trade recession and puts its faith in the brighter future indicated for the world in an American revival.

From Derbyshire

*"Will you kindly
issue me twenty
further £10 Shares.
Cheque for £200 en-
closed for which I
shall be pleased to
have certificate in
due course, and
request that you for-
ward dividend war-
rants as heretofore."*

Another very interesting item
from our postbag. Full details of
this attractive investment will be
sent on request.

Reliance
PERMANENT
BUILDING SOCIETY

Established 1842.

**PERCY STREET
LONDON — W.**

Telephone : Mincorn 3638.

Member of Building Societies Association.

"Some men are wise . . . Some are otherwise"

INVESTORS with the 'Chelsea' obviously belong to the former category. In a world of fluctuating values the shares of this old-established concern do not vary, and their generous dividend is consistently maintained and paid with unfailing regularity.

3½ % Free of Liability to Income Tax
Equal to 44-16-6 per cent gross.

Write for Brochure "Share Investments."

**CHELSEA PERMANENT
BUILDING SOCIETY**
110 KING'S ROAD, CHELSEA,
S.W.3

Telephone : KENsington 6681 (2 lines)

Established 1878 Assets exceed £1,000,000
Secretary : John McKiernan, A.C.I.S., A.L.A.A.

The Austrian Loan

One of the most satisfactory events of the month has been the Anglo-German debt and trade agreement. When I last wrote the service of the Austrian foreign debt was in the balance but the negotiations held in London led to a satisfactory solution whereby even though bondholders had to accept cuts in interest both on Austrian and German loans the sinking funds were restored and the prospect of a maintenance of payments in the future rendered much brighter. The agreement also gives promise of an increase of trade between Britain and Germany and on that score was welcomed as another, if only a minor, step in Mr. Chamberlain's policy of European appeasement.

The Wheat Situation

The world wheat situation has been causing concern among the producing countries. A month or two ago it was believed that Italy would have to import about a million tons of wheat, but since then the position has improved and their harvest is now estimated to be but little below that of last year. There are, however, large surpluses in view both in North America and the Danubian countries and probably also in Russia. The disposal of these excess crops is a problem which is exercising the minds of all producing countries, and in view of the determination of all former importing countries to render themselves more or less self-sufficient is one that is difficult of solution.

The financial position in France is once more giving cause for some anxiety and there is a recrudescence of a flight from the franc into gold. While there is no tangible evidence of a deterioration in the situation the French are once again suffering a *crise de confiance*.

DIARY OF INTERNATIONAL EVENTS: JUNE 15—JULY 14

GREAT BRITAIN,

ITALY, FRANCE AND SPAIN

IL DUCE's anxiety that the Anglo-Italian Pact of April 16th should come into effect was conveyed to Great Britain on June 4th. The Italian Press, in its first comments (June 18th), showed irritation at the delay. It argued that Italy had fulfilled her part of the Pact, that a "settlement" in Spain had been retarded by the opening of the French frontier, but that after the Council meeting (May 11th) England was free to recognise the conquest of Ethiopia. Statements in Parliament (June 20th, July 6th) showed that the British Government was not seeking delay, but could not give full effect to the Pact till the Spanish question was settled, as pledged by Mr. Chamberlain (February 21st). Regarding Ethiopia, the Press, recalling Lord Halifax's statement at Geneva, observed that recognition had to be part of a general appeasement; and that failing a truce in Spain to which Italy was opposed the "settlement" must be sought by a withdrawal of "volunteers" through the Non-Intervention Committee.

The crucial point was the French attitude towards the transit of war material. M. Flandin alleged (June 2nd) that 250,000 tons of war material had been allowed through in April-May, in virtue of an unpublished decree of March 17th, by M. Blum. The latter admitted in the *Populaire* (June 18th) that, since Italy had avowed her intervention, France had ceased to "play gendarme." In deference to British representations and to smooth the path of Anglo-Italian relations, M. Daladier reversed this policy and after June 13th

the frontier was sealed by France. International control on the French and Portuguese frontiers was still suspended. France's action was approved by the Italian Press as a starting point—though the *Stampa* (June 23rd) insisted that gun-running from the Provençal ports must cease.

After the closing of the French frontier the Non-Intervention Sub-Committee was able (June 21st) to reach substantial agreement on the British Plan, officially described as "a scheme for re-affirming and strengthening the Non-Intervention Agreement, for withdrawing foreign combatants from both sides, for granting in certain circumstances, belligerent rights to both commands, and for strengthening the observation of Spanish frontiers by land and by sea."

In a series of meetings (June 24-30th) the Sub-Committee revised the Plan, reducing the costs, and strengthening the clauses concerning sea observation to meet the Russian objections. It was finally agreed that observers should be stationed in 8-10 Spanish ports, under conditions rendering evasion difficult, and that if Russia refused to contribute to all the costs, her share would be made good by the other four Powers. The amended Plan was adopted by the main Committee by July 5th, with a further modification to ensure the parallel enforcement of sea and land control to meet the standpoint of Russia. The four Powers at once paid £12,500 each to enable the work to begin, and the Plan was despatched on July 6th to both the parties in Spain.

The prospect of some months' delay before the "volunteers" could be withdrawn caused Italy to urge more insis-

tently (July 8th) the bringing into force of the Anglo-Italian Pact. A unilateral withdrawal of the Legionary "volunteers" being unacceptable to Rome, it was agreed, after further diplomatic discussions, to expedite as far as possible the functioning of the British Plan.

At the same time increasing annoyance at Italy's failure to resume the interrupted negotiations was manifested in France, where the closing of the frontier—advocated by England, but not as a unilateral act—had been considered as "payment in advance (cf. *Populaire*, July 9th) for enabling the Anglo-Italian Pact to be applied and, for the conclusion of a Franco-Italian Pact, without which the former would appear to France an incomplete safeguard for peace.

The continued bombing of ships under British flag, in Republican ports, aroused deep indignation in England. The *Tribuna* (June 24th) claimed that Legionary airmen had sunk 17 vessels between June 4th and 22nd. After a *démarche* at Rome by Lord Perth (June 28th), counsels of moderation were given to General Franco by Italy—which, however, disclaimed responsibility, and the attacks diminished. On June 28th Sir R. Hodgson, who had been directed to demand explanations of the bombardments and return to England, reached London with General Franco's reply, which maintained that ports were legitimate objectives and proposed that a harbour should be neutralised for lawful traders, subject to an extension of the contraband list. In England it was felt that this proposal might imply recognition of the blockade, and that Almeria, the port suggested, was unsuitable, especially for trade with Catalonia. The Republicans also objected to the scheme as an encroachment on their rights.

On June 25th the intention of the Republicans to retaliate for air raids by bombing the places whence the raiders

came was conveyed to the French and British Governments, which remonstrated earnestly against any project of attacking German or Italian territory. All idea of extending such reprisals beyond Majorca was then disclaimed through the Spanish embassies (June 26th). The German and Italian Press declared that air raids on their cities, or even on Majorca, would be met with acts of war.

The organisation of the neutral committee to report on air bombardments (see July number, p. 85) was impeded by the decision of the United States (June 21st) not to take part and the consequent withdrawal of other participants. Meanwhile the scheme had been accepted by the Republicans (June 27th), who then asked that the committee should report on the bombing of Blanes on June 29th.

Despite air bombardments and the progress of the Nationalists towards Sagunto, the Republicans maintained a firm countenance; but there were signs that they would not reject mediation once foreign intervention had ceased. Dr. Negrin, broadcasting from Madrid (June 18th), appealed for a "common denominator" for all Spaniards. The British Government's readiness to mediate, alone or with others, was affirmed by Mr. Chamberlain (June 21st, 27th). In Italy, however, the inspired Press (cf. *Stampa*, June 23rd) denounced all projects for a truce—which were attributed to France—as designed to retard General Franco's victory.

EUROPEAN CONVERSATIONS

IMPORTANT conversations took place at Venice (June 16-18th) between Dr. Stoyadinovich, Yugoslav Premier, and Count Ciano. Italy was understood to be anxious for an extension of the Belgrade Agreement of 1937—now out of date owing to the *Anschluss*—as a permanent basis for her Balkan foreign policy, while Jugoslavia primarily desired

a development of trade relations. "Full identity of views" on "questions of mutual interest" was officially announced. In Yugoslav circles reports of a military understanding were expressly contradicted.

CZECHS AND SUDETEN

AFTER a first round-table conference (June 23rd) the Sudeten leaders announced that they were claiming that equality of nationalities should be inscribed in the Constitution and that Czech colonisation in the German districts should cease. The negotiations then languished while Dr. Hodza negotiated with the coalition parties. The British and French ministers asked for information (July 1st) as to the progress of the Nationality Statute, and the Sudeten party (July 2nd) said they reserved their attitude towards it till they were apprised of all its contents.

President Beneš declared (June 30th) that the Government would go to the extreme limit of concessions and that the nationalities problem would be justly resolved in a few weeks. The German Press showed impatience: Herr Goebbels declared (June 21st) in a speech that it would soon be seen that a race could not be separated in two countries. In Leningrad, Dr. Litvinoff said (June 25th) that Czechoslovakia was a country defending herself and responsibility for any attack must fall on the aggressor.

Dr. Hodza also invited (June 18th) the Polish leaders to a discussion, and conferred with certain activist Hungarian deputies, whose title to speak for the Magyar minority was, however, denied by the *Pester Lloyd* (June 24th).

Herr Hitler was reported (about July 6th) to have impressed on the British Government his hope that the matter should be settled before the Nuremberg Congress in September.

The visits paid by Col. Beck, Polish

Foreign Minister to Stockholm and the Baltic States, in May, June and July, did little to further the project of a neutral league, centred on Warsaw in place of Geneva, and extending from Scandinavia to the Black Sea. The Eighth Conference of Baltic States at Riga discussed the subject, but its members were impressed by the consideration that such a league must necessarily be dominated by Poland and would be directed against their powerful neighbour, Russia. Finland was also alive to this danger and preferred her attachment to the Scandinavian group.

SANJAK OF ALEXANDRETTA

IN the Sanjak of Alexandretta the registration of electors, by the League Commission, gave small hope for the Turks of the majority (22 out of 41 seats) which the French had concurred in their obtaining. Meanwhile, owing not least to British counsels of moderation at Angora, the French and Turkish general staffs at Antioch were approaching an agreement, under which the Sanjak would be provisionally policed by troops of both states in equal numbers (2,500); it was thus possible for negotiations for a treaty of friendship to be resumed. On June 22nd the Turks, having impugned the impartiality of the electoral commission, ceased to recognise it; its President suspended its work and returned to Geneva. Three instruments, initialled between France and Turkey at Angora (July 4th), provided for: co-operation in maintaining security in the Eastern Mediterranean, and mutual withholding of aid from an aggressor; Turkish preponderance—though without territorial rights—in the Sanjak; and certain safeguards for Turkish and Syrian optants. The French and Turkish troops entered the Sanjak on July 5th; the presence of the latter was distrustfully viewed in Syria. In Paris the agreements were approved as

a realistic solution of difficulties due to the—still unratified—Franco-Syrian treaty of 1936, as heralding a close entente with Turkey, and marking a parallelism with the British policy, exemplified in the grant of credits (£16,000,000) by Parliament (July 4th) for Turkish armaments and economic development.

SWISS NEUTRALITY

THE Swiss Government having informed the Governments of Italy and Germany that the League Council had taken note (May 14th) of Switzerland's intention not to participate in sanctions under the Covenant, the Italian Government replied (June 21st) that Switzerland's will to neutrality would meet with a corresponding will on Italy's part to recognise it. Germany replied in similar terms, citing her previous declarations. The Reich Foreign Office organ observed that neutrality implied an objective attitude and reserve in expressing ideas inspired by differences in the regimes of the two States.

LATIN AMERICA

THE frontier proposed by the Buenos Ayres Peace Conference in settlement of the Chaco dispute between Bolivia and Paraguay, was accepted by the former state, but not by the latter. On July 9th the delegates of the two states agreed to accept the southern section of the proposed boundary, leaving the northern section—important owing to its relation to the oil-fields—to be fixed by the arbitration of the Presidents of the six mediating states, subject to the agreement being confirmed in Paraguay by a plebiscite to be held within three weeks.

THE FAR EAST

THE German Ambassador to China was recalled, and left Hankow on June 26th; most of the German advisers left on July 5th; the Chinese Ambassador in Berlin was recalled about June 30th.

In official statements (June 17th, 25th, July 6th) Japanese ministers warned

their nation to expect a long war, and rejected mediation by third parties; but they indicated that, in changed circumstances, Japan might revise her decision of January 16th not to negotiate with the Chinese National Government; the Peking and Nanking Governments, when merged, might, Prince Konoye explained (July 6th), negotiate with a reformed National Government, not under General Chiang Kai-shek's leadership.

General Ugaki, foreign minister, denounced (June 17th) alleged aid given to China by France in munitions and advisers—charges which M. Bonnet denied (June 20th). Hoikow, the port of Hainan Island, was shelled by Japanese warships (June 24th) and the Island's occupation was threatened—though territorial aims were disclaimed. France protested (June 21st) against this design and, about June 27th, the French and British Governments informed Japan that an occupation might cause complications, in which case they would support one another. Japanese warships withdrew from Hainan about June 30th. France then occupied the Paracel Islands (100 miles south-east of Hainan), a step which Japan (July 8th) declared to be contrary to assurances given in Sept., 1937. On June 24th, Japan landed troops near Swatow and occupied Namoa Island, twenty miles distant, as an air base.

The breaching of the Yellow River dykes frustrated the Japanese manoeuvre against Hankow from the north. The Yangtse floods delayed other columns moving on Hankow from Angking. The Japanese forces advancing up the Yangtse captured the boom and land defences at Matung (June 27th) and occupied Hukow (July 5th) whence they could threaten Kiukiang or Nanchang. Japan advised neutrals (July 11th) to evacuate Hankow and six other areas which would be bombed in the advance on Hankow.

WORLD REVIEW

Incorporating
Volume VI. No. 1 'REVIEW OF REVIEWS' and 'WORLD' September, 1938

40-42 WILLIAM IV STREET
LONDON, W.C.2

Telegrams : BOOKSTORE, LONDON
Telephone : TEMPLE BAR 0127-9

WORLD REVIEW is the only English monthly review giving an extensive selection of articles from publications all over the world. These articles are chosen with great care, since WORLD REVIEW can only be valuable as its sponsors want it to be, if it avoids all political bias. The Editor in his own article, and other signed contributors, express their opinions as frankly as they please. Otherwise the Review would lack force and colour. But the ultimate object of WORLD REVIEW is to perform a useful and progressive service by allowing

THE NATIONS TO SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES

GERMANY TURNS SOUTH-EAST

by VERNON BARTLETT

AT the foot of the rocks on which I am sitting is deep water in which long weeds sway to and fro as though the sea were breathing. Small fish, busy about their business, distract the attention. Once a day a little steamer puffs across from Oban carrying yesterday's newspapers amongst its miscellany of cargo. One glances at the headlines. Occasionally I go into the bar of the local pub, but if the conversation does turn on the affairs of the world beyond our island of Mull I should scarcely know it for some of the talk is in Gaelic and the rest in an English which is picturesque but not very intelligible to us men of Dorset. There are mackerel in the bay and their eagerness to hook themselves consoles me for difficulties of catching sea trout in the loch. If the weather is bad, it's good for fishing and if it's good, it's good for bathing. Any complaints? None!

Or rather, one small one. How, in such surroundings, can I write what my American colleagues call "a think piece" about international affairs? Despite the villainy of the black-backed gulls, it is so difficult here to realise that there is one great power in Europe whose government has deliberately adopted gangster methods at home and abroad. Say

what you will, there is not so very much to choose between authorities who "persuade" Austrian Jews to "donate" half their fortunes in the hope of being allowed to leave the country (and then still forbid them to do so) and the gangsters or kidnapers of the United States.

In last month's issue of "World Review" I tried to put forward, in the form of dialogue, the case for and against Nazi Germany. A very short, but very important book by Dr. Einzig, *Bloodless Invasion*,* brings me back to the subject, for in it is exposed a formidable reply to one of the arguments in defence of German policy—that the interests of peace are served by allowing the Germans to develop their "natural" market in South-Eastern Europe.

In an equally important book, reviewed in this issue, about the Far Eastern "incident" Miss Freda Uteley writes: "What really faces us to-day is this. Any country which has made itself a "great power" by spending a large part of its wealth on armaments, and thereby created great trusts stifling the economic activities of the rest of the population at home, can insist on multiplying its population and then demanding other people's territory to solve its population problem." This is very much what Germany is doing in the Danubian and Balkan areas, for preponderating economic and political influence may lead to servitude just as abject and galling as the servitude that follows conquest by arms. And Dr. Einzig makes out a very good case to show that the German government, quite deliberately and by the unfairest methods, is acquiring that political and economic control.

The Nazi Drive

Before Herr Hitler came into power the German share in the trade of the Danubian and Balkan states was roughly between 15 per cent. and 20 per cent. of the total and this was the result of a very active campaign. Now it has risen to between 40 per cent. and 50 per cent., chiefly at the expense of Czechoslovakia and Italy (who may begin to doubt whether German "neutrality" during the period of sanctions was as complete as it appeared at the time). And the great question is this. Is this increase a legitimate one, resulting from the energy of the new Nazi Germany and likely to absorb enough of it to lessen the danger of war? Or is it a proof of a ruthless ambition which must lead to war unless other nations group together in so evident and overwhelming a fashion that the whole Nazi system will crumble?

*Duchworth, *as. 6d.*

Dr. Einzig has no doubts. He gives a formidable list of the methods whereby Germany is gaining control over these smaller South-Eastern European states against their will. She has, in the first place, quite deliberately abused her exchange clearing arrangements with them in order to get herself greatly in their debt. German firms bought far more goods from these states than they could take from Germany. It sounded all right until people woke up to the fact that, under the clearing arrangements, the money paid into, for example, the German clearing account kept by the Yugoslav importers in Belgrade was not nearly enough to equalise the amount paid into the Yugoslav account by German importers in Berlin. To objectors Germany could reply that they had only to buy more German goods and the discrepancy would be wiped out. They could, indeed, show indignation that German exporters were not getting a fair deal although it is quite clear that a Balkan peasant cannot make much use of the mouth organs or Zeiss binoculars that have flooded his national market. It is even reported that, in view of the present shortage of onions in the Third Reich, Bohemians are now smuggling them across the frontier in large quantities and are being paid for them in cocaine owing to the scarcity of foreign exchange. In some cases the government has had to intervene to pay its exporters to Germany since there was no money in the clearing account for the purpose, and in one case at least (in Rumania) it had to inflate in order to do so.

Re-selling Ruse

But there are other methods than merely running into debt. The clearing agreements were altered so that current imports and exports should balance each other. Germany then bought Hungarian and Rumanian wheat, Greek tobacco, Turkish raisins or Yugoslav timber without loss of foreign exchange (since they were bought through the clearing system) and resold them abroad, receiving much-needed foreign exchange in return. She thus spoils the foreign market for the Hungarian, Rumanian, Greek, Turkish or Yugoslav exporters and brought them still more under her influence.

Or again, with the help of government subsidies, German exporters offered goods on quite fantastically liberal credit terms, without worrying overmuch whether the purchaser was ever likely to pay. According to Dr. Einzig "an initial deposit of the equivalent of five shillings secured the delivery of a bicycle while anyone who was prepared to make an

additional payment of £1 was able to become the possessor of a small German motor car."

The Long-Term Credit Trick

How was such generosity possible? The trick was so simple that for some time the experts could not solve it. Germany granted the credits but the borrowing countries unwittingly and unwillingly financed the operation, and Dr. Einzig, taking the hypothetical case of Rumania, explains how. "Rumanian exporters to Germany are due to receive payment out of the funds of the German clearing account in Rumania, accumulated through the payments made by Rumanian importers for goods bought from Germany. On the surface it looked as though, with the establishment of the rule that German-Rumanian imports and exports must balance each other, the interests of Rumanian exporters had been sufficiently safeguarded, since their total claims during a given period must be equal to the funds obtained by the clearing account from Rumanian importers of German goods. No provisions were made in the clearing agreement as to when the Rumanian importers should pay for the German goods they purchased. While Rumanian exporters sold their goods on a cash basis, Rumanian importers bought their goods mainly on a credit basis. This meant that, owing to the delay in payment by Rumanian importers, there were no funds available for the settlement of the claims of the Rumanian exporters. The latter would have to wait until the credits granted by Germany to Rumanian importers had matured and the importers had actually paid for the goods received."

Germany could afford to grant these long-term credits since, long before they matured, she had received payment in the form of goods exported from Rumania. If she exported to Rumania machinery worth £1,000,000 she could at once buy £1,000,000 worth of Rumanian wheat, even if payment for the machinery was not made for years. The German exporter of machinery was at once paid out of the reichsmark proceeds of the sale of the Rumanian wheat, although he had sold his goods on a long-term credit basis, whereas the Rumanian exporter, even though he had sold his wheat on a cash basis, was not paid for a long time since, owing to the long-term credits granted to Rumanian importers, funds were too slow in arriving in the German clearing account. It did not even matter much to Germany if her debtors defaulted, since the Rumanian authorities had to try to collect the money to pay Rumanian exporters.

The German frozen debit balance would be increased, but so would Rumanian political dependence upon Germany.

And, according to Dr. Einzig, what matters most to Germany in the long run is to gain political control of the Balkans, for without it economic control is valueless in war time. Certainly the support known to be given by the German government to the local Nazi parties lends colour to the argument. Quite apart from the fact that many firms doing business with Germany are given to understand that they must dismiss their Jews, they have to contribute largely to the "voluntary" funds for the local Nazi organisations and the governments tempted to take action against these organisations know that it is in the power of a resentful German government at any moment to dislocate their national economy by transferring its business elsewhere and leaving them with nothing but hopelessly frozen credits. Small wonder that the German armaments manufacturer, with second-hand goods to dispose of, finds willing listeners among governments who are Germany's creditors and who can obtain from her adequate war material without spending a cent of their already scarce foreign exchange, even though that war material would be of little use in war time unless they were Germany's allies.

Anybody who knows the Danubian and Balkan countries realises how strong a feeling there is against this German control and how much hope has been aroused by the British loan of £16,000,000 to Turkey and the hints of other credits to come. These states should at least be given an opportunity to choose, and they have no choice while Germany is allowed unchecked to use such methods to subjugate them. And while Germany conscripts her citizens in her feverish effort to build up fortifications against Western states which are no more likely than Czechoslovakia to attack her, it would be folly for the British government to cede strategic positions in South-Eastern Europe with the same purblind nonchalance as it has done in Spain. Dr. Einzig, who is an important expert on such matters, is convinced that, at the cost of a very few millions (which would not matter very much to the Treasury which is now spending roughly a million a day on the preparation for another war) this country could win over half a dozen allies, each with a considerable army, air force, and supplies of the greatest importance to Germany in time of war, and thus probably prevent a war altogether.

Apart from the grant of small credits now, in place of the large loans we should certainly offer these states when once hostilities had broken

out, the British government could do a great deal to free them from the bonds which bind them against their will to Germany. The development of methods of barter and the extension of the exchange clearing system would enable them to increase their trade with Great Britain without losing their precious foreign exchange. The government, now that it is buying supplies for war reserves, could deliberately purchase in the South-Eastern European markets even at a small financial sacrifice. Above all, financial assistance could lead to a reduction of the economic barriers between the Danubian and Balkan states and to a stabilisation of their currencies in relation to the sterling and the dollar.

There should be, as I urged last month, no long-term policy of encirclement of Germany which would make a subsequent explosion inevitable. There should be no indiscriminate lending which keeps in existence uneconomic factories and, consequently, tariff barriers. But there should be a vigorous reply to the deliberately unmoral methods whereby Germany is gaining political domination of states which have a right to independence and whose independence is an important British interest. The more vigorous the reply, the greater the chance of a genuine agreement between Great Britain and Germany.

"THE WATCH ON THE DANUBE": A CORRECTION

To those readers of Mr. Douglas Reed's article "The Watch on the Danube" in our last issue who have protested that "Coblentz is surely not on the Danube, but at the confluence of the Rhine and Moselle" we sorrowfully answer: it is, indeed. The fact is that over-intelligence on the part of our printers, coupled with the holiday spirit on the part of our editorial staff, changed unnoticed the Austrian resort of Cobenzl, about which Mr. Reed wrote, to the Coblentz which appeared in his article. Mr. Reed himself says that he is quite hardened to this mistake being made; also that he is certain there is a reader somewhere in England who buys all the books and magazines that are published in the hope of finding this particular slip and being able to draw attention to it; so why, he says, "discourage someone who contributes so liberally to our support?" That may be, but we are sorry nevertheless, and would thank those readers who tempered their rebuke with kind words about the standard of accuracy maintained by WORLD REVIEW.

WHICH WAVE?

English shipowners indignantly reject the offer of one free port in Spain. They ask how come Franco is telling Britannia which wave to rule?—"New Yorker," quoted by "News Review."

FRITTO MISTO

"The Italian race has remained pure for the last 2,000 years."—La Difesa della Razza, Rome.


When Alaric mopped up in Rome
With his totalitarians
Italians dames were not at home
To visiting barbarians
Disdaining to supply the Goth
With Teuton offspring hardy,
As later they withheld their troth
From lovesick Langobardi.

Their way was equally abrupt
With overlords Byzantine
Lest Roman blood they might corrupt
With influence levantine.
These steadfast virgins spurned like dirt
The decadent Hellenic
And never would so much as flirt
With Emirs Saracenic.

Invaders of two thousand years,
Not always of the purest,
Left fewer racial souvenirs
Than any summer tourist.
The mothers of the Coming Race
Abhorred miscegenation
And substituted in its place
Parthenogeneration.

Thus their posterity retains
No trace of alien foemen,
Not Fifty-Seven Heinz-like strains
But just the antique Roman . . .
So Fascists learn eugenic lore
And racial boloney
And hope to look like Cæsar more,
And less like Al Capone.

REYNARD




HOLIDAY CRACKS

"Le Canard Enchaîné," Paris

AT CANNES

"It's disgusting. It appears these working people who are getting paid holidays spend their time drinking, with hardly any clothes on."



ENGLAND IN PARIS



"Oh! Darling. . . . Look! A monument to the glory of shorts!"

"Le Canard
Enchaîné,"
Paris

HE WHO IS LEFT
BEHIND

"Be sure and look after
yourselves well, dears."

Trier,
"Nebelspalter,"
Switzerland



"Il Travaso delle Idee," Rome
HUMANISING WAR

"Mrs. FitzBunion—please. prepare
yourself for some disturbing news
concerning the Colonel."

"Dublin Opinion"

THE OPEN FORUM



A COMMUNIST LOOKS AT EUROPE

by JOHN STRACHEY

In this section we print, without necessarily sharing the views they express, articles by men of international fame. Here we have a statement of the Left viewpoint on foreign policy by the best-known of the English Communist leaders. Mr. John Strachey, member of a distinguished literary family, is one of the organisers of the Left Book Club, and himself the author of numerous books on his cause

A COMMUNIST, like other people, when he looks at Europe, does not like what he sees.

A Communist, being human (he is, you know), is appalled by the spectacle of the Europe, and for that matter the world, of 1938. He sees what we all see. He sees that armament-making, and every other kind of war preparation, has become the major activity of everyone of the great, highly developed, highly civilised, peoples of our continent. He sees that at the South-Western end of the continent, in Spain, a particularly horrible combination of civil war and foreign invasion has been raging for the past two years. And if he lifts his eyes from Europe, he sees that another war is raging in the Far East. He sees also that a large part of the peoples of Europe, including the great and talented races of Germany and Italy, live under Fascist governments, which deny them all those civil and political liberties which the peoples of Europe had won by many centuries of effort. In addition to these more spectacular tyrannies, he sees the quiet degeneration of human society towards less free, less civilised, less humane, less developed, levels of community life over great tracts of Eastern and Central Europe. If, like me, he has a wife and two children, he wonders what sort of world this is into which

he has dared to bring human beings. He wonders what sort of a heritage we are all leaving for our children to grow up into.

Nobody, I suppose, no matter what his political opinions may be, can differ much about the tragic character of the above spectacle. But how widely we often differ as to what ought to be done about it! In a brief article such as this it would be hopeless to try and state what Communists think ought to be done about each and all of even the more pressing of the problems which assail us. Perhaps I can help to illustrate the Communists' attitude by writing rather more fully about one of those problems, and that the most immediate and urgent of all, the problem of how to prevent a new world war from breaking out.

There are, I take it, two conceivable policies by which Great Britain can make her contribution, and it is no small one, to the preservation of the peace of the world. That peace, which seemed so relatively secure even eight years ago, is now threatened everywhere and has been destroyed in three parts of the world, viz., China, East Africa and Spain. Nor, I suppose, can there be much discussion as to the immediate cause of that triple breach, and that universal threat. Three states, Germany, Italy and Japan, whether for good reasons or for bad we need not discuss here, consider that they must found Empires for themselves, or extend their existing Empires. They would, no doubt, prefer to do so merely by means of the threat of war upon the states which they propose to annex, or the other Empires which at present possess territories which they covet. Already, however, they have had to wage three minor, but sizeable, wars in order to implement their policy of imperialist expansion.

The Policy of Retreat

Now it is quite clear that there are only two ways of attempting to prevent the outbreak of world war in such a situation. The one is to retreat before the aggressor. You must abandon small or relatively feeble states, such as Abyssinia and China, whether or not you have pledged yourself under such instruments as the League Covenant to protect them; you must put your blind eye to the telescope when Italy and Germany, in flat contradiction of their newly given pledges, send invading armies and aeroplanes in order to attempt to decide the Spanish civil war in their interests; and you must do your utmost to persuade or cajole small, but by no means helpless, states, such as Czechoslovakia, to give way to the demands of Germany, even though by doing so she will be put at the mercy of the aggressor.

This is the policy which the British Government has for the past six years, from the moment in fact of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1932, steadily pursued. It has involved heavy sacrifices; it has involved considerable sacrifices of British interests; it has involved, for example, the sacrifice of important British financial and commercial interests in China; it has involved the jeopardising of imperial communications at both the Eastern and the Western end of the Mediterranean. It has involved far heavier sacrifices of ideals; it has involved the breaking of the solemnly pledged word of the British Empire under Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and in doing so has destroyed the League of Nations as a protection against aggression; it has involved the sacrifice of a British foreign secretary in order to placate a foreign government.

Was Peace Saved ?

It has involved all this. But, it may be said, even if all this is admitted, has it not been worth it? Has it not been worth sacrificing all these interests, material, strategic and ideal, for one thing—for the sake of peace itself? If this policy has done this one thing, namely, preserved the peace, have not all the other sacrifices been well worth making?

It is certainly necessary to examine this suggestion with the greatest care. For, if it is well founded, then few, if any, would care to deny its weight. What, however, has the policy of yielding step by step before the threat of the aggressors actually achieved? Undoubtedly, it has achieved this. It has achieved the fact, that as I write this article on August 4th (what a date!), 1938, none of the great powers are in a state of actual war with each other, though several are waging war with minor states. And I hope that this will still be true when you read this article.

Now, is this undoubted fact an achievement for the policy of retreat before the aggressors, which has been pursued, almost without interruption, for six years? I believe that, on the contrary, the undeniable fact is that six years ago, before this policy was inaugurated, there was no power in the world which had both the capacity and the inclination to plunge the world into war. We are now approaching the point, though, as I shall submit in a moment, I do not think that we have quite reached it, where there are no less than three such powers. In other words, the policy of retreat before the aggressors, far from having saved peace, even

in the limited sense of having staved off world war, has been the one thing which has enabled these aggressors to put themselves in a position, material, strategic and diplomatic, in which it is possible for them to threaten to provoke a major power to war.

If the policy of retreat, even at the price which I have listed above, had bought us the assurance of permanent peace, few would challenge it. Even if this policy had bought us six years of respite, without altering the chances of ultimate war or peace one way or the other, there would be many to defend it. Even if this policy had bought us six years of respite at the cost of making world war inevitable at a later date, there would be some who, though I believe foolishly, would defend it. But none of these hypotheses is in fact the correct one. What the policy of retreat before the aggressor has done is to create, as nothing else in the world could have done, the very possibility of world war. For it is this policy, which by destroying the League of Nations; by enormously enhancing the material power and the prestige of the three aggressor states; and above all, perhaps, by giving them key strategic positions in the world, as in the case of Italy in Abyssinia, and Germany and Italy in Spain and North West Africa, has come near to so strengthening these states that they can challenge one or other of the great powers.

The Alternative Policy

The alternative policy for preventing a world war is too well known for it to be necessary for me to describe it in detail. It is simply for all the states of the world which are willing, other than the three aggressor powers (and, of course, including them, if they should experience a change of heart and, consequently, a change of government), to enter a system of mutual insurance, by which each one of them guarantees the integrity of the others. Thus the aggressors would be confronted with the fact that an attack on any one state, whether it were a small state, such as Abyssinia, a large and supposedly defenceless state, such as China, a small but vigorous state, such as Czechoslovakia, or a great empire, such as the British, would encounter the massed strength of a great and world-wide defensive alliance, designed for no other purpose than to keep the peace.

There are two questions involved here. First, would such a policy, if it had been followed, have kept the peace during the past six years? And, second, would it keep the peace, if it were adopted, to-day? The first question can be answered definitely. It is notoriously easy to be wise

after the event. But who can possibly doubt that, if, acting through the League of Nations, or outside it, if they had preferred it, France, Britain, the Soviet Union, and (at any rate in the first case which arose) the United States of America, followed, as they certainly would have been at that time, by all the smaller, but by no means negligible, states of the world, had in 1932 stopped, by economic sanctions plus any other suitable measures, the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, the rest of the long tale of widening aggression would never have been told? Is not exactly the same thing true of the aggressions of every subsequent year? If, in 1933 and 1934, Germany's open determination to rearm had been met by the united action of the states of Europe, accompanied by the adoption by them of genuine disarmament for themselves at the Disarmament Conference, which was still sitting at that time; if, in 1935, the sanctions against the Italian aggression in Abyssinia had been pushed home, instead of being confined to those articles which Mussolini declared that he could do without; if in 1936, the ever-growing invasion of Spain by German and Italian forces had been sternly forbidden on pain of the provision to the Spanish Republican government of double the number of whatever aeroplanes, guns, etc., were sent in to General Franco by the Fascists; if in 1937, the extension of the Japanese aggression to China proper had been met by a world-wide boycott of Japan; if, in 1938, the German threat to Czechoslovakia was countered by support of, instead of menaces to, the Czechoslovak Republic; if, at any one of these points, a united resistance had been presented to the aggressors, who can doubt that the result would have been, not war, but the preservation of the peace of the world?

What Can Be Done Now

But all this, you may say, is past history. It is no use crying over spilt blood. What are we to do now? Now, and until and unless the actual outbreak of world war takes place, the position is fundamentally the same. It is perfectly true that the policy of world alliance against the aggressor is more difficult to-day because the aggressor has been allowed to become much stronger. But that does not mean that it is less necessary. On the contrary, it is ten times more necessary, for to-day it represents the only means of preserving the peace of the world.

The Sybilline Books of the present world situation read like this. Yesterday, it would have been easy, completely without risk, to preserve

peace by unity against the aggressor. To-day that could still be done. To-morrow it could probably be done. The day after to-morrow it could possibly be done, but if a war nevertheless took place, the aggressor powers would be quickly crushed. The day after that the aggressors would have got so strong that the war, when it came, would be long drawn out and terrible indeed. The day after that the war would end in victory for the aggressors and in our defeat.

In other words, the continuation of the policy of retreat before the aggressors will, if it is continued much longer, make the preservation of peace difficult and hazardous. If it is continued still longer, it will make war inevitable. If it is continued beyond that, it will make not only war, but defeat, inevitable. Our present policy will not prevent us from having to fight. It will ensure that we have to fight; and, if it is continued to the end, it will ensure that we have to fight without ideals, and without allies.

SUBTLE

I have to thank *The Countryman* for an outstanding example of bucolic British humour at its quiet and subtle best. A Lady Supervisor of Village Morals accused a workman of having reverted to drink because "with her own eyes" she had seen his wheelbarrow standing outside a public house. The accused made no verbal defence, but the same evening he placed his wheelbarrow outside her door and left it there all night.—"*The Crown Colonist*," London.

A PRIMITIVE SUPERSTITION

"Just before we took off from Floyd Bennett Field on our round-the-world flight," said Mr. Hughes, "a woman ran out to the airplane and stuck a piece of chewing gum on the tail. According to a long-standing superstition, this is supposed to bring good luck."—"*Evening Standard*."

BRIGHTER BREAKFASTS

The latest novelty in America is a bright green egg for breakfast. The shell is the normal colour, but when you cut off the top you are confronted with a bright green yolk. Some genius has discovered a substance which, if mixed with the hen's food, causes this effect.—"*Straits Budget*," Singapore.

SANS-SOUCI,† U.S.S.R.

"I ascribe the fact that the number of cases of neurosis, depression and suicides is lower in the Soviet Union than in capitalist countries, to the social and economic order which frees the Soviet citizen of certain anxieties, as, for example, the fear of unemployment that exists in other countries."—Dr. M. A. Meyer, Executive Director of the New York Psychoanalytic Institute, in Moscow.

BRITAIN IN NOMAD'S LAND

Helping Hand for Bedouins

by HANS M. NIETER

Mr. Hans Nieter, a young film journalist, has just returned from an expedition to Palestine, Syria, Transjordan and Iraq, where he has taken documentary films of the life of the people. Here he describes something of the conditions in Transjordan. Part of the Turkish Empire before the war, Transjordan became, jointly with Palestine, a British Mandated Territory afterwards. In view of the lamentable situation in the adjoining part of the territory, it is interesting to read of the good relations and fine work to the credit of the British in Transjordan. Its Arab ruler, the Amir Abdullah, has been often mentioned as possible mediator in the Palestine turmoil, and has himself submitted a settlement scheme to the British Commission

CROSSING the Allenby Bridge from Palestine into Transjordan does not merely mean passing over the Jordan from one country to another, but crossing from 1938 into mediæval times. The change is apparent at the Transjordan frontier posts where Arabs coming into Palestine are politely but firmly relieved of their guns, bandoliers and very business-like daggers. After witnessing the behaviour of "officially" disarmed Palestinians, to see everybody armed to the teeth but peaceful in Transjordan would bear out the armament racketeer's argument that weapons do not provoke war.

From Allenby Bridge it takes about three hours by car through the mountains of Moab to reach Amman, capital of Transjordan. It seems that even in this wild and mediæval country one cannot get away from that accursed Great War, for on the way, passing a terrific ravine, one sees one of the German big guns rusting into time.

Amman is a hundred per cent Arab city, and only occasional adventurous tourists and archæologists pass through it on their way to Petra. Built like an amphitheatre in the mountains of Moab, it is the ancient Philadelphia of the Greeks, and the biblical capital of the Ammonites. There is also a real Roman theatre hewn out of the rocks, and opposite it a small Arab hotel, suitably named The Philadelphia, in which the

unsuspecting guest will find American bibles by every bedside, coyly covered by the mosquito net. In the hall of the hotel is a further attraction—one of the walls is covered by a huge map, apparently drawn by one of our military experts during or after the War, on which are shown the positions of Amman and Maan, and the whole Syrian and Arabian deserts. The remarkable thing about this map is that it contains no geographical notes, but only sentences distributed over it somewhat like this—"Broken country fit for heavy tanks but not for light artillery"—"Landing for plane impossible"—"Unfit for heavy artillery," etc., etc. On the right of the map I found the apologia for this work of art—"This map is out of scale and should be read approximately twenty miles further East."

The Amir Interviewed

I was sitting in my bath in The Philadelphia when one of my colleagues dashed into the bathroom, and rather agitatedly asked me to get dressed at once as we were commanded to appear before the Amir Abdullah. Half an hour later we were sitting in his palace, in a small Edwardian room furnished with a large mahogany desk adorned by two telephones, waiting for His Highness to appear. Two of his Chamberlains, Mustapha Bey and Samir Rifai Bey, the Director of Education, were waiting with us. Suddenly the door opened and the Amir entered, wearing a beautiful Arab dress and a spectacular golden dagger. His bearded, ivory-complexioned face smiled a friendly welcome as he shook hands with us. As the Amir only speaks Arabic, Samir Bey acted as interpreter.

Naturally our first questions dealt with the Palestine problem, but His Highness refused to be drawn. Changing the subject he asked us if we had been out to see any of the real Bedouin tribes, Bedouins being apparently his pet hobby. Several times a year he leaves his little palace in Amman for a tour of inspection of the different tribes, and with Miscal Pasha, the great Transjordan sheikh, he is trying to settle the Bedouins on the land in the fertile regions around Amman, Es Salt and Jerash. He then offered us his fullest assistance in regard to our work in the desert with the Bedouins, and, after the custom of the country, we got our coffee and a cigarette and were graciously dismissed.

Many people think of the desert as just a huge stretch of sand, dotted occasionally with decorative palm trees, under the shade of which

picturesque film sheikhs recline in splendid tents. In reality the landscape of the desert changes from the broken country "not fit for heavy artillery" to landscape resembling the mountains of the moon, alternated by sandy wastes, rock-strewn waterless river beds, and the huge flat expanses of the Flint Desert. And out of this cruel and merciless country human beings wring a living.

Transjordan, which is roughly as big as Ireland, has an Arab population of approximately 300,000, of whom two-thirds are still living the life of nomads in the desert. Nowadays they confine themselves to the raising of sheep and camels, raiding, their former principal source of income, having been stopped by the Transjordan Government.

The Work of Major Glubb

The desert has become organised! The shadow of Lawrence still lingers. British officers who worked with him are still carrying on in his spirit. Peake Pasha, who organised that magnificent body of men, the Arab Legion, is still their Commander-in-Chief. The remarkable Major Glubb, who fell under the spell of the desert and since the end of the War has lived among the Bedouins, speaking their dialects, has won their trust so much that they appeal to him as arbitrator in nearly all their disputes. His great problem was how to stop inter-tribal warfare and raiding. This he solved in a brilliant way. He recruited a few hundred sons of sheikhs and other young Bedouins, and moulded them into a superb force—the Desert Patrol. Outside Arab countries it is difficult to realise how great an achievement this was. In ordinary circumstances it is nearly impossible to make a Bedouin leave his tribe. Military discipline is beyond his understanding, and his training would have broken the heart of many a sergeant major, but Major Glubb, with his understanding of Bedouin psychology, has forged these sons of the desert into a super-efficient military corps.

Small forts are placed at certain vantage points in the desert, especially in the territories bordering Syria, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, in most cases about fifty miles from the frontiers. They are equipped with wireless transmitting and receiving apparatus, and are held by only a tiny force of from four to six men each. The desert is systematically divided into sectors, each of which is patrolled by two or three men mounted on camels. They follow the caravan routes, and branch off to inspect scattered Bedouin camps, where they are usually received with

open arms, as they bring news of the outside world and serve as arbitrators to smooth out the many disputes. In a patrol of, say, three men they will probably not all come from the same tribe, so that the Desert Patrol acts also as an intermediary between the different tribes, working for an understanding to create an Arab national unity. After four days each patrol returns to its base fort to make a report. These reports are sent to Amman to Major Glubb, so that the Transjordan Government always has a true and vivid picture of the economic conditions and the morale of its nomad inhabitants.

Guarding Desert Travellers

Another important function of both the Desert Patrol and the Arab Legion is to search the caravans coming from Saudi Arabia for smuggled hashish. Nor does the rigid control of the desert stop at Bedouin tribes and caravans; the movements of every traveller crossing the desert are carefully watched over by a fatherly government. For instance, when we left Amman to go to Petra, some two hundred miles, we had to check out at the Arab Legion post outside Amman, and check in four hours later at a water hole commanded by a desert post at Kattrani, where the registration numbers of our cars were already known. After checking out at Kattrani we reported some eight hours later at El Kerak, the old capital of the Moabites, where we were indignantly asked where we had been for the last two hours, as the full scheduled time for our journey was only six hours. Before leaving El Kerak we had to get a special permit to continue our journey by night, as it is a strict rule that no travellers may be abroad after sundown.

To reach Maan we had to cross the vast expanse of the Flint Desert—shimmering, white hot—so desolate, so devoid of any resting place for the eye, that to travel over it produces a peculiar giddiness. The expanse of flatness is so terrific that one loses all sense of motion. We were told that it is impossible for a man to walk here for more than half an hour at a time and remain sane. After a time the tremendous waves of heat produce extraordinary optical illusions. Sometimes we seemed to be on the shores of a lake, and at times this illusion became so strong that we found ourselves braking hard to stop driving into the water. This strange water mirage seems to be produced by a kind of misty haze lying close to the ground. Sometimes a small stone lying in the distance is magnified into an enormous rock. We were suddenly alarmed to see a

huge black something moving towards us. When quite near it transformed itself into a truck belonging to the Transjordan Frontier force.

Meeting another car in the desert is such an event that one always stops to exchange cigarettes and pleasantries. This particular truck was also concerned in the organisation of the desert. The men in it were on one of their periodical visits to the outlying Bedouin camps to fight that scourge of the desert—tuberculosis. At one of the desert water holes, El Asrak, is a small hospital run by an English doctor, Dr. Thompson. Perhaps "hospital" is an ambitious term for just two little huts built of dried clay. There are no shining instruments, no beds, no nurses, only shelter for patients from the cold desert nights, but with all its shortcomings it is an outpost of the army fighting against tuberculosis.

Although usually of very fine physique, the Bedouins who come in contact with town civilisation are prone to disease, especially tuberculosis. They have very little resistance to infection. They are nearly all undernourished—*terribly* undernourished. I met several who had nothing but a little camel's milk for four or five days. In the germ-free air of the desert they can remain quite healthy in these conditions, but as soon as they come to a town disease takes a rapid hold of them.

There is an industrial revolution encroaching on the desert. The free sons of the desert find their lives hampered on all sides. The price for sheep has dropped since the importation of cheap food stuffs. The price for the once all-important camel has dropped since the introduction of the lorry. Income from raiding has been stopped by the organisation of the desert, and the average Bedouin to-day has to live on the sum of £4 a year. This is one of the blessings of industrialisation!

With a full understanding of the difficulties under which the Bedouins are living, both the Arab Government and the British Mandatory Administration are doing their best to lighten the burden. The Amir Abdullah and his highly educated executives are trying to teach the nomad tribes to settle and cultivate the land. He is offering vast tracts of fertile land to settlers at ridiculously low prices; if I am not mistaken, at a price equivalent to about 2s. an acre. Miscal Pasha has started a model farm for young Bedouins. The British Mandatory Administration, under Sir Charles Cox, the Resident, has taken in hand the improvement of hygienic conditions. The Medical Corps of the Transjordan Frontier Force, under Major Robinson, has organised anti-tuberculosis squads, as well as anti-malaria squads who cover all stagnant water with some


paraffin preparation. The Military Hospital in Zerqa, the chief garrison of the Frontier Force, has most of its beds occupied, not by members of the Force, but ordinary civilian Arabs. Maternity homes have been started in Amman, Zerqa and Maan, and it is impossible to describe the difficulties encountered by the British medical officers in bringing enlightenment into the secluded lives of Moslem women.

Transjordan is only a little country with 300,000 inhabitants, but they are 300,000 human beings. Industrialisation is taking its toll even in that remote land. British colonisation is often maligned, but in this small corner of the earth I have seen with my own eyes how British men and women are working hard to bring better living conditions to a very lovable people.

DISREPUTABLE ORIGIN

Fifteen hundred years ago the Jews were using the Swastika in a synagogue at Apamea, near Hama, Syria. Belgian archæologists digging the site have just found a mosaic floor using the sign for decoration.

No, it's next use was not by the Nazi movement by a long way. It occurs among the signs of medieval agnosticism. And the League used it as a flag in the earlier post-war years.—*"Evening Standard," London.*



"Marianne," Paris


NO COLLARS OR TIES

(Italian order)

"He has turned Fascist."

"By conviction?"


"No, for economy."



"Le Canard Enchaîné," Paris

(Mussolini puts his Cabinet through athletic tests)

"The dear child! He's sure to become a Cabinet Minister!"





BALKAN AUCTION ~

ENGLAND'S FRONTIER ON THE DANUBE?

by DR. KARL SILEX, Editor

From the "Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung," Berlin, 3.8.38

Should increasing German dominance of the Balkans be countered by Britain and France to the utmost, even if it is being achieved by nothing more violent than the methods described in our leading article? Talk of British financial support, coming visits from Kings Boris and Carol, and the news of Bulgaria's conclusion of a pact of non-aggression with the Balkan Entente, have brought this question to the fore

NOWHERE is the displacement of weight in the political scales so plain as in South-Eastern Europe. The Little Entente, which was established there as an outpost of France, is now leading only a shadowy existence. French attempts to persuade Yugoslavia, Rumania and Czechoslovakia to conclude pacts of mutual assistance have been made at every meeting of the Little Entente for the past few years, only to fail regularly.

How unreal those times have become in which the Little Entente wanted to form itself into a kind of common foreign-political unit, which would make an appearance as a united Great Power of 50,000,000 souls and throw its weight into the scales of Big Politics! Neither of the partners foresaw the risk that Prague's Soviet pact must mean, not only for Czechoslovakia but for those who let themselves be dragged into sharing the risk.

The first recognition of this fact may be ascribed to the great Yugoslav King Alexander. The Balkan Entente was founded by two members of the Little Entente, Yugoslavia and Rumania, allying themselves with Greece and Turkey. More and more the centre of gravity shifted from the Little Entente to the Balkan Entente; this displacement of weight was made easier when Yugoslavia made her foreign policy independent of Paris by coming to an agreement with Mussolini's Italy. The alleged natural tension between Belgrade and Rome disappeared and with that the entire situation changed. This development was favoured and hastened by the friendship which unites both Rome and Belgrade with Berlin.

The agreement which has just been concluded between Bulgaria and the four Balkan Entente powers shows the reaction of this displacement of weight. At its inception the Balkan Entente could not be quite acquitted of aiming at the encirclement of Bulgaria. Promises were made, more or less to force Bulgaria to join the Balkan Entente, in order thus to bring her into the anti-revisionist Front. Bulgaria opposed this, and at the instance of Yugoslavia her neighbours accustomed themselves to the idea of Bulgarian rearmament. They have now acknowledged Bulgaria's right to arm, while on all sides a pledge to renounce the use of force is repeated, such as is already contained in the Kellogg Pact and other treaties.

In addition the co-operation between Yugoslavia and Italy has reacted on the relationship of Yugoslavia to Hungary. The line which is being followed was expressed by Hungary at the time of the Rome-Belgrade Treaty in the words: "The friends of our friends can't be our enemies." Hungary and Yugoslavia are the friends of both Italy and Germany simultaneously. That gives the standpoint of re-orientated South-Eastern Europe as regards the Berlin-Rome Axis.


Whilst a policy of good sense is thus being revealed in a part of Europe, Prague remains the big question mark. The impudent article

with which the *Lidove Noviny* greeted Lord Runciman should make the world note what a risky game is being played in Prague. (According to the German reports the *Lidove Noviny* of Prague wrote as follows: "If we are to be told that we ought to give everything that is demanded of us, we can ask, too, what sort of an example they show us who are advising this surrender—England in particular. If we consider the 'Indian minority' of 350 million human beings, we see that Lord Halifax, as former English Viceroy, has had ample experience of what it means to satisfy a minority. . . . England can indeed point out that she understands how to give way. She lets General Franco destroy more than 20 ships, and declares proudly she is too mighty to have to be ashamed on that account. If that is true for England, the opposite is true for Czechoslovakia. England can risk a lot, Czechoslovakia very little. This comparison shows that someone is advising agreement who has himself been convinced in many cases of the complete impossibility of agreement, and who paid for the various miserable agreements which he achieved with sacrifices which the richest nations in the world can perhaps afford, but which a country like Czechoslovakia can not. All our friends and enemies can reckon with one thing—that there is no power on earth which can force us to abandon our vital interests.")

What we know of Prague's plans so far shows them to be still so completely inadequate that even masters of compromise, such as the

THE
RIGHT
OF SELF-
DETERMINATION
FOR PEOPLES

"Now I have forgotten what it was I wanted to remember!"



"Kladderatsch," Berlin

English have often proved themselves to be, may easily find the material a bit short. Even London does not dare to propose the customary business compromise of fifty-fifty. The diplomatic correspondent of the Times appears in the guise of mathematical magician and proposes that each party be content with seventy-five per cent of its demands. That makes a total of 150. Who is going to advance the missing fifty per cent? England? . . .

To Thwart Germany

The programme of Lord Runciman's visit is arranged. But how about its subject? We are forced to ask ourselves the question, whether the Western Powers want to stick to the subject at all. The subject has been, of course, declared to be the fulfilment of the national demands of the Sudeten-Germans. But a glance at the foreign press shows that this subject is either not being discussed at all or only in isolated cases. In reality London and Paris are only discussing their own subject, which is, whether an extension of Germany's continental position is a vital danger to them. The *Liberal News Chronicle* would like to deny the Sudeten-Germans their rights because otherwise the weapon of a blockade against Germany would lose in strength. Two former French Prime Ministers are disputing. Flandin has "made his choice." He agrees to Germany's continental position, for the reason that it leaves the path open for France for her Mediterranean and overseas policy. For that he is being attacked by Léon Blum. Germany, the latter says, has made a deal with Mussolini for a free hand in the East. For the Reich, Central and Eastern Europe has been reserved and for the new Cæsar a new Roman Empire is proposed. By abandoning Central and Eastern Europe to Hitler's Reich, France and England would in no way be able to purchase peace and quiet for themselves in the Mediterranean, but would run up against Mussolini there all the more.

It can be seen that such discussions completely ignore the fate of the Sudeten-Germans. They also ignore the position in the Far East, in which England and France have a greater interest than they admit. In addition, M. Blum keeps quiet about Germany's exemplary act in concluding the Naval Treaty of 1935, by which England's imperial position was acknowledged by Germany and by which France, too, profited.

It is this sort of accompaniment which is stiffening Prague's backbone, and encouraging it to evade the real issue and to rely upon being

an indispensable pawn on the chessboard of the world powers. This same accompaniment has caused a Polish newspaper to ask the appropriate question whether Baldwin's statement about England's frontier being on the Rhine no longer holds good and whether England is now wanting to move her frontier to the Danube. That is a very serious question, to which we cannot be indifferent. Is Lord Runciman's independence as a private individual being so remarkably emphasised because London and Paris cannot make up their minds to stick to the subject?

NO CAUSE FOR REJOICING Balkan Fascism as Before

From "D.Z.Z.," Moscow, 3.8.38

NATURALLY the question is being asked, whether the signing of a Pact of Non-Aggression between Bulgaria and the states of the Balkan Entente does not signify a change in the "traditional" course of Bulgarian foreign policy, and whether from now on Bulgaria, the ally of Hitler's Germany, will not turn towards the democratic Peace Front.

Nothing of the sort, of course, has happened, although the signature of the Pact of Non-Aggression, and the renunciation of the use of military force in the settlement of differences cannot be denied a certain positive significance.

The internal political developments taking place in Bulgaria, such as, for instance, the re-establishment of a Parliament (that deceptive image of democratic forms of government), the removal of a number of reactionary politicians from the government, etc., are doubtless signs of a certain sobering-up from military-fascist intoxication. It would be a mistake, however, to regard Bulgaria's turn towards the Balkan Entente as a turn away from Germany and an approach to the democratic Peace Front.

The decisive factor in this connection in the character of the Balkan Entente itself, which is to-day by no means what it was in 1934. The Balkan Entente of to-day is a Union in which a decisive rôle is played by fascist monarchies such as that of Greece, which is represented by the

BALKAN AUCTION

arch-Hitlerite, General Metaxas, of Yugoslavia, represented by Stoyadinovitch, and of "fascised" Rumania. As is well known, Stoyadinovitch, emulating Colonel Beck, fulfils special tasks for German fascism. His line is the disintegration of the little Entente (Yugoslavia, Rumania, Czechoslovakia) and the alteration in character of the Balkan Entente.

There are no sufficient grounds for assuming that the Pact of Non-Aggression aims at combining the Balkan countries in face of the danger of attack from German imperialism. This danger has been grasped by the broad masses of the Balkan peoples, but the ruling classes of Yugoslavia, Greece and Rumania, ignoring national interests, are continuing to follow the path of approach to the aggressors.

BRITISH HAND FOR RUMANIA? At the Crossroads

From "Great Britain and the East," London, 4.8.38

NO other Power came as well out of the peace discussions as Rumania. Her territories were enlarged by four times: Russia yielded up Bessarabia; the Hapsburg Empire, Bukovina, and the Banat. Rumania went into the war with a population of 7,600,000. She came out of it with 19,000,000 inhabitants.

Revisionists, however, who are always claiming that they were deprived of their historic rights by the Peace Treaties, should bear in mind that nearly all the territory gained by Rumania in 1919 had belonged to her 150 years before. She was deprived of the Bukovina by the Hapsburgs in 1775, and the Russians took away Bessarabia in 1812.

At all events in 1919 Rumania became a "Power." Since then one of the main questions of her politics has been whether she shall be a "European Power" (that is to say, a country having close connections with the West) or merely a Balkan State, unprogressive and interested only in the South-East. In these times of increasing British influence in the Balkans, the answer to this question is of especial importance.

Before the War Rumania was a disorganised, backward, corrupt, semi-feudal Balkan State. Suddenly, after 1919, she found herself faced with the task of ruling districts which had up to then been accustomed to better developed, "European-minded" Governments. It seemed that

Rumania must either become properly European, or fail in her task.

While, during the last twenty years, Titulescu, Duca, Maniu and other liberal-minded politicians have believed in opening this road to Europe, others, notably Goga and Codreanu, have raised the cry "Back to the Balkans."

Much of Rumanian internal politics can be understood only when this is borne in mind. The reactionary parties, particularly the "Iron Guard," have done all they can to block the "Road to Europe," boasting that they are the privileged "barrier against revolution," and alleging that the Left Liberal Wing and the Peasant Party are tools of the Bolsheviks.

The result is that progress in Rumania has been impeded. A by no means satisfactory state of affairs is revealed by some figures recently published in the newspaper *Currentul*.

Out of 3,078,820 peasant families in Rumania, 1,002,556 are still

WORLD
PEACE
CHAMPION



Sapajou,
"North China"
"Herald," Shanghai

living in huts built of plain clay, some 600,000 of them not even possessing a window. About 500,000 peasants live with their cattle in one and the same room.

Out of 60,855 springs which are used for water supply, 28,743 were found to be infected with disease germs. This perhaps explains why Rumania, besides holding the high record for births in Europe—650,000 births a year—also holds the death record—350,000 a year. More than 10 per cent. of infants die in their first year of life.

The poverty of the peasants, who represent 80 per cent. of the whole population, is well shown by the fact that 2,000,000 of them do not possess a cow, 1,600,000 not even a pig, and 250,000 have not even a chicken.

The average meat consumption of a Rumanian family is 70lb. a year.

When these figures are considered, it is not surprising to guess that the majority of the Rumanian population is discontented.

Another ground for discontent is the Minorities question. Since the Great War, only 13,000,000 out of the total of 19,000,000 population are actual Rumanians. The remainder are Magyars, Germans, Turks, Bulgars and Russians.

The Two Paths

All Rumania's difficulties might be mastered by a policy of suppression. That is to say, by preventing people from expressing their discontent. Or the difficulties might be overcome by a programme of economic and political improvement. Codreanu believed in the first policy. Titulescu and Maniu supported the second.

The Patriarch Miron Christea's present Government seems to have decided, somewhat hesitatingly for the second course, the "European" way.* A huge reconstruction programme was recently announced which is of great interest to Western countries. According to this programme, the Government is to make every effort to obtain sufficient credits outside the country to purchase agricultural machinery, to carry out widespread improvements in sanitation and to revive the greatly depressed oil industry.

It is indeed a great chance for Great Britain, for Rumania—in spite of the poverty of her population—may well be called potentially one of

*A very liberal Minorities Statute was promulgated last month by the Rumanian Government

the richest countries in Europe. Probably there is no other land on the Continent with so much unexploited wealth. According to geologists, no more than 10 per cent. of her mineral wealth has yet been tapped. Fresh investigations will almost certainly discover new oil wells. Modern agricultural machinery could easily double or even treble the crops in Bessarabia, which, after the Ukraine, has the most fertile soil in Europe.

This reconstruction programme should inevitably lead not only to social improvement and economic prosperity, but also to political security. Rumania to-day is again at the cross-roads. The alternatives are—forward to Europe or back to the Balkans, in the pre-War bad sense of the word.

WHY
(ACCORDING
TO THE
NAZIS)
THE CHURCH
RECOGNISES
NO RACIAL
DIFFERENCES



"Die Brennmessel,"
Berlin

BETWEEN TWO FIRES ~

SOOTHING DROPS FOR MANIACS

by HERMANN BUDZISLAWSKI

*From "Die Neue Weltbühne" (German Jewish emigré weekly),
Paris, 4.8.38*

Lord Runciman's mission of mediation to Prague, which this paper links with the visit of Herr Hitler's A.D.C., Captain Wiedemann, to London, has roused a frenzy of mutual recrimination in the German and Czech Press. Mistrust of Britain's aims appears to be one point on which both agree. The left-wing journal here quoted reflects the same viewpoint as the Soviet Russian Press

WHY have experts? The professional diplomats achieve nothing, and so Adolf Hitler sends his personal adjutant out travelling—a smart man who even in the World War was capable of commanding a company. As it turned out later his company was the most important in the Army; for Adolf Hitler was serving in it—the volunteer Hitler, who, it is true, pushed himself forward, but who, strange to relate, did not create such an impression that the command of the Army was entrusted to him—which would have meant a totally different end to the war.

About Captain Wiedemann and his London mission any number of novelette stories have appeared. But what has it got to do with us whether he knows Princess Hohenlohe or not? We preferred looking at the photographs; we compared them with one another because we thought at first there must be some mistake. That face might belong to a policeman, or his film opposite, but not even to an officer of the police or a gentleman adventurer. Faces are deceptive, and the English aristocracy, which takes a good look at its guests, was not repelled by his exterior. But we cannot be so wrong that we are not justified in coming to the conclusion that here is no diplomat but a gambler in world politics—someone who takes a chance on anything.

The conversation between Wiedemann and Lord Halifax cannot have been particularly philosophical. It alarmed the English so much that they were seriously afraid that they might again have to break off their holidays prematurely as they did twenty-four years ago, in order



THE "MIRACLE LORD" AND HIS WIFE

"The English 'mediator in the German-Czech dispute' has already won a certain popularity for himself. The Sudeten-German man-in-the-street, with good-natured irony, is calling him 'Runzelmann' (the German Puck who does good deeds to the needy) or the 'Wunderlord' (the miracle-lord)."—*"Die Zeit," Prague (organ of the Henlein Party).*

to march to war. We have already stated in these columns that the national socialists were certainly only bluffing. Nevertheless, in London they believed the threats and hit upon the odd idea of sending to Prague, for the purpose of study and counsel, the most experienced British statesman who had had least to do with Central Europe. Lord Runciman may well ask to be allowed a few months' time before he has gained a grip of the situation—and he has been commissioned to be thorough, to examine everything, but not to overwork himself. He intends to fish, play golf and avoid war. He has taken experts with him whose superior knowledge will be successful in complicating the problem and in producing partial solutions, and his wife, an efficient historian, who will provide everything with a scientific historical basis.

England has replied to blackmail with war by postponing the war. Now, there are numerous British statesmen who do not know much about Central Europe. On the other hand, most of them have intensively studied the problems of the Far East and the Mediterranean and it

would, therefore, be difficult to send British experts *à la* Runciman to Manchuria, where shooting is going on just now, and to Spain. . . .

There is no doubt that an extension of the Far Eastern war would react upon Europe. Meanwhile the Mediterranean volcano is becoming more active in spite of all the fire-extinguishers which are spraying water into the crater. The Anglo-Italian agreement is postponed, the Spanish war has flamed out afresh. The republicans have reconquered 700 square kilometres in a large scale offensive and, if there are no other consequences, this at least means that the end of the war is not in sight. Fresh Italian intervention will follow; fresh tension must result which will outlast Lord Runciman's Prague mission.

Hopeless British Method

Attempts to separate the various conflicts into tidy compartments and do away with them one after the other by postponement do not succeed. After a time they grow together again and in the meantime have got larger. This method of trying to save peace is hopeless. A short time ago there was an opportunity of solving the Sudeten-German question by acceptance of the Czech minority statute. It was certain that the national socialists would have evaded a war with England. Instead of facing the question of relative power openly, attempts are being made to cure homicidal mania with soothing drops, and valuable time is being lost which is wanted for the solving of other tasks.

For it is evident that Spain will again be in the foreground in the next few weeks. There is enough power available to drive Italy from the Pyrenees too—but no use of it has been made for the last two years. In the meantime Italy is undergoing an ever more dangerous internal political development. The observers who not so long ago reported the immense cultural difference between fascism and national socialism are now forced to report the process of ideological co-ordination between the two, and they will soon be obliged to see that Italian racial theories are far more crazy even than the German. Anyone who has been in Southern Italy must have noticed from the mere look of the people the extraordinary admixture of Arabic-African blood. Probably there is not the slightest biological difference between Jews and large sections of Italians. But the time is passed when a political slogan could be scientifically refuted and so robbed of value. Nowadays the only thing of importance is the object of a thesis, not its truth. The object of this new idiocy

is evident—to draw Italy and Germany closer together and co-ordinate them for common plans for hegemony. Europe's increasing intellectual decay, manifested here, is among those realities which are bringing us closer to war. Arguing makes no difference.

OPEN LETTER TO "MYLORD"

Nazi Menace to Britain

by DR. B. PALKOVSKY

From "Pritomnost," Prague, 5.8.38

THE Sudeten-German Party and its allies openly profess adhesion to Nazism. They are not concerned with their own position in this State. The aim of Nazism is not Czechoslovakia; we are only a hindrance. The Nazi path to power leads *via* our fatherland to British territories. The Nazi programme is not merely anti-Slav, it is anti-British as well.

To-day Germans have adopted the standpoint that genuine Germans can only live under a National Socialist regime, and are seeking to spread the Nazi plague throughout the world. . . .

What would the autonomy mean that the Germans are so enthusiastic about, and that you, mylord, are to bring them? The end of democracy. . . .

As soon as you have come to know this land and its people, you will realise that it fears no sacrifice whatever for the idea of world peace, because it is convinced that finally the democratic spirit of the world will conquer despite all. But even this willingness for sacrifice has its limits. It will never go so far as to play into the hands of the attacker by putting up no struggle. Should the Western democracies desert us, which we do not believe, nothing would remain but for us to fight out our fight with the help of all those who would grant us aid in this difficult and decisive moment, when it is a matter for us of life or death.

HITLER'S REAL AIM

From the "Sozialdemokrat," (organ of German Socialists) Prague, 27.7.38

WE have had so much experience of Fascist policy in general and National Socialist policy in particular that we are justified in

saying that Berlin is not concerned with the liberty of the Sudeten-Germans. Before the gates of the Third Reich stands Italian South Tyrol; the fate of the Germans there plays only a minor part in the policy of the Third Reich. Berlin's supreme interest is to detach Czechoslovakia from her external political alliances, which stopped Germany's march last May. As a first step Germany aims at bringing Czechoslovakia to abandon her defensive alliance with the Soviet Union.

Just as little is the Sudeten-German party concerned with national peace. On the contrary. The quieter the situation is here the more the Sudeten-German party has to lose; the longer uncertainty lasts the more it hopes to win. The Sudeten-German party aims at totality, that is to say, at mastery of the German districts and elimination of all those who do not want to submit to it. Those who uphold the ideals of democracy—and that includes England to an outstanding extent—will strive for true national peace, which can only be based upon the principle of equal rights of nations, politically as well as economically.

IS THERE A CZECH "STATE" ?

From the "Berliner Tageblatt," 3. 8. 38

THE Sudeten-Germans are demanding, like the Slovaks, like the Hungarians and like the Poles, nothing more or less than equality of rights. There can be no arguing that fact away; it is the essence of the matter. Half equality is none at all. If the Czech press goes on talking with great emphasis of the "maintenance of the Czech State," if every attempt of half of all the human beings living in Czechoslovakia to obtain their human rights at last is described as an attack against "the State," then anyone judging the case objectively must ask whether the State is there for men or men for the State, whether an apparatus of State is properly constructed whose functioning presupposes the oppression of half of all its citizens. Finally, it is playing a wanton game with peace when the *Ceske Slovo* writes that the "tactics of the Sudeten-Germans," by which it means their sober statement of objective political facts, have as their object "to provide an excuse for an other than peaceful solution." Such misrepresentations are calculated to poison Lord Runciman's mission of mediation from the start. That, in fact, seems to be precisely the object. The whole chorus of Czech papers is in harmony over this

tune. Everywhere they are talking of the situation as "becoming more acute." Do they want to make it more acute?


AN INADEQUATE DOCUMENT

German Critics of the Czech Proposals

From the "Berliner Morgenpost," 28.7.38

AFTER more than two months of mysterious silence the Czech Government has placed its cards on the table. The decision to make known the Nationalities Statute at last was made so to speak overnight; the suddenness of this action is obviously closely connected with the arrival of the English adviser, Lord Runciman, who is thus to be convinced of the Prague Government's goodwill.

In three introductory sections and thirteen main clauses the Czech Government have succeeded in saying nothing fresh. Many points in the document have an almost despairing resemblance to that famous February Agreement of 1937, in which the German parties, who were at that time not yet united, were made a number of promises which were



"Marianne,"

WHY NOT?

A travelling trunk suggestion for Lord Runciman.



Paris

ARRIVAL IN PRAGUE

"I am the friend of all, and enemy of none."

never kept. For, if they had been kept, the present tension might probably have been avoided.

The Czech document contains such a plethora of regulations, promises, and threats of punishment that it is not possible to discuss it in detail here. But the very introduction shows the complete inadequacy of the proposals, since their object is stated as being "to co-ordinate and complete." This is precisely what they should not be. Rather what is required is a completely new order of Government. With this false initial position it follows *ipso facto* that all conclusions made on the basis of it are useless. The same fundamental mistake is seen in another of the formulas used: a "State people" and "minorities" are spoken of, and not national groups in a State of many nationalities, all with equal rights. Again and again it has been pointed out from the German side that the essential basis of any future order must be the recognition of this absolute equality of rights.

Nevertheless it is interesting and enlightening as regards Czech methods to examine a few details of the Statute. For instance, at one point it is stated that "new employees in positions in State institutes or undertakings, which serve exclusively the needs of a population belonging to a certain nationality, are to be *principally* recruited from the ranks of applicants of this same nationality."

Such restricting terminology as "principally," "in so far as not otherwise . . .," "as far as possible," are to be found in all essential places, and give such an elastic character to every regulation—quite apart from the fact that they contain nothing new and essential—that in practice every local authority will be able to do what it likes with any of them.

In another place, for example, where there is talk of some kind of concession, it is stated that applicants belonging to a national group are to be employed in so far as "they are suitable." This guiding principle held good in previous practice too, and by "suitability" was commonly understood "political reliability" and by that again reliability in the sense of the Prague Government.

These examples of the ambiguity and insincerity of the regulations contained in the draft Statute might be added to indefinitely. But there is less point in doing that than in pointing out again the complete inadequacy of the document in principle.

We shall be eager to see what Lord Runciman's attitude will be to this production.

THE GERMAN PEOPLE'S CAR

Vast Scheme Progresses

From German Press Reports, 2. 8. 38

The work of the Labour Front, which superseded the Trade Unions in Hitler Germany, is not confined to the settlement of labour disputes by arbitration; a very large part of its activities consists in the organisation of cheap holidays for the workers, hundreds of thousands of whom benefited when the Nazis introduced paid holidays for all into Germany. The latest enterprise of the Labour Front is the production of a People's Car, a few details of which are given below

ON the occasion of the 75th anniversary celebration of the I. G. Farben's works at Leverkusen (on August 1st), Dr. Robert Ley, (head of the Labour Front) made a speech in which he announced the inauguration of a savings scheme for the People's Car, and gave further interesting details about the car's production.

Dr. Ley reminded his hearers first of all that he himself had worked at Leverkusen for seven years. Even at that time socialism was being preached as Community Spirit. This Community Spirit was what National Socialism wanted to see in all works, and wherever it was not yet completely achieved it would be to-morrow. Even at that time "*Kraft durch Freude*"—strength through happiness—was being preached, and happiness had become the driving power for strength. The "*Kraft durch Freude*" organisation of the Labour Front had brought happiness, sport and physical training into the factories. Last year alone over 700 million marks (£35,000,000 at par—*Editor*) had been spent by works managements in the cause of beautifying work. . . . The great "Strength Through Happiness" seaside resort of Rügen would, it was hoped, be ready for occupation by Labour Front holidaymakers next year.

Dr. Ley then dealt with the new People's Car factory, and emphasised that it was the intention of National Socialism that there should before long be nothing in Germany in which the German worker did not have his share. *In ten years' time there would be no working person in Germany who could not own a People's Car.* For 990 marks



EVERY GERMAN FAMILY IS TO OWN THIS £49 10s. CAR

(£49/10/0) an excellent car had been built, with room for four to five people. All the cars built had 100,000 kilometres (62,500 miles) behind them without any repairs worth mentioning. The most recent tests in the Alps had proved the magnificent qualities of this car.

The German Labour Front, however, was going on the assumption that 990 marks was still too much for the working man to pay out. This was where the Leader of the Labour Front had stepped in. It had now been arranged that the car could be secured for a weekly instalment of 5 marks, in which insurance was included.

It was also hoped to include radio in the People's Car for the same, or practically the same, cost. The question of garaging, of repair shops and stocks of spare parts would be solved in the same generous fashion.

The car would do 100 kilometres on only 6 litres (approximately 27 miles to the gallon.—*Editor*), said Dr. Ley.

In 1945 the whole factory, which would be the biggest in the world, would be completed. While the Ford works produced a million cars a year, the People's Car factory at Fallersleben would produce 1½ million

cars annually. It went without saying that this works of the German Labour Front would be an exemplary one in every way.

Immense training works would be built, in which the national apprentices' competitions would be held, and from which the *élite* in personnel would go to German industrial concerns. As regards the welfare of the working man, entirely new paths would be trodden. *The People's Car City was going to be an example to the world in its planning and architectural beauty.* It went without saying that in the whole city the spirit of "*Schönheit der Arbeit*" (beauty of work) would be at home. The People's Car City, which would possess every kind of cultural amenity, was going to be an "Acropolis of Happiness, Beauty and Work."

Applause from tens of thousands of listeners greeted Dr. Ley's announcement of the inauguration of the new saving scheme for the People's Car. The lowest savings instalment, inclusive of insurance, amounts to 5 marks a week. The halls of the mighty factory will be up this year, and by the end of next year it is hoped to produce the first series. Production will then be increased from year to year until it realises the prescribed extent of 1½ million units annually.

OUR GREAT NEWSPAPER PUBLIC

I was intrigued to read, in the *Sunday Express*, that Godfrey Winn has learned to love lobelias at last, and to see that, after quoting George Herbert's prayer. "Thou has given so much to us, give one thing more—a Grateful Heart," Collie Knox commented, "It is charming, don't you think?"

I agree. As Godfrey Winn might have said, "I think it well and fairly spoken."

I do not know for whom these articles are written, but Collie is quite frank. Speaking of his readers, he says, "I think you would all be welcome at any children's party . . . by any child. I can pay you no worthier tribute."

Nor can I.—*Hannen Swaffer, "World's Press News."*

INDIGNATION FOR FASTER TRAINS

The Soviet Press declares that mass indignation and determination to make a firm stand against the Japanese aggressors already to-day had a great stimulative effect on Soviet industry: workers everywhere increased their effort and even engine-drivers drove the trains faster.—"*Times*."

FRANCO H. & C.

Mr. Patrick Donner, the member for the Basingstoke Division of Hampshire, is a Diehard. He was formerly secretary of the India Defence League; to-day his principal enthusiasm is for the Spanish Nationalists. He has even named his two principal bathrooms "Franco" and "Mola."—*Londoner's Diary, "Evening Standard."*



Richard Gri

WANTED—A BOLD FRENCH POLICY

by PIERRE MILLE

From "L'Ere Nouvelle," Paris, 3.8.38

There is vital need for an enterprising policy of development in French Africa, if Italy and Germany are not to try and force the lock, urges this French writer

IT was a great mistake, says M. Y.-M. Goblet, the eminent geography editor of the *Temps*, to call by the name "Trans-Sahara" the railway which should long before now have linked up our possessions in Northern and Western Africa; that railway which is eternally discussed and never built. The French, like other peoples, conceive of things in terms of words, and so ask: "Why run a railway through a desert? There is nothing to be fetched out of a desert and it will serve no purpose." If, on the other hand, the line had been christened the "Mediterranean-Niger," public opinion would have grasped its importance and people would have realised that it offered both an assurance of prosperity and a guarantee of security; in other words, that it would be an "Imperial" way.

The Sahara separates our Northern and Western African territories "in the same way as a sea, which becomes a connecting link between two places as soon as men have learnt navigation." The tropical forest is impenetrable, but there are routes across the desert, and communications are often easier through the plains on its borders than through inhabited regions. "Moreover, France has made these ancient routes safe, by means of an incredibly small number of troops and at a figure whose lowness surprises foreign colonial powers." The work has been completed in the last few years by the development of the Cameroons. An excellent port has been built at Duala, and the railway has been extended to link up with the system in Equatorial Africa, our Equatorial Africa, of which the Cameroons form a natural complement.

This is what Y.-M. Goblet shows in a few lines with the authority of his expert knowledge: the shortest road from the Eastern Sahara and Lake Chad country to the sea passes through the Cameroons, the "hinge" of Africa, as President Doumergue called them. It is for this reason that

the Cameroons are coveted by so many foreign powers. "This is the explanation," writes M. Goblet, "of Germany's campaign to assure the 'return' into her hands of this possession, the mandate of which has been given to France. At the same time, Italy (who has already obtained territory in our Tibesti) is planning a Trans-Sahara railway, starting from Tripoli, passing through Mourzouk and on to Lake Chad, where the line will link up with the existing railway in the Cameroons—which will have become German again—and so on to Duala, which will be an aircraft base as well as a military and commercial port. And so," he concludes, and this is obviously true, "our eastern Sahara will suffer foreign penetration, French Western and French Equatorial Africa will be separated, and our African Empire be broken into bits; Equatorial Africa will lose its western province; the Lake Chad district will be isolated in the interior of Africa."

"In these conditions," adds M. Goblet, "the French Trans-Sahara, the 'Mediterranean-Niger,' would become almost pointless. The great highways of French Africa, our imperial routes, would descend to the rank of roads of purely local importance. And the native and Arab populations would wonder what unheard-of disgrace had stricken their powerful and protective France, who had brought peace alike to the fertile countries and the desert routes."

The situation could not be more clearly summed up. With the Rome-Berlin axis in existence, General Tilho has already shown that the German-Italian Trans-Sahara would quickly become, by force of circumstances, a Trans-African, making a junction with the railways of Belgian Congo and Anglo-Afrikaner South Africa. Trade and passengers from South Africa, instead of using a railway via Algeria and Morocco and connecting with Marseilles and Paris, would come to Tripoli and then to Genoa. No longer our North Africa, but Italian Tripoli, would hold the keys of Africa. France would thus have abandoned in this continent the predominance which she shares to-day with England.

The Cameroons Must Be Held •

The moral is that France must not on any account abandon the Cameroons. If she keeps the mandate there cannot be a Trans-Sahara from Duala to Tripoli. And we should still have time to construct a Mediterranean-Niger Railway which would remain an Imperial route.

Under the *Ancien Régime* we never had a great American policy;

our one idea was to keep Haiti, which we have since lost by other mistakes. Will 20th century France be able to conceive a great policy for Africa and consider the problems connected with that country as matters of the greatest importance? That is the whole question.

AN INTERNATIONAL HIGHWAY Eye On War Uses

From "L'Ere Nouvelle," Paris, 3. 8. 38

A Committee has recently been formed with the laudable object of developing the motor roads of Africa and making plans for a great highway to run from Algeria to the Cape. The principal existing roads are to run into it, and also a main transverse road connecting the Atlantic and Indian oceans at the Equator. The highway will be international obviously, since it must pass through French, Belgian and English territory. Its length will be about 3,750 miles. Its principal stages will be: Algiers, Laghuat, Ghardaia, El-Golea, In-Salah, Arak, Tamanrasset, Inguezram; in French West Africa, Agades, Zinder; in Nigeria, Kano, Maidugari, Dikoa; in French Equatorial, Fort-Lamy, Fort-Archambault, Fort-Crampel, Bambari, Bangassow; in Belgian Congo, Bongo, Buta, Stanleyville, Irumu, N'Goma, Costermansville, Kasongo, Elizabethville; and then, in South Africa, Lusaka, Livingstone, Bulawayo, Johannesburg and the Cape.

The crossing of certain parts of Nigeria not being practicable except in the dry season, the committee is considering a plan for the road to pass round the North of Lake Chad; even now it is possible, by using the boat service to cross Lake Chad, to go from Zinder to Fort Lamy without leaving French territory.

We may point out that, while awaiting the construction of this vast arterial road it is already possible for long distance travellers to cross overland from Algeria to the Cape. The *Compagnie Générale Transsaharienne* which runs a regular service between Algiers and Fort Lamy arranges an extension to the South for individual travellers. They go via Lado on the enchanted banks of the Nile, via Port Florence on the banks of Lake Victoria, via Kalomo beside the Zambesi, into the Transvaal via Pretoria, and so on to the Cape.

This account of the highways of Africa would be incomplete without a word on the work which M. Georges Mandel has been so devotedly carrying on for the establishment of a good modern road between Morocco and Senegal, via Mauretania. This last link has become feasible since the pacification of the Tapilalet, and even considered solely from a strategic point of view it will be of immense importance. "The war of the future will be fought in Africa," wrote the bellicose General Ludendorff, and our Minister for the Colonies does not ignore the fact that it may one day be necessary to bring overland to North Africa both arms and men of the Dark Continent.

CARS FROM ETHIOPIA

Italy's Empire Plans

by GERHARD HERRMAN

From "Zeitschrift für Geopolitik," Heidelberg

THE securing of raw materials and colonisation (in Italy's African Empire) are still tasks for the future, even now. For the fifteen years of constructive activities in Libya, which have only been intensively carried on since Marshal Balbo took office, cannot blind our eyes to Libya's meagre potentialities. Even by 1936 there were only 66,000 Europeans living there, mostly Italians, of whom the great majority were working in the coastal towns. The number of settlers only amounted to a few thousand. . . . There seems to be no possibility of increasing this number to any extent, as by far the greater part of the colony consists of desert.

It cannot be expected, either, that Libya's economic resources will ever be able to contribute to any appreciable extent to the Motherland's supplies. Italy is suffering to-day from having only been able to acquire the last remnants of North African coast which were going at the time. The significance of Libya, therefore, lies first and foremost in its strategic position, flanking Egypt and Tunisia. Nevertheless, Italy has been able to acquire valuable experience there in methods of European settlement and handling natives, which is standing her in good stead now.

In Italian East Africa (consisting of Abyssinia, Eritrea and Somaliland) the settlement of local affairs is left to the natives; only the village chieftains are responsible to the Italian authorities. In this way the Italians are relieved to considerable extent of trivialities and can provide for the great differences of races and custom among the native population. Religious faiths are given equal rights—which means in practice that the Coptic Church, to which the former ruling class belonged, has lost its former precedence. This class, the Amharics, only amounted, however, to about a quarter of the total population of 7,600,000. In actual fact, however, Islam is favoured by the Italians. As the majority of the population in Italian East Africa is Mahommedan, as well as the entire population of Libya, Italy's efforts to establish herself as Protector of Islam follows of itself for reasons of politics. In addition, a great part is played, of course, by the opposition to Great Britain, and the intention of making use of the latter's difficulties with the peoples of the Near East.

Apart from pacification and winning over the natives (among other things by extension of schools and combating disease), the Italian government finds itself faced by three tasks: opening up means of communication, securing raw materials with production of manufactures, and settlement of Italians.

Road Plans

As lucrative production of raw materials and settlement are only possible after the country has been opened up for communication, road-making is the most urgent task now and in the next few years. The six-year-plan announced in the summer of 1937 provides for the building of 6,250 miles of roads by 1943 at a cost of 12,000,000,000 lire. For the time being railways are not to be constructed.

It remains to be seen how the construction of a network of roads will affect the Jibuti—Addis Ababa railway, with which French Somaliland, already completely surrounded, stands or falls. After the completion of the motor road to Assab in 1939 a decline in traffic on this railway can be expected—in any case it has only a small capacity and is expensive to run. A friendly agreement between both countries over French Somaliland would be the most sensible thing for any French government, as otherwise friction must arise, the danger of which would be out of all proportion to its cause. In the construction of their network of roads,

the Italians can make use of the experience gained in building the 1,250-mile-long Libyan coastal road which Mussolini opened in March, 1937.

A Treasure House

The potential economic resources of the country are far and away greater than Libya's. In East Africa the land rises from sea level to the plateau of Habesh (about 6,600 ft.). It contains, that is to say, all kinds of economically useful climatic zones in spite of its proximity to the Equator. Cultivation of cotton and oil-bearing seeds as well as corn-growing and cattle-rearing are possible in the higher regions. Almost all important minerals, with the exception of oil, are present, although partly in very remote districts. Further important factors are the wealth in timber and the numerous possibilities of electricity production, particularly at Lake Tana and the more important tributaries of the Blue Nile, as well as in the overflow of the Webi Shebeli and the Juba.

Italian experts estimate that after completion of communications, the Motherland's requirements of the following materials will be provided by East Africa: cotton, oil-seeds, corn, coffee, meat, milk products, skins and furs, timber and precious metals. Reliable information is not yet to hand regarding the extent of iron ore, copper, lead, tin and coal deposits, but there is no doubt that at least a part of Italy's requirements of these raw materials will be covered by her colony.

A very essential difference, however, can already be seen between Italy's work in opening up her colony compared with that of the old colonial powers. Italian East Africa is to be more than merely a supplier of food and raw materials for the Motherland. Not only in order to save transport expenses, but in order to make the colony in the course of time a self-contained economic unit, the intention is to build up manufacturing industries on the basis of local raw materials. Abyssinia's timber supplies, for example, make possible the establishment of saw-mills, cellulose and paper works, plant for production of oil from wood, etc., whereby a considerable part of local fuel requirements can be covered on the spot. The deposits of iron and coal in Harrar are to form the basis for the establishment of big steel works. Although they are to be used in the first place for the production of railway lines and bridge-building material, according to the experts' plan it ought to be possible within no less than five years to manufacture cars locally.

These ambitious industrial plans naturally demand correspondingly

skilled labour. The natives are of course not suited for such work. Since the summer of 1936, therefore, a big flow of Italian building and industrial workers, and hand-workers, has set in. In the summer of 1937 there was a labour army of 116,000 people in the colony, a number which has in the meantime been considerably increased.

Self-Sufficiency the Aim

The economic development of the colony is fundamentally different in two respects from methods formerly customary. Italian East Africa is going to be considered economically as well as administratively as a unit, whose productivity will be developed from the point of view of communal and not capitalistic gain. Although the extent to which the Empire can be complementary to the Motherland is being studied with particular interest, this is not the solely decisive point of view. For the very reason that the Empire is so far distant from the Motherland, and can only be reached through the narrow Suez Canal, it must be placed on its own feet economically as quickly as possible in order that it may be able to exist independently of the Motherland, even if only for a limited period.

For this reason again the entire work of development is being carried out on the basis of state planning. This is in sharp contrast to the colonial methods of former times, when young colonies in particular were given over to economic piracy of the worst description. This state plan, however, wisely refrains from taking everything under state control; efforts are being made, rather, to make use of private initiative under state guidance, as in Germany. . . .

In comparison with economic development, agricultural settlement has been purposely relegated to second place. Not until possibilities for cultivation of particular products in the various districts have been carefully explored, not until the network of roads has established cheap communication with the larger centres, particularly with the ports, will the settlement of Italians on a big scale begin. . . .

According to the former Colonial Minister Lessona's statements, the following types of settlement are planned: firstly, purely white settlements, in which the natives will not be allowed as permanent employees, but at the most as seasonal workers or house servants. Settlements here are to take the form which has proved its worth in the Pontine Marshes and in Cyrenaica, that is to say, the settler has at first to occupy

the land, according to a fixed cultivation plan, as tenant of the state and only later becomes proprietor.

The districts not suited to white settlement are to be opened up in three ways: (a) through industrialisation with partial employment of coloured workers in mining and forestry, as well as food and other industries (b) by establishing plantations owned by Italian companies, and (c) by a more highly developed native economy, specially planned for export and under state direction.

For the time being there are only a few thousand Italian settlers in Italian East Africa, mostly in Eritrea and Somaliland.

Italian experts estimate that in the course of about ten years a million Italians will have been settled permanently in the Empire. Even if this total is not regarded as slightly optimistic, it would only represent the growth of population in two-and-a-half years. No fundamental solution of the Italian over-population problem can, therefore, be expected from the Empire by settlement alone. At least equally important is the feeding of the increased population by means of increased industrialisation in the Motherland, as well as in the colony itself.

Political Effects in Europe

The great extent of Italian East Africa's economic riches and settlement possibilities must not blind one to the fact that its potentialities are long-term ones. For the next few years neither an extensive effect on Italy's population problem nor on the economic structure of the Motherland can be expected. For the time being the development of the Empire demands the utmost exertion of all the Motherland's resources, both material and ideal. . . . This forced concentration on her Empire has already had far-reaching political consequences for Italy. She has consciously renounced external political activity in Europe.

In this connection the ever-postponed reckoning with Great Britain gains decisive importance. One must keep in mind that for Italy the time factor is of decisive significance. While the Abyssinian campaign, the race against sanctions, had to be ended as quickly as possible, to-day, on the other hand, it is a question for Italy of gaining plenty of time for the peaceful development of her Empire. Three years ago the dispute with the League of Nations was conducted under the motto: "With Geneva, without Geneva, against Geneva!" To-day Italy stands before the fateful question of her Colonial policy: "With Great Britain, without Great Britain or against Great Britain?"

THE FAR-EASTERN STRUGGLE~

HOW JAPAN THINKS

by GUENTHER STEIN

From "The Austral-Asiatic Bulletin," Melbourne, July

The writer of this description of present-day Japan is a well-known newspaper correspondent and author, with years of experience in that country

OUTWARDLY Japan's attitude in the present war with China may give the impression of national unity and discipline or even of some enthusiasm. The people "behind the guns" are working quietly to keep pace with their ever-growing task of feeding a rapacious mechanism of war economy. At the same time, they are obliged still further to tighten their own belts. On the surface, political dissension and anti-war feeling (so rife in recent years and so disquietening to the military), seem for the moment to have lost whatever vigour and frankness they had before the outbreak of the war. Cities, towns and villages are continuously covered with bunting. Their main streets are almost daily filled with flag-waving people whose demonstrations, however, bear the appearance of being much too well-organised to be spontaneous, consisting as they almost entirely do, of school children, Young Men's Reservists' and Patriotic Women's Associations.

These tireless marchers celebrate the latest victories—they are kept entirely ignorant about any Japanese reverses—and they pray at temples and shrines for more and decisive victories to come. They penetrate into the back streets, and often into houses and offices where they collect funds for national defence, and gifts and charms for the men in the field. In a rather stereotyped way, they cheer up the soldiers who are leaving for the front, and their families, as well as the sick and wounded who return. With all that, they seem to be striving hard to cajole the general populace into an enthusiastic response, and as politeness, if not feelings of quite a different character, would hardly permit a Japanese to refuse some kind of echo to such entreaties, popular cheers are forthcoming to a certain extent. The general atmosphere, therefore, would seem almost gay and festive.

Yet the Japanese authorities seem to hold doubts as to the soundness and consistency of this "positive" attitude towards the war on the part

of the nation as a whole. They invigorate their Spiritual Mobilisation Movement and keep on urging all circles to that national discipline and unity which, on the other hand, they boast of as an unquestionable and immutable fact, peculiar to Japan. They increase the police forces, and intensify their control over the spoken and the written word, all the while amplifying the definition of what is considered "dangerous thought." Arrests and other kinds of prosecution, though not spectacular in volume, are increasing all the time. Occasional remarks in private conversation by people in high positions definitely confirm that, inwardly, all is hardly as serene, nor as propitious for the future, as outward appearance might suggest.

How the "Right Ideas" are Instilled

Those in Japan who made themselves responsible for carrying on the present war, who keep on reminding the nation of the more "real" enemies than China who will soon have to be dealt with, and who have thus to keep up the spirit of a fundamentally peace-loving population, can rely upon no organs equivalent to "The Party" in Germany, Italy or the Soviet Union for instilling into the people, high and low, intellectual and primitive, the "right ideas." But they have at their disposal three powerful ideological instruments, apart from an all-too-submissive, ill reputed, and therefore rather uninfluential Press. There is, first of all, the Police Force, which in Japan has certain time-honoured patriarchal functions of popular enlightenment and guidance, besides those which would be regarded as normal in other countries. From that huge network of little police boxes at the street corners, and with the local policeman's habitual weekly visits to every home, they wield a very great influence indeed.

Secondly, there are the soldiers' and sailors' letters to the folks at home, calculated to be of more import than any Ministerial propaganda. These stimulating epistles, before being censored, seem to be carefully inspired by special political instruction in the barracks, in the field, or aboard ship, and so far they do seem to "get home." There is, thirdly, that big though heterogeneous and anonymous home-army of civilian patriots, recruited from all strata of the population, the residue of feudal Japanese Knighthood, who, on grounds of principle, would never question the desirability of war in the service of Japan's "great mission in the world. . . ."

The work of all these ideological forces is still being facilitated by certain peculiarities of the rather complex and unstable yet by no means "mysterious" mind which most Japanese seem to have in common. The deeply rooted tendencies to restrain one's own independent thoughts; to mistrust one's own judgment if it happens not to conform to pattern; and to evade such trouble as might arise from any kind of oppositionary action: all these traits of Japanese mentality have been developed through strait-jacket methods of disciplinary education. Families still enforce a great measure of patriarchal orthodoxy. The daily routine of other social relationships, of whatever kind they may be, continues the work of restricting individuality and fostering submission. For even in those fields of Japanese social life where conditions might appear to be as "modern" as in their English equivalents, distinctions as between "younger and elder," "inferior and superior," "disciple and master," remain more than mere conventional categories, and they help to keep alive, though certainly not unopposed, a hierarchy of subordination by one person, or group of persons, to another. It is difficult for the Western observer to visualise this in all its powerful influence on the nation's mentality.

Mental Imprisonment

It is thus that many an intelligent and well-educated Japanese who, on his own initiative, would produce all the pertinent arguments of logic and sentiment against war and militarism in general, and against the present struggle with China in particular, may be expected to end up with rather surprising confessions. He would say that he is not able to think of what he could do to make his voice heard, and to do his part in forming something like a popular will; even though he knows himself to be one of a vast majority of people who are all of the same critical mind and even though he is aware that such action would by no means go against the letter nor against the spirit of the Constitution. He would probably add that he is not even quite certain of the correctness of his critical views as applied to "the present emergency situation." And he would hardly fail to mention that he does not want to disappoint those "elders" who trust in him, nor to endanger those "equals" or "juniors" who would be inclined to follow him, by getting into any sort of trouble on account of his taking a frank attitude of dissent.

This mental imprisonment of almost all Japanese in a network of

psychological inhibitions and personal loyalties, makes it easy to understand why the intimidation or the arrest by the police of the comparatively few persons who combine even the mildest type of "dangerous thought" with qualities of personal courage and prestige, so effectively prevents the rise of an actual opposition, even though the human element abounds for it. It explains, on the other hand, why so much energy is being spent by the authorities on winning over to their cause not only converts from radicalism, but also "key-men" in all walks of life who have large circles of trusting friends or dependents, and a reputation of being fairly "liberal," and anti-militarist at heart. The foundation, recently, by a few leading army officers, together with some business men and politicians, of an organisation "for the unification of public opinion," is a case in point. According to the Japanese press, "their first purpose will be to secure unity of opinion among the original membership of 52 (sic). Then, members will work through their respective connections. . . . Business men will be held responsible for the education of fellow business men and their employees, etc. . . . Finally it is hoped by this means to ensure the like-thinking of all the people of Japan."

Growing Fears of Another War


But uneasiness and fear seem to be rising, just the same, behind the outward appearance of national discipline and cheerfulness. They begin to endanger the whole precarious edifice of the people's ideology, which the consequences of a still continuing industrial revolution may not have changed, but have already undermined to a considerable extent. These feelings have several sources. One lies in the growing economic difficulties, another in the human suffering caused by the war. A third one is a widespread apprehension that the China campaign, huge though its proportions already are, and appalling though its aftermath must be, may be followed rather soon by a "real war" in another direction. For this, many Japanese regard the present events in China as a mere curtain-raiser.

The rather liberal editor of the *Oriental Economist*, Mr. Tanzan Ishibashi, reflected the popular mind when he confessed some time ago: "We cannot expect that peace may be restored in the Far East as soon as the present war is over, but we have to anticipate that another war of still more serious consequences may break out on the heels of the present one." In the officially inspired propaganda about the inevit-

ability of "major complications" which preceded, and now accompanies, the "China affair," the Soviet Union figures most prominently as Japan's "real enemy," with the Naval Powers, and especially Great Britain, a close second. All of those Western nations, the people were told with much insistence, would soon have to be dealt with in one way or another, in order to stabilise Japan's everlasting predominance over East Asia and to guarantee the "liberation of China from Western ambition and greed."

It is this aspect of the near future, even more than the expectation of increasing economic hardship, which seems to haunt the Japanese people; probably with the one exception of that small minority of naive and belligerent fire-eaters. One might mention the argument that, with all the exertions of the present China war, Japan may hardly be able seriously to engage any of those Western Powers, the growing strength of whose armaments the Japanese Army and Navy seem to fear so much for the future. However, it does not seem to hold good with the average

THE
"OPEN
DOOR"
(JAPANESE
STYLE)



*Sapajou,
"North China
Herald,"
Shanghai*

business man and intellectuals, nor with the man-in-the-street. For all of them came to realise from their own experiences during the six years of strain that passed since the conquest of Manchuria, and from events in Germany and Italy, how much the argument of "economic incapacity," if applied to non-democratic countries, has disappointed those who tended to rely on it in their optimistic prophecies. And they know, also from their own experience, gained during the last half-century, what risks the Japanese military are willing to take at the people's expense—especially when the alternative to hazardous action abroad would seem to be the acute danger of facing an outburst of popular illwill against the military rule at home.

A danger like this to Japan's fighting services may still seem somewhat distant at the moment, but it exists. It may grow rather rapidly since the costly military expedition in China proves to have weakened rather than strengthened the country's position, international as well as domestic, and has in itself developed into a very "real" and dangerous war. This seems to be only too well known to the military and to their civilian supporters. But, to their samurai mind, subjugation in the domestic field would probably seem even more distasteful than honourable defeat in further battles.

REALISTS AT SEA

Business Interests and China

by OWEN LATTIMORE

From the "Atlantic Monthly," New York

Mr. Owen Lattimore is Editor of "Pacific Affairs," organ of the Institute of Pacific Relations in the United States, and author of "The Mongols of Manchuria," etc. He knows the Far East as few men do

WHEN Japan a year ago set out on what our strangely mild post-war vocabulary calls its "latest adventure," it was very generally believed that China, this time, was done for. The most extreme Chinese courage would be able to achieve nothing more than a gallant gesture

of resistance. Only foreign aid could prolong the resistance beyond a few weeks.

Yet it is now quite clear that this was altogether the wrong way to put it. Japan is the one that cannot possibly succeed without strong backing from other countries.

The situation is worth a little realistic study, especially by those who urge indifference to the fate of the Far East, on the ground that Japan is first on the spot and strong enough to get what it wants. But is it? The argument of the bogus realists is that Americans, while sympathising with the helplessness of China, ought to be careful not to antagonise Japan, because it is a victorious Japan that America will have to deal with after the war. But what if China turns out to be the winner?

Even Japan's first great victories and territorial gains were only tactical. They hid for a while, but could not hide permanently, a strategic defeat.

* * * *

If Japan were obviously going to conquer China in short order, we might dodge the issues. We might pretend to be hard-boiled realists and say it is all none of our business. The now obvious probability that China can win without being propped up, and the certainty that Japan cannot pull through without a heavy investment of British and American industrial resources, materials and credits (Germany and Italy could not swing it), demand a more genuine realism in attempting to forecast the significance of the alternatives of Japanese and Chinese victory.

A new Japanese "realism" has lately become more and more articulate. The argument runs like this: "We are the only bulwark against a Bolshevised Asia. We have to be rough about it; but you know how things are in this hard, real world. At the same time, we have practical propositions to make. We are going to rule China, but we are willing to admit that we haven't the money or the resources to exploit it. While we do the ruling, you can invest profitably in our enterprises.* You won't have any control, and you won't have any Open Door, but your dividends will be guaranteed, and China will be policed and orderly, and there won't be any Red menace."

What this says and what it means are two very different things. How would these American investments be used? Korea and Manchuria and Japan, where American investments are a good deal heavier than they are in China, provide the answer. They would be used to energise

Japanese competition outside the Japanese Empire. They would result in wider Japanese competition all over the world, cutting into American foreign shipping revenue, trading profits, banking profits and insurance profits, and at the same time throwing Americans in America out of work.

This is not only a general statement: it can be made specific. One of Japan's declared purposes is to develop a North China cotton supply that would free it of dependence on American cotton. As in cotton, so in everything else; the money of some Americans, invested in North China, would be used to compete with and lower the standard of living of all Americans.

As for China, it is frequently said that an independent China would be simply a bigger and more dangerous Japan. I do not think so, for definite reasons; and besides, a China ruled by Japan would certainly make a bigger and more dangerous Japan.

China went into this war a backward country. It cannot win unless it becomes vastly more progressive and constructive. It cannot win without appalling sacrifices on the part of the whole nation—the lives of those who have lives to give and the money of those who have money to give. It cannot win unless, in the course of the war, it tremendously increases the strength of the national Government and improves the democratic mechanism by which the Government serves the interests of the nation and hears and acts on the will of the people.

The last thing that the Chinese will tolerate, after the sacrifices they are now making, is a further sacrifice in peace-time to the special interests of any group. Neither the Kuomintang nor the Communists nor provincial war lords like Pai Chung-hsi and Li Tsung-jen (immensely powerful in their bailiwick before the war, but now throwing everything they have into the common struggle) will be able to "capture" the Government or part of the country after a victorious peace. The only way that a Chinese Government will be able to stay in power will be by acting swiftly and effectively in the national interest.

* * * *

Immense constructive enterprises will have to be undertaken, immediately. That will mean investment for everybody, in any part of the world, who has money to invest. In order to assure the people that they really have something worth their sacrifices, the whole standard of living in China will have to be raised. That will mean trade, production and enterprise of every kind. It will mean wide competition, of the

only kind healthy to capitalistic enterprise: competition geared to a rising standard of living.

Both in order to get what they need as cheaply as possible and in order to avoid falling under the control of any one Power, the Chinese will have to throw the Open Door wide open, and keep it open. That, I think, is the clinching argument.

America's classic Far Eastern policy of the Open Door has never been anything but a gamble in futures. It was founded in the first place on the clear and logical assumption that China must some day develop, and that the development must not be monopolised by any one country; that there must be competition and that it must be healthy.

It would be the most disastrous defeat in the history of America's participation in world affairs if, just as we are coming within reach of the evolutionary, non-revolutionary liberation of China foreseen by John Hay and guarded as an article of faith in our Far Eastern policy ever since, we should bring it to abortion by lending our money, our industry and our political influence to the uses of Japan.

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE CONFLICT

Moscow's Explanation

From "Izvestia," Moscow

THE plans for the conquest of China are collapsing. Japan is obliged to send more and more reinforcements to China, and the Kwantung army, which has considered its entire *raison d'être* to be the accumulation of forces for an anti-Soviet war and which requires large forces to maintain its domination in Manchuria, is now afraid that it may be compelled to send part of its forces to the assistance of the Japanese armies that are enmeshed in the boundless expanse of China.

To avoid such a prospect, the Kwantung army has apparently decided to stop at nothing to draw attention to itself. The Kwantung militarists have argued approximately thus: all we have to do is to show that all is not well on the Soviet-Manchurian frontier, and the supreme command will see that the Japanese army in Manchuria must on no account be weakened but must, on the contrary, be strengthened.

It is also highly probable that the said supreme command (whether

or not it saw through the cunning scheme of its zealous subordinates) did not object for its own reasons to some minor and well-thought-out provocation on the Soviet frontier. Taking into consideration the opportunist and conciliatory policy of certain great powers, the Japanese command perhaps reckoned that the U.S.S.R. would display the same willingness to yield to the Japanese on a question directly affecting her interests.

The Manchurian Incident

The Japanese militarists stop at nothing to achieve their own ends. The Kwantung army staff staged an artificial incident on the Soviet-Manchurian border, an incident for which there had never been any grounds, since not a single border guard or Red Army man has ever set foot on the other side of the Soviet-Manchurian frontier.

Not content with this, the Japano-Manchurians attempted to seize an island belonging to the Soviet Union, and at the same time a group of fascist hooligans in Tokyo forced an entry into the grounds of the Soviet embassy. But the Japanese militarists have blundered again. Although they might have deceived some persons in Japan by their false reports, this sally of theirs was met with well-founded disbelief all over the world.


The calculations of the Japanese militarists were completely smashed as a result of the firm position adopted by the U.S.S.R., who in the given instance, as always, based herself on authentic facts, official treaties and documents.

This is not the first time that, when things were going badly with them, the Japanese militarists resorted to provocative anti-Soviet sallies. This is not the first time that the Soviet Union has nipped Japanese provocation in the bud.

Surely it is time the Japanese militarists realised that their clumsy manoeuvres are doomed to failure and merely leave those who plan them open to the ridicule of the whole world.

MINOR POINT EXPLAINED

The final question was about those mountains in Siberia which were 6,500 feet high on our American maps, but which turned out to be 9,000 feet high, and necessitated some quick thinking by Howard Hughes to avert a crash. He said there were two possible explanations: Either our United States Hydrographic Survey maps were wrong or else the new Soviet five-year plan called for an increase of 33 $\frac{1}{3}$ per cent. in the height of all mountains, and this had been successfully attained in the face of Trotskyist sabotage.—*"New York Times."*



THE SOVIET UNION

World Review

The Arctic and Far Eastern domains of the Soviet Union are said to be a treasury of mineral wealth awaiting development

ANGLOPHOBIA IN MOSCOW

Challenge of the Russian Navy

From the "Nationalzeitung," Basle, 3.8.38

The speech referred to here was made by M. Kalinin on June 19th, but was not released for publication until July 4th. A Naval Treaty binds Britain and Russia, it may be noted, but does not limit the Soviet Navy to any proportion of the British Navy, as does the Anglo-German Agreement

WE pricked up our ears when a few weeks ago it became known that the Soviet President, Kalinin, had announced at a meeting of Leningrad naval experts a plan to build a Soviet war fleet which would "not be inferior to the British Navy." It was not only that Russian intoxication with power took a particularly impressive form in Kalinin's announcement, whether it will soon be carried out or not; his speech was remarkable for the scarcely veiled challenge, or at least the emphasis on political conflict with England, which was suddenly revealed. True, Kalinin's words contained more irony than hate, as if he wanted to say to the English: "You thought that we were no good—now you are going to be made to see that even on your own most particular territory you can't beat us." But for British ears it was a challenge, all the more incomprehensible in view of the fact that just at the same time efforts were being initiated in Paris to bring about a *rapprochement* between London and Moscow. A fortnight ago we discussed these attempts, but now they have been superseded once more; in Moscow, friendship with Britain is quite off, and Kalinin's speech now looks like the overture to an intensification of the differences between the two states such as has not been observed so openly for ten years past.

What has happened that Russian mistrust of British policy should so suddenly blossom forth in the Soviet press and in speeches by Bolshevik leaders? It has nothing to do with any approach by Russia to Germany; the Kremlin sees in National Socialism, now as before, its sworn foe. But, on the other hand, Moscow believes that England has fallen victim to the latest German promises and that an Anglo-German agreement will in the last resort be directed against the Soviet Union. So far the Russians have only had to be witnesses of the, for them, shameful success which

German diplomacy has had in making a breach in the "United Front" of the two western powers as regards Czechoslovakia. For dear peace's sake, in order to obtain respite from German claims for colonies, England appears ready to sacrifice Czechoslovakia as a sovereign state. The Soviet press does not ascribe any very great power of resistance against British plans to France, and it is not uninteresting in this connection that Moscow is declaring that Russia would if need be hasten to the help of the Prague Government even without France. But England is being very much more severely attacked, because England seems not only to be sacrificing the Czechoslovak Republic but to be leaving Germany a free hand throughout all eastern Europe. It is the old Russian worry which always crops up whenever there is talk of a European conference taking place without participation of the Soviet Union. Already *Pravda* is suspecting that Germany will get her way, will force Prague to renounce the pact with Russia and thus isolate the Soviet Union. But according to the Russian press even Hitler is only a puppet in the hand of British world policy, which remains conscious of the conflict between the two Empires of England and Russia, and whose final aim is to keep Russian competition suppressed.

A Distorting Mirror

One may well say that truth and fiction are marvellously mixed in these fears, that England's attitude towards Germany may well rouse suspicion (apparently in Paris as well, in spite of the pretty speeches at the time of the King's visit) but that all further Russian surmises presuppose a conception of British perfidy which has no existence in reality. We find ourselves far in the realms of hysteria when we hear what is being said and written to-day in Russia about England's intrigues in the Far East. Russian suspicion is being roused by the policy which it is said the British Government is carrying out with the help of Japan, even more than it is by England's efforts to reconcile Berlin and Prague. No one will admit that it is British interests in particular which are being threatened by Japan's adventure in China; the fact is ignored that England, in spite of dislike for the Moscow Terror, has reconciled herself to the existence of the Soviet regime, because she might well one day have need of Russia's military might as a partner in the struggle against Japan. In the distorting mirror of Russian speculations and fears England's rôle looks quite different. For years, according to them,

London has been trying to use Japan for keeping Russia down and in order to involve the Soviets in due course in a war. No less than Kalinin himself recently declared that England in 1931 made no objection to Japan's robbery of Manchuria in order to retain Japan as an ally in the struggle against the Soviet Union; if there is to-day certain tension between London and Tokyo, it is only because England is displeased at Japan's dissipating her strength in China instead of turning her whole force against Russia! That may well be called carrying Anglophobia to an extreme.

It can be seen from this sudden swing-round in the attitude of Russian public opinion towards England that the old Anglo-Russian points of conflict can at times be denied but never completely eliminated.

THE
UNIVERSAL
QUESTION IN
VIENNA

"Are you Aryan, or
are you learning
English?"

"Die Brennessel"
Berlin



MYTH OF U.S. FREE TRADE

State Barriers are Rising

by JOHN T. FLYNN

From "Collier's Weekly," New York

BACK in 1933 the politician-economists were telling us that the trouble with America was that she had lost her frontiers. Maybe she has. But she has gained forty-eight new frontiers—one for every state. For the states have gone in for protection of home industries and have been busily building tax barriers around themselves to keep out the hated merchandise of their sister states.

The Constitution says the states cannot impose duties and imposts on products from other states. But that doesn't prevent the State of Kansas from having sixty-six ports of entry—more custom houses than the Federal Government has around two oceans and a Class A gulf. And it doesn't prevent about seventeen other states from splitting themselves off into as many little economic republics surrounded by border patrols to keep out salesmen, trucks, gasoline, liquor, cigarettes and other merchandise of "foreigners."

This parade began about 1933, when Kansas found that a lot of bad bootleg gasoline was flowing into the State and was being sold free of the Kansas tax. It was perfectly natural to guard against this abuse. The idea turned out to be a good one. First, it gave work to about 175 people. Next, the border patrol could be used not merely to keep bootleg gasoline out of the State, but also to make difficult the entry of all sorts of competitive products.

Then the railroads discovered that they had a neat little weapon with which to swat their most hated enemy, the automobile. The truck that wants to go through Kansas must now pay a tax of $1\frac{1}{2}$ cents per ton-mile. On entering some states that have large gasoline taxes, trucks, and in some cases private cars, are compelled to pay a tax on the gasoline in the tank. This is to force "foreigners" to buy gasoline within the State.

In other states, like Oklahoma, the out-of-state car is stopped at the State border and the driver must declare his cargo of cigarettes, beer or gasoline—all subject to a State tax.

Even though all the seventeen states have not actually put their laws into effect, some of them being merely retaliatory threats, the trend is toward increasing the number of taxes and the number of uses to which the ports of entry are put. The whole movement marks one of the dangerous drifts in business that have appeared in this country in years.

Of course, it is entirely possible that certain special individuals may be, temporarily at least, aided by these devices. But the movement is based upon a complete disregard of the fact that every town and village is not a little market to itself. In Iowa a great cereal factory makes its product out of Iowa corn and spends its entire payroll on Iowa labour, but sells almost all of its product outside the State. It may be all right for Iowa to set up barriers to prevent the people of other states from "taking good Iowa money" out of the State, but Iowa would be in sad condition were it prevented from selling its products in other states.

The Constitution provides that "no state shall lay any impost or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws . . . and all such laws shall be subject to the revision and control of the Congress." And the next paragraph provides that no state, without the consent of Congress, shall lay any duty on tonnage. How they manage to get around these provisions must be left to the constitutional lawyer.

Taxing "Foreign" Food

The isolationist states do not stop at the port-of-entry laws. California is a great wine State. But if her citizens drink beer, she wants them to drink California beer. So California imposes a special tax on beers made outside California. Wisconsin is a great dairy State, so she adds a special tax to the Federal tax on oleomargarine to keep out butter's greatest rival.

In 1935, Washington State adopted a 2 per cent sales tax. Whereupon Washingtonians went outside the State to do their buying. To offset this, Washington devised the "use tax." Now, if you bring an article into the State, you will have to pay a 2 per cent tax for the privilege of using that article in Washington.

At least eight of the twenty-four states with sales taxes have gone in for use taxes—California, Colorado, Ohio, Oklahoma, Iowa, Kansas, Utah and Wyoming. And in good time, doubtless, most of the others will. For nothing can come into style so fast as a new tax in this country.

And now a new and dangerous idea makes its appearance—a by-product of the minimum-wage battle. The proposal is that once a state adopts a wage standard for its factories it shall be permitted to exclude the products of factories in other states which have lower wage levels. Thus, South Carolina would not be permitted to ship into Massachusetts. Alabama would not be permitted to ship into Michigan. In turn, Michigan might be prohibited from shipping into Massachusetts.

This, of course, is the protective tariff principle applied to the states. And it would mean, if adopted, the creation of forty-eight independent states, each nestling behind a wall of embargoes and trade restrictions.

What will be the End?

The big question is: where will all this end? The utter blindness of communities to their real interests where sectional emotions are aroused is startling. A farm association secretary in a small Iowa village once told me that that town was, as to all essentials, completely self-sustaining. "We could put a wall around ourselves and we would have eatin' and sleepin' and wearin'."

That is probably true. But they wouldn't have much. Because, as that town is organised, its one source of revenue is corn and hogs and, save for a trivial amount, all the produce of the farmers, on whom that town depends, is sold outside. That town, and all other towns that produce anything whatsoever, must tap the pockets of people in every state of the Union. In turn, they must submit to a little tapping themselves.

The development of this country has been built on several forces. But certainly one of them has been its vast, free market. If we are now to turn back the clock 150 years and are to break the country up into forty-eight small markets, and even hundreds of smaller markets, the end of our progress is in sight.

STORM OVER EUROPE

Army manœuvres in the Principality of Liechtenstein are being held this year on an unusually large scale (one soldier on full war footing, with two days' provisions). The German Government is not concealing its anxiety, in spite of the fact that Liechtenstein is protesting the innocence of its intentions.

Incidentally, it is reported that leap-frog has had to be suppressed in barracks, owing to shortage of effectives.—"*Le Canard Enchaîné*," Paris.

INTERNATIONAL BOOKSHELF



The Editor reminds his readers that he does not necessarily share the opinions expressed by reviewers in this section. But this is a free country and knows no censorship

WARNING TO LONDON

AIR RAID. By John Langdon-Davies.
Routledge. 2s. 6d.

Reviewed by
AIR COMMODORE L. E. O. CHARLTON

THIS book is a notable addition to the literature of modern war. It is presented in three parts, the first of which is an analysis of the sustained air raid over Barcelona during the 16th, 17th, 18th days of March, while the other two deal successively with the behaviour of the high explosive bomb on impact, and with the psychology of panic-stricken crowds.

This is a remarkable and fearlessly written book throughout, but it is Part I more than either of the other two which will arrest attention. It is obvious, even to the layman, that the bomber which appears over its objective silently and unannounced can wreak destruction to more purpose and with greater safety, than if its approach were detected from afar. In the former case it need merely drop its load and turn for home. In the latter it will encounter opposition from ground and air, while the populace, given warning thus, can take to cover. The author took pains to study this particular series of raids, being afforded access to the official log-book for his purpose, and concludes convincingly that they heralded an entirely new technique in bombing, the discovery of which automatically consigns

most of the existing literature of A.R.P. to the waste-paper basket. The raiders, based at Majorca, had the initial advantage of a sea approach, which in itself forms a dire threat to any seaport city. By cutting out their engines at their ceiling height they could glide for many miles in noiseless fashion until Barcelona lay below all unsuspecting of her danger. Within two minutes at the very most their cargo was discharged, and they themselves headed out to sea with a wake of death behind them, almost before the anti-aircraft guns of the defence might get off the first few rounds.

The author aptly calls this manœuvre the method of "Silent Approach," and claims that it has been evolved by the air strategists of Italy and Germany, in accordance with the practice of utilising Spain as an experimental laboratory for the set purpose of applying it elsewhere on a grander scale when the next occasion serves.

There were thirteen such raids in the series, and the picture of them thus presented is as different from our own preconceived ideas on the subject as chalk from cheese. There was no warning period whatever, no barrage fire to keep the raiders off, neither attack by fighters nor pursuit, and no calm resumption of their business by the public when the "all clear" sounded. Instead, the timetable, roughly, was as follows: First the bombs are heard to drop. Half a minute later the sirens blow. Fifteen seconds

after that the guns open fire. In about one minute from the impact of the first bomb the raiders are homeward bound. After the lapse of about ten minutes from the start the barrage fire ceases, and later still, at the discretion of those in charge, the "all clear" goes. Meanwhile the effect on the minds of the people has been sufficient to destroy their mental life for something like forty hours, at the end of which the raiders did not come again. During that period there were only 26 minutes of actual danger to the populace, but the remainder of it, 39½ hours, was consumed by fear and by growing suspense, culminating in catastrophe, which would assuredly have very nearly lost the war for the Republicans had the raids continued.

The lesson of this book is not far to seek. London is very nearly a seaport city and also open to the dangers of "Silent Approach." If Catalonians can be made inert in mind by insidious air attack, so can Londoners as well.

In reply to a request for a few further criticisms of Mr. Langdon-Davies's statements, Air Commodore Charlton wrote as follows:

I do believe that "Silent Approach" is a big advance in the technique of air attack, and that the principle, naturally with modifications, is applicable to our circumstances.

As concerns the gliding angle of fully laden aircraft, I doubt the mathematical accuracy of the figures given, but they are approximate, and, more important still, developments in aerodynamics will tend to prolong the angle of the glide.

The author does not, I think, make a claim that the A-A gun is useless. He argues, rather, that the noiseless approach is apt to defeat it, especially by night and when visibility is poor.

Another consideration is that with a very little throttle a glide can be pro-

THE STORY OF HITLER'S STRANGLEHOLD ON CENTRAL EUROPE—

Bloodless Invasion

by DR. PAUL EINZIG. "He examines the motives, procedure and progress of German economic penetration in the Central and S.E. European States . . . and adduces numerous suggestions for counteracting it. This is a timely book, eminently worth buying and digesting."—*Economist*.

At all bookshops 2/6 net, by post 2/9

DUCKWORTH

3 HENRIETTA STREET, LONDON, W.C.2

publishers of

Chamberlin's *Japan Over Asia* (15/- net), and
The Third Reich, by Henri Lichtenberger (18/- net)

THE CLASS CONFLICT IN ITALY

by

KARL WALTER

5s.

The rise of the working classes in Italy is traced from the first years of political unity, with an analysis of the various influences under which it came and the first violent demonstrations of it—Socialism, Anarchism, Syndicalism, the riots in Sicily, Milan, and elsewhere, the author having taken part in the movement of those days, living among the workers there, as he is again, under the Fascist regime.

P. S. KING & SON, LTD.
WESTMINSTER

longed, and that engines well-throttled back are not extremely audible at height.

Even when all is said and argued by those who are loath to accept the author's contention, it must always be borne in mind that gliding at any angle is a noiseless method of approach, and that even the shortest does operate to contract the warning period on which the safety of the populace depends.

IN THE QUAGMIRE

JAPAN'S GAMBLE IN CHINA. By Freda Utley. *Secker & Warburg*. 6s.

Reviewed by SIR FREDERICK WHYTE,
K.C.S.I.

IN *Japan's Feet of Clay* Miss Utley gave us a critical appreciation of the strength and the weakness of Japan as a World Power. In the present volume she has used her knowledge to provide the reading public with a more popular account of the origin and possible outcome of the present conflict in the Far East, and she naturally traverses here much of the ground covered by the earlier book. She begins with the origin of the war in North China in July, 1937, describes the purpose of Japanese policy in that area, and shows how the uncertain direction of Japan's action has been due to well-known conflicts of interest in Tokyo. Apart from her sympathetic support of the Chinese cause, her main endeavour is to show the extent to which Japan has been spending her resources on a campaign—or campaigns—of unlimited objective which can hardly earn for her an adequate return. It is true, as Miss Utley says, that if the Japanese Government could now take the risk of liquidating their obligations in the Yangtze Valley, they might be able to claim that their main strategic purpose in North China had been achieved. But, in order to do this, they

would have to silence the powerful groups in Japan which see in a Yangtze victory the main object of the war. And even if Japan could execute without loss of face the difficult manœuvre of a withdrawal from Central China, the war would not be over, for China would fight with renewed zest.

In this respect Miss Utley's Postscript on the changes in the Japanese Cabinet last May is peculiarly interesting and suggests—as I agree—that the time may not be distant when we shall see a new political crisis in Tokyo, provoked by the struggle between those who would confine action to a decisive settlement in North China and those who hope to see Japan established as the predominant Power in the Yangtze Valley as well.

Taken all together, this is the book of the moment on the Far East. Some readers, like the present reviewer, will not agree with Miss Utley's treatment of British policy, which is not her strong suit; but the account she gives of the forces at work in Japan, of the powerful trusts, of the conflicting cliques in the Army, of the peasant as the beast of burden carrying the heavy load of Japanese "progress," is exactly what is wanted today. And at six shillings her book ought to reach, and deserves to reach, a very wide public.

RECORD OF BESTIALITY

WHAT WAR MEANS. By H. J. Timperley. *Gollancz*. 7s. 6d.

Reviewed by VERNON BARTLETT

"REALISM" in politics has become a splendid mask behind which cowardice and stupidity parade as common sense and wisdom. This book shows just how cowardly and stupid is the policy of pretending that the Sino-Japanese war is none of our business, and that those of us who protest against the most brutal in-

vasion in history are in some way endangering peace.

Mr. Timperley's reputation stands so high in China on account of his lucid reports to the *Manchester Guardian* that one is at first disappointed to discover that he has edited the reports of others with the very minimum of comment of his own. But his method is in reality the more effective for its self-denial. Here are the opinions not of one well-informed and intelligent political journalist, but of many who have written, with no political end in view, accounts of their own experiences. Missionaries, doctors, business men in all parts of China that have come under Japanese domination report the same atrocious campaign of murder and rape, and the impression that this behaviour of the Japanese troops was deliberately ordered from above. The incidents in Nanking (where "evidences from burials indicate that close to 40,000

unarmed persons were killed . . . of of whom some 30 per cent had never been soldiers") were not isolated; Mr. Timperley brings forward evidence to show that they have been more or less paralleled in dozens of other Chinese cities. And the astonishing effect of all these reports is that one is left hopeful—the good deeds of the unknown and humble British, Americans, Germans and others who have untiringly and courageously tried to save the refugees from the worst brutalities of the invaders shine in an appallingly bad world.

The conclusions to which Mr. Timperley's work of sub-editing lead seem to be these: (1) those Japanese who favoured the domination of China by relatively moderate methods have been defeated by the extremists, who have destroyed all possibility of Sino-Japanese co-operation by this campaign of atrocities; (2) the Japanese military leaders are in this war to the hilt, and are deliberately encouraging atrocities in the hope that they may frighten the Chinese out of giving the slightest assistance to guerrilla warfare, even at the risk of losing those British credits with which Japan might successfully and profitably exploit China; (3) this desperate policy shows the futility of talking about mediation and the importance of giving such international help to China that the Japanese financiers and industrialists will realise that they stand to gain as little as the Japanese peasant from the war in China.

The moral of Mr. Timperley's book is that if, after reading all this evidence of unparalleled brutality on the part of the Japanese, we still put the aggressors and their victims in the same category, we shall deserve what is coming to us. He ends up with a repetition of the ultimate truth that, however reluctant the "realists" may be to admit it, "there can be no hope of peace for any of us unless we can set up and maintain some permanent system

"JUBILEE"



**NO-TROUBLE
WORM-DRIVE
HOSE CLIPS**

are the **BEST TO GET**
for
**RADIATOR JOINTS,
LEATHER COVERS on
UNIVERSAL JOINTS,
AIR, OIL and WATER
HOSE JOINTS**

**Easy to fit, remove or
refit, without damage,
repeatedly.**

Guaranteed Never to Leak

*Stocked by Garages and
Accessory Dealers
Everywhere*

Send for a
Free Sample Clip to Test

**L. ROBINSON & COY.
20 London Chambers
GILLINGHAM · KENT**



of collective security . . . against aggression," and he is convinced that the system could be made to work safely and successfully in the case of China.

A CHILD'S GUIDE TO EUROPE

LOOKING BEHIND THE CENSORSHIPS. By Eugene J. Young. *Lovat Dickson*. 10s. 6d.

Reviewed by DOUGLAS REED

THE American judgment of European affairs is a most important thing for us, and, wishing to see on what material the American public bases its judgment, I approached with great interest these "revelations of a Foreign Editor." What stories, said the publisher on the dust-cover, journalists could tell if they dared—and Mr. Young had dared. He had taken the lid off Europe.

He arrived in New York, a young man, about 1900, proceeded the publisher, and "set out to make himself an expert on foreign affairs—and as a result he is now Cable Editor of the *New York Times*." This line faintly reminded me of something: "I swept the floor so carefuller, that now I am the ruler of the King's Navee."

The dust-cover left me in doubt whether Mr. Young had ever been to Europe, but I turned with gusto to his book. I began to get keenly interested when I reached the third chapter, "Simplicities of the International Game." Mr. Young finds nothing complicated in foreign politics. "There is a trick in judging international events. It consists in finding out how the old realisms operate beneath the false pretences. I have often told sub-editors who have worked with me on foreign desks that almost every situation can be reduced to two-and-two-makes-four by a working knowledge of the elementals on which statesmen have to base their efforts."

Mr. Young then does this simple sum in addition. On the two-and-two method he produces, in brief and numbered tables, the "basic motivations" of British, French, German, Italian and Russian foreign policy. One of the main aims, or basic motivations, of German foreign policy is to acquire "A Window on the Sea." Before Germany was defeated in the World War "she demanded a slice of France looking out on the North Sea, with Belgium thrown in. An outlook on the Mediterranean through Northern France was also part of the old army's plans. To-day the purpose undoubtedly remains the same."

My vision clarified by this glimpse of German armies striving through Northern France towards the Mediterranean, I went on through "British Suppleness and French Rigidity," "The Synthetic Diplomacy of the Have-Nots," and "High Politics Behind Ethiopia" to "The Razzle-Dazzle of the Rhineland," which seemed to promise the end of the rainbow. Here I learned that the German seizure of the Rhineland was followed by months of palavering and negotiating, which so wearied "Hitler and Foreign Minister Brüning" that they went on holiday. Hitherto I had shared in the generally prevalent delusion that Dr. Heinrich Brüning had not held office under Herr Hitler, indeed, that in the summer of 1936 he was seated at an university not far from Mr. Young's New York. I even gained this impression from Dr. Brüning's shade, as it now seems, when I encountered it in London a few weeks back.

Then, in "Edward VIII and Germany," Mr. Young does two-and-two with the Duke of Windsor, the "King's Friends" under Lord Londonderry, Mr. Baldwin, and Herr Hitler, and makes a really Big Four, though at one moment M. van Zeeland of Belgium tries to fly in and make a Full House.

In Germany, when you make a statement that suggests ignorance of your subject, or over-simplification, they say "*So stellt sich der kleine Moritz das vor*"—"That's how little Maurice sees it." Reading this book, I murmured at some points: "*So stellt sich der kleine Moritz Europa vor*." When I came to "German demi-gods and inner feuds" and read that the Germans "kept Hindenburg in office until he died in 1935 and after that a great monument was erected on the battlefield of Tannenberg so the multitudes could go there and continue to worship," I recalled an infernally hot day in July or August, 1934, when I sat and watched Hindenburg being consigned by Hitler "to Valhalla" in the Tannenberg memorial—built, I fancy, about 1925.

In between Mr. Young gets quite a number of things right.

THE TROUBLED SEA

ITALY'S FOREIGN AND COLONIAL POLICY, 1914-1937. By Maxwell H. H. Macartney and Paul Cremona. *Oxford Univ. Press.* 12s. 6d.

THE MEDITERRANEAN IN POLITICS. By Elizabeth Monroe. *Oxford Univ. Press.* 10s.

Reviewed by H. A. ST. GEORGE SAUNDERS
To anyone who takes international politics seriously—and for the citizens of a country which rightly claims to be one of the few great democracies left in the world, it is certainly a duty to do so—both these books are necessary, and that of Miss Monroe is invaluable.

They are written by experts who know their job from A to Z. The plain man, the voter who is ultimately responsible for the persons who guide his destiny in these critical days, may jibe a little at Messrs. Macartney and Cremona's book on the ground that it is inclined to go more into detail than is necessary. This is hardly a

criticism, for the book sets out, after a preliminary chapter on guiding principles and clues, to trace the tortuous course of Italian policy over the last thirty years. The authors have included careful studies of Italy's attitude towards Disarmament, Colonial Expansion and the Founding of an Empire. In this, the bulk of the book, Italy's disappointments, triumphs and failures are set out with the methodical skill of good historians. Their final chapter is an admissible exposition of Italy's future aims. Their conclusions, under this head, are as obvious as they are ominous.

"The creation of an expansionist *romanità* is a dogma for Signor Mussolini and not a decorative phrase. For years his policy has been based upon sabre-rattling rather than on diplomacy. Fascist Italy . . . is ready at any moment to stake her all, and she will bear down all opposition in her struggle for power and greatness unless she should meet another and a greater power of equal determination. Is Great Britain destined to be this Power?"

Every Italian knows and feels that the Mediterranean problem has not yet been solved, and that a final solution will have to be reached.

Miss Monroe, whose book is much shorter, has attempted something on a larger scale, nothing less than the recent political history of the Mediterranean. As far as the parts played by Great Britain and Italy are concerned she has brilliantly succeeded in this ambitious task.

Miss Monroe is that rarity, an impartial historian who can still contrive to interest and even thrill the reader. She begins by putting the pros and cons of Great Britain's remaining in the Mediterranean, and rightly reaches the conclusion that we must stay to preserve our diplomatic influence in Europe, to safeguard our imperial strategy, to increase our national prosperity and that of the peoples

dependent on us in that part of the world, and to fulfil our sense of obligation towards the Jews. Finally, we must as a nation show the flag along one of the world's main highways of trade.

Space forbids me to do more than refer in passing to her description of our relations with Egypt, Greece, Cyprus, Malta and Palestine. She contrives to put her finger on the main trouble in each, and on Palestine she is particularly valuable and shrewd. Britain will enjoy no peace in the Middle East until it defines exactly what it means by a "National Home" for the Jews. Once this is done, in her view, the best solution of a problem perhaps insoluble is to limit Jewish immigration to a percentage of the Arab population. On the present solution, partition, her comment is devastating: "The British Government, its dilemma as complete as ever, is left to the gloomy reflection that Solomon's judgment, though so famous, was never carried out."

Perhaps the most valuable part of the book is the description of the difficulties and achievements of France in Syria and North Africa. There she breaks ground which must be new to the average English reader who is ignorant of the problem of the "colours" in Algeria, the *projet Viollette*, the *Destour* party in Tunisia, the proud aspirations of the Maroccans, "*Le Marocain c'est un lion; l'Algérien c'est un homme; le Tunisien c'est une femme.*" Her conclusion is one of confidence in the present French administration provided that Frenchmen can bring themselves to realise that they have, in North Africa, an Empire composed of peoples now reaching the dangerous stage of beginning to think in terms of nationality. "Present British and French experience in Moslem territories," says Miss Monroe, "is proving that whereas Moslem allies are an asset, Moslem dependencies are a liability." This simple truth is too often forgotten.

In her chapter on Italy, Miss Monroe covers, though much more swiftly, some of the same ground as Messrs. Macartney and Cremona. It is a most interesting chapter because it is an acute analysis of the Fascist ideals and methods, and this reveals their strength and weakness. It is in some respects consoling, for the weakness is very real and would at once become apparent in the horrible event of war. Much of Italy's behaviour in the Mediterranean is façade, but façade most skillfully made to look like solid travertine. She may send about the sea she calls, and would make, *mare nostrum*, her gaudily painted merchant and passenger vessels, she may pour money into Albania, provide free news from her powerful wireless station in Bari or from the *Agence Egypte Orient*, and free education and free newsreels, but the Mediterranean peoples are not deceived. The Moslem has a long memory. He does not forget the bestial cruelty of the Italians in the conquest of Libya where "they perpetrated cruel deaths of which I have met witnesses, but which are best not described."

"The Tunisian or Egyptian, himself an ardent nationalist, does not want to listen to Fascist transports, and, if he must consort with any foreigner prefers the company of an easy-going Greek or Englishman to that of an Italian brimming over with his own importance."

Nor should we forget that Italy is to all intents and purposes an island with 2,500 miles of vulnerable coast-line and that 86 per cent of her sea-borne trade goes through the Mediterranean, of which we control the outlets.

Miss Monroe, in her final chapter, points clearly to the danger inherent in the present situation in the Mediterranean and analyses the four major forces at work—Italian ambition, Anglo-French conservatism, German *Drang* and Arab awakening; she gives to each its relative importance and her judgment is sound.

LIGHT ON THE DARK CONTINENT

AFRICA ÉMERGENT. By Professor
W. M. Macmillan. *Faber*. 12s. 6d.

Reviewed by SIR JOHN HARRIS

THIS is Professor Macmillan at his best. There is no other modern book so closely packed with information as the four hundred pages of *Africa Emergent*. The author has spent eight years gathering his material and more than three years writing the book. Professor Macmillan has not been content with a study of blue books; he has visited large areas of Africa for the sole purpose of gathering suitable material for his work. It is not merely that this book is so full of solid material, it is presented with a balance of judgment which creates confidence and makes it a joy to read. There is hardly any subject affecting Africa which does not find a place in this book—from the health of the labourers on the mines in the Transvaal to the price of the bullocks of the Fulani herdsmen in Nigeria.

It is difficult to "pick out the eyes" for the simple reason that they occur in every chapter. At the present moment, when so much is being said about the need for Colonies for overseas settlement of white populations, chapter V represents easily the best statement yet made on the subject—South Africa's pitiful story of the "submerged twentieth" of 100,000 white men without hope of competency, farmers in Kenya, Nyasaland and Rhodesia who are vainly trying to make good on a capital of less than £2,000, the heroic financial sacrifices of Lord Delamere, make together a chapter not only exceedingly well done, but one which comes to the public at a most opportune moment.

Professor Macmillan sets forth a good deal of sound native policy. He does not hesitate to point out the weaknesses of the African, but he frankly tells his readers

From Cornwall



£10 Shares
3½% Interest

Tax Paid by Society

Write for Details

Reliance
PERMANENT
BUILDING SOCIETY

Established 1862

PERCY STREET
LONDON—W.

Telephone: Museum 3628

Member of Building Societies Association

that the "only warrant for our tenure of African Colonies is that our presence is of service to Africa itself," and in this connection he has a warm passage or two in support of the Mandatory system. He emphasises correctly the healthy effect which the "annual review" of mandatory administration has upon Colonial Governments.

How wide is the scope of the author's labours is illustrated by his examination of mining. With justice he emphasises the care taken of the employees, the food, clothing and sanitation—"The Rand mines have done more than any other South African employers for the health, welfare, and reasonable comfort of their African workers." One might wish perhaps that he had a greater enthusiasm for model villages for the workers, but the tribute he pays to the gold mining companies is indeed well deserved. It is difficult for the ordinary "reviewer" to

follow the maze of all the ramifications of Professor Macmillan's figures on capital, but it will surely surprise the ordinary reader to learn that of the 736 gold mines floated in South Africa, apparently only 57 survive as profitable concerns to-day; the losses must have been enormous.

Signs are not lacking that the British public is beginning to show greater appreciation of the work of the Colonial Officials. Professor Macmillan's book is further evidence of this welcome change. Yes—*Africa Emergent* is a piece of work well and truly done.

THE WORLD OF FINANCE

Our City Editor, "Rapier," is away on holiday, but will resume his usual monthly survey in our October issue.

SUBSCRIPTION ORDER FORM

If you would like to receive **WORLD REVIEW** regularly, fill up this form and send it to your Bookseller or Newsagent, or direct to:—

WORLD REVIEW
40-42 WILLIAM IV STREET,
LONDON, W.C.2

Please enter my subscription to "World Review" for $\frac{\text{six months}}{\text{one year}}$ post free commencing with the issue. I enclose remittance for $\frac{7/-}{14/-}$
(Canada 13/6)

Name.....

Address.....

Published on the first of each month.

DIARY OF INTERNATIONAL EVENTS: JULY 15—AUGUST 14

CZECHS AND GERMANS

THE problem of the nationalities in Czechoslovakia remained at a standstill while Dr. Hodza negotiated with the coalition parties. The Reich Press showed impatience, and repeated that full autonomy for the Sudeten Germans was a German interest, not susceptible of compromise. Complying with friendly counsels, the Prague Government had refrained from submitting its proposals to Parliament till they had been debated with the national groups; but it became known that they were based on a system of four elected diets, controlling provincial administration (Bohemia, Moravia-Silesia, Slovakia, Ruthenia), within which the nationalities would form sections, but would not constitute federal units. The Sudeten German demands of June 7th (published on July 19th), envisaged, on the other hand, autonomous racial groups, having their leaders in the cabinet, which would not be answerable to parliament. The divergence between these standpoints was so wide that when negotiations began a deadlock must evidently have ensued.

On July 18th Captain Wiedemann, Herr Hitler's A.D.C., assured Lord Halifax that the Führer desired a peaceful solution of the Sudeten question, and though disappointed at the lack of progress, believed that a working arrangement could be reached. After conversations between the French and British Governments concerning this communication, Dr. Hodza was asked by the British Minister (July 24th) if he would accept an Englishman as mediator—not as arbitrator—in the dispute. This was agreed to, and on July 26th Mr. Chamberlain announced that Lord Runciman had consented, subject to the acceptance of his mission by the Sudeten German party also. The Reich and Sudeten German Press were favourable to the step, it being understood that Lord Runciman's advice would not commit the British Government. The

Reich Foreign Office organ (August 3rd) expected that he would insist on the discharge of the promises—to which England was a party—made to the nationalities in 1919. The Czechoslovak Government (August 1st) welcomed the mission as evidence of England's leading part in European appeasement.

The Prague Government handed its Administrative Reform Bill on July 28th to the Sudeten German leaders, and its complete proposals on July 30th, as drafts for amendment or discussion; it declared its readiness (August 2nd) to negotiate on any proposals consistent with the State's security and integrity.

In response to Mr. Chamberlain's appeal (July 26th) for "an atmosphere of calm," there was at first some abatement of Press polemics. The publicity given in Berlin at the end of July to the acceleration of defence work in the Rhineland, and the proclamation (August 3rd) of "prohibited zones" on the German frontiers, were regarded in some quarters as intimations that Germany's attachment to peace was not prompted by weakness. On July 31st at the Breslau festival some thousands of Sudeten German gymnasts acclaimed Herr Hitler as their leader. On August 3rd Lord Runciman arrived in Prague. After a week spent by him in preparatory discussions with both sides, the way lay open for direct negotiations between the two sides.

EUROPEAN CONVERSATIONS

THE "confident sympathy" between France and England referred to by President Lebrun (July 19th) was revealed in the warm welcome given to King George and Queen Elizabeth at their state visit to Paris. The discussion between Lord Halifax and the French ministers, and statements in Parliament (July 26th, 27th) showed that the unity of views recorded at the French Ministers' visit to London in April had been strengthened and con-

firmed, though no obligations had been assumed beyond those in the Covenant and the Locarno treaties, as re-affirmed in the London Arrangement of March, 1936.

* * *

Italy continued during July to show disappointment at the delay in implementing the Anglo-Italian Pact of April 16th. On July 26th Mr. Chamberlain repeated that a "settlement" of the Spanish question—which, he now explained, implied that the position in Spain must have ceased to menace European peace—was still a pre-condition, but he deeply regretted the unforeseen delay, attributable to neither government.

* * *

The French Government's fear lest the pressure for the implementing of the Anglo-Italian Pact, while Italy refused to resume the Franco-Italian conversations, might conceal a design by the "Axis" to dislocate the "Entente," are believed to have inspired an exchange of private letters in mid-July between M. Daladier and Mr. Chamberlain. On July 27th Lord Halifax expressed regret that the Pact had not been followed by the improvement in Franco-Italian relations, so essential to restore confidence in the Mediterranean. Observing that any hope of driving a wedge between England and France would be as vain as that of dividing Berlin and Rome, he appealed for mutual trust during the present delay. In the French Press his statement was taken to mean that the Pact of April 16th would not be implemented till it was completed by an Italo-French agreement. Reports received from Rome (August 3rd) by the Quai d'Orsay showed little prospect of a resumption of the negotiations.

On the eve of the British Royal visit to Paris Captain Wiedemann, Herr Hitler's personal envoy, brought Lord Halifax the Führer's assurance that he desired better relations with England, with whom he saw no fundamental differences. In Parliament (July 26th) Mr. Chamberlain cited the Anglo-German naval agreement as proof that agreement was possible between totalitarian and

democratic states. The French Press regarded Herr Hitler's initiative as pre-facing a resumption of the Anglo-German conversations (interrupted by the Anschluss in March).

* * *

The governments of the seven "Oslo" Powers, whose foreign ministers met in Copenhagen (July 23rd, 24th) declared their opinion that, in view of last year's events, the system of sanctions had ceased to be obligatory, whether for individual states or for groups.

Colonel Beck, Polish foreign minister, visiting Latvia (July 14th-16th), informed the Press at Riga (July 16th) that Poland regarded Article 16 of the Covenant as optional. On July 30th he went to Norway to discuss—according to the Polish Press—joint action by Poland and the "Oslo" Powers at the League Assembly concerning Article 16.

SPAIN

THE second anniversary of the war (July 17th) saw the Nationalist armies, 200,000 strong, pressing on to Valencia, though stubbornly opposed. Pressure on Sagunto was relieved by a surprise offensive launched by the Republicans with 50,000 men across the Ebro, piercing the Nationalist lines to a depth of 15 miles. Strong reinforcements checked the attackers before Gandesa (July 28th), while aircraft—including 451 "Legionary" planes, bombed their bridges over the Ebro, thus imperilling the position of the Republicans in Lerida province; the Republicans opened a secondary offensive.

The formation of an international commission to report on bombing of open towns having failed, it was replaced by a committee of two British officers stationed at Toulouse—subject to the Spanish parties' consent, which Mr. Chamberlain said, on July 26th, was assured. On the same date he announced that General Franco had accepted an enquiry by a British and a Nationalist naval officer, with a neutral umpire in case of disagreement, into the attacks by his aircraft on British ships.

The Non-Intervention Committee's Plan for the withdrawal of "volunteers" was accepted on July 23rd by the Republican Cabinet, which, however, suggested a more extended observation of ports (limited in the Plan to four on each side). General Franco's reply was delayed, in spite of reminders conveyed by Sir R. Hodgson, who had returned to Burgos on August 2nd. Speaking on July 17th, Dr. Negrin declared that resistance would continue till foreign intervention ceased.

Persistent reports of renewed Italian intervention were brought to Italy's notice by Great Britain (August 8th) and enquiry was promised. The Spanish Government protested against this situation to France and Great Britain (August 9th). French opinion also grew impatient; M. Blum, in the *Populaire* (August 10th) urged the re-opening of the frontier.

REFUGEES

The Conference of 31 States convened at Evian at the instance of President Roosevelt decided (July 15th) to set up a standing inter-governmental committee as "machinery for negotiations," and for dealing with the settlement of refugees from Germany and Austria, who were expected to number 600,000 in the next five years. Most of the governments, while advocating gradual infiltration in place of mass immigration, seemed disposed to interpret their absorptive capacity liberally. The Conference insisted that, if regulated emigration were to replace disorderly exodus, "involuntary emigrants" must not be made destitute before departure, and that, in this respect, Germany's co-operation was needed. The Committee met in London (August 3rd) and Mr. Rublee (United States) was appointed Director. The German Government will, it is understood, be kept informed of its proceedings through the British and American Ambassadors.

BALKAN STATES

As the counterpart for a treaty of non-aggression, signed at Salonika (July 31st) between Bulgaria and the states of the Balkan Entente, the latter waived their

right—latterly relaxed in practice—to enforce Bulgaria's compliance with the disarmament clauses of the Peace Treaty of Neuilly, and with the clauses of the Lausanne Convention (July 24th, 1923) demilitarising the territories bordering on Greece and Turkey. Bulgaria, though thus regaining equality with her neighbours, will not modify her refusal to adhere to the Balkan Entente—which definitely opposes frontier revision—but she will—it is understood—be allowed access by Greece to a port on the Ægean, as was indeed contemplated at Lausanne in 1923.

PEACE IN AMERICA

THE signature at Buenos Ayres (July 21st) of the Bolivian-Paraguayan peace treaty was acclaimed as proving, in Mr. Hull's words to the Board of the Pan-American Union at Washington, that "the inter-American system of consultation and co-operation is a vital force in maintaining peace," words that are all the more significant because, with Venezuela's notice of withdrawal (July 12th) nine American States have now seceded from Geneva. American Press comments emphasized the concession of a free port on the Paraguay River to Bolivia—which thus gains access to the Atlantic, and the fact that the frontier arbitration, which must be completed within sixty days of the signature, may not deprive Bolivia of the oil district, as factors in the settlement.*

In a note of July 21st Mr. Hull demanded compensation from the Mexican Government for the seizure of 1,000,000 acres, since 1927, of agrarian lands owned by United States citizens, and proposed arbitration upon the principles of international law involved under the Inter-American arbitration treaty of January, 1929. The Mexican Government rejected the proposal.

A difference between the United States and Great Britain regarding the ownership of the Canton and Enderby Islands in the Phoenix group (Pacific Ocean) was settled (August 10th) by a compromise, under which the islands will be controlled,

as aviation stations, by a joint Anglo-American regime, the issue of ownership being left indefinitely in abeyance.

**The western and northern frontiers are subject to arbitration, not as stated in last month's diary.*

THE FAR EAST

QUALIFYING a semi-official announcement of June 24th that foreigners in the war zones did not possess extra-territorial rights, the Japanese Government assured Great Britain (July 13th) that it had no intention of revoking the rights enjoyed by British subjects.

Referring to cases of discrimination by the Japanese authorities against British traders in China, Lord Halifax stated (July 27th) that attempts to impose restrictions in North China as had been done in Manchukuo would conflict with Japan's assurances that she would not obstruct British trade in the occupied areas. His government, he said, were considering the ways open to them to secure the protection of British rights. Questioned on the steps to be taken to give effect to the League's resolution concerning aid to China, Mr. Chamberlain (July 26th) declined to promote a loan which would be based on securities of a hypothetical value, but said that other means of affording aid to China were being considered.

On July 23rd the Japanese began a fresh offensive movement up the Yangtse valley against Hankow; Kiu-kiang fell on July 26th. General Chiang Kai-shek was reported (August 9th) to have ordered the evacuation of 500,000 civilians from the city before August 15th.

RUSSO-JAPANESE CLASH

THE withdrawal of Soviet troops which, on July 11th, had occupied the heights of Changkufeng, at the junction of the Korean, Manchukuo and Siberian frontiers, was peremptorily demanded by the Japanese ambassador in Moscow (July 21st). Dr. Litvinoff refused, declaring the place to be Russian territory in virtue of a map—rejected by Japan—attached to the Russo-Japanese treaty of Hunchun. Beginning on July 26th the Japanese attacked and occupied the heights. Serious fighting followed for ten days, each side claiming the advantage. Soviet planes raided the railways in Korea and certain air-raid precautions were ordered in Japan. Meanwhile, negotiations continued between the two governments, neither of whom desired major war. Japan's proposal for the withdrawal of both sides to their positions on July 10th, pending re-demarcation of the border, was rejected. On August 7th Moscow announced that all the Japanese had been expelled from Soviet territory. Germany intimated to Japan (August 8th) that she could give moral support but could not extend the scope of her present obligations. On August 10th, Japan agreed to an armistice as from next day, the troops retaining their positions, pending re-demarcation of the frontier, on the basis of the above-mentioned Russo-Japanese map, by a mixed commission of two Soviet and two Japanese-Manchukuo representatives.



All Classes of Insurance Effected

Branches & Agencies
throughout the World

Chief Administration
7, CHANCERY LANE, LONDON

WORLD REVIEW

Incorporating
Volume VI. No. 2 'REVIEW OF REVIEWS' and 'WORLD'

October, 1938

40-42 WILLIAM IV STREET
LONDON, W.C.2

Telegrams: BOOKSTORE, LONDON
Telephone: TEMPLE BAR 0127-9

WORLD REVIEW is the only English monthly review giving an extensive selection of articles from publications all over the world. These articles are chosen with great care, since WORLD REVIEW can only be valuable as its sponsors want it to be, if it avoids all political bias. The Editor in his own article, and other signed contributors, express their opinions as frankly as they please. Otherwise the Review would lack force and colour. But the ultimate object of WORLD REVIEW is to perform a useful and progressive service by allowing

THE NATIONS TO SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES

HOW WE FACED WAR

by VERNON BARTLETT

THESE notes are written in the middle of the worst crisis that has hit this poor crisis-bombarded world since the end of the war (formerly referred to as the "Great War" and now significantly enough more often as the "last war"). Day after day there are anxious crowds in Downing Street, and, so has authority relaxed under the pressure of events, even on the secret little grass square outside the Ambassadors' door of the Foreign Office, a square so neat and trim that I have never seen even a dog venture to walk on it.

The crowds, older Londoners tell me, remind them of the critical days of 1914. Of that I am no judge, for all I remember of the eve of the war is that I spent a glorious day fishing in a Hampshire stream and then bicycled home to Bournemouth to find a group of excited and happy people reading the latest bulletins scrawled up outside the local newspaper office. But I believe that there is a very important difference between the crowds of to-day and those of 1914. Some of the photographs show the crowds of to-day laughing and enthusiastic, but any crowd grins happily when it sees a press photographer. I have been through Downing Street a great deal in the past few weeks and I have seen no rejoicing. Instead there is a solemnity which has greatly impressed most

of the foreign newspaper correspondents whose job it is to gauge British opinion. And this solemnity is due less to memories of the last war—for most people in the crowds are young—than to a conviction that war is an absurdity and yet may be preferable to this everlasting crisis dependent on the whims of one man.

It is, of course, difficult to judge public opinion—or rather it is far too easy to pass hurried judgment based upon the stray comment of taxi drivers, lift boys, waitresses, policemen, charwomen and important-looking gentlemen in clubs—but to my mind the most significant development in Great Britain even before Herr Hitler's Nuremberg speech is the growing realisation that peace is threatened not by the intolerance of the Czechs, not by the stubbornness of the French, not by the intrigues of a Colonel Beck in Poland or of a Count Ciano in Rome, but by the fact that a man who has had his way by thumping his fist on the table will go on adopting the same method until he is told as bluntly as possible that he must stop.

* * * *

I would scarcely have thought it possible that there could be so much cold anger against the policy of the German government and yet so little hostility toward the German people. That is the difference between 1914 and 1938—there is, here in London, at least so far as I can judge, a feeling of pity for the Germans in their present helplessness which is emphasised by one's own feeling that even in a democracy with a nice vote in the general elections, with the power to send letters to the press and with the right, if one wants to, to declaim one's opinions at the street corner, one can do so little to alter the course of events. These crowds in Downing Street are pathetically helpless rather than vulgar in their search for sensation. Even those of us who look much busier, who hurry from conferences in the Foreign Office to newspaper offices where sub-editors wait impatiently for front page copy, feel just as helpless. On the night of the Sudeten German ultimatum we were almost relieved—a machine was in motion which we could not control. Events were so much too big for us. At midnight I heard the tape machine ticking and hurried across the room to see the latest sensation. There was, I read, a "special correction" to a message about Max Baer and Tommy Farr. And I wondered if the news mattered even to Max Baer and Tommy Farr.

When the secret history of this crisis comes to be written, the most

amazing feature of it will be the number of Germans who have privately appealed to people in authority in this country to take the strongest possible line against their own Government that was compatible with justice. When one remembers the tradition of blind loyalty which used to inspire the German army—except for a short period after the war when social democracy was in power—one is amazed to hear that important officers appealed to the British government through one channel or another to warn Herr Hitler in the strongest possible language. The same appeal came even from prominent Nazi leaders whose admiration for much that the Fuehrer has done could not be questioned, but who realised the probability that their own country would be the worst sufferer among the Great Powers in the event of war. Or, at any rate, of war to-day.

* * * *

I used to argue, poor fool that I was, that the development of broadcasting would make war almost an impossibility. The malicious efforts of war propagandists would be nullified by the broadcasting of some sentimental song from an enemy music hall. It would be impossible, I believed, for anybody to work up that lunatic hatred which leads one to



BEAT THAT IF YOU CAN!

Mr. Chamberlain plays a friendly game with Herr Hitler, Signor Mussolini and M. Daladier in this composite photograph from "Marianne," Paris.

attribute the vilest motives and morals to everybody who happens to bear an enemy passport.

I listened to Herr Hitler's Nuremberg speech in a pleasant room overlooking the quiet squares of Lincoln's Inn. Around me were books by great men who are now banned in Germany because they were Jews, gramophone records which could bring to one music written by men in moments of highest inspiration, but which may no more be heard by citizens in Germany, unless perhaps as the works of unknown composers. Surely, I said to myself, it was impossible that we in Great Britain could ever again suffer from the same intolerance. And then through the loud speaker came the hoarse shouts of a man who is desperately sincere in his hatred, and as I listened to the deliberate appeal to the worst prejudices of the mob I felt my own anger rising, and I in turn was ready to stand up and rant against National-Socialism as Herr Hitler was ranting against democracy. It is not perhaps surprising that the B.B.C. no longer uses as its motto: "Nation shall speak peace unto nation."

You who listened to the broadcast of that speech should not forget that it came as the climax of a week of carefully prepared mass hysteria. The reaction elsewhere in Germany was, I am told, quite different. There was no enthusiasm for all this talk of military might, and not over-much sympathy for the Sudeten Germans who, after all, have never been governed from Berlin and who are divided from Germany by one of the oldest-established and most mountainous frontiers in Europe. The German who used to feel some relationship with the Austrian from Graz or Linz or Innsbruck feels very little with the Sudeten from Eger or Aussig or Reichenberg. And the same German is very much more interested in peace than in plebiscites.

But one cannot estimate with any assurance the time it would take for this latent opposition to take effect. One can only say it would take longer than one would expect. For there again broadcasting could be expected to work up for a Germany fighting for her life an incomparably greater will to resist than could be aroused for a campaign against the Czechs. Perhaps in three or four months a people whose nerves (and, in many cases, whose physical health) has already been overstrained in time of peace would begin to show signs of disintegration. In estimating Germany's strength one should never forget that at the last genuine elections, in November, 1932, there were more Socialist and Communist voters than National Socialist ones.

This means that, if we have to talk of war with Germany we should concentrate on a war of ideas in the conviction that, if our conception of freedom is a good one, it will convince and prevail.

In the last war the part played by propaganda, especially when weariness had set in, cannot be exaggerated. But to some extent the German people would be weary before the next war began. They have drilled and marched and shouted and waved flags until even the less intelligent of them are beginning to get a little bored.

If it were possible to run a war without generals, one would not drop bombs over German towns and villages but millions upon millions of leaflets. If only one in a thousand were read it would probably be far more effective in creating a desire for peace than would a bomb which causes almost as much anger as terror. And the efforts of the Gestapo to collect and destroy the other nine hundred and ninety nine would certainly not increase confidence in the rightness of Germany's cause.

Each time I cross the room to the "ticker" to see the latest item of news on the tape machine I have a second of fear lest it should announce

THE STAR TURN
FROM NEVILLE
CHAMBERLAIN'S
"GREATEST SHOW
ON EARTH."



John Groth,
"New Masses,"
New York

to me the invasion of Czechoslovakia, or the bombing of Prague, and that leads on to a sense of amazement that the people in this country, fatalistic though they be about war, are worrying so little about self-defence. We spend a million pounds a day on the preparation of armaments, which are of course in themselves the most necessary defence of all. But we spend practically nothing upon propaganda, upon the preparation of a national register to prevent the most appalling muddles during an emergency, and even upon air raid precautions.

Leaders Without Imagination

The public, one is told, is not interested and it is true that the ordinary man shrugs his shoulders and says: "What's the good of it all?" Is that senile cynicism, the gesture of a people too tired to defend itself? I don't believe it. I believe that the whole trouble is the lack of imaginative leadership. In China, in Abyssinia, in Spain, and now perhaps in Central Europe, our political leaders have made the unforgivable blunder, much more common to democracies than it ought to be, of forgetting that life without ideals is as little invigorating as food without salt. During the last decade public opinion on several occasions has risen to heights of generosity and self-abnegation which were magnificent and inspiring and on each occasion the governments have suddenly capitulated to fear. Of the four men who have met day after day in Downing Street to discuss our fate, one was responsible for sacking the most popular Foreign Secretary we have had since the war; another was responsible for the betrayal of the League in Manchuria and another was one of the signatories of the Hoare-Laval report. One has the deepest sympathy for any man called upon to bear the responsibility of deciding between peace and war, courage and cowardice on behalf not of himself alone, but of a whole great nation. And yet one cannot wonder that under such doubtful leadership there is an apathy which suggests to the foreigner that the British Empire is hopelessly decadent. We want no Fascism here, but we want discipline. We want no dictatorship, but we want leaders. There is an odd etiquette in Fleet Street that one paper very seldom refers to another by name, even when it wants to slang it. I dislike etiquette and I am glad to pay tribute to an article by W. Horsfall Carter in the *Fortnightly Review*. Horsfall Carter in "Reconnaissance on the Home Front" in the July number of the *Fortnightly Review* shows up, as no writer I have read has done, the danger of drifting on in the

same old way and the importance of much more vigorous and imaginative leadership in the democracies if they are to resist the brutal but vigorous assault of the totalitarian states.

I foresee a rapid development of that indirect censorship in which the British excel, in order to preserve the reputations of the men who failed to have munitions on our warships when we might have checked the Italian invasion of Abyssinia and the destruction of the League; who failed to take *any one* of the obviously essential measures to prevent appalling casualties and loss of life should this country be dragged into war, who failed to warn Germany in unequivocal terms that we consider our conception of justice worth fighting for.

The *Fortnightly Review* may be our competitor on the bookstalls; it is certainly our colleague in its efforts to persuade the British to shake of their apathy.

Postscript


Twenty-four hours after Mr. Chamberlain had been discussing war measures against Germany I saw him on the aerodrome at Munich on his journey to Berchtesgaden. Cheering Germans stood on chairs to see this British Prime Minister who had taken so dramatic a step in the hope of saving peace, and the Union Jack (borrowed at the last moment from the British Consulate General), fluttered side by side with the German flag. There he was, with his old fashioned "butterfly" collar and his umbrella, on the strangest mission ever undertaken by a British statesman.

A wise step? One cannot yet tell. To some, the journey all the way to Berchtesgaden seemed a little too reminiscent of a journey by a German king to Canossa. The latest reports as I write would seem to indicate that this will prove to be all too accurate an interpretation.

FATHER OF HIS COUNTRY

Venezuela Government are to close the list of Gomez claimants. Juan Gomez, celebrated Dictator of that country, died in 1935, leaving a fortune of £6,000,000. He had the reputation of being more times a father, grandfather and great-grandfather than even King Augustus, who died in 1733 leaving 354 children by his 700 mistresses. There have been 7287 persons registering claims to a share in the Gomez fortune, of which the Government have recognised 4,300 as being well founded. Government propose to meet the claims by issuing Venezuelan bonds, but financial experts warn them that to put such a large sum into sudden circulation will cause inflation and raise the level of prices.—*"Evening Standard," London.*

PARIS
STILL
LAUGHED




"Marianne"

"Il faut conserver son sangfroid."
"Froid ou pas froid, je tiens en effet
à le conserver! . . ."



"Marianne"


"No, I don't believe
there'll be a war, but if a
nice little absorption of
excess population started,
it wouldn't surprise me at
all."



IN DIPLOMATIC
CIRCLES

"And here is my mov-
able signpost for frontier
incidents as desired."


"Le Canard Enchaîné"



"L'Ordre"

"Do you know Chamberlain is meeting
Hitler?"

"No, is he? In how many rounds?"



"Marianne"

"It appears that in the event of war we
shall travel in the passenger compart-
ments."

FOREIGN BODIES

by SPOTLIGHT

All the world likes to read gossip about other people. The human eccentricities that lurk behind the imposing figures officially presented to the world are seldom known; these personal notes aim at giving flesh and blood to the men whose names appear so often in our articles.

TO write, in the middle of September, for readers who will read your words at the beginning of October is not easy in this year of grace, for who would care, in 1938, to prophesy three weeks ahead?

If you put down all the facts on paper and soberly add them up, the answer is war. The process which began with the tearing up of treaties and high-speed rearmament has reached the point where it, the irresistible force, encounters an immovable object, a small nation recently liberated and resolved to fight in defence of its freedom. The process—so the paper sum of the facts seems to say—has now reached that stage where no more cheap swoops are to be had and where, logically, the enormous fighting machine that has been created comes into action to ensure the continued success of the process.

And yet! Either my sub-conscious, as the Americans say, refuses to face up to the distasteful inevitable, or I have a hunch that there will be no war—yet. I can't see why, and the answer to that sum is impregnable; I have totted it up a dozen times, and it always comes out the same. But, somehow, in spite of everything, at this writing—as the Americans say again—I have a feeling that we are going to skid by war once more, for the present.

What has happened in these fateful weeks, that have seen foreigners in Berlin and Prague and Budapest and Warsaw packing their bags, sending their women and children home, getting their passports visæd, making all the preparations they can for a quick getaway?

How it has all recalled 1914! Then you had a set of rulers and statesmen and politicians, many of whose names are now almost forgotten, confabulating and exchanging notes and sending ultimatums and giving warnings, and at the end of it all came the lunatic war, that seems twenty years later to have bequeathed new virility only to the vanquished German Reich, now mightier than ever. Now, in 1938, you have another group of figures in the spotlight, saying and doing the same things. You have not war—yet. Perhaps they have learned.

Our Strong Man in Berlin

One of the busiest of these spotlit figures, in these recent weeks, has been Sir Nevile Henderson. He is strong-willed, a bachelor, a martinet. He does not sink his personality in his calling, as do most diplomats. He liked Alexander of Yugoslavia, who had such confidence in him that Henderson was jocularly known to the Serbs as the uncrowned king of their country when he was in Belgrade, and he thus gained the reputation of being privately in sympathy with the methods of the King's dictatorship. Inevitably, this reputation followed him to Berlin, where in a speech soon after his arrival he enjoined Englishmen to study with more sympathy and understanding the "great social experiment of National-Socialism."

The great social experiment has been keeping Sir Nevile busy these days. British statesmen and diplomats, in 1938, are inevitably anxious to avoid the reproach that was made against their predecessors of 1914—that they were too irresolute, and left the Germans in doubt about England's attitude. Sir Nevile must have seen the spectre of that reproach loom big before him at the end of August, when he learned that Hitler's Foreign Minister, the bellicose von Ribbentrop, was unshakeably convinced that England would in no circumstances intervene in a war arising out of the Czechoslovak dispute. Sir Nevile urgently sent word to von Ribbentrop that to assume so much was to be gravely wrong. But in London the anxious question was asked, when Sir Nevile's telegrams came in, "Does Hitler make his decisions on the strength of von Ribbentrop's advice? Is he informed about the real state of British opinion?"

Ribbentrop—Saviour of Peace?

The awful spectre of 1914, in fact, stalked the corridors of the Foreign Office, and this is why Henderson was sent to Nuremberg with instructions to try and see Hitler himself. He failed; and this, again, was why, on the eve of Hitler's great speech, the British Government sent for the representatives of the world's newspapers and made that long statement, designed to remove from Hitler's mind any doubt there may have been there that an attack on Czechoslovakia would bring England into the field against Germany. A dramatic moment. Possibly von Ribbentrop, the main exponent of the "lightning war" theory, saved the peace by his inadroitness in this moment.

Another man in the spotlight is Milan Hodza, the Czechoslovak Prime Minister, of whom you hear relatively little, because he is overshadowed by his President, Eduard Benes. But Hodza is an interesting figure, the human embodiment of these problems of Danubian Europe which caused the last war and have brought us so near to the next one. He is a man of parts: he can talk to you in English, French or German, when he goes to Yugoslavia to meet Little Entente friends he converses with them in Serbian, and once, a pleasant gesture of goodwill which much annoyed the Hungarians, who detest politeness from Czechoslovaks, he made a speech in Hungarian in unveiling a monument to a Hungarian poet in one of the Hungarian minority districts.

Pre-War Reformer

In Hodza's career the wheel of Danubian problems has turned full circle. Before the war, when Czechoslovak independence seemed but a roseate dream, he was a lonely Slovak deputy in the Hungarian Parliament, and he was a good friend of that Archduke Franz Ferdinand whose assassination at Serajevo in 1914 led to the World War. Franz Ferdinand saw that the Austro-Hungarian Empire would collapse unless the nations



"La Lumière"

Paris

"To start with, Germany is not ready for war."

"Huh! She doesn't look as if she were ready for peace either!"



"Marianne"

Paris

KARLSBAD FOR SLIMMING

One of the real reasons for the German claim to the Sudetenland.

living within it were given some measure of self-government and proposed, when he came to the throne, to try and make such reforms. This was the basis of his friendship with Hodza, who loved Vienna and at that time never thought of anything more than Czechoslovak home-rule within it. Franz Ferdinand, incidentally, was detested by many people in Vienna and Budapest precisely because he had such plans. Now he has been dead these 24 years and Hodza, as Prime Minister of the young Republic, is once more grappling with the many-headed monster of Danubian politics—the eternal drive of the Germanic family towards domination in Danubia and the eternal resistance to this of the smaller nations that lies in its path.

Admiral on Stormy Seas


A little further down the Danube the spotlight picks up another figure—Miklós Horthy. The last commander-in-chief of the Austro-Hungarian navy, he still wears his admiral's uniform; in the 19 years that he has been régent of Hungary he has only twice seen the sea—once as Mussolini's guest at Venice, once as Hitler's guest at Kiel. He, too, has lived through many changes. As Franz Josef's naval aide-de-camp he knew the great balls and banquets at Schönbrunn; and as Regent of Hungary he twice expelled by force of arms Franz Josef's successor, the last Emperor Karl, when he tried to regain his Hungarian throne. In 1937 Horthy sat in the Imperial Box of the Vienna Opera as the honoured guest of Miklas and Schuschnigg; and in 1938, on his way to Kiel and Hitler, he was greeted in that same Vienna, where Schuschnigg now lies in captivity, by the upraised arm of Seyss-Inquart.

Nineteen years have passed since Horthy rode into Budapest, from which the Rumanians had cleared the Reds, at the head of the Hungarian national armies. He is hale and should live another fifteen years. What will be Hungary's place in Danubia by then, now that she is irrevocably linked to that great Reich which has declared the claimant to the Hungarian throne, for which Horthy is Regent, to be a criminal?

CAN IT BE GOERING?

Foreign notability contemplating domicile in England will shortly be in the market to purchase an important country Estate with a large house and good sporting facilities. Price not first consideration—probably up to a quarter of a million pounds available for right place—but must be really first-class property in every way.—*Advertisement in the "Times."*

THE OPEN FORUM



AMERICA AND EUROPE'S CRISIS Isolationists and Anti-Fascists

by RAYMOND GRAM SWING

In this section we publish, without necessarily sharing the views they express, articles from men of international fame. Millions of listeners know and admire Mr. Swing as the man who, in fifteen minutes each week, gives them an extraordinary vivid and balanced account of current American events. In this analysis of his country's attitude towards the European crisis, our readers will find the qualities which make him one of the best broadcasters the B.B.C. has had the good fortune to secure

NO democratic country in the world is so anti-fascist as the United States, though whether this is so much repugnance as fear is a difficult question to answer. If it is repugnance it would influence American foreign policy strongly. If it is fear of a trend toward fascism at home, it would be a less potent factor in foreign affairs. But it is fair to say that the usually disunited Americans are overwhelmingly hostile to Hitler and Mussolini. They speak and write against them and their works with passion and bitterness.

But no country feels more secure. Isolationism, of course, rises from this sense of safety. Unless American interests are palpably affected by world events, the instinctive desire of the country is to behave in a way to remain safe, which means to avoid conflict. So the usually disunited Americans are also overwhelmingly in favour of remaining aloof from the present dangers of Europe.

These two generalisations, that Americans are anti-fascist, and that they are isolationist, are probably the only ones that can be made about American opinion as to European affairs. Obviously the two generalisations contradict each other. If Europe goes to war in the near future,

the fascists will be on one side and the democracies on the other. American sympathies then will be with the democracies. And that would go against the strong tide of isolationist feeling. There will be a conflict within the American mind. Anyone who pretends to know how this conflict would work itself out has unusual prophetic power. Less gifted prophets can only study the two currents of feeling, and this study leads to almost infinite ramifications.

Creed of the Isolationists

To say, simply, that America is isolationist is to misrepresent a complex tangle of feelings, some isolationist, some pacifist. American isolationists of the true blood are anti-foreign, and they are not fundamentally anti-war. They would fight America's battles willingly. What they refuse to do is to fight the battles of other countries. They are against collective security, which they think is the effort of foreigners to induce America to fight and pay for their selfish aims. They do not speak the language of international law. They believe that the only guarantee of peace is to be so mighty that no other country will dare to violate American rights. Hence they make a cult of indifference to right and wrong in other nations' quarrels. Their one objective is to keep America out of a foreigners' war, so they must refuse to take sides on the moral questions which lead to wars.


This brings the isolationists to a chronic distrust of all foreign policies. Rather than to appear indifferent to right and wrong, they find wrong in everything. They represented the British efforts to curb Italy in Abyssinia through the League as a mere service of British imperial interests. They regard every approach to joint Anglo-American action in the Far East as an intrigue which will end in the United States pulling British chestnuts out of the fire. They can say, with some truth, that the League of Nations has never been sincerely used, and that there is imperialism behind the conduct of the European democracies as well as the dictators.

To the isolationists the great crime in modern American history was coming into the world war. They picture this as an act of idealism which ended in the most disastrous and unidealistic peace. It cost an enormous expenditure on America's part in the war, and then the bulk of the loans to the Allies. Not only that, America was not thanked for the loans, but was excoriated for dreaming of collecting them.

The isolationists dominated the Munitions Senate Inquiry, which was arranged to prove that America entered the war for economic reasons, since it committed its own prosperity to the victory of the Allies. So they passed the neutrality legislation which would make it possible to forbid Americans to have business dealings with future belligerents. The years have been well used to build up a thesis, a simple, documented thesis, intelligible to every child, and nearly every child in America understands it. Isolationism is not in the least idealistic. It is hard-boiled and vigorously selfish. And it is intensely patriotic.

Pacifist Allies

The pacifists, neither hard-boiled nor patriotic, have allied themselves with the isolationists. They did so during the Senate munitions investigation, and in the campaign for the neutrality legislation. This is, no doubt, a very strange alliance, and a few genuine pacifists are aware of its incongruity and immorality. But they believed that this was a way to stay out of war. They went into the partnership hesitantly, perhaps fearing their own deterioration. It certainly has set in. For by now some pacifist organisations are issuing public statements to say that Czechoslovakia is an "artificial" state, and they infer that no damage can come to the world if Hitler has his way with the Sudeten Germans. They become in effect apologists for the fascists. And that maintains an



"And now thank
God for the Atlantic
Ocean."

"New Masses," New York

identity of outlook with the isolationists who favour a plebiscite in Czechoslovakia, simply because it sounds like a democratic solution, and will destroy any possible pretext for the United States to take an interest in the affair.

But the desire to stay out of war in the United States is not restricted to isolationists and pacifists. A substantial, if minority, element in America still believes in international co-operation, and in America bearing its responsibility for world peace. And this element also would wish to stay out of a European war to-day. It would not look upon a war in defence of Czechoslovakia as a war of collective security, but as one fought in defence of France first of all, and of Britain in so far as its security depends on France.

It is this body of thought in America, intensely interested in foreign affairs, well aware of America's membership in the world, which in time will determine American action. The isolationists and pacifists are alike dogmatists, but they are not realistic, and will not count in the end. It is the informed Americans who will lead. For the present they certainly would not advocate America's coming at once into a European war over Czechoslovakia or over anything else. If the war is fought now they will want to revise the neutrality legislation so that America could help in a limited way with resources and manufactures. Greater American participation would not be regarded necessary, until it became clear that the democracies were unable to win without it. One could expect the same slow development as in the World War, and the same ultimate decision. America would come into a war in which it felt its national interest at stake. If it had to choose between living in a world in which the democracies or the fascists were victorious it would choose the democracies. In 1917 it had to choose between a victory of the Allies or the Central Powers. The choice to-day would be different both as to names and ideas, but it would be similar.

Upholders of Law and Order

What makes for confusion in appraising American opinion is that this body of informed American thought is still in the minority, and expresses itself more quietly than the isolationists and the pacifists. Its leaders are President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull. But that does not mean that it is a party doctrine, for there are as many Democratic isolationists as Republican, and the believers in co-operation are on both sides of the party fence.

The President and the Secretary of State, as spokesmen of this informed minority, do not use a single voice. Mr. Roosevelt is inclined to be more emphatic and impulsive than Mr. Hull. In his Chicago "quarantine" speech he went further than the State Department would have liked. In his Kingston speech, promising to defend Canada, he was a shade more precise than the State Department wished. But their objective is the same. Mr. Hull wants a world of law and order. He wants the observance of treaties. He wants a family of nations aware of their inter-dependence. He is more tedious in expressing himself, and far more cautious. He is willing to take a step at a time, which is not the Roosevelt temperament. But he is taking the steps. If one studies his utterances one will find that each time he sums up the underlying principles of American foreign policy he adds a phrase, until now the frame-work is nearly full. The British reader will not find in it a pledge to leap to the aid of Britain. Nor is that what Mr. Hull cares about it. But he will find in it an affirmation of a world in which the Briton and the Briton's view of society would be safe.

Mr. Hull always speaks about co-operation but never about agreements to co-operate. He knows his public. He must avoid the outcry that America is being led down the garden path by the British, which is what an agreement with Britain would look like. He is wise enough to appreciate that true co-operation is an act of the spirit, and comes from better understanding, warmer sympathies, and more open collaboration in non-political fields. It is that whether a treaty has been signed or not.

What has made it harder for the Roosevelt-Hull school to speak persuasively is that it is in the non-political fields that Britain has found it hard to collaborate. The trade agreement has taken a dangerously long time for consummation. The debt question has been allowed to fester until now it is late to raise it at all. And British speakers quoted in America seem to be eager for the promise of help for *Britain* when Americans would respond only to an appeal to support certain principles which Britain has not energetically supported.

Mr. Chamberlain² Has Not Helped

I should have said that a month or two ago Anglo-American relations were at about as low an ebb as at any time since 1920. Mr. Chamberlain's foreign policy, perhaps unjustly, won him few friends in

America. Being anti-fascist, the Americans did not like the spectacle of reconciliation between British democracy and Italian fascism, elements which from their perspective are not reconcilable. The indifference to Spain, as part of the deal with Mussolini, really helped turn non-Catholic Americans to the Loyalist cause. At the outset of the Spanish war the Americans had been, if anything, pro-rebel. They began changing their minds when they saw the open participation of the fascists. They were confirmed in their new opinion when they saw that Spain was a pawn in an arrangement between Chamberlain and Mussolini.

The movement to lift the embargo against Spain (under the new neutrality legislation) actually reached the point when it might have been carried in the Senate if President Roosevelt had not felt obliged to stop it. The whole case for lifting the embargo was this: It had been applied originally as an effort to stop the civil war, and Britain was "non-intervening" in the same way. But Italy had refused to "non-intervene," and Britain was making a deal with Italy. So the American embargo became a part of the British intrigue with Italy. The isolationists who took this stand, like Senator Nye, chairman of the Senate Munitions Investigation, were not so much pro-Loyalist as they were anti-British. They appealed to their colleagues to pull America out of the position of playing imperial British politics. Mr. Roosevelt personally favoured lifting the embargo for better reasons. But he could not be carried to the point of doing what he would have been pleased to do, if it poked a stick in the wheel of Mr. Chamberlain's policy.

The anti-British sentiment in America is not as strong as in the days of the Black and Tans. But it remains as a factor always useful for any special purpose. Americans are now more friendly to the Spanish government, thanks to Mr. Chamberlain. They also are (for a while) more friendly to the government of Cardenas in Mexico because the British withdrew their ambassador—over a question of debt payment. It would be no doubt foolish to exaggerate the anti-British feeling, for it is much like the feeling between brothers, harder to keep pleasant than between mere friends. But it would be as foolish to ignore it. Not until a substantial trade agreement has been made, and not until the debt question has been settled, can Britain expect more favourable reactions from Americans. One might also say that not until Britain perseveres in a consistent, clear foreign policy against *all* aggression can it hope to receive American help in fighting some particular aggression which arouses Britain unless America should be similarly aroused.

But behind whatever antagonism or pique may be felt in America toward Britain lies a big fact. The British dominions and empire mean much to America. Americans are not always aware of it. But they would become acutely aware of it if they saw that the British world might pass into the keeping of another ideology. Dorothy Thompson, one of America's most vigorous political writers, is sure America would enter a war the moment London was bombed. I am not of this opinion. But I share her view that America would fight to prevent the British Empire falling into fascist hands or under fascist influence. I agree when she says that we should then fight so that the British would continue to bear their present responsibilities—and that these responsibilities should not fall to America. For in that statement speaks true national interest. And until a world of collective security has been established, true national interest must be the one guide of foreign policy.

BLOOD AND RENT

The author (Miss Elim Anderson) is aware that "particularly since the economic and political uncertainty of recent years, consciousness of class is coming to be more important than consciousness of 'race' as such." She cites the pertinent comment of one Irishman who said that "there's damn little fat in thinking you're better than an Eyetalian if neither of you can pay the rent."—"New Masses," *New York*.

GOODWILL AT INTERNATIONAL HOUSE

An official of the University of Chicago's International House was recently asked whether foreign crises were making a serious impact on the house. "Yes," he replied, "and last Christmas Day was the best example. On that day a Russian resident received word that his brother had been shot in the purge, the German residents demanded a separate room for their Christmas dinner because they didn't want to eat with Jews, a Spaniard insisted on moving to another floor because a pro-Franco student was in the next room, and the Japanese and Chinese kept smiling at each other so politely that I knew a blow-up was coming."—"Japan Chronic," *Kobe*.

PARIS: "GERMANIC CITY"

In his new book *The Struggle for Power*, Herr Alfred Rosenberg writes :

"That magnificent old Paris, where, in the middle ages Flemish was spoken more than French, was as Germano-Gothic as Normandy or Frisia, until this city, too, was inundated by Jews, by Southern bastards, Romans, etc., and lost her character just as ancient Rome had done. It is only in Brittany and Normandy that France still possesses sources of Nordic strength."—"L'Ere Nouvelle," *Paris*.

WILL YOU, WON'T YOU?

"There is reason to suspect that both Great Britain and France were preparing to bring yet more pressure on the Czechs. This is behind the French suggestion that Lord Runciman should be asked to produce yet another plan."—Vernon Bartlett, *"News Chronicle,"* 15th September.

"Will you give a little farther?" said his lordship to the Czechs,
"There's a gentleman behind us I should really hate to vex,
"I have taken on a mission to maintain the open door,
"So to prove co-operation will you give a little more?
"Will you, won't you, will you, won't you give a little more?"

"I shall use to your advantage every token of goodwill,
"So do your part by giving way a little farther still,"
Then said the Czechs, "Our formulas already number four."
And they thanked his lordship kindly but could not give any more,
Could not, would not, could not, would not give a little more.

His lordship said, "You've no idea how lovely it would be,
"If you'd just give way completely and leave all the rest to me;
"The fruitful paths of compromise I would again explore,
"As a purely private person, if you gave a little more?"
"Will you, won't you, will you, won't you give a little more?"

The Czechs said mediation would be greatly simplified,
If concessions were requested in a quarter still untried,
His lordship answered that this view he must indeed deplore,
If they found themselves unable to concede a little more—
If they would not, could not, would not, could not give a little more.

He pointed out how steadily and surely they'd advance,
Secure in the assurances of Britain and of France,
But they answered in a strain that shocked his lordship to the core,
That they feared non-intervention if they gave a little more—
So would not, could not, would not, could not give a little more.


REYNARD.

WAYS
WITH A
KNOT

Self-determination
does the trick.



"Kladderadatsch"
Berlin




cecoslovacchino,
dite il vostro
pensiero



THE
MOSCOW
VENTRILO-
QUIST

"Il Travaso
delle Idee,"
Rome



"Saturday Evening Post"

"Hello, Czechoslovakia, are you still
there?"



DEUTSCHLAND ÜBER ALLES

FRANCE RATS TOO

From the "Narodni Osvobozeni," Prague, 16.9.38

We go to press this month at a moment which cannot be less than a decisive turning-point in history. The complete surrender of the French and British Governments in the face of Herr Hitler's ultimatum has staggered the world, which is still only just waking up to its vital importance. When the following extracts were printed, the first inklings of what was to come were only just becoming apparent. In our next issue we hope to do more justice to this fateful event

THE news has come that France, too, is beginning to wonder whether, under the slogan of self-determination, Czechoslovakia might not be advised to refrain from defending her frontiers—those frontiers which after the World War were recognised and confirmed, thanks to France.

We know that it is a fact that there are circles both on the Right and Left in France who doubt the policy followed by Briand, Poincaré and Foch with Masaryk and Benes. The reasons should, therefore, be

recapitulated, which led France to acknowledge Masaryk's programme for the new Europe as right. France and the rest of the allies recognised at that time that they must establish and maintain a Central European Front. They recognised that lasting peace can be built up upon and with those who sincerely wish for peace. Has anything happened in the meantime to alter this truth?

Even at that time the policy of Masaryk, Briand and Wilson was opposed. In the name of peace, attempts were made to save Austria-Hungary. As we were determined to defend our national existence, we were represented as being *saboteurs* of peace. We were victorious nevertheless, and events proved us right. But the old doubts are cropping up with new dangers. In France and England there are some who would like to save peace by taking a path which would lead certainly to war.

BASIS OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

From the "Ceske Slovo," Prague, 16.9.38

CHAMBERLAIN several times acknowledged the truth and justice of our cause. He knows that it is not a matter of Czechoslovakia, but of world peace, of truth and morality, the maintenance of which is the basis of the British Empire.

For us, there is no other path to follow than that which we have trodden for twenty years. The frontiers of the Republic are inviolable and sacred. We shall give way before no power, whether presented to us in the form of a plebiscite or otherwise. Our nerves will not break down. We are united and firm. And we know that peace for Czechoslovakia means the peace of Europe.

THE FIASCO

From the "Lidove Listy," Prague, 16.9.38

WE gave way in the proposals we made to the Henlein Party only to prove to the whole world, and our allies in particular, that we bear no guilt should peace be destroyed, and that we were ready to make even the greatest sacrifices in the interests of peace. The final result of this policy, however, is a complete fiasco.

We have given way so far that the entire world has recognised one of the greatest sacrifices to peace ever made; and still this policy has not borne the fruit which our allies promised themselves from it. The situation has on the contrary worsened, Germany has interpreted our conciliation as weakness—and, furthermore, the Czechoslovak public is a prey to unrest and doubt as to whether this procedure was the right one. . . . Further steps along this same line would not only weaken us internationally, but might shatter us internally.

TO CANOSSA

From "L'Humanité," (Communist), Paris, 15.9.38

"MR. NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN is going to Berchtesgaden!" When this terrifying news was telephoned to us, we could not bring ourselves to believe it. The news, however, is true.

The air was still resounding with Hermann Goering's insults to Britain, "protector of the Jews," when His Majesty's Prime Minister in the United Kingdom went to wait in the ante-chamber of the Führer's private residence—just as Schuschnigg did!

Terrifying step! We can imagine the glamour with which this news will crown the Chancellor of the Reich, who has proclaimed himself the envoy of divine Providence and successor of the masters of the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation. Tonight's broadcast music programmes were interrupted in Germany in order to announce the homage that the head of the greatest Empire in the world was going to render to the Reich of the swastika.

Were one to want to exalt the war-lord's megalomania, his spectacular taste for power, were one to want to galvanise still further life into Nazi Germany, one could have done nothing better.

All the news during the last five days has confirmed that official Germany feared the consequences of a warlike enterprise. This fear was a factor for peace. What should have been done was to make it more precise, to leave no doubt, to assure the aggressor ten times a day, every day, that he could not count upon impunity.

The nations were clinging to this hope of peace. Mr. Chamberlain has set the gears in reverse. He did not warn Germany; he is ringing the front door bell at Berchtesgaden instead. He did not say: "Further adventures prohibited!" He is begging: "Allow me to hear your

demands. Don't put yourself out to inform me of them. Permit me to make, by aeroplane, the journey to the Bavarian Canossa!"

Oh! I know the answer! We shall be told: "Peace is worth more than pride. If it was necessary to go to Berchtesgaden to save peace, let us praise the man who accepted this humiliating pilgrimage."

But no! It is not peace that will be saved at Berchtesgaden! Peace is inseparable from the security of Czechoslovakia, and it is its sacrifice which the Prime Minister has gone to arrange.

ANY NEUTRALS? YES, PLEASE!

From "Le Canard Enchaîné," Paris, 14.9.38

This famous French satirical weekly has helped its readers a lot in the past weeks to maintain their good humour and nerve

AMONG the different proposals being considered in the endeavour to find a solution to the Czechoslovak problem, neutrality has been mentioned.


A federal and neutral Czechoslovakian state might be constituted. It seems that this plan could not be accepted.

This may be regretted. But it is not for us to know the reasons which caused it to be rejected.

AT THE MANŒUVRES

"What's the corporal as a civilian?"

"Teacher of the Lambeth Walk."



"Le Canard
Enchaîné,"
Paris

Nevertheless this plan seems to us too full of good sense to be completely abandoned. And if others reject all idea of neutrality, we for our part are ready to answer the question:

"Any neutrals?" "Yes, please, us!"

In fact, since so many countries are benefiting from neutrality, we think that now it is France's turn.

As eminent statesmen have said in admirable speeches, France has proved her worth on all the battlefields and her army has always distinguished itself by its courage. Everyone knows that we fear nothing.

A change might not be out of place.

We ought now to find out if we are as great, as magnificent, in neutrality as in war.

It is worth trying.

And for our part we are ready to accept without fuss a neutrality rejected by others. With, of course the guarantee of England, the United States, Italy and Germany; these gentlemen, naturally, reserving the right to fight for us, if, some day, they think our neutrality to be in danger.

HOME TO THE REICH !

Chamberlain's Task


From the "Leipziger Neueste Nachrichten," 16.9.38

A noble rivalry between London and Paris has broken out in some sections of the Press over the question of who moved the English Prime Minister to his bold decision to seek out Germany's Führer in the heart of his country, in order to discuss directly with him the maintenance of peace and the solution of the European crisis. This rivalry is certainly praiseworthy, but it is of no importance in comparison with the deed itself, in comparison with the power of decision which the English Prime Minister has brought to light. If we on the German side wanted to join in this Anglo-French race to claim priority in the idea, we would not be without prospect of coming in first. For, after all, the method which Chamberlain has adopted is that which has always been preferred and recommended by the Führer—that of bi-lateral negotiations, of sincere speech between man and man.

It is in Anglo-German relations particularly that this method of negotiation and solution of problems can claim a noteworthy success; the Naval Agreement, after all, was born without the assistance of an international conference and only by conversations between the two parties. How strong the impression of this method has been with Chamberlain, he himself testified not long ago in the House of Commons, when he advised his fellow-countrymen to appreciate the significance of the Naval Agreement more strongly than up to the present. The Führer and the German people, therefore, welcome with great satisfaction the fact that Chamberlain through his visit to the Obersalzberg has again turned to this method of negotiation, and that he put his happy thought at once into practice.

The English Prime Minister is accompanied by the sincere and heartiest wishes of all men, without difference of nationality, who are working not only for peace in itself but also for the idea of justice and honour in the life of nations. True, the mere fact of the political flight from London to the Obersalzberg is a deed, but it alone does not suffice to assure the final fulfilment of these hopes. Chamberlain's journey comes at a point in the development of Europe and of the problem of Czechoslovakia in which there can no longer be any fundamental differences of opinion about the kernel of all questions. In the last few days particularly a far-reaching clarification has taken place which offers hope of a peaceful solution.

No less than the head of the Italian Government, Benito Mussolini, has placed himself at the head of fighters for a sensible, natural and just decision, by his open letter to Lord Runciman. With the full force



"Le Canard Enchaîné,"

UNDER GRETCHEN'S PLAITS

Paris

of his powerful personality the Duce assumes leadership of the friends of a just peace outside of Germany. In clear and forceful language he hammers it into the world how the Czechoslovak State is to be regarded and how it is to be handled to the advantage of European welfare and peace. With the plainness of content and monumental power of form which characterise him, Mussolini points out the internal contradictions which have for twenty years afflicted the artificial construction of the so-called Czechoslovak State. With ruthless decisiveness he draws his conclusion for a settlement which would be no compromise, but a clear-cut separation in accordance with the principles of common-sense and justice.

The Duce makes the sensible solution that the nationalities out of which the "State" bearing the name of Czechoslovakia is thrown together, should be joined to their brother nations and that the National State of the Czechs should then be granted entry into the European group of States. Mussolini also recommends as an instrument of this constructive operation a plebiscite of the nationalities in the spirit of the right of self-determination, for which the democracies are supposed to have fought in the world war, and which Adolf Hitler from inmost conviction of honour and duty made his demand, and that of the German people, in his Congress speech.

Ink v. Blood

Such frontiers drawn in accordance with nationality would no longer be drawn with ink, to use Mussolini's words—they would be fixed in accordance with the blood of human beings and so drawn by the hand of God who has created differences between blood and blood. It was an outrage against the idea of national self-determination which was committed at Versailles with the ink of hate and revenge, when they sought to force contrasting blood-streams into the same channel and thought they could make a majority of nationalities bow beneath the yoke of the Czech minority for all time. In the Führer's speech, with its unequivocal demand for the right of self-determination for the Sudeten Germans, as well as in Mussolini's letter to Runciman, the problem has been given clear outlines. Should there still exist any doubt in the mind of the world, how the Sudeten Germans themselves interpret their right of self-determination, and how they picture its practical realisation, the last remnant of vagueness will be removed by the deeply

moving proclamation of Konrad Henlein: freedom, peace and work for the German men and women who are still chained to the Czechoslovak monstrosity and who are striving with every fibre of their national consciousness and every drop of their German blood to free themselves from it. Home to the Reich! That is the banner of liberation which Konrad Henlein has unfurled in the decisive hour on the Obersalzberg; that is at the same time the only path which can lead to a lasting solution.

There is no longer either time or possibility for any compromising efforts, which would ban 3,500,000 Sudeten Germans to live within the frontiers of the Nationality-State of Czechoslovakia, however their autonomy were constituted. The Czech holders of power, who even a few weeks ago might have had some prospect of maintaining, at least outwardly, their patchwork State by the introduction of autonomy, have gambled away their chance. Konrad Henlein's proclamation cuts the table in half between Germans and Czechs and gives the other nationalities the password to follow the example of the Germans and decide the course of their national fate with their own strength and will.

May our guest from England, whom Adolf Hitler is welcoming to the conference table in the Berghof, understand the sign of the times, and may he find the strength to help the Führer of the Germans to a solution which will breathe the spirit of peace and of national justice.

SOCIETY NOTE

Some venturesome people, undeterred by the war, are holiday-making in Spain this month.

Lady Constance Milnes-Gaskell went off to North-West Spain with a party of friends immediately her period of "in-waiting" to Queen Mary was concluded.

She has visited cathedrals at Burgos and other towns and is doing a round of sight-seeing, including Guernica.

Lady Constance's daughter, Mary, and her husband, Mr. Lewis Motley, live in a lovely Wren house on Clapham Common dating back to about 1712. When they were having it redecorated recently they found money and bills of the period behind some panelling.—*Woman's Page*, "*Evening Standard*," London.

NOT TO MENTION 10,000,000 DEAD

The last war cost the world £80,000,000,000. That sum, figures a statistician, could have provided every family in Britain, Canada, Australia, the U.S.A., Germany, France, Belgium and Russia with a £500 house, and £200 worth of furniture, standing on five acres of land. A £1,000,000 library and a £2,000,000 university for every city with more than 100,000 inhabitants in those countries could also have been bought.—"*Evening Standard*," London.

REDS IN SUDETENLAND

by A. FADEYEV

From "Pravda," Moscow

EVERY summer the anti-fascist cultural organisations hold a Culture Day in the town of Liberec in the Sudeten province which borders on Germany. This is a day on which Czech and German anti-fascists get together.

I travelled out on a train packed with Czech and German workers, office employees, students, teachers, going there from Prague. They planned to pass the night in the open air and spend the next day holding meetings and making merry.

No sooner had the train steamed out of the Wilson station in Prague when red flags, kerchiefs and ribbons hung from every window waving merrily in the breeze.

A song is sung in both Czech and German.

"England had better mind her own business,

We'll settle the question without her help."

That is how the Czech and German working people in Czechoslovakia feel.

The engine drivers, the switchmen, the workers at crossings, peasants in the fields know what train ours is and whither it is bound and they greeted us with the "Red Front" salute. In reply hundreds of hands clenched in fists are thrust out of the windows and the air resounds with the greetings, "Nazdar" (the form of greetings used by the "Sokols," members of the national sports society) and "Red Front."

At one station three trains meet—a troop train, a train carrying "Sokols" and our train. Everyone jumps out of the cars and at once the platform and the space between the tracks are filled with a noisy, colourful, fraternising throng.

Thus, with songs and red flags, we enter the town of Liberec. On the platform are none but police. That is a good sign, for it means that the Henleinites have not been allowed on the platform. The police assume stern expressions but it is easy to see that their hearts are with us. They are Czech police.

The people fold up the red flags, form into a column and march through the station out into the streets of Liberec. We foreign newspapermen walk on the pavement as observers. Progress is difficult. The

pavements are crowded with cocky young men dressed in short knee breeches and white socks, their hairy knees bared. Singing the same songs as before, the column marches briskly through the streets of Liberec with upraised fists and shouts of "Red Front" and "Nazdar" toward Koenigsbursch, a small suburb where the celebrations are to be held. From the pavement in the wake of the marchers come hostile, angry shouts of "Heil Hitler!" "Heil Henlein!" But one can observe the sympathetic faces of passers-by in civilian dress, who do not venture to raise their voices. Here and there, however, from the depths of the hostile crowd clenched fists are thrust and the "Red Front" greetings heard. Instantly a scuffle takes place, which is promptly stopped by the police.

The Henlein storm detachments are considered disbanded and the wearing of uniforms has been forbidden by law. But both detachments and uniforms exist quite openly. Some of the more insolent of Henlein's followers risk wearing the uniform even on the streets of Prague. But I myself witnessed how the Prague street undresses these "braves." It is done most politely. I might even say, democratically—in the Czech manner. The "brave" is lifted up so that his clothes should not be soiled (the Lord forbid!) by falling on the asphalt pavement, his boots are unlaced, his white socks removed, his boots are laced up again and the socks are thrust into his pocket.

But here we are in Koenigsbursch where there are a great many anti-fascists. En route we pass a meeting of Henleinites being held in a garden. Entire battalions of police are stationed between the two zones in order to prevent them from clashing. It has already grown dark and the large Koenigsbursch square is thronged. A hastily erected stage is flooded with lights, there is a lively trade in beer, sausages and sandwiches in the little illuminated stands placed around the square. A meeting is in progress. Bursts of applause, shouts of "Zdar" and "Red Front" are heard. Suddenly an ovation thunders out lasting for ten minutes: "Long Live the Soviet Union!" "Long Live the Red Army!" "Health to Stalin!"

I notice a group of Czech soldiers in the crowd and approach them:

"What is the situation on the border?"

"Nothing new. We are standing by for the time being."

"Are they provoking you?"

"Something happens every day."

"And what do you do?"

"Once we gave it to them, but now we are not allowed to, so we are biding our time. A week ago the Henleinites held a demonstration right on the border and the peasants from the other side shouted: "You can have our Adolf; give us three hunks of bread!"

The popular rejoicing lasted all night, only to break out with renewed force at sunrise. On the day of the celebration more than 20,000 anti-fascists assembled in Koenigsbursch. The German anti-fascists are indeed heroes. If you remember the extent to which the workers of the Sudeten province are at the mercy of their Henlein masters, if you think of the unemployment, the espionage, when every step by a worker is known to his boss, when school-teachers question their pupils about the political views of their parents, when every honest man who dares to raise his voice against Henlein risks poverty and starvation, these people who fight the fascists are people of iron will. But they know that they are expressing the thoughts and desires of the overwhelming majority of the population of the Sudeten province which, under the Henlein regime, cannot speak out in its defence.

Of late, under pressure from Britain, the Czechoslovak government is making concessions to Henlein. This, of course, is its own business. But the people who guide the policy of the Czechoslovak republic must know that they are now being put to the test by their people. And this is at the same time a test of history. A people cannot perish; it will live forever and it will never forget and never forgive.

EIGHT POINTS

The Sudetens have announced their eight points at Karlovy-Vary.

In our turn, conscious, alas, of also only representing a minority, we have met in our concrete cellar in the Rue d'Antin, and we have also reduced our demands to eight points.

Here they are :

1. No war.
2. No war.
3. No war.
4. No war.
5. No war.
6. No war.
7. No war.
8. No war.

We must add that these eight points are indivisible and that we cannot permit the deletion of a single one.

We would rather go to war.—"*Le Canard Enchaîné*," Paris.

MEDIATORS TWO-A- PENNY



"Marianne,"
Paris

"Can I tempt you, gentlemen? We have a nice line in mediators going cheap."



"L'Oeuvre,"

Paris

"I am frightened of an unprovoked incident. I won't go home without Lord Runciman."



"Marianne"

Paris

THOSE FILM STARS!

"... and now there's that Simone Simon making a speech on the Czech problem!"

ALAS FOR BUNS

Among words winged to-day are those of a newspaper telling us that women who wear their hair in the shape of "buns" will not be able to wear gas-masks. This is the sort of thing that helps us to keep our sense of humour—if not of proportion.—"The Star," London.

ENGLISH TRADITIONAL STRATEGY

Necessity for an Expeditionary Force

by GENERAL ARMENGAND (of the Air Force)

From the "Dépêche de Toulouse," 2.8.38

THE English are unduly attached to their traditional strategy, which demands that their navy, and that new kind of navy—the air force—should be stronger than those of any other power, the army being of very secondary importance. Accordingly, they have made huge efforts on sea, and more especially in the air, where they have let themselves be surpassed by Germany. To them it would seem imprudent to make an increased effort over the land army since that would lessen results on behalf of the other two forces. Consequently, they cling to the antique notion that they should avoid prematurely engaging the army outside the country, and they cast aside the doctrine of a massed intervention on the continent even though it might mean an immediate advantage to their allies.

The English doctrine pleases men in the Navy who think the security of certain countries like France and England is primarily determined on the sea, and members of the Air Force who give first importance to the army in the air.

I myself think that the English Navy, Air Force and Army should be equal and that operations for the defence, the conquest or the mastery of a determined zone should be entrusted more and more to a combination of the three forces whenever possible. In not realising this fact, England is out of touch with the times. For example, the development of the strength of the lighter naval forces and the air forces would rule out the Mediterranean if Italy should be in conflict with England and France; maritime communications from the west to the east could only be maintained by way of territorial waters *after the conquest of Libya, with the assistance of the three armies of the land, the sea and the air.*

As another example—a land army would play an important rôle in the defence of the English sky and coasts. If the Reich armies should take possession of the coasts of Flanders and the Pas de Calais, the situation of England would be tragic. If, on the contrary, these armies were held back on the eastern frontiers of Belgium, air invasions would be difficult and unremunerative. Moreover, the range of the English air

force in offensive action would be much greater than in the first hypothesis. The same is true of English domination of the North Sea. So it is a categorical imperative for the general strategy of the United Kingdom to stop a German invasion as near as possible to the eastern frontier of the Low Countries with the Army and the Air Force.

True to tradition, the English do not close their eyes to obvious realities. The events of Central Europe are forcing a fairly rapid evolution of ideas on the rôle of the army. Voices are lifted declaring the necessity of a larger expeditionary force than on the eve of war in 1914.

How Could Czechoslovakia Be Helped ?

These obvious realities are the rapid growth of the effectives and armaments of the German army and the fortifications facing France which, because of their length, make direct help for Czechoslovakia more and more difficult.

Six days after mobilisation the Germans would have forty divisions at their disposal, sixty divisions nine days afterwards, and in a fortnight a total of 160 divisions. After a brief delay the Italians could bring up forty divisions and a total of sixty-five divisions towards the fifteenth day.

It is equality in the forces which would be called on to face each other immediately which maintains peace. Let us reason as the great German general staff may do. It knows that decisive military successes may be obtained during the first few weeks of a war by an offensive carried out on a very large front, for example against Czechoslovakia from Upper Silesia to Hungary, or against France from Holland to the Alps. It knows that the conquest of the terrain becomes extremely slow, costly and difficult a few weeks after the opening of hostilities.

It cannot be satisfied with a plan for an initial victorious invasion of Czechoslovakia only, and a change of offensive three or four weeks later to invade and conquer France. The first offensive would no doubt be victorious but the second would fail. *It is a double offensive against the east and the west which would bring complete, rapid and decisive victory.*

For this a considerable superiority would be required of the armies of Italy and Germany over those of France and Czechoslovakia, Belgium and Holland, allowing for a waiting attitude on the part of Poland and Yugoslavia.

Imagining the hypothesis of aggression against Czechoslovakia, they would consider a French offensive to be a deplorable military plan because it would probably be doomed to failure at the feeble point where it could be developed.

Certainly their argument is very strong. Nevertheless, the allies in the last war adopted this plan and pursued it uninterruptedly. Also, it does not exclude another, that of which Mr. Winston Churchill was the tireless apostle from the beginning of 1915, and which consisted of the armies of the east intervening towards the middle of Europe through Serbia and Salonika.

Today, to put a stop to the German avalanche a similar plan of operations should be followed at once. But if Italy were hostile a passage through the Mediterranean would have to be opened up which would involve, as was said above, the rapid conquest of Libya by the Anglo-French armies in Africa.

Italian Threat to Egypt

But would it not rather be Egypt which would be conquered by the Italian army? The English army in Egypt and the Near East consists of only about 20,000 men. A few months ago, Italy had 40,000 men in Libya, on the frontiers of Egypt, and more than 150,000 men in Ethiopia and Eritrea.

No doubt the growing British power on sea and in the air are important supports. But the English navy, when it was the most powerful in Europe, did not prevent war from shaking the continent from one end to the other for eleven years at the beginning of the last century. And to-day it is a question of preventing war in Europe.

The possible German offensive through the Low Countries would be discouraged by fortifications as solid as our Maginot Line, erected in front of Brussels and Antwerp as far as the plateau of Waterloo, and by enough active forces to occupy them with sufficient strength. England can do a lot in this direction by her influence over Belgium and Holland, and herself, by her capital and her army.

The possible offensive of Germany against Czechoslovakia with the virtual or effective support of Italy would be made less likely by strong action in the military sphere by England complementing that of France. This would result from the existence of a British Expeditionary Force stronger than that of 1914 and ready to cross the Channel, together with important armies in the Near East and in Egypt.

SOUTH TIROL SACRIFICED

by GUNNAR ALMSTEDT

From the "Weltwoche," Zürich

In 1919 the German-speaking province of South Tirol, together with the Italian Trentino, was taken from Austria and annexed to the Italian Kingdom under the terms of the secret Treaty of London, of April 1915, which contained the offers which brought Italy into the last war on the Franco-British side against her own ally. No plebiscite was held in South Tirol and the protests of the population were ignored. The results of a plebiscite would have been a foregone conclusion. The last Austrian census of 1910 showed a total population of 245,000, of which 223,000 were German-speaking Tirolese; 16,000 were Ladins (akin to the Romansch-speaking people of the Engadine) and only 6,000 Italians. It is a curious phenomenon that whereas Herr Hitler has apparently had to abandon the South Tirolese in order to secure Signor Mussolini's support, the Socialists and Communists of the world are now pressing the claims of these persecuted Germans

SOUTH TIROL, the home of an ancient culture, is proved to have had a purely German population for nearly fourteen hundred years. By the treaty of St. Germain it was, for strategical reasons, given to Italy, much against the wishes of Lloyd George and Wilson. The Peace Treaty does not include any clause concerning the rights of the South Tirolese minority; guarantees were considered unnecessary because the Italian delegates had declared that "united and free Italy" would naturally respect the cultural institutions of other peoples.

But soon after the Treaties were signed a very marked policy of denationalisation was inaugurated, which has not been appreciably modified since Hitler has been in power.

At the time of the Austrian Anschluss the South Tirolese hoped that the hour of release had come for them too. The news of Hitler's entry into Vienna spread like wildfire, and soon people began to think that it was only a matter of hours or days before North and South Tirol would be united once more. When nothing happened, the rumour spread

that when Hitler visited Rome, Mussolini would make him a present of South Tirol. The situation in North Tirol was similar. There was even a rumour, after Hitler's entry, that the union of South Tirol with the Reich had already taken place. One of the newly-appointed National Socialist officials at the Government offices in Innsbruck, when questioned on the subject, replied: "Yes, we have had two telegrams from Vienna, saying that Mussolini has given us back South Tirol." A few hours later the rumour was officially denied by the Linz wireless station. In Innsbruck the denial was made in a less official way; Storm Troopers went through the various restaurants, declaring that the rumour was the result of "communist provocation." An incident at one restaurant was typical of the mood of the day. When the Storm Troopers had read their proclamation, there was a disappointed silence until two Italians who happened to be present began to applaud, whereupon one of the Storm Troopers who had just read the proclamation went to them and said: "But we shall get it all the same."

For the time being, however, such developments were out of the question. On the contrary, the Germans closed the two Institutions which had until then maintained connections between North and South Tirol—the Andreas Hofer League and the *Arbeitsstelle für Suedtirol*.

Desperation

In spite of this, the South Tirolese did not give up hope. Just because they looked on Hitler as the only man who could save them, they could not and would not believe that the "Leader of all Germans" would abandon to its fate that German land on the southern slopes of the Alps whose ancient teutonic culture was in such desperate straits.

After many protests from workmen about discrimination in the distribution of work in favour of newly-arrived Italians, the Mayor of Schlanders—like all Mayors and Town Clerks in South Tirol, an Italian—sent a punitive expedition into the refractory district. This did not prevent all German cars that passed through South Tirolese villages being greeted with "Heil Hitler!" while children were frequently photographed standing in front of these cars and holding Swastika flags.

In the village of Laas the punitive expedition fired at the unarmed population and a 27 year old workman called Ludwig Stricker was fatally wounded. The body was brought on the 25th April from the Meran Hospital to his native village for burial. The Italians tried to

prevent the villagers from attending the funeral by bringing the coffin to the village at 2.30 a.m. and demanding that the service should take place at once. The priest refused to hold the service before seven, when the funeral took place and was attended, although the grave was surrounded by sixty armed Militiamen, by more than 1,000 people of the neighbourhood. A man who gave the Hitler greeting at the graveside was arrested. Simultaneously there was a wave of arrests in the Vintschgau district, which included amongst others that of the former deputy in the Italian Parliament, Karl Tinzl, who was imprisoned at Schlanders.

No news of these events, which took place a week before Hitler's visit to Rome, was allowed to appear in the German Press.

Far less attention is paid in Germany to the South Tirolese than to the Sudeten Germans. No protest is raised over the facts that Italian is the compulsory language in schools and law-courts, and that even theatrical performances in German are forbidden. Anyone who teaches German children their mother-tongue, even privately, risks his money and his freedom. Italian workmen are introduced into the land by artificial methods, and favoured at the expense of the original population. More dangerous still for the people, who are almost all owners of small-holdings, is the organisation known as the "*Ente de Rinascita per le tre Venezie*," which has the right to expropriate every land holding.

It is in the circumstances not surprising that the Germans in South Tirol are losing their faith in Hitler as a Deliverer. A typical manifestation of the despair of the South Tirolese in the "South Tirolese Horst Wessel Song," written after Hitler's visit to Rome and circulated widely in South Tirol:

"In deepest sleep, the windows thickly curtained,
You pass through the German land of South Tirol,
You, the only hope of your German fellow countrymen,
The last dream of deliverance—Good-bye!

Our arms, already raised in greeting, sank,
But not our courage, which always fills our souls,
As we heard that, up there at the Brenner,
That frontier, drawn at St. Germain, must remain.

We will not now or ever admit defeat,
We feel more German now than ever before.
A day will come, after these Roman-German days,
When the red eagle will once more arise!"

HUNGARY NEXT

Sailing in Germany's Wake

by PAUL KERI (Budapest)

From "Die Neue Weltbühne," Paris, 1.9.38


The British were foolishly optimistic over the conclusion of a provisional agreement at Bled in Yugoslavia last month between Hungary and the States of the Little Entente, according to this observer. Cession of the Sudetenland to Germany in accordance with the Franco-British plan certainly means a similar claim against Czechoslovakia from Hungary, with Rumania next on the list.

IN Germany the Bled agreement (between Hungary and the countries of the Little Entente) was very coolly received; in England, on the other hand, a downright silly interpretation was put on Horthy's trip to Kiel. The English press greeted the Bled agreement with a display of excessive optimism, which astonished people in Budapest more than anywhere. Really nothing had been done to cause this outburst of joy, which originated in the obstinate English notion that no one can be so deeply entrenched on one side of a barricade that he cannot maintain relations with the other.

At the Bled conference they agreed on issuing an "identical" communiqué, which nevertheless turned out to be not quite identical. The States of the Little Entente referred to themselves as "the States of the Little Entente," while in the Hungarian communiqué they were spoken of as "Rumania, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia."

For the last year and a half Hungary has ignored the existence of a Little Entente. Up to then the heavily armed Little Entente was in the mouths of politicians and the columns of all the newspapers as the hated obstacle to peaceful treaty revision. Gradually this has changed. For a year now, in fact since the world press started talking of an encouraging *rapprochement* between Hungary and the Little Entente, this term "Little Entente" has ceased to exist in Hungary. It may no longer be mentioned in Magyar and in diplomatic discussions; scrupulous care is taken to see that negotiations are conducted bilaterally, with Rumania, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia individually.

Hungary never wanted even to make identical agreements with each of these states; she insisted on making different agreements concerning minorities with Rumania and Jugoslavia from that with Czechoslovakia.



HUNGARY'S LOST CITIZENS

"Hungarian Quarterly"

This discrimination against Czechoslovakia has been obstructed, and to that extent Bled meant a success for the Czechs. But Hungary has still not abandoned her intention of concluding a different agreement about minorities with Czechoslovakia. She has merely postponed action until the European situation changes, or as the semi-official *Pester Lloyd* says: "until, with time, it becomes possible to make Czechoslovakia take a better view of the question of Hungarian minorities."

The dream of frontier revision—let there be no mistake about it—has penetrated deeply among all ranks and classes. That is an example of how one-sided propaganda can lead a country to suicidal thoughts and actions; for the Left, the Liberals, the Jews, and even the men around Count Bethlen, are committing moral and political suicide when they subordinate everything to revision and base Hungary's relations to other countries solely on the chances of procuring it. That is what has come to pass, and Hungarian society is now much more intransigent on the subject than is official policy itself. Of late Hungarian politicians have made their demands more precise. The claims for frontier revision against Jugoslavia have been allowed to drop since the death of King Alexander. And Count Bethlen, himself a Siebenbürger, (now in Rumanian territory) a year and a half ago, when he had more authority

to speak, renounced revisionist demands against Rumania. Since then, claims for revision have been concentrated against Czechoslovakia.

Even before that, propaganda had been loudest against Czechoslovakia, despite the fact that the Hungarian cultural and national minority there was much better off than in the two other countries. Nevertheless, so long as it was a matter of the recovery of *all* the lost parts of Hungary, such nuances were of no importance. But to-day it is the negation of common sense to renounce claims against Rumania and Jugoslavia, where the Magyars are treated so much more badly, and only to demand the return of the Slovaks and Magyars from Czechoslovakia.

Geza Szűllő, the leader of the irredentist Magyars in Czechoslovakia, recently gave an explanation of this paradox. "Rumania and Jugoslavia," he said, "are more or less dictatorial monarchies, but Czechoslovakia is a democratic republic." Geza Szűllő understands what is really behind revision: sullen hatred of democracy and the anxiety of the Hungarian feudal lords to assure their own reactionary rule—at *all costs*. It is amazing what good intentions the world's press has been attributing to the Hungarian rulers who visited Germany. It was stated that they wanted to rescue their country from the German *Drang nach dem Osten*. Bled and the trip to Germany were said to be a despairing last attempt to shield Hungary from German greed. These sentimentalists were satisfied by the remark in Hitler's speech: "Now that we, as neighbours, have found our final boundaries." Of course the English can once more point out that Hitler has given a guarantee somewhere or other. City gentlemen can now do business with Hungary without qualms, so that she will acquire the foreign exchange which she needs because she has to pay for her political deal with Germany—and which she needs a lot of, to enable her to do without her trade with Czechoslovakia.

Nazis and Holy Revision

Horthy and Imrédy represent two groups. The people surrounding the Regent have always protected the Fascists from the presumptions of the "constitutional" aristocracy—i.e. from Bethlen and his lot. Now things have gone so far that it would be regarded as treason towards the holy cause of revision and Hungary's military interests if Horthy were to take energetic action against the Hungarian Nazis. He may not be longing for a hundred per cent co-ordination with Germany; certainly he will do nothing to prevent it. Szalasi, the Hungarian Nazi leader, it is


true, wanted more; he wanted to put himself in Horthy's place and was too stupid even to conceal the fact. He attacked the highest quarters and reproached the Regent's wife with having a grandmother, who, although rich and distinguished, had been born a Jewess. Now the Regent wanted to make his position safe in case another Bürckel, (the German Nazi Governor of Austria) should be placed over him in Hungary. At present, since he is still being courted, he may succeed. The honour which Madame Horthy was shown in Kiel by being made sponsor to the *Prinz Eugen* (the new German battleship), shows that Horthy's personal position has been assured.

Premier Imrédy's Rôle

Imrédy is no Nazi. He could have betrayed the bourgeois clerical tradition of his family and made a career for himself as a renegade; but he chose a cleverer method. He likes to be known as the Hungarian Schacht. As an expert on national planning he is to put through the Five Year Plan, the great preparation for war within the framework of German military preparedness.

Because Imrédy is no Nazi he has maintained a cool neutrality

WOOLING
THE
WOLF



"Moscow News"

towards Nazi efforts. The government itself has not much to say in such matters. Szalasi, who was originally only condemned to a few weeks imprisonment, got three years' penal servitude from a higher tribunal nearer to Horthy. Szalasi is only a comic figure; he is an Armenian, and from an Armenian to a Jew is but a step. Above all he has attacked the Regent personally, and had him portrayed with a lock of hair coming down his forehead. The Seyss-Inquarts, Henleins, Szalasis are only passing figures; it is only at the moment of action that the decision is made, who is to be Nazi Governor.

Jewish Policy The Clue

More important than the Szalasi affair is the fact that the government has just announced the issue of new industrial employment laws. Ten thousand Jewish employees driven out of their businesses are to be prevented from earning their living in crafts or retail trade. The Hungarian Jews are condemned, finished.

How a government handled the Jewish question used not always to be the decisive factor by which to judge its entire policy. But to-day? If Mussolini is now taking up anti-Semitism it is not because there is a racial problem in his Empire, nor because he can thus do Hitler a favour which costs nothing. He is doing it because he knows what a powerful lever anti-Semitism can be in politics, both internal and external. Wherever anti-Semitism ousts all other questions, National Socialism, which preaches it wholeheartedly, must sooner or later hold the field. And that is the case in Hungary.

Imrédy does not conceal the fact that he is not an anti-Semite by nature. He was not always called Imrédy; the "y" was added. He comes from an old family of Odenburg Germans. The racial question is not his cup of tea; it does not concern him; he just wants to be a Schacht, nothing else. Beuve-Méry, the clever correspondent of the *Temps* has called the Imrédy regime the Hungarian Schuschnigg era. But he is wrong there. In the first place, Schuschnigg worked so successfully for Austria's economic independence that the Nazis found a lot of treasure to remove from Vienna; in the second place, Austria was a German state, Schuschnigg a German politician—he could only have saved himself if he had jumped over to the other side of the barricade. Imrédy, on the other hand, has enthusiastically undertaken the task of attaching Hungary economically to Germany. It should be the normal task of Hungarian statesmen to

preserve the independence of the Magyar nation. But that is not what they are doing; they would rather take a chance on frontier revision.

It is correct that Hungary won a certain breathing spell at Bled. But not in order to make a stand against Germany's lust for conquest. She only wants to wait and see if Hitler will really succeed in doing what he intends. If any of Hungary's freedom is saved it will not be because of the resistance of Hungarian rulers. They have already surrendered. If Hungary is saved she will have only the heroic resistance of Czechoslovakia to thank. The politicians of Hungary will in that event be surprised at Hitler's loss of power and prestige, and, with the support of the Western powers, they might even succeed in escaping complete subjection. But by any determination on their own part? Never.

LEFT
OVER
FROM
THE
LAST
WAR

"Take care, it
hasn't exploded
yet!"

*"Il Travaso delle
Idee," Rome*



BRITAIN THE NEW CARTHAGE

Is Mediterranean Peace Possible?

From the Rome Correspondent of the "Weltwoche," Zürich

PEACE goes on obstinately refusing to come to the Mediterranean. Or, rather, the co-existence of two Mediterranean hegemonies side by side is not proving so easy to establish as was thought, in spite of all Gentlemen's Agreements. Some months ago efforts were obviously being made on the Italian side, as on the English, to bring the Anglo-Italian Agreement into force, in spite of the Spanish affair's still not being "settled." And, for a time, it looked as if this masterpiece, this squaring of the circle, was in fact about to be achieved. But then suddenly everything went to bits again. Attempts at sabotage were made from French and Russian quarters. In France and England the Left worked strongly against it. The proposal made by General Franco, and supported by Italy, to create a safety zone in Almeria harbour for British ships, was torpedoed forthwith. That caused unbounded annoyance in Italy. The Duce made his celebrated speech in front of a threshing machine against the "Demoplutocracies." Italy's attitude again stiffened visibly.

And now the same has happened in the other Mediterranean Power, England. In his last speech before Parliament rose, Chamberlain, to everyone's astonishment, declared that the withdrawal of the Italian volunteers would not suffice to bring the Anglo-Italian Agreement into force. The position in Spain after the withdrawal of the volunteers, he said, must be clarified before the Agreement could become effective. This fresh stiffening of the British attitude towards Italy is rightly interpreted by foreign observers in London as meaning that "the British Government is, after all, more anxious to maintain the Mediterranean as a free channel than it has been thought to be."

It may well be said of this stiffening of both sides that it once more throws a vivid light on the great difficulties which stand in the way of a realisation of the Anglo-Italian Agreement, and rouses fresh doubts whether real understanding and peaceful co-operation between the two Powers is in fact possible.

This reappearance of Anglo-Italian differences, and the bitter struggle which is again going on in Spain brings up the question once more, whether the Spanish expedition really does signify merely an

"adventure" for Fascist Italy, as is maintained in many quarters, or whether it is part of a great foreign-political conception, an important part of the future of the new Roman Empire as envisaged by Mussolini, and therefore hardly to be abandoned by him overnight.

This question, as well as the other, why Anglo-Italian understanding still meets with such difficulties, can perhaps be cleared up to a certain extent by a glance at events in the more ancient history of Rome, which, in spite of their having happened two thousand years ago, look astonishingly real and modern to-day.

Even at the time of the old Roman Empire, statesmen invariably advocated the view that Rome herself, her mastery of the Mediterranean and, indeed, her entire position in the world, could only be secured were she to possess control over the harbours of the Iberian Peninsula, in addition to the littorals of the present Balkan countries, Asia Minor and North Africa. Scipio Africanus was the greatest exponent of this Roman policy. After him it became traditional; and the historians of to-day, when observing present Mediterranean problems, refer to him again and again.

What was the set-up in those days, when Rome for the first time began consciously to press forward into the position of a world power? The great problem of the day was the rivalry between Rome and Carthage. The two did not, however, only wrangle, but made honest efforts to come to an agreement and live peacefully side by side. From 264 B.C. to 146 B.C., everything possible was attempted in order to create good neighbourly relations; but the attempts failed every time, and finally resolved themselves into the 120-year-long conflict of the three Punic Wars. Between the first and the second wars, however, there was an interlude of 23 years' peace, and between the second and third one of 52 years. During these interludes "Gentlemen's Agreements," carefully worked out by the diplomatists of the day, were concluded again and again. Yet the force of facts was too strong for all these agreements. And when Rome finally could no longer tolerate the rival claim to mastery, and took the path prescribed by Nature—that of a political naval policy—the conflict came to a head, and the great political problem of the day was only finally solved by the destruction of Carthage—and in the same year, of Corinth.

The co-existence of the Roman and Carthaginian hegemonies in the Mediterranean had, in fact, proved itself impossible, and Roman world

supremacy only became reality after the competition of Carthage was finally removed.


In all these developments the great Scipio Africanus (with whose political ideas Mussolini has much in common) played an important, pioneering rôle. In order to consolidate Rome's power, Scipio had first to gain a firm foothold in Spain (211-206 B.C.) and, subsequently in North Africa, for only on so extensive a foundation, he said, could the Roman Imperium exist. Carthage called in the help of Macedonia and Syria; but the aid of these countries was unavailing. Rome triumphed, under Scipio's masterly leadership, over Carthage; a few years later, in 190 B.C., he fought in Syria and so completed his imperial work.

As can be seen, there is really a certain resemblance between Rome's Mediterranean policy at the time of Scipio and that of Mussolini's Italy to-day. Rome and Carthage two thousand years ago endeavoured to come to a peaceful agreement over the mastery of the Mediterranean, and Italy and England are trying to solve the same problem to-day. And, just as Rome and Carthage were unable to achieve this goal, Italy and England are failing to-day. Just as Scipio believed he must gain a firm foothold in Spain and Africa in order to found and secure the Imperium, the Duce to-day has his eyes fixed on these two coastal strips. Just as



"Le Canard Enchaîné"

"First comes a bombardment, then come diplomatic notes, and one fine day one wakes up with a treaty of friendship round one's neck!"



AT GENEVA

Paris

"What is needed, you see, is to unite the nations in a kind of League. . . ."

Carthage was once the stronger sea power compared with Rome, so is England to-day compared with Italy. And just as Carthage called on the help of Macedonia, Syria and other Mediterranean lands in her defence against Rome's growing power, so England at the time of the Abyssinian war and sanctions won over the coastal countries of the Mediterranean to an anti-Italian alliance.

Naturally, no too far-reaching conclusions should be drawn from this analogy. But it is certainly interesting and apposite. It shows how extraordinarily difficult efforts to divide the Mediterranean zones of mastery into two 50-50 parts have proved in the course of history to be.

Deeper Than Spain

It is being assumed at present that it is only the still unsettled Spanish question which is preventing the Anglo-Italian Agreement from coming into force. But anyone who knows Roman history will suspect that the real grounds for the inability of England and Italy to come together lie much deeper. By concluding the new Gentleman's Agreement, England theoretically acknowledged Italian parity in the Mediterranean. Now, however, when it is a matter of carrying it out in practice, England does not seem altogether agreeable to giving up her 230-year-old hegemony in favour of a division of power with Italy. And the great question, round which the whole of Anglo-Italian relations have been revolving for years now, i.e. whether a peaceful division of spheres of influence in the Mediterranean is historically possible at all, can still by no means be regarded as having been answered in the affirmative.

THE BETTER WAY

The Commander-in-Chief of the French Air Force, General Vuillemin, was, we know, greeted by his colleague Goering with particular friendliness on his visit to Germany. Goering, clad all in white, welcomed him at Karinhall, and in the course of conversation enquired about the French General's children. "She has two teeth already," he said proudly of his own daughter.

A deep impression was made in Germany by General Vuillemin's gesture in presenting the German ocean flyers, Heinke and Moreau with French air badges. In order not to be outdone in courtesy, General Milch pinned German air badges on the breasts of the French pilots.

An officer watching this exchange of courtesies remarked: "Anyway, it's a good deal better to exchange decorations than to have to win them by fighting each other."—*"Weltwoche," Zürich.*

THE GRIP TIGHTENS

by MARIO PETTINATI

From the "Gazetta del Popolo," Turin, 3.9.38

IF you speak of racialism to the English, ninety out of a hundred frown disapprovingly and inveigh against persecution.

And yet, a few nights ago, the mere fact that three coloured artistes newly arrived from America went to a small hotel in the capital (by no means one of the most aristocratic) was enough to make all the English residents rise *en masse* and protest: "Either the negresses clear out, or we do." So that the manager, with great tact, but equal energy, was obliged to show his chocolate-coloured guests the door and put them up—after vainly offering them to a dozen other hotels—in a common guest-house where neither the passports nor the colour of the clients' faces is too closely scrutinised.

This little episode shows that the same John Bull who protests against the racial campaign of others and decries us because we try to isolate our race and keep it pure, is the first to apply in practice what he denies in theory.

Here too, therefore, whether the English admit it or not, racialism exists, in fact, a racialism so deep and well-defined that even to-day—when distances have been well nigh annihilated—a few miles of ocean are enough to form an abyss between the "*civis britannicus*" and the rest of the world.

"Barbarians begin at Calais"—wrote an Englishman a century ago, and the statement is as true to-day as it was then. One may have lived half a century in England, one may have shared business interests, friendships, amusements with the English, one may have become a member of their Clubs, a partner in their enterprises, the companion of their most intimate life, but in their eyes the foreigner never ceases to be the "alien," the "~~alien~~ alien": the division is clear, the gulf is immense, and no bridge of interests, friendships, or mutual esteem can span it.

Anyone arriving at Dover for the first time is immediately conscious of it; arriving for the hundredth time one realises it even more.

But in the past Jews have made important breaches in this racialism which is engraved in the heart of every Englishman. Guided by their

flair for business and their unscrupulous adaptability, they found in England the most favourable terrain: the materialistic opportunism, the greed for gold and power, the imperialistic ambition and the craving for conquest which have guided England from the dawn of the nineteenth century up to the present, have constituted the easiest and the most convenient platform for Jewish expansion and predomination.

Timid at first, submissive, whining and relegated to the poorest quarters of London and the more important cities, the Jews have gradually become bolder, more self-assured, more exacting. From the East of London, where they had been banished by the English of the early Victorian era, they slowly moved towards the centre, towards Belgravia, Mayfair, Hampstead, Kensington, towards the districts inhabited by the aristocracy and the well-to-do, passing *via* of course, the City, and penetrating even into Whitehall and Buckingham Palace.

Invasion of the West End

Little by little the East End, the cradle of the Jews in London, has become empty: the ghetto has broken its barriers: to-day, only foreigners go to Whitechapel seeking a legendary Jew who changed his abode some time ago and has left only a vague, picture postcard souvenir of himself. To-day, British Israel no longer lives beyond the Tower of London, where the metropolis begins to mingle with the sombre reaches of the Port, amidst the darkness of the City: he has changed his name and his quarters; he is no longer called Clozenberg, Rausen, Nussbaum, Neuman and Friedman, but Clevering, Rowson, Nuttboan, Newman and Frees: he does not live in a hovel now, but owns a fine house in the smart suburbs of Hampstead and Golders Green or a fine flat in the West End: he does not wear rags and go on foot, but he wears "tails" and a top hat, and goes about in a Daimler and a Rolls Royce. He no longer knocks at the door seeking employment, nor does he spend long hours behind a shop-counter. Now that he is rich, an employer, he in his turn distributes wealth and employment, controlling the markets, fixing prices and salaries, bargaining at will with the products of human labour, favouring whom he will and destroying anyone who dares oppose or threaten him.

The coming of the Jews to England is not of recent date. A century has elapsed since Lord Macaulay's famous speech in favour of the concession of civil and political liberty to the Jews, in favour of their admittance to Parliament, to the Law Courts and the administrative life

of the nation. Disraeli, Sassoon, Solly Joel (Egypt, India and South Africa) are by now historical figures. But the complete domination of Israel over John Bull, the passing into Jewish hands of the economic and political power of the greatest empire in the world, which makes Arnold Leese—the precursor and the apostle of British anti-semitism—say that England by now has become a “Jewish country” is of comparatively recent date, and for that reason less known.

How many Jews are there in England? In 1914—according to the most trustworthy information—they did not number 300,000: to-day—again according to the most reliable sources of information—they have reached 1,500,000. An exact census does not exist and never will exist, because the Jew, just as he feels no scruples about changing his name, is quite prepared to conceal his own religion. In English prisons, for instance, the prisoners who admit that they are Jewish are extremely rare, so that in the official statistics one finds the strange phenomenon of an enormous number of convicted persons “without religion” compared with a negligible number of Jews and a large number of Protestants and Catholics.

In London alone, according to what one hears, there are 500,000 Jews amongst 7,000,000 inhabitants, that is to say about 8 per cent. In Manchester the proportion is 6 per cent, in Leeds 5 per cent.

To be even more precise there are certain districts in London where Jews—who were unknown there thirty years ago—to-day constitute the majority and German is the language spoken. In one street in the well-to-do district of Hampstead, out of ninety-two houses, two only are not inhabited by Jews: in Maida Vale there is a building with 64 flats, 47 of which are let to Jews.

SAXON-ISAACSONS

by S.B.A.

From the “Palestine Post,” Jerusalem

WHEN we remember the profound influence that Palestine through the Scriptures has had on the religion and the speech and therefore the thought of the British people, it is not surprising to find ourselves carried back beyond historical records to the realm of mythology. In this way the connection between Palestine and Britain dates back further than most people would think.

According to the fervently held belief of some, part of the seafaring tribe of Dan left Palestine for Greece—where they embodied their name in the Dardanelles—whence they made an expedition to Ireland and settled there, even before the days of Jeroboam II. They then crossed to Scotland and were later—fifteen hundred years later—joined by a second part of the same tribe who had wandered in a northwesterly direction overland across Europe and settled in what they made known as Denmark, whence they invaded Britain. The tribe of Simeon became the Scythians, then became modified in name to Kimmerii, then Cymri, by which name the Welsh call themselves even to-day. They called the country which they finally occupied Britain; they themselves were British, that is Brit-ish, which is Hebrew for “People of the Covenant.” Now the Saxons are plainly Isaacsons—that is obvious, and the Normans are but a branch of the same group of Northmen. The present inhabitants of the British Isles are therefore simply a re-union of the tribes of Israel, and their to-day’s occupation of Palestine—their country of origin—is seen to be natural and pre-ordained.

Thus are first and last things united.

Not only, according to this belief, is the connection between Britain and Palestine a racial one. There is the strongest of personal links. For when Jeremiah went into exile after the destruction of the First Temple he did not go to Babylon, as is commonly supposed, but to his kinsmen in Ireland, taking with him a princess of the House of David. This lady married the ruler of Ireland, who was himself descended from Zarah, the son of Judah, and from them sprang the direct line whose representative in our own day is His Majesty King George VI. So much for mythology, as the British-Israelites read it.

AN ARAB VOICE

Myth of Jewish Power

From “As-Siraat al-Mustakim” (Arab Nationalist), Jerusalem

THERE has been a great deal in the press of late to the effect that British policy vis-à-vis Palestine is being dictated by World Jewry. What is the truth? How is it possible to believe that a great Imperial power with the resources of Great Britain, and which rules over large tracts of the earth’s surface, would humble itself before a handful of

Jews; and would be the willing servant of a few million sons of Zion? We do not believe that Great Britain would allow her might and strength to be used in the interests of these people. He would have to be clever indeed who would persuade Britain to take any line of action except in her own interests.

Where is this much vaunted power of world Jewry? It was amply proved to the world by Hitler that it was built on foundations of deceit and questionable methods. Thus, we have a man like Dr. Weizmann uttering words to this effect to Great Britain:

"We shall remain in Palestine whether it is pleasing to you or not. You are able to accelerate or impede our progress at will. But you would be well advised to render us every assistance; otherwise our powers for construction could well be turned into powers of destruction, which would have disastrous results for the world. . . !"

The Jews, a self-confessed helpless and weak people, threaten the world with destruction! No one should have any fear of these people, particularly now that their weakness has been laid bare by a Hitler!

Britain's Imperialist Aims

It is a fact which admits of no argument or contradiction that it is manifestly in the interests of Great Britain to dominate Jewish policy. It is because of this that she favours a kind of Anglo-Zionist policy in Palestine. She is bent on breaking the power—however illusionary this might be—of the Jews as she has of other people who have stood in the way of her imperial ambitions.

Do not the Jews realise that the promise of the establishment of a National Home is rendering their existence in Europe untenable, quite apart from threatening them in Palestine itself? They can never recover their former position in Europe. They know well enough that they are in the hands of Great Britain and that this power is in a position to dictate to them as she has dictated to others.

Let the Jews do some heart-searching, and then they will be compelled to admit to themselves their great blunder. But they lack the courage to give voice to their thoughts, for by doing so they would lose the only sympathy left to them: that is, the sympathy of Great Britain.

Looking at the matter from another point, it would be well for all Arabs and Moslems to pay little heed to this mythical power of World Jewry. If the Arabs can convince Great Britain—and they are doing so—

that her interests lie in the seeking of Arab friendship, even though the scales are weighed heavily against the Jews, then her policy will take a new turn in the direction of service towards the Arab and Islamic worlds.

N. RHODESIA PROTESTS

Criticism of Settlement Plan

From the "Bulawayo Chronicle," 1.8.38

In our issue of July last we published a proposal by Count Coudenhove-Kalergi that the Jews might be granted a settlement area in Northern Rhodesia. Here are some criticisms from that Colony and its Southern partner

ATTENTION was called in these columns a day or two ago to a proposal made by Count R. N. Coudenhove-Kalergi that Northern Rhodesia should be made available for Jewish settlement. That the idea has gone further than a proposal was disclosed by Sir Leopold Moore in a statement which he made when speaking at the opening of the Bindura Show. Sir Leopold said that the Imperial Government had designed a plan to settle in Northern Rhodesia five hundred families of Jewish refugees from Austria and Germany. "It won't strike you now as being very important," he said, "but if you think about it you will realise that 500 families in Northern Rhodesia would turn Northern Rhodesia into an annexe of Palestine."

We do not think Sir Leopold correctly forecasts the reaction of the people of this country to the proposal. They will immediately regard it as of outstanding—almost paramount—importance. There is not at the moment any need to go into the details of the matter, though these are of a primary importance. How could it be otherwise than important to know the class and character of these refugees? To raise one point only: in the main, the Jews who have hitherto come to the Rhodesias have not ranked among the producers, but have favoured occupation ~~side~~ the producing ones. Could Northern Rhodesia reasonably be expected to absorb several hundred people to-day who are not producers? If they are producers what arrangements are to be made for the disposal of what they produce? Who is to finance the experiment? Can the Imperial Government legitimately finance such a scheme when it has before it

the report of a Commission which tells it bluntly that it has failed to make provision for the legitimate development of the people of the territory over whom it claims a trusteeship?

These and a score of other vitally important questions immediately arise, but it is futile now to discuss them. The outstanding point to stress at this moment is that the Imperial Government's proposal is ill-timed and inopportune to the point of being unjust to the people of both Northern and Southern Rhodesia. The future of these two countries is now being investigated by a Royal Commission appointed by the British Government, and it is surely unheard of that before that Commission's report is ready—before, indeed, the whole of the evidence has been collected—a decision should be taken by the Imperial Government which, if it is carried out, will fundamentally change the whole position.

WHY BRITISH TERRITORY?

From the "Rhodesia Herald," 29.7.38

THE admittance of Jewish refugees to a country in numbers not large enough adequately to cope with the general problem, yet large enough to upset the recognised balance of the established population, would inevitably provoke anti-Semitism. The question which the *World Review* article raises is whether there is not a land, still new and sparsely populated, where a readjustment could take place to provide a Jewish land. If it could be found it would be a solution. But whether Northern Rhodesia is such a land is another matter. Although the economic benefits to surrounding territories of large-scale development, on which capital would not be stinted, have to be remembered, various difficulties present themselves. One is whether this is the time to consider Northern Rhodesia when a Royal Commission is investigating amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia. Another is the question: Why should Great Britain, which did not make this Jewish problem, be expected to provide for its solution? This is an international matter, and if a sparsely-populated African territory is needed, Tanganyika, a mandated territory, would seem a better choice.

For Southern Rhodesia there is one outstanding lesson in the whole matter. A country which has only a handful of people for its population is the inevitable goal when pressure, economic or political, moves on a mass of the world's population.

FAIRIES IN EIRE

Strange Sightings at Crossroads

A letter to "The Times," 6.9.38

Although we do not usually quote from English newspapers, we feel this is an occasion on which an exception is well justified, if only for the sake of our foreign readers

Sir,—I wonder if others of your readers who are depressed at times from reading so much about developments in Central Europe, the Far East, Spain, and other distracted parts of the world would be as interested as I was to hear that it is not wars, or rumours of wars, that are the topic of conversation in certain parts of Western Ireland. It was with a feeling of positive relief, after reading *The Times* from cover to cover, that I turned the other morning to the *Dublin Irish Press* and learned that "Watching for fairies has leaped into sudden popularity in West Limerick." Crowds, it was stated, were assembling in the evenings at cross-roads hoping to catch a glimpse of the "good little people"; boys and men had chased the fairies—"and they jumping the ditches as fast as a greyhound"—while a youth named Keely said he had actually held a leprechaun by the hand.

Old people there were, it is true, who shook their heads and said it was a "bad omen" to see so many of the "little people" at one time, and in broad daylight as well as in the evenings, and "many people—especially girls—are afraid to go out after dark," according to the story.

Here in part is what the *Irish Press* has to say about these strange occurrences:—"John Keely, a schoolboy, seeing a fairy alone, on Tuesday, ran and told the Mulqueens about it. They sent him back to interrogate the little visitor, who admitted to Keely that he 'was from the mountains, and it's all equal to you what my business is.' "

Next day two fairies appeared at the cross-roads between Ballygarry and Kilfinney, six miles from Rathkeale, in daylight, with skipping-ropes, and "they could leap the height of a man," according to ~~Robert~~ John Mulligan and other eye-witnesses. The little people allowed Keely to approach them and he actually took one of them by the hand and "set off along the road with him," he said. When the fairies spotted the others lying in wait in the nearby bushes they took fright and "away they went like the wind," with the Mulqueens, Keely, and others in hot pursuit.

Describing the unearthly visitors witnesses stated to the reporter that the leprechauns were about 2ft. in height and had "hard, hairy faces like men, and no ears." They were dressed in red, and one of them wore a white cape, and they wore knee-breeches and "vamps" instead of shoes. Several who claim to have chased the "little people" say that "though they passed through hedges, ditches, and marshes they appeared clean and neat all the time."

The locality where these strange doings are taking place is near the foot of Knockfierna, it is stated; this hill is steeped in fairy lore, and under it, according to tradition, is the palace of Donn, King of the Munster Fairies. People from Rathkeale, Croom, Adare, and other parts of Limerick are gathering at the cross-roads in the evenings, hoping to catch a glimpse of the Good People.

"We could not believe what we saw if anyone else told us," many told the reporter. "A suggestion that the 'fairies' may in fact be human 'midgets' brought from England by an Englishwoman is contradicted by her," it is stated.

I am, etc.,

JOHN BARRY.

25, Montagu Street, W.I.

A TRAGEDY OF JAPAN

Leaving a note reading, "I would rather die than continue to live and bother my neighbours with the bad smell of the rice-bran mash in my kitchen. I hereby tender my apologies to my neighbours by ending my life," Kuniko, wife of Isamu Ube, operative of the Army arsenal in Tokyo, committed suicide by swallowing poison.

It is stated that when she was churning the rice-bran mash in her kitchen several days ago, Uematsu, a neighbour was heard shouting, "What a smell!" again and again. He was actually addressing one of his sons, who was smashing rotten eggs against the wall in the backyard, but she thought the remarks were intended for her. She had been brooding ever since and finally killed herself.—"*Japan Chronicle*," Kobe.

JUNGLE DINNER JACKETS

A ~~former~~ Malayan living in retirement at Home writes: "The legend of the lonely Englishman dressing for dinner every night in the jungle surely arises from the fact that this is, or was, the custom of the employees of the Bombay-Burma Company when out on their tours through the Burma teak forests. I met two of these men years ago, and they both assured me that they donned dinner jackets every night and that that was a rigid custom in their company, never departed from."—"*Straits Budget*," Singapore.

UNNOTICED PEACE

From "La Nacion," Buenos Aires, 5.8.38

TWO weeks after the signing in Buenos Aires of the peace treaty between Paraguay and Bolivia one still hopes to see in the European press a belated comment on an event of such political and legal importance. Unlike the slow passage of years in the Old Testament, time is now measured in weeks. Events with an international repercussion come tumbling over each other and to papers in Paris, London and Berlin two weeks can sometimes separate two eras in history.

Nevertheless, the Chaco peace treaty, which has crowned the work of the Buenos Aires conference, is one of those facts which the European press ought to make haste to place in the limelight, if only to bring a little comfort to the masses who are gradually and pathetically becoming resigned to the inevitability of war. This example of two countries, after two years of desperate fighting and heavy losses, now shaking each other warmly by the hand and entrusting the final settlement of their long-standing frontier dispute to their sister states, could never have reached Europe at a more opportune time, when one hears of nothing but armaments and when everybody is fearfully preparing for the worst.

Surely a failure now to recognise this peace treaty would suit the political game of the dictators who look upon war as the only solution of international disputes. For there is a chance that the dictators, sworn enemies of the League of Nations, might seize this opportunity to bring further discredit on the League at Geneva. They would point out that the League's prestige and wide influence was certainly not increased by the fact that the smaller "League of Nations" at Buenos Aires had met with such success while Geneva after much talk had accomplished nothing. And what more could the governments of London and Paris desire but that the European disputes, the cause of so much trouble, should be solved in the same way?

But the press in the democratic countries does not act on the instructions of ministers of propaganda. It is still a free press, with all the advantages and disadvantages of freedom. If the Chaco peace treaty passes unnoticed by them we shall not look upon this omission as a lack of interest in the New World, nor as a failure to realise its importance.

We realise that the explanation lies in the overwhelming sequence of events through which Europe is now passing. When there is one sick person in a household no one gives a thought to those who are well. When all eyes are turned on countries who are now fighting to the death, there is no time to look at those who are smoking the pipe of peace.

BIG BUSINESS'S WAR

Story of the Chaco

by GEORGE MACGREGOR

From "New Masses" (Communist), New York

THE Chaco war brought to the surface all the forces against democracy and peace in this Western hemisphere. Ancient Spain contributed her share with a heritage of undefined boundaries. Nineteenth-century nationalism brought on the War of the Pacific between Chile and Peru and Bolivia, the result of which excluded the last from her Pacific littoral. Bolivian objections to the verdict received their *coup de grâce* in Washington in 1929 when Peru and Chile divided the disputed territory between them. The development of imperialism on a large scale in Bolivia immediately after the World War emphasised the need of an outlet. In 1922 an American banking syndicate floated a \$33,000,000 loan for which 65 per cent of the national revenue was pledged. Four years later, 1926, Standard Oil acquired control of some 8,500,000 acres on the Chaco frontier. The same year saw a loan, almost \$10,000,000, negotiated with Vickers-Armstrong for war materials, coincident with the employment of the German General Kundt to modernise the army. Bolivian nationalism responded to the vicious impact of the capitalistic struggle. The politicians transferred their programme of hate from Chile to Paraguay.

In that country a similar impulse fanned the flames of nationalism. Argentine firms, dominated by English capital, had acquired cattle lands totalling more than ten million acres in the Chaco claimed by Paraguay. Moreover, Argentina's refusal to Bolivia of permission to build a pipe line from the Santa Cruz fields into Argentina closed the development of these rich pools. Bolivia's attempt, therefore, to secure a port on the Paraguay threatened the English-Argentine monopoly. Progressive

elements in all Latin America denounced these American and British oil interests, seconded by munitions makers, as we have recently learned from the Senate inquiry, for fanning the Chaco dispute into a war. Their belief was fortified, certainly, by the spectacle of two bankrupt countries continuing to purchase huge quantities of war materials.

The war saw the early success of the Paraguayan forces which swept over most of the Chaco and into Eastern Bolivia. However, the latter country extended its line to the Paraguay River. The slaughter went on while the American countries and the League of Nations struggled to resolve the conflict. The Pan-American conference on arbitration failed in 1929. Next Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Chile began diplomatic manoeuvres, but the weakness of Argentina as an interested party destroyed the effort. The League of Nations, overcoming United States opposition to European good offices, thereupon sent a commission into the Chaco late in 1933. After visiting the battlefields and holding conferences, the commission issued a remarkable report that clarified issues but left the war raging. The United States then proposed an arms embargo, but fascist Italy, Japan, and others, horrified at any prospect of peace, refused to join. Negotiations by American powers and the League with the combatants continued. Finally, in June 1935, Argentina and Chile succeeded in getting an armistice, which on January 1st, 1936, matured into a protocol. Left suspended, however, were the territorial claims of the two belligerents.

Within the five countries themselves the war brought political upheavals. In Paraguay the turn was fascist. Franco, with a coterie of military officers, seized power; supporting them were a handful of Paraguayan politicians who held office only by virtue of continued hostilities. In Bolivia the overthrow drove out Captain Roehm, "martyred" by Hitler, who had replaced Kundt. A conservative-liberal government confiscated the holdings of the Standard Oil, cancelled other foreign concessions, and looked for peace.

However, the hopes of the Bolivian liberals and the Western world were dashed by the Justo dictatorship, fascist in nature, ~~in~~ Argentina, closely identified with British imperialism. Through Saavedra Lamas, his foreign secretary, the Chaco solution suffered delay after delay. Particularly notable was the exclusion of the question, through Saavedra's influence, from the agenda of the 1938 Pan-American Conference in Buenos Aires which made notable declarations regarding inter-American

peace and friendship. Moreover, within Paraguay the small camarilla of Franco politicians upheld Saavedra by rejecting the several proposals for settlement which Bolivia, in the interests of inter-American peace, regularly accepted. Ultimately, the defeat of Justo, the deep longing of the Paraguayan and Bolivian peoples for peace, and the steady pressure of the five American states trying to evolve a formula, paved the way for the final peace signed July 21st of this year.

The basis of the agreement is that the major part of the Chaco in which Paraguayan forces had operated goes to Paraguay. However, Paraguay did surrender to Bolivia a significant strip across the north from the Pilcomayo River near Pozo Hondo to a point just north of the mouth of the Negro River on the Paraguay River, the exact points to be fixed by an arbitration commission. Specifically, Paraguay guaranteed to Bolivia right of free transit through its territory to Puerto Casado on the Paraguay River with the right of Bolivia to establish there depots and stores necessary for carrying on her foreign trade. Vitally important and a testimonial to the good-neighbour policy is the clause by which both agree not to engage in war over any present or future difficulty, but to submit differences to arbitral proceedings of the various American pacts and conventions.

A Larger Importance

The settlement of the Chaco war has its larger importance in American affairs. President Ortiz, by using his influence in the direction of peace and therefore democratic evolution, has broken with the Saavedrista tradition of fostering suspicion and intrigue. The emergence of Bolivia as an Atlantic power will reduce her dependence upon feudal-fascist Peru. Moreover, the Atlantic port will bring important civilising influences into the rich Oriente area of Bolivia, not so impenetrable as generally believed. An Indian country, like Mexico, Bolivia has a soil in which democratic and progressive ideas can flourish, already manifested in her confiscation of the Standard Oil holdings. Mexico's recent expropriation of all the foreigners' oil has found wide approval among Bolivians. Contact with the vigorous intellectual life of the La Plata, a toning-down of influences from priest-ridden Peru, and a feeling of brotherly solidarity with Mexico are among the beneficial results of Bolivia's struggle.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

The Editor welcomes letters from readers, which should be kept as short as possible

AGAINST ANTI-GERMAN POLICY

SIR,—Mr. John Strachey in your September issue criticises the “policy of retreat,” and advocates opposition to the dictators even at the expense of a war. While granting the truth of the main line of his argument, I would like to draw attention to certain points in his summary of “what might have been” had the Powers acted otherwise on certain occasions from 1932 onwards.

In the first place, he says that the Manchurian adventure could have been stopped by the application of sanctions and “other suitable measures,” and that the Abyssinian campaign could likewise have been stopped. No one doubts it, but we must face the fact that the League (which all good Communists hold should be the sole guide of national policy), expressly precludes the only “other suitable measures”; and that, in 1935, Italy had only to announce that the imposition of any given sanction would be regarded as an act of war to make it “League”ally inapplicable. Perhaps this comes under the category of “spilt milk,” but it seems unfair to criticise the British Government for what was due to the inherent weakness of the League itself. Britain had either to pursue that policy of retreat or abandon the policy of the League.

And, in the second place, it seemed likely that the British Government would have supported a revision of this restriction in 1935, and that a unanimous League would oppose the aggressor by force. But, so far as the layman can make out, France held out in order to maintain her Italian alliance against Germany. It also seems that France would not be averse, now, to such a concerted action

in the case of Czechoslovakia, since it would there be directed *against Germany*. Inferences are, of course, always dangerous, and perhaps I am being unjust to our old ally, but I am sure that my criticism of them is no more unjust than that which we so often hear against Germany.

The prime failure of post-war European policy has been just this persistent anti-German trend. Germany is always “the bad boy,” her every move is distrusted. Mr. Strachey himself refers to her “open determination to rearm” in 1933, but does not mention its connection with the construction of the French Maginot Line—though he hints at it in the phrase “genuine disarmament” which should have accompanied opposition to Germany’s move.

Germany’s present policy is the inevitable outcome of the anti-German policy of the victor powers. We called the tune, and now we must pay the piper. France’s fears are understandable, but they are largely of her own making—the encirclement which now threatens her is what she herself planned for Germany. Would Britain have intervened to save Germany? Should Britain intervene to save France? Three years ago the British public would have willingly given their all to establish the principle that aggression (by anyone) should not be tolerated. Would they now give it as willingly for the limited principle that *German* aggression be suppressed? Mr. Strachey’s implication that we should make a stand on the Czech question is likely to be met with the answer that, if the nations found it expedient to put their consciences in their pockets in 1935, they can find it expedient to do the same here, too, especially as

the Czech case is far less convincing than that of Abyssinia.

This much is clear, that even if, at the cost of a world war, Germany is once more "put in a corner," she will never stay there, and to-day's troubles will be repeated until such time as the nations recognise her equality with them in Europe. This is the one policy with regard to Germany which has not yet been tried, and difficult as such a trial must be in the present circumstances, why not make it now instead of later? Britain, France and Germany, working together would be an absolute guarantee of European peace.

A. S.

Glasgow.

PRACTICAL POLITICS

SIR,—I have been reading the *WORLD REVIEW* with interest, and particularly Mr. Strachey's article. I, like him, have small children and I dread what is in store for them, remembering my own more or less tranquil youth compared to what theirs may be.

I thing paragraphists and theorists write glibly of mistakes, of missed chances, after the event. But give them the responsibility, the grave responsibility of the Government of the day, and, alas, their theories would soon be resolved into nothing but hot air.

Conditions to-day are ephemeral, and what last week seemed the obvious course for the Government this week is entirely the reverse. When you are dealing with rulers of comparatively new States, Hitler, Mussolini and the like, you are dealing with opportunists, and no British Government in recent years has been a match for these gentry.

Until, therefore, we come down to earth and adopt the methods of totalitarian States, we shall be left in the blue, or worse, much worse, and our children who all unconcernedly play with toy

aeroplanes and engines of war, as mine do, will suffer what we, perhaps, have never suffered.

There was never so much need of practical politics as there is to-day, and by practical politics I mean giving like for like, intrigue for intrigue—Hitler, Mussolini and the rest are intriguers waiting for the cat to jump.

It's all very well talking about the League of Nations and other altruistic methods. Altruism in every walk of life is as dead as mutton, and as Europe is made up of a heterogeneous mass all striving for something, no round table talk which does not give them what they want will serve.

We have all we want and more; other nations have not, and until they get a modicum of this, the strife will go on.

G. DRUMMOND.

London, W.1.

THE GERMAN PEOPLE'S CAR

SIR,—In the article "The German People's Car" in your September number there is a mistake which I would like to point out. I do this all the more readily as your readers are really not accustomed to finding mistakes in this excellent magazine.

You write, in converting the German reckoning into English, that the car will do "approximately 27 miles to the gallon." In reality this should be "approximately 45 miles to the gallon."

You will agree that this gives a reader quite a different conception of the economy of the car. One must admit that the car is extraordinarily cheap to maintain, and will be really a People's Car, when one remembers (a) that insurance is contained in the weekly instalment payments; (b) that no tax is payable; and (c) that in all probability petrol for the People's Car will not cost even half as much as for other cars. It should not cost more than about £12 a

year for a man who here in England, for example, would reckon £1 a week for his car.

Pastor H. Diehl.

*German Evangelical Seaman's Mission,
South Shields.*

THE WALRUS—AN APPEAL

SIR,—I wonder if you could help me in the following matter:

Very often in English writings I find allusions to a certain *Walrus* and a *Carpenter*. The quotations I have read have made me wish most fervently to know more about these two, but it has been impossible for me to trace the author, the publisher or even the right title of the poem. I should be immensely grateful if you could indicate me how to get hold of a copy—or if this is not possible, please, just a word of enlightenment.

B. K.

Stockholm.

DAWN

(A memory of the Somme, September, 1916).

*"Heaviness may endure for the night,
but joy cometh in the morning"*

Came a sudden cold, grey twilight,
Came a silence of foreboding,
And the flickering starlight faded,
And the Very lights died smouldering.

With a rustle through the grasses,
Came the fresh cool air of morning
And the sleepers turned and shuddered
At this herald of day's dawning.

Came the welcome warmth of sunshine,
Came the sound of guns in action,
Came the sweet warm scent of hayfields,
Came the breath of putrefaction.

September, 1938

G.V.O.

We modestly lay claim that—

We may be behind with the news, but we are well ahead with facts and warnings. As far back as September 1936, under the heading: "Thunderclouds Over Bohemia" we published a full statement of Sudeten German grievances by Konrad Henlein. Some facts contained in this have, we believe, even now not appeared in the general press.

THE POLISH CLAIM AGAINST CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Poland's claim to Teschen will be very much "in the news" in the next few weeks. The full story of the importance of this rich mining area, how it was seized by Czechoslovakia in 1919, and the subsequent history of the dispute, were told in "WORLD REVIEW" for July 1938. Copies of this issue are still available.

Be armed with the facts before crises arise.

A subscription form will be found on page 80. And tell your friends to write for a free specimen copy to "World Review," 40-42 William IV Street, London, W.C.2

INTERNATIONAL BOOKSHELF



The Editor reminds his readers that he does not necessarily share the opinions expressed by reviewers in this section. But this is a free country and knows no censorship

NAVY'S PART IN CURRENT HISTORY

THE GREY DIPLOMATISTS. By
Lt.-Comdr. Kenneth Edwards, R.N.
Rich & Cowan. 15s.

Reviewed by GEORGE MARTELLI

Taking as his text Nelson's saying that "a fleet of British ships of war are the best negotiators in Europe," Commander Edwards tells the story of the Royal Navy's activities from 1922 down to the end of 1937. To be strictly accurate, it is the part played by the Navy in international events affecting the Mediterranean, and the story is almost exclusively confined to that sea. Whether this is so by design or accident is not made clear, but it is equally significant in either case. At Dartmouth and Greenwich, where I once sat in the same class-room with Kenneth Edwards, we were taught by that fine historian, Professor Geoffrey Callendar, that Britain's influence in the councils of Europe had consistently waxed and waned with the rise and fall of its sea power in the Mediterranean. I believe this is truer to-day than ever, and it is highly satisfactory, considering the uselessness of so much that we learn at school, to find the Commander confirming out of his own experience and observation what was preached to the sub-lieutenant.

Commander Edwards has the double

advantage of writing both as a naval officer and a journalist. As a naval officer he knows what it means when a ship has to be hurriedly commissioned for an emergency, a fleet concentrated for a demonstration, or a naval base improvised against threat of attack. He knows what is possible and what is not. He can appraise the value of different arms and has seen the forces at work which give policy—and war, he reminds us, is but a "continuation of policy by other means"—the power to be effective or not. As a journalist, on the other hand, he has followed the diplomatic action of which the "Grey Diplomats" are the ultimate instrument. He is in the rare position of knowing both why and how the machine works, on which the existence of all of us depends.

His story starts at Smyrna, where the author was serving in one of the ships which went to the rescue of the population after the débâcle of the Greek Army. He saw refugees throw themselves into the water to escape the fury of the victorious Turks, and took part in one of those purely humanitarian operations which have come to be almost routine work for the Navy. From there the scene switches to Corfu, where Mussolini was showing his mailed fist for the first time. Follows the long period of what the author terms "retrogression," a period of disarmament, of declining morale, and of diminishing British influence

as Italy's naval power increases. There are excellent chapters on the Anglo-Italian crisis of 1935, in which Commander Edwards lifts some of the veil which cloaked our unpreparedness at that time.

From evil, however, came forth good. The discovery that our predominating position could be challenged shocked the nation into action, and made possible the effort of rearmament whose fruits we are beginning to see. "The end of the Mediterranean crisis saw a very different state of affairs," writes Commander Edwards. "In every way the power and prestige of the Royal Navy was on the up-grade. The emergency had demonstrated once again the truth of Bacon's words: 'He that commandeth the sea is at great liberty, and may take as much or as little of the war as he will.'"

The last part of the book describes the action of the Navy in Spanish waters, the piracy campaign, the Nyon conference, and the many issues raised by non-intervention. In his concluding chapter the author discusses the future in the Mediterranean and ends on a plea for Anglo-Italian friendship.

HARMLESS SPOOK OR WORLD MENACE?

THE COMMUNIST
INTERNATIONAL

By F. Borkenau. *Faber.* 12s. 6d.

Reviewed by DOUGLAS REED

Dr. Borkenau's industry is great. First, *The Spanish Cockpit*, then *Austria and After*, both of which I enjoyed, and now *The Communist International*.

This book begins with the statement: "Some believe that the Communist International will save the world; others, that it is the shape of the devil in our present time; some, and among them the author of this book, that it is neither the

Sweden: Ancient and Modern

edited by ROLF GRAUERS

Foreword by Vernon Bartlett

This attractively produced book is both a concise history of Sweden and a practical guide to its attractions. Present-day conditions in this land of many wonders are shown against a background of centuries of development. The story throughout is supplemented by a sketch of the country's scenic beauty and is illustrated with photographs, maps and diagrams.

5s. net

GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN

CHINA FIGHTS FOR HER LIFE!

By H. R. Ekins and Theon Wright

10/6 net

Pearl Buck writes:

"I do not know a book more to be recommended for a clear, unbiased, intelligent picture of the what and why of the China of the moment."

Philip Jordan (*Life and Letters To-day*) writes:

"Step by step Messers Ekins and Wright trace this long campaign under that Japan has waged upon China now rousing itself from a supine inaction. They are just authors, and as such impartial, and I cannot remember having read a more detailed and accurate portrait of Chiang Kai-Shek, upon whom, for good or ill the destiny of China now rests."

MCGRAW-HILL

Aldwych House, London, W.C.2

one nor the other, but simply a failure." Dr. Borkenau was himself a member of a foreign Communist Party affiliated to the Comintern—the German Communist Party—from 1921 to 1929, so that his view commands respect. For my part I think it is the right one; in my experience in many countries of Europe I have found the foreign children of the Comintern increasingly ineffective, and valuable, out of all proportion to their strength, to the friends of oppression and reaction in these countries—for what should we do without our Reds?

Starting from this conviction, Dr. Borkenau comes, at the end of his book, to the conclusion that, since the vital thing for Russia is to be on the same side as the democratic countries in any major international war, this doubtful asset, the Comintern, should be discarded, the Russian Revolution limited to a domestic process, the faded dream of the world revolution abandoned. As long as the Comintern exists people in the West will distrust Russia; ineffective though it is, it arouses anxieties among large numbers of people in other countries because of the aims it originally proclaimed; and its dissolution, and Russia's scrupulous abstention from interference abroad, would enable Russia to be treated on an equal footing with those democratic countries "whose ideals it professes to share."

Well, there you have it. I remember that when Anthony Eden went to Moscow and saw Stalin a communiqué was issued stating that there was "no conflict of interests on any major issue of international policy." That is the fact. Russia wants nothing that England has; some other countries do. But that communiqué, and Litvinoff's toast to King George, and the Union Jacks at Moscow Station, and the British National Anthem in the Moscow Opera, roused angry cries from many parts of England. "What about Communist propaganda?" or in

other words, "What about the Comintern?" The spook of the Comintern has continued, as Dr. Borkenau says, to scarify opinion in other countries and make many people in them antagonistic to the thought of co-operation with Russia. When I was in Moscow I asked Litvinoff, "What about Communist propaganda?" and he answered that Communist propaganda was a phrase used by people who wanted bad relations with Russia. Nevertheless, as Dr. Borkenau argues, the Comintern has a high nuisance value. Without it, he seems to imply, the European line-up would be far easier, there would be nothing to prevent the reconstitution of the Anglo-Franco-Russian combination, built to contain Germany, and all would be well. Would it? Well, perhaps it would.

Between the beginning and end of his book Dr. Borkenau has packed a mass of information about the development of the Communist Parties outside Russia. This is so long and so full of detail that it tends to obscure his main argument, described above, but it is most useful for students of these things and others interested in them, who wish to be able at a moment's notice to dip into a concise summary of the Bela Kun interlude in Hungary, the struggle against Bulgarian Fascism of our old friend Georghi Dimitrov of the Reichstag Fire, the collapse of German Communism, the development of Communism in China and France and Spain, the convulsive efforts of Moscow Headquarters to understand and direct the kindred movements abroad.

Dr. Borkenau knows a great deal from personal experience, and his knowledge is evidently supplemented by a large library or a carefully maintained collection of press cuttings. His book, thus, is full of useful information, all of which, as far as I could judge, is accurate. As to that conclusion—well, we shall see.

At the moment it is difficult to imagine Moscow recanting, and depositing the corpse of the Comintern as a sacrifice on the altar of democracy. But who knows?

SPAIN AND THE WRITER

DAYS OF HOPE. By André Malraux.

Routledge. 8s. 6d.

SOME STILL LIVE. By F. G. Tinker.

Lovat Dickson. 10s. 6d.

Reviewed by PHILIP JORDAN

To anyone acquainted with what little literature of our time deserves to be called 'significant,' the name of André Malraux is familiar. And rightly so. M. Malraux is one of the few men of our age who concern themselves with those problems whose solution is of the highest importance to us all. He knows that unless he enjoys freedom in which to think and liberty in which to express himself, the writer will never amount to a row of beans; and that unless the writer amounts to a row of beans the literature of our age will be left to the guardianship of such talents as our major best sellers now possess; and will thus perish from the earth as soon as one generation of old ladies succeeds another.

I remain unconvinced, however, that it is the first duty of all writers to come down out of the Ivory Tower; for it is my conviction that many a promising career has been wasted because the harsh air of the world was too strong for it and killed whatever imaginative and creative intelligence those careers showed, leaving in its place only the husk of exact observation. Such men should have remained in their intellectual stratosphere. But not M. Malraux.

If any writer of our time has justified that pernicious doctrine of descent it is he. So far from stifling his creative power, the air of the world arena has strengthened it until it now flourishes in the splendour of its maturity.

Not every wind that blows has improved it. Like all good writers, Malraux has written bad books; but—which is unlikely—if any of the literature of our generation survives, *La Condition Humaine*, will be among the first to cause another generation to remember our own with respect. English readers were given the book under the silly and wholly inappropriate title of *Storm in Shanghai*; and those who read it will not have forgotten it.

A worthy successor now arrives, *Days of Hope*, quite admirably translated. Once more it tells the most important story of our age: man's struggle, his open-eyed struggle, against the powers of darkness. Good and evil have always been the majestic characters of those who would create literature rather than write books. And good and evil are the characters in this imaginative re-creation

A study
for sane people
EUROPE
IN THE
MELTING
POT

by VLADIMIR de KOROSTOVETZ

A brilliant survey of European politics and constructive suggestions for a sane solution to the present international tangle.

10/6 net
HUTCHINSON

of the Spanish civil war, in which M. Malraux was himself a distinguished pilot. Here, between horizons as wide as Spain itself, is a tale that embraces all mankind; but if you prefer to read the book, not as an allegory, merely as a novel, you will still be startled. History and fiction lie down together and have produced between them a book as exciting as it is noble.

Mr. Tinker deserves a better fate than to be linked in the same review with M. Malraux, for Mr. Tinker is not a writer and, I am sure, does not profess to be one. Nevertheless, he has produced an honest and exciting book about his experiences as a pilot in the service of the Spanish Government. He was a good pilot and is an honest reporter; and those who would know something of the difficulties with which the Government had to contend in the early days of the war had better read it. He will probably come to the conclusion that we should be better and happier had the aeroplane never been invented. I think he would be right.

UNHOLY MUDDLE

POOR KNIGHT'S SADDLE.

By Douglas V. Duff. *Jenkins*. 12s. 6d.

Reviewed by C. F. O. CLARKE

OVER eight hundred years ago the Association of the Poor Knights of Christ was formed to police the Holy Land and guarantee the safety of its highways. To-day their place has been taken by the British administration. This book is an attempt to examine how far Britain has proved a worthy successor to the mediæval constabulary; its author was himself for ten years a member of the Palestine Police.

The book mainly consists of a series of conversations with people drawn from every section of the Jewish and Arab communities, as well as with

British officials. The variety of types living cheek by jowl in this small territory, less than the size of Wales, is in itself enough to make the difficulties of government intelligible. On each side there are violent partisans, for whom the words "reconciliation" and "compromise" have no meaning. The author himself appears to favour the principle of partition, although, locally, the doubts about how it can be carried out seem only equalled by the wealth of criticism it has aroused. In Mr. Duff's view it is a confession of failure on the part of the British Government that no other solution should offer itself.

One of the chief defects in the British rule appears to have been the lack of first-class administrators. From this account, officials are far more concerned with avoiding black marks from above than with showing firmness and initiative. For this the home Government is, in the last resort, responsible; it has failed to appreciate the difficulty of the task it set itself until too late; and now, if there is one point on which the majority in Palestine are united, it is dislike for a regime that cannot win respect. The British are sensitive about their colonial tradition; but Palestine can give them little cause for satisfaction so long as an official there can air the following views on Partition:

"It may answer long enough for Britain to crawl out of this mess we have made, without losing face, and rousing the dear old British public to round upon the professional politicians and the higher lights of the Civil Service at home, the birds who sit at ease in arm-chairs above Whitehall and tell us to do things no human being could perform."

By bringing the reader into touch with the day-to-day life of Palestine, by taking him through town and village and letting him hear the views of priest and labourer, merchant and politician,

Mr. Duff has given him a real opportunity to understand a situation which newspaper reports oversimplify. Historical digressions and touches of landscape provide the tale with a vivid and interesting background.

THE MELTING POT

AMERICANS ALL. By William Seabrook. *Harra*p. 8s. 6d.

Reviewed by M. McDougall

MR. SEABROOK'S book is a lively piece of reporting, full of authentic pictures of such different types of people as Scandinavian farmers in the Northwest, Polish miners in Pennsylvania, German brewers in St. Louis and Italian newspaper owners in New York, members of the "foreign language groups" he has investigated all over the United States. (Only European races are dealt with; there is no mention of the Chinese, Japanese, Filipinos, Mexicans, Red Indians and Negroes whose assimilation into American society is so much more difficult.) It is obvious that Mr. Seabrook has the faculty of getting on well with people and he makes them seem real to us, principally by telling us exactly what they said and did.

The main moral he draws from his experiences seems to be that though men be emigrants or the sons of emigrants, they are none the less good and loyal Americans. He glorifies the symbol of the melting pot and tells us how the process of Americanisation is being accelerated. And it is true that while describing all his different groups he is also giving a good picture of Americans in general, their energy, friendliness and optimism. At the same time he is most interesting when he reveals how many national differences still persist.

A corollary to his main conclusion about the patriotism of all recently naturalised Americans is his belief in the

Just Published

THE BOOK OF THE MOMENT

THE MAN IN EUROPE STREET

By

**RUPERT
CROFT-COOKE**

(An authentic account of what the Man in the Street in other European Countries is thinking.)

IN publishing THE MAN IN EUROPE STREET we are presenting what we consider to be the most important of this year's additions to "books on Europe." The author, who speaks half-a-dozen languages and has already travelled widely, was anxious to find out what "ordinary people" are thinking and saying in the provinces, in cafes, and beerhouses, on the Continent in this year of crises.

Fully Illustrated 10s. 6d. net

Have you read?

THE [GREY DIPLOMATISTS

By

**LT.-COMMANDER KENNETH
EDWARDS, R.N.(Ret.)**

(Author of "THE MUTINY AT PINVERGORDON")

"This very timely book is a history of British seapower in the Mediterranean from the end of the Great War to the end of last year. The Author . . . lends many a vivid touch to his narrative . . . is scrupulously careful and exact about his facts . . . and has an excellent sense of perspective."

—SUNDAY TIMES

Fully Illustrated 15s. 0d. net

RICH & COWAN

37 Bedford Square, London, W.C.1

extreme rarity among them, or indeed among any other Americans, of what he calls "subversiveness" and "Red Radicalism." How much his estimates are influenced by the fact that he himself is "an old-fashioned reactionary Ogden Mills Tory black Republican" it would be hard to say.

He is better at describing his experiences than at drawing conclusions from them. His generalisations are too apt to be remarks like this: "The Poles in their quiet way are quite interested in sex, but with less *frou-frou* than the French, though they are sometimes compared to them"; or this, "if you look at a map you can understand immediately why the French and Swiss are petty, and the insular British repressed about everything except empire-building."

SOVIET BLURB AND FACTS

FROM TSARDOM TO THE STALIN CONSTITUTION. By W. P. Coates and Zelda Coates. *Allen and Unwin*. 10s. 6d.

SOVIET TRADE AND DISTRIBUTION. By L. F. Hubbard. *Macmillan*. 12s. 6d.

Reviewed by R. H. S. CROSSMAN

It is strange what little relation there is between the price of a book and its value. Only 2s. 6d. separates the two books on our list, and yet one is a mere brochure, the other a serious study. Mr. and Mrs. Coates have performed the function of a Public Relations Officer, and the only value of "From Tsardom to the Stalin Constitution" is that it tells you just exactly what the Communist publicity experts want you to know. It is, in brief, a "blurb."

In their outline history of Russia, which, despite the title, occupies only half the book, it is interesting to notice

that Trotsky is not mentioned in relation to the organisation of the Red Army, that Stalin is associated with Lenin from 1917 on as the acknowledged leader and that the famine of 1932 is discreetly overlooked. The second half of the book consists of description of the accomplishments of the regime culled mostly from Soviet newspapers. As all figures for production, wages, etc., are given in roubles, no analysis is possible of the real progress achieved. Let me make it quite clear that I have no objection to advertising methods as such. Only I feel that the price charged is excessive.

Mr. Hubbard has written an invaluable book for those who want to understand how a planned economy really works. I felt after reading it that I understood for the first time the gigantic task of the Soviet Administrators. Though Mr. Hubbard is highly critical of the regime, he restored to me a lot of the appreciation of Communist achievement which Mr. and Mrs. Coates had extinguished. After a short historical introduction, he deals briefly and incisively with retail trade, agricultural marketing, the price-system, real wages, and the condition of the peasants. His last two chapters are concerned with social and class problems.

It is a relief to get away from statistical records to a business-like account of the actual administration of the Soviet economic machine. I was particularly interested in his description of retail trade, which shows that, though there is still planning of staple necessities, there is increasingly a free market for luxury goods. It is also illuminating to learn that prices are sometimes varied for reasons of high politics and that by this means a sort of tariff protection has been produced for certain agricultural areas. But perhaps the most useful chapter of all is that on nominal and real wages, the first lucid analysis I have read of this thorny problem.

My only criticism of Mr. Hubbard is that he retains a queerly idealistic picture of capitalism, which makes him unduly pessimistic about planning. I quote one sentence without comment.

"It seems extremely probable that if capitalist conditions governed employment in Russia, that is to say, if every worker was entitled to a fair living wage and no employment enterprise was allowed to pay sweating wages, there would be a considerable volume of unemployment."

In spite of such surprising statements, *Soviet Trade and Distribution* is an invaluable piece of research.

A VARIED LIFE

I LOOK BACK SEVENTY YEARS.

By E. H. Lacon Watson. *Eyre & Spottiswoode*. 10s. 6d.

Reviewed by FREDERIC WHYTE

IN this extremely pleasant, leisurely, mellow book Mr. Lacon Watson, by turn schoolmaster, journalist, publisher, novelist, and war-correspondent, tells us the story of his life and friendships. Admirers and friends of that gifted little man of letters and ardent Irish patriot, Lionel Johnson, will be much interested in the author's vivid portrait of him at Winchester. At Cambridge Mr. Lacon Watson was an energetic rowing man. After Cambridge came schoolmastering; then a period of bachelor life in London, at Staple Inn, as a free-lance contributor to the press; and the first literary effort to which he looked back with any satisfaction, "The Unconscious Humourist and Other Essays." At Staple Inn he became intimate with Festing Jones who on special occasions conceded to him glimpses of Samuel Butler.

Most of Mr. Lacon Watson's friendships date from the founding of the Author's Club by Sir Walter Besant, Besant himself heading the list. Conspicuous among the many others have

been Mr. Morley Roberts and Mr. H. A. Vachell. Of Mr. Vachell's *Brothers* he writes: '*Brothers* placed him at once in the front rank of living novelists. . . . I could not entirely believe him when he told my wife that the character of Mark Samphire was taken from me'; the only resemblance he can see between himself and that character is that they both stammer. And so the narrative proceeds most interestingly down to the time of the Great War, when, after vain efforts to secure a commission in the Army ("too old at fifty," though a good many of his contemporaries succeeded), he found useful occupation first with the Postal Censorship, then in Reuter's Editorial Department, of whose methods he gives particulars which will be quite new to most people. Later chapters in which he records his experience as a Reuter's Special on the Italian Front form one of the most outstanding sections of a really admirable book.

POTTED INFORMATION

WHAT'S WHAT AND WHO'S WHO IN SOME WORLD AFFAIRS.

By J. A. Sinclair Pooley. *Bale, Sons and Curnow*. 5s.

"I KNOW how easy it is to drop into a jargon which saves the writer trouble but puzzles the reader," says Mr. Vernon Bartlett in his foreword to this little handbook. "What are the Oslo Group and the Little Entente? When did Herr Hitler wipe out the last inequality clause of the Versailles Treaty? Who are the Iron Guards? What is the task of the Fascist Grand Council?—such questions are always cropping up to frighten the average citizen who cannot find time to specialise in foreign affairs, but who yet realises more and more their vast and increasing importance to him and his children." Mr. Sinclair Pooley's little book supplies the answers in brief.

THE WORLD OF FINANCE

BACK FROM THE BRINK

by "RAPIER"

As I correct these lines, the news comes through that the British and French have adopted a plan for the solution of the Sudeten problem, involving a re-drawing of the Czech frontier. At first sight this appeared like complete capitulation to Hitler's demand, but it is understood that it will be made part of a general settlement in order to achieve appeasement along the lines on which Mr. Chamberlain has been working ever since he became Premier. The announcement that the Prime Minister was "proceeding Hitlerwards" (to use the phraseology in which I cabled this news) followed by the report of the plan, caused relief in the City, and brought some recovery from the very low levels to which fear of imminent war had sent prices during the preceding week.

The European political crisis which developed in August and increased in intensity in September brought business in financial and commodity markets almost to a standstill. The one exception was the foreign exchange and bullion markets, where nervous Continental operators fled both from their own currencies and from sterling into gold and dollars. But in mid-September fear of the imminence of war made operators prefer cash to gold. In the event of war it might be impossible to effect insurance of gold shipments to New York which would prevent arbitrage.

Hoarders, therefore, began to dispose of their gold and bought dollars with the proceeds. In normal times by shipping gold to New York they can get dollars shortly after arrival when the gold is sold to the American Treasury. There has also been a slight increase in money rates which, though still small, presages what might have happened should war have broken out.

In these circumstances many people in the City were asking how long the world is going to be held to ransom by perpetual political crises and whether it would not be best once for all to have a clear-cut solution so that the world can get on with its ordinary business without these recurrent upsets. The economic situation of the world is serious enough without the added complication of political crises. Instability of currencies, quotas, tariffs, subsidies and foreign exchange restrictions continue to hamper international trade. Armaments are piling up at an ever increasing rate and lowering the standard of living for this generation and the next. The doctrine of self-sufficiency permeates the economy of many great nations and further restricts the standard of living throughout the world. But until we get some political appeasement it appears impossible to tackle economic problems. No country is really self-sufficient, except perhaps a South Sea Island, and the efforts of

Germany, Italy and Japan to attain a measure of self-sufficiency are only partially successful. Germany has made the greatest progress in this direction but the fact that her imports still amount to over 4,000 million marks worth a year proves that she is still dependent upon foreign trade for many essentials. Even on a peace basis, Germany cannot supply its needs of foodstuffs, iron ore and oil, especially heavy oils. And this despite the Goering Four Year Plan.

German "Bloodless Invasion"

To remedy these defects, Germany has been pursuing a policy of barter trade, particularly with the Balkans, by exchanging manufactured goods for raw materials such as wheat and oil. With the dwindling of the world's markets the Balkans have been forced to find an outlet for their surplus products and though such methods as those employed by Germany are unsatisfactory to the Balkans they have but little option. In a recent book by Dr. Einzig, this German policy is stigmatised as "Bloodless Invasion" and Britain is urged to adopt counter measures. As is well known, Britain has already done something to strengthen its position with Turkey by the grant of a credit of £16,000,000 and is now negotiating with Roumania to arrange export credits on similar lines. An agreement has also been made with Roumania by which a British firm is to import 400,000 tons of Roumanian wheat. This is not an outright purchase, as the wheat will remain in the ownership of the Roumanian authorities until sold in the open market at prevailing prices. It will be shipped to Britain over the next nine months and amounts to approximately one-third of Roumania's exportable surplus for this crop year. Terms of payment provide for advances to Roumanian authorities against wheat arriving and the sterling will be paid as to 40%

From Kent

"Enclosed please find cheque value £2,000 for Shares in your Society, which kindly acknowledge and add to my Account with you."

Another item from our postbag, which should convince you that this Society is the ideal medium for your investments.

Reliance

PERMANENT
BUILDING SOCIETY

Established 1864

PERCY STREET
LONDON — W.

Tel.: MUSeum 3628

Member of Building Societies Association

into the Anglo-Roumanian clearing account and 40% to the additional purchase of British goods by Roumania. The balance of 20% sterling will be at Roumania's free disposal. The interest of the transaction is that it does offer a prospect of improving the position of the clearing account and does not therefore, as so many German transactions do, lead to further frozen credits.

Drawbacks To Political Trade

The difficulty of Britain's increasing its trade with the Balkans is that with our protected market here and our Imperial preference, and possibly new arrangements with the United States under a trade treaty in the near future, the scope for taking any largely increased amounts of Balkan produce appears very limited. Germany has no such arrangements for importing raw materials and with its existing shortage of foreign exchange naturally finds barter trade a way

out of its difficulties. In the old days France was one of the best markets for Balkan produce, but with its wheat subsidies and many restrictions on imports it is no longer an important market. It was the French, however, who suggested at the conference in London which followed the occupation of Austria by Germany, that credits should be given to the Balkan countries. So far, it would seem that Britain is to provide these credits, though of course, in the heyday of the "Little Entente," France provided credits for armaments supplied from France's arsenals. The whole question is one of great difficulty, for no one wishes to increase the already large amount of existing frozen credits, and to provide credits without marketing facilities seems only half a solution. In any case, international trade based upon competing political interests, is unlikely to bring that economic appeasement for which the world is waiting and watching.

SUBSCRIPTION ORDER FORM

If you would like to receive **WORLD REVIEW** regularly, fill up this form and send it to your Bookseller or Newsagent, or direct to:—

WORLD REVIEW
40-42 WILLIAM IV STREET
LONDON, W.C.2

Please enter my subscription to "World Review" for $\frac{\text{six months}}{\text{one year}}$ post free commencing with the issue. I enclose remittance for $\frac{7/-}{14/-}$

(Canada 13/6)

Name.....

Address.....

Published on the first of each month.

DIARY OF INTERNATIONAL EVENTS: AUGUST 15—SEPT. 14

CZECHS AND NAZIS

THE direct negotiations between Dr. Hodza and the Sudeten leaders reached a deadlock (August 17th), when the latter rejected the Government's proposals based on the constitution of four provinces and maintained their memorandum of June 7th (which included the claim for territorial autonomy). About August 25th, owing to Lord Runciman's mediation, the Government formulated a new scheme, envisaging a system of twenty-seven departments, some of which would be wholly German. But the signs were unfavourable for compromise. In Germany a partial mobilisation had been carried out, vast manœuvres were organised under war conditions, involving the retention of 1,000,000 men under arms, while work was intensified, with conscript labour, on the Western ("Siegfried") defence lines. The chancelleries in Belgrade, Budapest and Moscow and the French Air Chief, General Vuillemin, a guest at the German manœuvres, had been sounded as to their countries' attitude should Germany intervene. The Sudeten leaders had been assured by the Reich of "every support" if a solution were long delayed, and had been authorised by some of their leaders to use arms for self-defence against Marxist terrorists. The German Press became more menacing, representing the Sudetens as cruelly oppressed and magnifying every incident. These developments caused no less grave concern in Germany than abroad. Securities fell steeply on the Berlin Bourse.

In Paris and London the implied threat of force was held unjustified, in view of the conciliatory attitude of the Prague Government. On August 27th, Sir J. Simon reaffirmed Mr. Chamberlain's warning of March 24th that England might become involved if a war broke out. Sir N. Henderson was recalled from Berlin to confer with the Cabinet, which

met on August 30th and approved steps which might be suitable in given circumstances.

Sir J. Simon's speech produced a momentary lull during which Herr Henlein, at Lord Runciman's suggestion, conferred with Herr Hitler, who approved of his continuing negotiations. On the same day, however, the Sudeten leaders rejected the main part of the Government's scheme, and, on September 4th, still averse to compromise, they declared that the only solution lay in the prompt realisation of the—still undefined—"8 points" of Herr Henlein's Carlsbad speech (April 24th) and, as some of their spokesmen announced, in a reorientation of Czechoslovak foreign policy—a demand which had also figured in the Carlsbad speech. Herr Henlein now summoned a Nazi rally—illegal in Czechoslovakia—to meet at Aussig on October 15th.

The Prague Government, yielding once again to Lord Runciman's counsel, formulated a "final" offer (September 5th), which went far to meet the "8 points" and was considered in Paris and London as a reasonable basis.

After renewed mediation by Lord Runciman the Sudeten leaders accepted these proposals as a basis, but later in the day broke off discussions on the ground of police violence offered to a deputy in some rioting at Morava-Ostrava. The situation was all the more tense owing to the political excitement aroused in the Reich by the Press campaign and to the imminence of Herr Hitler's closing speech at Nuremberg. The French and British governments were concerned to dispel any illusion that a conflict, resulting from a *coup de force*, could be localised. It was announced in Paris (September 5th) that, in view of the increase of German effectives on the Rhine frontier, certain reservists had been called up and the Maginot Line fully

manned; naval forces were concentrated at Brest and Toulon; M. Bonnet, (September 5th) reiterated that France would fulfil her pledges. The British Admiralty also announced precautionary measures; the Fleet was already concentrating in the North Sea for manoeuvres. The implications of Sir J. Simon's speech were made clear by Sir N. Henderson to the Nazi chiefs at Nuremberg. Lord Halifax postponed his journey to Geneva (where the 19th Assembly was to meet on September 12th). The United States' sympathy with the efforts of the "peace-loving nations" was manifested in speeches by Mr. Hull (August 16th) and President Roosevelt (August 18th); the President remained near Washington during the crisis ready to summon Congress if war broke out; his ambassador in France, Mr. Bullitt, stated (September 5th) that no one could say if the United States would not be drawn into a European war. An American Atlantic squadron was provisionally organised.

The Italian Foreign Office organ approved (September 8th) the principles of the "8 points," but deprecated demands for a plebiscite or a separatist solution.

On September 9th it was announced that the Sudeten leaders would resume discussion on the Prague Government's plan. On September 11th, the British Government stated in a communiqué to the Press its conviction that its warnings had reached Herr Hitler, and repeated its belief in the necessity of a peaceful settlement.

Herr Hitler's speech at the close of the Nazi rally (September 12th) was a scarcely veiled ultimatum to Czechoslovakia. He accused Dr. Benes of playing with concessions and of fabricating the legend of Germany's intended aggression on May 21st, and of her retreat before England and France. Germany, he said, would not submit to such an indignity a second time. He stirred the feelings of his audience by depicting the plight of the Sudetens, subjected to "shameless ill-treatment" and "hunted like wild beasts"; but, he said, they were not defenceless or

deserted. Recalling his words of February 22nd (that Germany would not tolerate the continued oppression of 3½ million Germans beyond the frontier) he demanded the right of self-determination for the Sudetens, and declared that there must be "*an understanding one way or another.*" Addressing himself indirectly to foreign Powers he claimed that Germany had made greater sacrifices for peace than any nation and had accepted "a number of frontiers" as final; but there was always a united front against Germany. In his proclamation on September 6th he had already announced that Germany was invulnerable to a blockade. He now described the impregnable western fortifications, behind which, he declared, stood the "German people in arms."

The speech was immediately followed by an organised outbreak of incidents in the Sudeten districts, in some of which the Government declared martial law. Herr Henlein thereupon demanded the withdrawal of these measures within six hours, failing which his party would "not be responsible for future developments." The Government not complying, serious affrays followed in many towns. The Sudeten leaders declared (September 13th) that the "8 points" no longer formed a basis for negotiations.

On September 14th Mr. Chamberlain telegraphed, offering to meet Herr Hitler next day, "with a view to finding a peaceful solution." Herr Hitler replied that he was "very ready"; Berchtesgaden was appointed as the place of meeting.

SPAIN

ON August 18th the Republican Government was re-constructed with a view to militarising industries and intensifying efforts.

On the Ebro front, after a month's fighting, the Nationalists had relieved the pressure on Gandesa, but the Republicans, in face of incessant attacks, retained their foothold on the right bank of the Ebro.

General Franco's reply (published August 22nd) to the Non-Intervention Committee's compromise plan of July 5th rejected "proportionate evacuation," on

the ground that a fair census of the volunteers was impossible, and that nationals of states not represented on the Committee would not be withdrawn. It also rejected the surveillance of ports by observers and air-patrols, on grounds of sovereignty and military exigencies. On the other hand it proposed the withdrawal of 10,000 volunteers on each side and the establishment of two "safety ports" in Catalonia and Levante for neutral merchant ships; but it demanded the unconditional closing of land frontiers and the immediate grant of unrestricted belligerent rights, without awaiting the withdrawal of the volunteers. In London the reply was regarded as a virtual refusal, making a new line of approach necessary if the Non-Intervention policy were not to be discarded. Russia at once announced that she would make no further concessions. The Barcelona Government assured Great Britain (August 25th) of its readiness to apply the Plan for withdrawal of volunteers—subject to reciprocity—to persons of all non-Spanish nationalities.

The British Chargé d'Affairs at Rome again drew attention (August 18th, 21st) to reports of fresh Italian intervention in Spain, especially during the Ebro battle in July, and to the embarrassment thus caused to the French Government, which continued, in face of internal pressure, to close the Pyrenean frontier. Count Ciano, while not denying the reports, observed that no proofs were adduced, and indicated that supplies or men sent to Spain merely sufficed to replace wastage; Italy, he said, would not withdraw her men till other countries did so. The Italian Press at the same time made counter-charges—which were denied in France—of renewed transit of men and material over the French frontier. It also gave prominence to the achievements of the "Legionary air force of the Balearics" during the Ebro fighting.

The British Committee of experts for investigating air attacks visited Republican Spain (August 18th) at the Spanish government's request. Its report, published on September 1st, showed that in certain cases (cf. Torre Vieja, August 25th)

the civil population had been deliberately attacked.

HUNGARY AND HER NEIGHBOURS

ADMIRAL HORTHY, regent of Hungary, and accompanied by his chief Ministers was received at Kiel by Herr Hitler with Royal honours (August 22nd). The speeches addressed to him stressed the historic comradeship of Germans and Magyars in resisting attack from the East. The Regent, for his part, proclaimed the friendship Hungary, Germany and Italy and their common will "for a just peace," but, so far as known, he avoided any definite commitments to the "Axis." Simultaneously with his visit the Little Entente Conference (Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Yugoslavia) was meeting at Bled to seek improved relations with Hungary. The path had been opened by the publication in Rumania (August 4th) of a statute giving equal rights to all nationalities. On August 23rd agreements were initialled,

"JUBILEE"



**NO-TROUBLE
WORM-DRIVE
HOSE CLIPS**

are the **BEST TO GET**

for

**RADIATOR JOINTS,
LEATHER COVERS on
UNIVERSAL JOINTS,
AIR, OIL and WATER
HOSE JOINTS**



**Easy to fit, remove or
refit, without damage,
repeatedly.**

Guaranteed Never to Leak

**Stocked by Garages and
Accessory Dealers
Everywhere**

**Send for a
Free Sample Clip to Test**

**L. ROBINSON & COY.
20 London Chambers
GILLINGHAM · KENT**

in the first part of which the three states unconditionally acquiesced in Hungary's rearmament, already unilaterally undertaken. The second part, in which the parties promised to refrain mutually from the use of force, was stated by the Hungarian Foreign Minister to be contingent upon the settlement of the minorities question after the nationalities question had been regulated in Czechoslovakia—where Hungary was demanding greater concessions than in the other two states. When it is settled, the agreements can take form as bilateral treaties between Hungary and the individual states. The communiqué issued by the Little Entente hoped for their early conclusion "in the interests of the Danube region as a whole."

The British, French and Rumanian governments agreed (August 18th) that the European Commission of the Danube should cede to Rumania the control of Danube navigation between Braila and the Black Sea and other powers which Rumania claimed to exercise as the sovereign state, subject to decision by an arbitral tribunal in case of disputes concerning navigation regulations.

THE FAR EAST

THE Japanese offensive against Hankow was developed in August on a wide semi-circle, from Juichang, south of the Yangtse, which fell about August 26th, to Tangkwan in the elbow of the Yellow River. The fall of Hankow being expected to end major operations the next actual problem was the "re-construction of China." Prince Konoye's message to Italy (August 19th) said that after the overthrow of General Chiang Kai-shek China must decide whether to form a single state or a federation. The War Minister indicated (August 29th) that the amalgamation of the Peking and Nanking Governments was now contemplated.

The Japanese ambassador in Paris (August 15th) described the traffic in arms via Indo-China and the Franco-Soviet Pact as "black spots" in Franco-Japanese relations. Fears were expressed in Japan lest General Chiang Kai-shek

should base himself on Yunanfu, in touch with French territory, when driven from Hankow, which was now isolated from Hongkong owing to the activities of the Japanese aircraft.

After the Russo-Japanese clash in July, there was a move in Tokyo for improved Anglo-Japanese relations, in spite of the dislike of the nationalists for any concessions to England. The Press was informed (August 22nd) that Japan was not rejecting England's demands, and that her policy was to prevail on other Powers to withdraw their countenance from General Chiang Kai-shek. The *Asahi* suggest (August 16th) that British claims might obtain speedier satisfaction if England ceased to support China.

The United States protested to Japan (August 26th) against the action of Japanese aircraft which forced down a Chinese-American air liner near Canton (August 24th) and machine-gunned the passengers. The Japanese reply (August 31st) maintained that the action was consistent with the laws of war, and that the United States had no standing, as the air-liner was Chinese-owned. The Japanese official spokesman (August 26th), discussing a British protest against the suppression of Press messages concerning the same incident, maintained Japan's right to censor all non-official cables.

MEXICO AND THE U.S.A.

IN view of the dangerous precedent in inter-American relations created by the Mexican Government's denial (August 3rd) of any obligation under international law to give prompt compensation for the seizure of foreign property, the United States renewed in more emphatic terms (August 23rd) its proposal for arbitration on the expropriation of the American-owned farm lands. President Cardenas, in a speech to Congress and a Note (September 4th) rejected the conditions that no such seizures should take place pending a settlement and that a fund should be built up to provide compensation, affirming Mexico's right to "expropriate all lands that may be necessary," undeterred by foreign pressure.

WORLD REVIEW

Incorporating
Volume VI No. 3 'REVIEW OF REVIEWS' and 'WORLD' November, 1938

40-42 WILLIAM IV STREET
LONDON, W.C.2

Telegrams: BOOKSTORE, LONDON

Telephone: TEMPLE BAR 0127-9

WORLD REVIEW is the only English monthly review giving an extensive selection of articles from publications all over the world. These articles are chosen with great care, since WORLD REVIEW can only be valuable as its sponsors want it to be, if it avoids all political bias. The Editor in his own article, and other signed contributors, express their opinions as frankly as they please. Otherwise the Review would lack force and colour. But the ultimate object of WORLD REVIEW is to perform a useful and progressive service by allowing

THE NATIONS TO SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES

THE END OF AN EPOCH

by VERNON BARTLETT

MR. NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN wrote laboriously in the guest book at his Munich Hotel and then spread out before him a single sheet of paper on which I could see the sharp up-and-down signature of Adolf Hitler. Most of us had worked for twenty-five hours on the previous day, and our brains were slow to seize the significance of these few sentences whereby the British Prime Minister and the German Fuehrer proposed to rule out war for all time between their two countries. We did not for the moment realise how much more important it was than the long and complicated communiqué on the fate of Czechoslovakia which had been handed to us in the early hours of the morning. That paper, later to be waved triumphantly to the crowds at Heston, has no validity as a treaty, but it marks the end of an epoch as no formal treaty could do.

Opinions will always differ as to what prevented war. Was it Mr. Chamberlain's surrender to almost all the German demands? Was it the news of the mobilisation of the British fleet? How true is it, for example, that after hearing Mr. Chamberlain's broadcast on the evening of September 27th—so much weaker than the semi-official statement that had preceded it by an hour or two—Dr. Goebbels

summoned all the editors in Berlin and ordered them to announce the general German mobilisation for 2 p.m. the following day and that, between 12 and 1 the same night, when the news of the mobilisation of the British fleet came through, he called them again and ordered them to cancel the announcement at all costs and by every means? How true is it, again, that no special precautions, such as the issue of gas masks, were made in Germany, because the authorities knew that they were not going to invade Czechoslovakia and that, therefore, nobody was going to invade Germany?

Mr. Chamberlain saved peace at Munich only because he agreed that British influence would help Herr Hitler to gain without fighting every single advantage for which he might otherwise have declared war. Even more territory was granted him after the Munich meeting than he himself asked for at Godesberg. If one points out that on such a basis peace can always be saved, one is not unfairly criticising a Prime Minister who shouldered a burden of responsibility such as not even Viscount Grey had to carry in August 1914, for Mr. Chamberlain was honestly convinced that Herr Hitler was so near to making war that there was no time for him to consult Parliament or even all members of his Cabinet before he started off on his German journeys.

One word, before we forget about the past and turn to the future, on the physical strain the Prime Minister had to face. Herr Hitler, it will be remembered, apologised for inviting an older man to make the long journey to Berchtesgaden. But Godesberg was no better. After an air journey to Cologne there was the journey by car to the Petersberg, a hurried lunch and then another journey by car and Rhine ferry to the hotel in which the Fuehrer had meanwhile been sitting on a café terrace near the Rhine and indulging in the most restful and refreshing of all occupations—watching running water. And Munich was far worse. Even at the best of times the journey by air is fatiguing, and Munich is a long way from London. The Prime Minister on arrival was not even taken to his hotel. He went directly to the Fuehrerhaus for the beginning of the negotiations and, with one very short interval for lunch in his own apartment, he was negotiating until well after midnight. Small wonder that the final communiqué left so many gaps to be filled by the ambassadors that Germany is now completely the master of the rump state, that the Czechs are far more bitter against the British and the French than

against the Germans, and that the British and French "guarantee" of the new frontiers is such an obvious farce that nobody talks of it any more.


* * * * *

Enough of the past. Those of us who protested against the peace terms of Paris even before they were ratified, who five years ago supported Herr Hitler in his demand for a limitation of armament on terms which Sir John Simon then rejected but would fall over himself to accept now, must avoid bitterness if we are told, by these men who so belatedly have discovered the holy principle of "self-determination," that we are war-mongers because we protest against the bullying of the Czechs to-day as we protested against the bullying of the Germans twenty years ago. We must look to the future. The world of Versailles is in ruins. Much of it was bad, but a little of it was good. The League of Nations did stand, for an important second in history, against the currents of prejudice and out-of-date tradition. How much of it was based on the firm foundations of international law and equity, and how much on the shifting sands of political revenge against a defeated enemy? We have to see what can be built up again when the floods subside.

From the moment the armistice negotiations began twenty years ago France sought to keep Germany down, to hem Germany in. The Little Entente, Poland, Russia, Italy, were all used at one time or another to this end. Great Britain's part was passive rather than active—she was not anxious to see the League of Nations made into an instrument for the enforcement of treaties, but she was also not prepared to make it into one for the modification of treaties as they became out-of-date. You cannot blame France for using every method to retain her dominant position in Europe. You cannot blame Germany for using every method to break free. And that document signed by Hitler and Chamberlain in Munich is the British admission that in this struggle Germany has won. If we do not like the methods of her victory or the men who have achieved it, we must blame ourselves, or our own die-hard leaders, who kicked Germany when she was weak and kow-tow to her now she is strong. (Get thee behind me, bitterness!: "La passion de l'homme libre," wrote Spinoza, "demeure la générosité, c'est-a-dire l'amour. . . .") And there is good as well as bad about this British admission.

There is, in the first place, the amazing evidence supplied by the popular welcome to Mr. Chamberlain at Munich that the mass of the people, even in a totalitarian state with all the martial propaganda of the last few years, hates the idea of another war. Nobody to whom I spoke on those three fateful visits to Germany expressed gratitude to Mr. Chamberlain for helping the Germans to carve up Czechoslovakia without loss of life. Everybody expressed gratitude because he had avoided war over an issue for which very few Germans would have cared to fight. Only among a few of the more arrogant Nazi officials was there any sign of rejoicing over the apparent weakness of Great Britain. For if Herr Hitler has achieved a fantastic international success he, or the warmongers round him, have suffered a tremendous national defeat. The people of Germany now know how nearly Nazi policy had come to grouping the world against them in another war. I am more convinced than ever before that the acquisition of new territory and new sources of raw materials and new strategic frontiers is not accompanied by a corresponding growth in the desire or the willingness of the German people to fight.

It may be no bad thing that Germany should have the economic (and hence the political) control of south-eastern Europe. In the September issue of this Review I quoted from Dr. Einzig's *Bloodless Invasion* a list of the strange methods used to achieve this control. But even credits given in such questionable circumstances may be



"PEACE
HOUSE" FOR
THE BRITISH
PREMIER

"No, now I've
thought it over,
I'm taking my
brick away."

"Le Canard
Enchaîné," Paris

better than no credits at all. It may, too, be no bad thing that the Franco-Soviet, the Franco-Polish, and the Franco-Little Entente alliances are coming to an end, for they existed to prevent those essentials of life, change and growth. There may even be good in the success of Germany's horribly drastic method of changing Czechoslovakia's frontiers, for it has been carried through without fighting, and one must admit that such revision would not have taken place had there been no threat of war to push it through.

* * * * *

But the prevention of war and the maintenance of liberty depend at least as much on Great Britain as on Germany. And here are some questions to which the British public deserves and should demand replies.

If the Munich agreement does, in fact, mean that the Versailles system is destroyed and that we are going to make a new beginning with Germany, why in God's name does the Government do nothing but say that we must speed up armaments as never before? Is it to be peace with Germany or war against Germany? Peace? Then proposals about colonies, the distribution of raw materials, our own military understanding with France, the future of Spain, the limitation of armaments and so on should surely have been brought forward before the effect of the Munich meeting had worn away. War? Then what possible excuse can there be for the surrender to Germany of so important a frontier and so efficient an army as the frontier and army of Czechoslovakia?

Was the excuse that we were too unprepared to take any risks at Munich? Then why, in God's name, are not the men who were responsible courtmartialled or driven from office? We spend well over one million pounds a day on preparation for war and we are still so unprepared! Where is the courageous leadership which alone will enable us to concede any just German demands but to discourage any encroachment on our independence? Is the only reaction to criticism going to be to try to stifle it? There is an uneasy feeling that the Government quite deliberately makes vital decisions when Parliament is not in session, that unparalleled precautions are being taken to keep news away from the newspapers. That is not the way in which to unite the nation, and there was never a time when unity was more essential than it is to-day.

FOREIGN BODIES

by SPOTLIGHT

History is nowadays made as much as ever by single individuals. In these pages our roving "Spotlight" is fixed month by month on the figures of the moment, illuminating the personalities of the men who appear as disembodied names in our articles, and revealing the motives which lead them to the actions that change our lives

SO I was right. Writing about the middle of September, for you to read on October 1st, I said that the moment had clearly come when the irresistible force of German expansionism, striking on the immovable object of the resistance of other peoples to it, must lead to war. And I added that I had a hunch that in spite of this we should just skid by war again—for the present.

We have skidded by it, leaving the mutilated corpse of Czechoslovakia in our track, and as we look back we exclaim: "Why didn't he self-determine himself out of the way, the cad." By the time you read this, hundreds of thousands of Czechs will be living under German rule, in the name of self-determination. By the time you read this, scores of thousands of Czech refugees will be living in tents and barracks in Prague. In your joy you have mafficked in Whitehall, you have mafficked in the Champs Elysées; the papers have printed pictures of you doing it, your faces big with smiles, your mouths wide open as you shouted "Good old Chamberlain" or "Three cheers for Germany." Peace on earth and goodwill towards Hitler. Good King Wenceslas, this Christmas, will look out on a Bohemia under German control.

The guiding idea of this monthly article is to give you little bits of gossip about "men in the news." Let us spare a little space this month for a man who is not in the news, a man of no account. His name is Eduard Benesh, the son of poor parents, as was his master, Masaryk. Nearly a year ago I sat and talked with him and tried to understand his optimism, his faith. How could anybody have faith in these times, I thought? You only had to put all your money on disloyalty and the insancity of treaties and the worthlessness of the given word to win every time.

But no, said Benesh, he would pursue his policy of staunch adherence to the great democracies, to the godparents of Czechoslovakia, England

and France, to the League, to collective security, to Czechoslovakia's Little Entente allies, "to the end." He believed in it. He did not believe in these reinsurance policies of making "friends all round" that were practised by Colonel Beck in Poland and by Dr. Stoyadinovitch in Yugoslavia; they meant that in the end "everybody would be let down." Only in one event would he change his policy, make terms with Germany, at the inevitable price of surrendering Czechoslovakia's real independence—in the event that England and France did not want Czechoslovakia, regarded Czechoslovakia as a liability and not as an asset. "But I must know," he said, repeatedly, "I must know."



"Haagsche Courant," The Hague

BENESH THE VICTIM

In April this year your Spotlight wrote in an American newspaper "They will never let him know, they will never tell him; they will at the last moment leave him alone, face to face with Germany."

Now Benesh is gone, one of those curious and comic figures who remain staunch to lost causes, who do not go with the wind, do not tuck

their political bank balances away in safe political countries. The press of many countries, even some countries which have been the allies of Czechoslovakia, jeer at him as he goes, as the man who did not make friends with Germany in time.

By the time you read this, more and more people in England, possibly—or possibly not, who knows, or perhaps they don't care anyway—will be realising what they have done. They will be realising that this is not a question of tearing off a strip of Czechoslovakia, as you might tear the counterfoil from a cheque, and giving it to Germany, and leaving a right little, tight little Czechoslovakia. It is a surrender to the threat of force which leaves this little rump Czechoslovakia a pendant of Germany, with a domestic political regime *gleichgeschaltet*, or co-ordinated, with that of the Reich; which leaves Hungary in like case; which has put Rumania, and Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria, and Greece irretrievably in the German camp, so that their war-strength, in all its forms, will be at the service of Germany.

Well, there you have it, and apparently you wanted it. Already Hitler is moving towards dictation of the form of Government you shall have in England. Read his speech at Saarbrücken on October 9th, with its remarks about Duff Cooper and Eden, and think back to that speech a year from now.

Wily Balkan Politician

And now look at some of the immediate effects. In Yugoslavia you have had a large body of muzzled but stubborn opposition to the policy of Prince Regent Paul and Dr. Milan Stoyadinovitch in seeking the friendship of Germany and Italy. To-day Dr. Stoyadinovitch is in a position to say "If I had done what you wanted, and harnessed our Yugoslav chariot to France and England, to the great democracies, to the League, to Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia would to-day have been in the position of Czechoslovakia. She would have experienced her Gethsemane, her Munich." His argument is incontestable, the opposition has collapsed like a pricked balloon. Stoyadinovitch, striking while the iron is hot, has ordered new elections, which will give him an overwhelming majority.

The recipe for a successful politician in a Balkan country is to hold office during a series of good harvests, to come to power just at the moment when an adventure in Abyssinia has set all your mortal enemies

ardently courting your friendship, and to make good use of these opportunities. Stoyadinovitch is well called Lucky Milan. He came to office, just three years ago, a democrat in a country surrounded by foes (Italy, Hungary, Bulgaria), and that experience of isolation in a sanctionist world a few months later set Italy wooing Yugoslavia and calling off her hounds in Bulgaria and Hungary. Germany, too, courted Yugoslavia in the hope of splitting the Little Entente.

Stoyadinovitch is stout, always smiling, of fine physique, speaks English and German. His policy is not all his own; it is also that of Prince Regent Paul, who inherited it from King Alexander. It is based on the conviction, born at the time of the Rhineland seizure, that France and England, at the decisive moment, would retreat before Germany, that small states would be left in the lurch, as was Abyssinia. Therefore, make friends with Germany and Italy, while keeping the line open to Paris and London.

The policy, bitterly disliked in Yugoslavia, until this month, has been triumphantly vindicated. Stoyadinovitch means, for the Yugoslav to-day, "Look at Benesh—and look at me. Look at Czechoslovakia—and look at Yugoslavia."

Magyars Fall into Line

Contemplate Hungary. Prime Minister is Béla de Imrédy, a good soldier in the war—he is entitled to call himself *vitez* or hero—a good banker after it, a staunch Catholic. After twenty years of arid revisionist politics in Hungary, of shelving the clamant need of that country for social reforms, he was called to power a few months ago by the Regent, Admiral Horthy, as the last hope of curbing National Socialism. Cadaverous, nearly bald, some people compare de Imrédy's features with those of Savonarola. He has imprisoned the Hungarian National Socialist leader, Major Franz Szálasi, kept National Socialism down. His Foreign Minister is the aged Coloman de Kánya, who was a high official in the Austro-Hungarian diplomatic service before the war and, at the Ballhausplatz in Vienna, played a leading part in those tortuous politics which led up to the world war. Wary brown eyes in a brown face; silver hair; clamped lips; open detestation of Czechs; of just what racial stock Kánya comes nobody seems to know.

Desperately the Hungarian Government, in order to ward off the attacks of its National Socialists, is trying to get a piece of Czechoslovakia,

something to make an appeal to its public opinion with. It will get something, not much, but something. But its National Socialists will argue that it was only able to get so much because of Hitler—and they will be right. Whether de Imrédy has soon to give way to a hundred per cent National Socialist Government or not is immaterial—for England. From now on Hungary's destiny is indissolubly linked to that of Germany.

Contemplate Rumania. At the beginning of this year King Carol tried a moderate pro-German, pro-Italian, anti-Jewish Fascist regime there, that of Octavian Goga. The opposition of France, England and America was then too strong; Goga fell, retired to the Riviera, died. Now, after Hitler's triumph at Munich and in Bohemia, Rumania's policy is inevitably veering away from France and towards Germany. The interim cabinet of elder politicians, headed by the Patriarch Miron Cristea, is nearing its end. A pro-German regime, possibly under Vaida Voevod, another Goga, impends; after that, possibly the resurrection of the extreme pro-German, pro-Italian and anti-Jewish movement, the Iron Guard, possibly the release of Corneliu Codreanu.

Consider Bulgaria. Boris, astutest of monarchs, chanced to be in Germany just at the very peak of the crisis. He was in England and France before it, for a short time, in Germany during it for a longer one, after that in Yugoslavia. Now he is back in Sofia. Just twenty years have passed since he saw his father Ferdinand off at the station after the abdication. Nation-wide rejoicings accompanied the 20th anniversary of his accession. Boris is really loved in Bulgaria. He is a good family man and the pictures of him with his little daughter Marie-Luise, of him and the Queen walking in the streets of Sofia with this little girl between them, are charming. But Boris, while guiding little Marie-Luise's hand as she writes in her copybook, misses no detail of the European drama with those sharp, shrewd, restless blue eyes of his—and he chanced to be in Berlin when the crisis was at its peak.

The little states are scurrying to put themselves on the right side of Germany. They have been forced to. Czechoslovakia was to have been twenty years old this month.

NEVER JAM TO-DAY

It is either too late or too early for collective security as a feasible peace programme.—*"The New Republic," New York.*

THE "PEACE" OF MUNICH

Mr. Eden: "Peace is
saved. I fear the worst
for Europe."

"Die Brennessel,"
Berlin.



"Mazda," Paris.
"Your nationality?"
The Czech: "Have you a recent news-
paper?"



"Philadelphia Record"
NOBEL PRIZEWINNER?

THE OPEN FORUM



BRITISH POLICY AND THE CRISIS

Why I Do Not Condemn It

by THE RT. HON. VISCOUNT SAMUEL, G.C.B., G.B.E.

In this section we publish, without necessarily sharing the views they express, articles from men of international fame. This month we have the honour of publishing an analysis of British policy from the distinguished Liberal statesman, Lord Samuel. Among the offices which Lord Samuel has held are those of Home Secretary, in 1916 and again in 1931-32, High Commissioner in Palestine, 1920-25, and President of the British Institute of Philosophy. There can be no statesman whose objectivity in supporting Mr. Chamberlain can be so completely beyond question as his

IT has been clear for a long time past that Britain, faced by the emergence of Nazi Germany, has had before her a choice of two policies. One takes its stand on the supremacy of Law, the duty of collective resistance to aggression; would try to remove grievances that were legitimate, but not if pressed by threats of war; would array an overwhelming force of peace-loving nations against the militarists; would declare clearly on what line we would take our stand and our determination to defend that line with all our resources and at every sacrifice. The other policy recognises that, in the relations between the Western Powers and Germany, a long series of disastrous mistakes have been made, ever since the Armistice in 1918 right up to the present time. It is impossible merely to admit these mistakes, to regret them and to pass on. "Over past events not even the gods have power." The record stands, and the consequences are what they must be. There were the provisions of the Versailles Treaty itself, with its Reparation Clauses, its Colonial Clauses and its frontier lines, some of them vitiated from the beginning. There was the disarmament of Germany, accompanied by the pledge that the Allies would disarm

similarly; their failure, during fifteen years, to do that or to show any disposition to do it. There was the occupation of the Ruhr, followed by the inflation of the German currency and the ruin of millions of Germans. There was the refusal to allow Austria to find an escape from economic disaster in a Customs Union with the Reich. The second alternative, then, starts from a frank recognition of all these blunders, would try to understand the recoil they have evoked in Germany, would face the consequences and endeavour to retrieve the situation. The effort may fail; we may be forced back in the end upon defensive war; provision must be made against that eventuality; but at all events let the attempt be honestly made.

There the choice lies. The two policies are separate and different. It is useless, and it is dangerous, to haver and waver between them. We must take one or the other. For my own part, I hold that the first policy is wrong and that the second policy is right; and I will submit my reasons.

* * * * *

For many of the chief features in Nazi philosophy and Nazi activities most British people have an intense aversion. The suppression of liberty of thought and action; the subordination of the individual spirit to State dictation; the exaltation of Power above Justice; the ready recourse to violence; and the consequences of all this in the oppression of political opponents, of Catholics and Protestants; in the cruel persecution of the Jews; in the abominations that go on in many of the prison camps—these things revolt the minds of humane and enlightened men and women, here and everywhere. They must necessarily be a bar to any feeling of cordiality or of sympathy for the Germany of to-day among nations which set high value on Liberty and on Justice. Nevertheless, that is not a sufficient reason for rejecting offhand all German claims without even considering whether they are in themselves reasonable or not. The existence of eighty millions of Germans is a fact; that they are controlled by Nazi rulers and obey their commands is also a fact. The world cannot get on at all if international relations are made to depend on the view taken of internal regimes—whether it be the regime of Russia under Tsarism or Russia under the Soviets, or of Germany or Italy under their dictatorships. We have to live in the same world and in the same continent as Germany. We must listen to what she says, however much we

may resent the tone and the manner in which she says it.

"I will concede everything to reason; I will yield nothing to pressure"; that was an admirable principle. But how much, in fact, has been conceded to reason in the course of European affairs during the last twenty years? Article 19 of the Covenant of League of Nations provides a procedure for the peaceful revision of treaties. It has never once been used. And it was never likely to be used, for its operation required unanimity; even a single nation which was a party concerned and would be affected adversely by a proposed change was given the right to veto it. But if in fact you never concede anything to reason, sooner or later you will be obliged by your opponent, and by your own conscience, to yield to pressure.

Mr. Duff Cooper says that there comes a point when we can retire no longer, when we must be ready to risk all for the sake of the thing in which we deeply believe. Otherwise we prefer ease to honour, decadence to greatness. Quite true; undoubtedly there is a point at which a stand must be made. But we must be sure that the ground is morally solid. Should we have been on solid ground if we had gone to war to maintain a unilateral disarmament of Germany, when we had ourselves undertaken that disarmament should be general? Or to resist the military re-occupation of the Rhineland—as much a part of German territory as Kent is part of England or Normandy of France? Or even to stop the union with Austria?

It is urged, however, that Czechoslovakia gave us the line; here at last was a clear issue. Let us agree that the methods used by Herr Hitler were indefensible. The grievances of the Sudeten Germans were exaggerated and their feelings inflamed beyond all measure. It was clear at the end that a settlement by agreement was not even wished for. The provisions finally adopted were patently unjust in many particulars. There ought undoubtedly to have been plebiscites in the minority areas; conducted under international control after calm had been re-established, and followed by a transfer of populations and by proper financial and economic adjustments. But would anyone assert that—if these points were the only ones at issue—Europe would have been justified in engaging in a general war because of them? Hard though it be to say it, we are driven to the conclusion that it would be better for the Czechs to suffer those wrongs than for them, and all the great nations as well, to endure that calamity.

It was certain that, if war came, the Czechs could not have been protected militarily. Their powerful fortifications on the west would have availed little, for there is every reason to believe that the invasion would have come from the south and have been overwhelming. The sufferings of the refugees now, tragic as they are, would have faded into insignificance compared with the sufferings of the same people, and multitudes more, under war. Further, if war had come, and at the end the anti-German alliance had conquered—what then? After years, perhaps, of immeasurable agonies, millions killed, cities devastated, the economic system of Europe in ruins—a Peace Conference would have met. Would that Conference have put back the Sudeten German population under Czech rule? Probably not. But if not, what would the peoples in that day have thought of the statesmen of this day who had accepted such awful calamities for the sake of an object which, after the struggle was over and the victory won, they did not even wish to achieve?

* * * * *

It is urged, however, that there would in fact have been no war. A resolute attitude on the part of France, Britain and Russia—years ago, or even six months ago, or even one day before Herr Hitler's Nuremberg speech—declaring, clearly and beyond all chance of mistake, that any attack upon Czechoslovakia would instantly bring them into the field in her support, this, it is confidently asserted, would have removed the danger of war altogether. Very possibly it would. But perhaps also it would not.

Any such guarantee at an earlier date would almost certainly have strengthened the natural reluctance of the Czechs to make concessions to the minorities. The reluctance was natural, since any concessions must in some degree have imperilled the future safety of their State; for this reason they had failed for twenty years to arrive at a settlement such as, at the time of the Runciman mission, they were at last prepared to concede. In those circumstances the conflict would have remained. War might have been postponed, but not necessarily avoided. Meanwhile, Britain's guarantee would have involved us at every stage in Czechoslovakia's internal politics. It would also have made us in effect partners in the Franco-Russian-Czech alliance. Europe then would have been definitely divided into two blocs, facing each other in mutual fear and distrust. That was a

situation which far-seeing statesmen everywhere deprecated; the British Imperial Conference of 1937 unanimously and strongly urged that that alignment at least should be averted. For a division of that kind would almost inevitably have led to war; just as the old policy of Balance of Power, during the centuries when it prevailed in Europe, led to one war after another in unending succession.

Finally, it is urged that even if, in spite of a firm attitude on the part of the three Powers, war did come, either at that moment or later, it would be worth while. It would be a war for great principles, so great that all good men should be willing to lay down their lives for their sake. Czechoslovakia, the Sudeten Germans, would have been merely incidents—the occasion but not the real issue. The real issue would have been whether the civilised world should lie prostrate under the jack-boots of militarism. At one time or at another time Hitler's ambitions would most certainly involve Europe in war. Better to have it now before his forces became yet stronger and while there was still a Czech army to fight on our side.

But this is clearly the policy of Preventive War. If we are told that the question of the Sudeten Germans was only an incident; that it was not a vital matter whether Herr Hitler was right or was wrong on that particular point, that what really mattered was the consequence of yielding to a claim pressed in so brutal a fashion, with the prospect of the further claims that such surrender would surely encourage—if that is the argument, then clearly we are being asked to involve ourselves and others in all the incalculable disasters of a European war, not for a definite and immediate purpose, but in order to avoid other disasters anticipated in the future. However vehemently it may be denied, that is, in fact, Preventive War.

A policy of that kind is always wrong. History is full of examples of sections of opinion in various countries at various times, alarmed and angry at the threatening attitude of some neighbour, proclaiming that war was inevitable sooner or later, and that it was better to face it then, for fear that conditions might be less favourable later. Often this immoral advice was, fortunately, rejected; at the critical moment the conflict was avoided; then the atmosphere changed; enemies became friends; and the war which was declared to be inevitable, was shown not to be so by the best of all proofs—the fact that it did not occur. So it may be now.

"No one," it has been said, "can foresee the future, not even those who make it." The statesmen who say that war will surely come may be right; and we are bound to take measures of defence to provide against that eventuality. But also they may be wrong. To wage war on the strength of a prophecy and for the sake of a hypothesis would be criminal folly. Better to face the risk of war in the future, even though the risk be obvious and grave, than to accept the certainty of war now.

* * * * *

For my own part, therefore, I cannot join those who condemn Mr. Chamberlain's policy during the crisis. In points of detail one may dissent, but *in the situation as it then was* it was the only way to avoid disaster. This, however, is not to condone the actions—and the inactions—which helped to bring about that situation. For the long catalogue of errors committed and opportunities missed this country cannot escape a share of responsibility—nor the present Government. The hope of the world lay in the League of Nations. For ten years the League functioned with success. The statesmen who allowed it to fall to its present level of powerlessness will deserve the censure of history. The turning-point, we can already see, was at the time of the Italian aggression on Abyssinia. Then the League was in line and mobilised, ready to act strongly in support of the principle of collective security. The Hoare-Laval Agreement led to an ignominious collapse. Nevertheless, the best hope for the future is still, I believe, in a restoration of the League. Clearly this cannot be achieved now or soon; and in any case not with a revival of the scheme of sanctions which was allowed to fail and has now been abandoned. But with a more restricted programme the League, after a time and in calmer conditions, may be able to secure a more extended membership; then, by reasoned consultation and friendly co-operation, it may help one more to safeguard the peace of the world.

DEMOBILISATION—SOVIET STYLE

During the last 18 months the Soviet army has lost from executions: 2 Field Marshals, 3 out of 6 District Commanders, 10 out of 13 Army Commanders, 57 out of 85 Corps Commanders, 110 out of 193 Divisional Commanders.

In other words, over 50 per cent of the higher ranks have been shot. Imagine what chaos there must be.—*Letter to "Time and Tide," London.*

TWENTY YEARS AFTER



"Il Travaso delle Idee," Rome

The League: "Nobody asked for me, I suppose?"



"Kladderadatsch," Berlin.

IT WAS ONCE A GOOD GAME

Lloyd George: "Curious, it always used to fit together, this Czechoslovak jigsaw."



AUNTY LEAGUE

WATCHES THE VERSAILLES

LEAVES FALL

(Only the Colonies are left to come.)

"Stimpelcarnus," Munich

MUSSOLINI IN THE CRISIS

Italy's Future Rôle

by GEORGE MARTELLI

Mr. Martelli, former "Morning Post" correspondent in the Abyssinian war, is the author of "Italy Against the World," an intimate history of that vitally important episode in Anglo-Italian-League relations; and now, after a tour of investigation of the countries of the Mediterranean, he has written a very lively account of his experiences and conclusions in a new book, "Whose Sea?", which has just been published by Chatto & Windus

IT has always been obvious that the Rome-Berlin Axis was something less than a military alliance. For that reason efforts to weaken the Axis were regarded as a legitimate employment for British diplomacy. It was realised that however much appearances might suggest the contrary, Italy had not made her choice and that it was still not impossible to wean her from Germany. It was in this belief, at any rate, that Mr. Chamberlain's policy of Anglo-Italian *rapprochement* found considerable support at home. As a diplomatist put it, we had to make it easy for Mussolini to rat on Hitler. During the recent crisis there were some signs that the policy was being justified. But after the solution found at Munich one may question whether its benefits have not been lost.

For many months past I have been regularly asking my Italian friends what their Government would do when the next war started. I think it is literally true that none of them knew. The nearest I ever got to a direct answer was, "it depends on you." Another way of saying that it would depend on the price which England, and France, could pay for Italian assistance. Naturally the extent and nature of the "consideration" were never defined. One gathered it would have to include certain facilities in connection with Abyssinia, and a satisfactory settlement of outstanding Mediterranean problems, such as Spain and, possibly, Tunis. It was clear, however, that there was one factor which dominated every other in the Italian mind when considering its attitude to a European war; and that was the question: "which side is going to win?"

To a close observer the evolution of Italian opinion in the course of the Czechoslovak crisis was one of its most interesting aspects. Outwardly the official line did not vary. Mussolini had written off the Sudetenland


as he had to write off Austria. He had long ago decided that no effective resistance would be put up by France and England; in consequence there was no danger in backing Germany and it was better to support what he could not prevent. A diplomatic success for Hitler would strengthen the Axis, above all it would strengthen fascism against democracy. It was only when the danger of war appeared that this policy underwent a modification. Mussolini did not want a war for several reasons, of which two were pre-eminent. In the first place there seemed a chance, if Germany forced the issue, of a stronger coalition being ranged against her. In this case the odds were against success and Italy would have been faced with the invidious alternatives of betraying her partner after openly espousing his cause, or of throwing in her lot with the weaker side.

Unpopular Axis

On the other hand there were indications that Italian public opinion was anything but enamoured of an alliance with Germany. It is common knowledge that the Axis has never been popular in Italy. It was fabricated in a spirit of truculence, when Italy felt herself isolated by world opinion. In spite of sanctions and Mr. Eden, the popular sentiment is still pro-English rather than pro-German. The Italian royal family has never liked the association with Germany; the Vatican has more than once showed what it thought of the Nazis; in spite of Fascist propaganda the man in the street, if he is old enough, still remembers the Allied victory as readily as he remembers all that followed it. Whatever the truth of them, the rumours of King Victor-Emanuel's threat to resign, and of riots in Milan to protest against the pro-German policy, had a foundation of probability. The Italians have been at war on and off—but more on than off—since 1935. The idea of being engaged in hostilities with England, France, and Russia, with an unfriendly America in the background, was evidently profoundly repugnant to them.

It was against this background of increasing internal anxiety that Mussolini was forced to consider the direction he was being driven in. While he continued to make speeches reiterating his sympathy with Germany, behind the scenes he was acting very differently. I have been told on excellent authority that during the whole of September, Rome was advising caution in Berlin. There was certainly no binding promise of military support. Towards the end of the month, as the outlook

became critical. Italians were saying that they would start by being neutral. This was confirmed by Mussolini himself, who in a public statement envisaged the conflict in successive periods, during the first of which he expected it to "localised." As to what would happen if the conflagration spread, Italy, he announced had already taken her stand. But of this most Italians were much less sure. Most of them agreed that it would depend on circumstances, especially the course taken by the war in the opening stages.




From "Whose Sea?" by George Martelli
FASCIST MONUMENT IN LIBYA

If anything were needed to prove the reluctance with which he contemplated hostilities, Mussolini's alacrity in playing the role of peace-maker demonstrates it beyond doubt. Had Mr. Chamberlain not thought of asking the Duce to intervene with his fellow dictator, it is quite likely that he would have done it spontaneously. The Prime Minister's request gave him the opportunity of performing the action more successfully. It also made it possible for Hitler to make the token concession of attending the Munich conference. One can do for one's friends what one would not do for an apparent opponent. Having "saved Europe from war," Mussolini had done all that his policy required. In the diplomatic, as opposed to the military field, he had nothing to gain by forcing Hitler to

yield more than was necessary for the avoidance of hostilities. He was thus able to bring to Munich his full support for the satisfaction of the Nazi claim. It was the Italian delegation's memorandum which formed the basis of discussion in the conference and whose adoption gave Germany as much as, if not more than, she demanded in the Godesberg memorandum. Thus the Rome-Berlin Axis was given a new lease of life. Italy avoided the dreaded choice, and she remained in a stronger position than ever for demanding concessions from the democracies as the price of her eventual friendship.

The question remains: what would Italy have done had Europe been involved in war? As we have seen, in the initial stage she would have adopted an attitude of armed neutrality, with a view to intervening later where her interest suggested. It is possible, however, that the course of the war would have limited her freedom of choice and forced her to decide with the minimum of delay. In Spain, for instance, which she might have made the touchstone of relations with the democracies, it seems likely that a rude surprise was in store. If reports are to be credited, the French Army had plans for occupying part of the peninsula as a safeguard against its use as a hostile base. There have also been rumours of a French march across Lombardy, with the object of attacking the Greater Germany on its flank and relieving the pressure on Czechoslovakia. Italy would certainly have resisted this with arms, while the entry of French divisions into Spain could scarcely have been to her liking. It would have left her with the choice of accepting an alliance on Franco-British terms, or of going into immediate opposition. In sheer despite she might have opted for the latter course.


If on the other hand France and Britain had tried to woo her with concessions, the difficulties to be overcome would still have been formidable. Fascism could not be fobbed off with promises. There would have been no Treaty of London with eventual and conditional rewards held out. Mussolini would have wanted his support to be paid for on the nail. And his price would have been high. Tunis, some say; a part of the Sudan  semi-control of the Suez Canal, according to others. One cannot see either the French or British Government, in the tremendous stress of a world war, however hardly they might be pressed, taking decisions about such matters at short notice. With public opinion exasperated by delay in satisfying her "legitimate demands," Mussolini might have found the necessary backing at home to bring his country into war

on the German side, especially if that side appeared to be winning, as was not improbable in the opening stages. Or he might have decided there was not sufficient inducement either way, and continued in an attitude of watchful impassivity, waiting for the favourable moment.

Nobody can say what any country would do even in given circumstances, let alone when the circumstances are unknown. In view of what has actually happened, speculations about Italy's attitude if something else had happened are of purely academic interest. The important thing to note is that the outlook in Europe, and therefore of Italy, before October 1st was entirely different from the prospect which confronts us all to-day. The accretion of strength to Germany which has resulted from the Munich conference has radically changed the balance of power in Europe. With her eastern frontier secured, either by neutral states such as Poland, or by subservient quasi-dependencies like Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and with the danger from blockade progressively diminishing, Germany becomes at least the equal in strength of Britain and France combined. Unless this position is rectified by Russia, control of the balance passes definitely out of the hands of this country. The advantage enjoyed by Britain for the last two centuries, which enabled her, thanks to the nice balancing of continental forces, either to remain

ON TOUR

"I find myself a bit short of new monologues. . . . Would you like me to sing you 'Rigoletto'?"



Le Canard Enchaîné
Paris


aloof or to tip the scales in her own favour, is lost—perhaps for ever. If the Four Power Pact becomes a reality, as was proposed at Munich, it is Italy who will henceforth hold the balance.

This is the goal which Italian policy has always pursued, but has never until now attained. Often in the past Italy temporarily occupied the position where her favours were bid for by the two opposing groups in Europe. Her pre-war diplomacy was a model of judicious promiscuity. Her flirtations with various Powers were always carried on with an eye to the main chance, and they succeeded to the extent of raising her from the status of a penniless debutante to that of a desirable *parti*. It was thus that she immobilised opposition to her war of conquest in Tripoli. By the same methods she was able to ask a considerable price for her intervention on the side of the Entente, after repudiating the Triple Alliance. But though she made the best of her worth as an ally, she could never really be said to hold the balance. Her relative strength justified efforts to cultivate her friendship, but it was not enough to exercise a decisive influence. After the war, she resumed her perch on the fence, but it was only by following Britain that she was able to maintain it. The dissipation of force in Abyssinia and Spain destroyed what was left of her freedom of action. During all this period the destiny of Europe lay in the lap of Britain and everybody knew it. This is no longer the case and Italians may be pardoned for feeling exalted when they consider from whom the mantle which has descended upon them has fallen.

The first tribute to Italy's newly acquired status is the decision of the French Government to appoint an Ambassador in Rome, thus implicitly recognising the Italian Empire in Ethiopia. As far as is known no *quid pro quo* is being asked for this concession, although hopes are held out of its leading to a wider Franco-Italian agreement including a settlement in Spain. Another tribute is the insistent rumour of an early meeting between Mr. Chamberlain and Signor Mussolini. How will Italy exploit her privileged situation? It is reported that the Duce is in conciliatory mood, is even ready to allow the Spaniards to finish their quarrel by themselves. This is a change from the attitude of a few weeks ago, when it was being said that no solution would be acceptable in Rome short of a complete Franco victory. It is believed that the French internal situation, which some consider as foreshadowing the end of the Popular Front, has made Italy more amenable in regard to Spain. It is hoped that the portents are as favourable as is suggested. It would, however,

surprise at least one observer if Italy did not see in the new balance an occasion to advance her own claims.

How long she will be able to hold this balance is another question. Its position is shifting so rapidly that it may soon pass out of the control of Italy. There are indications that Mussolini is by no means reassured about his own interests in central and eastern Europe. After the *Anschluss* Italy had to do a considerable amount of writing off, and she must recently have discounted further losses, especially in Hungary and Yugoslavia. From the purely economic point of view the prospect of German penetration eastward and south-eastward is even less gratifying to Italy than it is for Britain and France. It seems as though she may soon be faced with the choice either of combining with the Balkan countries to oppose the German advance, or of turning her back definitely on a Nazified Europe and devoting all her energies to an active Mediterranean and Imperial policy. Here, however, it is possible she would meet with more resistance than the western Powers were prepared to oppose to Germany. Ultimately, therefore, she may well be forced to combine with the west in a last stand for what remains of Christian civilisation in the old world. But before that hour strikes we can foresee more than one major crisis.



"Le Canard Enchaîné"

IN PARIS AFTER MUNICH

"The papers say you're terribly
ashamed. . . ."
"You too. Ha! Ha!"

"Marianne"

"That's Truttmann, the armaments
manufacturer."
"Ah, one of the peace-wounded."

IT'S ALL RIGHT THIS TIME

"Hard things are being said about the German Chancellor to-day but the House ought to recognise a real and substantial contribution on his part . . . The contribution of Signor Mussolini was certainly notable . . . most helpful . . ." Prime Minister, House of Commons, Oct. 3rd

Let us, who friendship's path pursue,
Give credit where the credit's due,
Avoiding the distorted view
Of frenzied demonstrators
Whose version of democracy
(Mere rampant ideology)
Assumes that we can not agree
With Europe's armed Dictators.

Their ideologic violence
Gives very natural offence
And bruises budding confidence
With wounding allegations—
I from mistaken zeal refrain
But try and try and try again
In friendly talks to ascertain
The price of good relations.

When war-clouds gathered, since dispersed,
Herr Hitler would not let them burst
Till we had patiently conversed
And found a fair solution.
Thus we, without one word of force,
Removed the trouble at the source.
(Here Mussolini made, of course,
A valued contribution.)

It took me but one tête-a-tête
The fallacy to dissipate
That Leaders of a Fascist state
Are greedy, grim or frightful.
In fact, if we can once dismiss
The ideologic prejudice,
The truth about Dictators is
They're perfectly delightful.

REYNARD.

KING IBN SA'UD SPEAKS

His First Published Interview

By H. ST. J. B. PHILBY

"So far as possible," writes Mr. Philby from Riyadh, capital of Sa'udi Arabia. "I have given the King's views in his own words. And I have his permission to make them public if I think they would be of interest to the world. The fact that His Majesty's views, already well enough known to the British Government, have never yet been published gives added importance to the breaking of his studied silence at what is a supremely critical moment"

ON Sunday, August 7th, the Arab world was electrified by the broadcast announcement that the Secretary of State for the Colonies had paid a surprise visit by air to Jerusalem and had already departed on his return to England. During the bare twenty-four hours of his stay he had seen the sights of the Holy Land by air and by car, and he sat in conference with the High Commissioner, the General Officer commanding the troops in Palestine, and other high officials. The dramatic appearance and disappearance of the *deus ex machina* portended good or evil—no one knew which.

A notice was issued by the Broadcasting Station at Ramallah that the High Commissioner would be on the air the next evening at 8 o'clock. Arabia tuned in—every receiver in the country was listening in. The moment arrived. *Parturiunt montes nascetur ridiculus mus*. Sir Harold MacMichael spoke—he sounded suitably emotional—for barely two minutes and in those two minutes he delivered himself of platitude after platitude like a child repeating a lesson in class. At Riyadh the feeling was one of disappointment and of irritation that such an occasion had been used to repeat sentiments bordering on the burlesque.

I had had frequent opportunities of discussing Arab affairs in general and the present situation in particular with His Majesty King Ibn Sa'ud, but His Majesty had generally evaded any statement of his sentiments for publication and I had refrained from any precise definition of his views and policy. I accordingly seized the present opportunity of ascertaining something of his views with the idea of

publication—relying on my long-standing friendship with His Majesty and of his knowledge of my constant efforts in furthering the interests of the Arabs.

I began by explaining to His Majesty the sentiments I had heard expressed by various individuals and the trend of various articles I had read in the European and Arabic papers. I suggested the general astonishment of the public at the studied silence he had adopted in regard to the present situation.

His Majesty replied to all this in the following words: "I have considered that in present circumstances silence is the wisest course. In arriving at that conclusion I have put my trust in God and my reliance on the knowledge of all intelligent folk in Islam and among the Arabs of the deep sincerity of my religious and national convictions. That is one reason and another is that I have not thought the circumstances suitable for the expression of my views."

"The present situation," I persisted, "demands an expression of your views so that the world may know them. Can your Majesty explain more clearly the reason of your silence and unwillingness to speak at the present time when everyone concerned with the Arab cause is deeply concerned to know your Majesty's opinion?" I added: "Your Majesty is fully aware of your position in the Arab world, and you know also how the British Government respects your sentiments and acknowledges your status in Islam and Arabia. As your friend, it would not be backward in according favourable consideration of your views if you explained matters and communicated your opinions to it. On the other hand, you see the Arabs and Islam greatly exercised by affairs in Palestine, while many of them regret and criticise your silence."

His Majesty replied: "There is no doubt, indeed, of the friendship of Great Britain. The policy we have adopted with our political discussions with Britain and other Powers is to treat all our conversations as confidential until we have disposed of the difficulties under consideration. I am satisfied that I have never failed to offer advice when I believed that the advice I had to offer was in the mutual interests of the English and the Arabs. Now I have offered such advice in the clearest terms, and expressed my opinions to Great Britain regarding the present situation and the consequences that may be expected from the present policy she is following."

"That," I interrupted, "is certainly praiseworthy, but what is more important is that the world should know your opinions and that you yourself should be informed as to the reaction of Great Britain to your advice and representations."

His Majesty replied:

"There are three reasons which lead me to think that the time is not ripe for such a public utterance. Firstly, because England is the friend of the Arabs and of all nations the one most needful of conciliating the Arabs and according to them their rights in view of the need for protecting her own interests and communications. Secondly, because between England and the Arabs there exist covenants and agreements, as everybody knows. And thirdly, because the present state of affairs and its consequences are not concealed from Great Britain, while, if the British Government is weighing the matter as it deserves to be weighed and is actively considering it, then there is still hope that it will reconsider its position and take action in a manner consonant with its own interests and the interests of its Muslim and Arab friends, thus returning to the more reasonable course. But if Britain has other objectives in view, then it seems to me that the words are of no use whatever if she has made up her mind and has determined to pursue such a course."

After a request from me that he should express an opinion as regards the advisability of keeping, at any rate, the Arabs advised of his views, His Majesty pursued:

"God be praised, the Arabs understand well enough where I stand. They know me as the champion of their faith and race, but of a truth I do not see much advantage in giving expression to my sentiments and advice under present conditions. I have no desire to speak more precisely on this subject. Nevertheless, fearing that my words may be interpreted in a manner which does not represent my views, I will give you a partial answer to your question. My advice to the Arabs from the beginning of my reign—and you know the Arabs are naturally intelligent as well as courageous and noble-minded—has been that they should be united both to defend their common interests and to give added weight to their status abroad. To this day, unfortunately, my hopes and wishes have in no way been realised. Most of the Arabs pursue their courses independently, though the aim and objective of all are identical. This plurality of ideals has certainly

caused a setting-back of progress towards the desired goal. Talk without complete agreement and absolute confidence cannot produce the desired results. So when I saw this divergence of ideas I fell back upon myself and remained content to express my personal opinions only to those that referred to me or asked me my views on matters of concern to Arabia and Islam."

"I am given to understand," I said, "from the opinions I have heard expressed by Arabs and their chief leaders, that Your Majesty's opinion is that which counts the highest in their view. I feel I am not far wrong in believing that they would in no way ignore your advice and guidance."

"That, of course, is true enough," replied His Majesty; "I myself do not doubt it for a moment, but all the same I have faith in the words of the poet who said:

'Wisdom consists of acting only when
The consequences of your act you clearly ken.'

"My instinctive nature is such that before entering upon any matter I always look round to make sure that there is an exit as well as an entrance."

I craved His Majesty's permission to put him a specific question regarding Palestine—namely the Jews' justification of their position in that country. His Majesty replied he preferred not to make any comment on that issue, but I insisted that England believed herself to have made promises to the Jews in the Balfour Declaration just as she had also made promises to the Arabs. His Majesty laughed and was silent. "I do not wish," he said at last, "to answer you on that point." I insisted: "It is the point on which the English rely."

"Glory be to God," he said at last, "that did not appoint a distant mark for the marksman! The Balfour promise was indeed the greatest injustice of Great Britain. Is it possible to imagine a greater calamity than taking away the lands and dwellings of the Arabs forcibly and handing them over to others? Why does Europe criticise Germany and others for turning out the Jews from their countries in which they are a minority in German (or other) territory and not find fault with herself (Europe) for scheming to turn the Arabs out of their country in order that the Jews may dwell therein? Admitting the British promises to the Arabs and the British Covenant with them, after all they did not give the Arabs any new property, they did not give them

anything more than their own lands, their dwellings and the dwellings of their fathers and forefathers before them. The Arabs have been domiciled in these territories, which they conquered from the Romans, for hundreds of years in unchallenged proprietary right. So how can there be a question of comparing one set of promises with the other?"

"If this is, then, Your Majesty's opinion," I said, "why do you not advise the English accordingly?"

"I can assure you," he replied, "that these matters are not hidden. England knows her own interests better than us. We have not failed to inform her of what is in our minds."

I then asked His Majesty if he would tell me what would be his attitude if Great Britain decided in favour of partition, and actually set up a Jewish state and invited him to accord recognition thereto. "The answer to that question," replied His Majesty, "is very simple and quite obvious. The Arabs are many, and Islam is multiple. Now, if the Arabs declined to recognise the Jewish State, then I would obviously be with them and of them. And if they were united in agreeing to such recognition, then I would remain alone in my view. And everybody knows full well that such action would not be consistent with my religion nor would it to the interests of the situation in which I find myself."

"One more question!" I pleaded as His Majesty showed signs of wishing to terminate the interview; "Can Your Majesty offer any suggestion for a solution of the Palestine problem?" And His Majesty answered: "I have already given you my views in the course of this talk. And, if there is anything new in what I have said from which the English and the Arabs may derive satisfaction, then the time for discussing it will arrive in due course."

OBVIOUSLY

A Press campaign is being waged, from the *Action Française* to the *Jour*. . . . "How do you think you are going to resist Germany? We haven't enough tanks, we haven't enough planes."

It is apparently because we weren't ready that there wasn't a war.

"Rearm," say the *Action Française* and the *Jour*.

Ridiculous.

If it's a fact that we have had the luck to escape our deaths because there wasn't everything there should be, there is one obvious solution.

Let us remain resolutely unready.—"*Le Canard Enchaîné*," Paris.



THE LION AND SWASTIKA ~

A NIGHTMARE GONE

From the "Nationalzeitung," Essen (organ of General Goering), 1.10.38

More than the acquisition of the Sudetenland, the Anglo-German declaration at Munich was hailed by the Germans as an epoch-making event. The dread of finding themselves waging war against the world once more gave way to optimism about a bright future for Europe in general and Germany in particular, later tempered by the announcement of intensified British rearmament

"**M**ISFORTUNES never come singly," according to the popular saying. To-day the German people will be inclined to say the same of good fortune. For the events of yesterday—the conclusion of the Four-Power Agreement in Munich, which freed Europe from the nightmare of a threatened general war, and led 3½ million Sudeten Germans home to the Reich in accordance with the Führer's unbending will, together with the declaration of the Führer and Chamberlain about the

will for final appeasement and co-operation between Germany and England—mean inexpressibly deeply felt happiness and good fortune to us all. Not in the sense of a stroke of luck, but in the sense of joy-bringing success as the result of years of hard work, based on a deep inner longing.

The World Against Them

Ever since the Führer announced for the first time that 10,000,000 Germans outside the Reich frontiers were hoping for a homecoming to the Reich—by which he meant our brothers in Austria and the Sudetenland—every German has known what the next goal of German policy must and would be. Now that goal is reached, now that we are taking these 3½ million Germans from the Sudetenland into the protection of the Reich, every one of us knows, of course, that the success of Munich signifies an immense strengthening of German prestige in the world. We have become accustomed in the last few years to find that an increase in Germany's might and prestige has simultaneously brought with it among some of our neighbours an increase in their incomprehensible fear of Germany. "Many enemies, much honour," is the saying, it is true; but it also seems to work the other way round: "Much honour, many enemies." And so there were not a few Germans who, despite their joy at the ever-growing prestige and power of the Reich, pointed out that, by following this path, we should one day again be opposed by the entire world.

They seemed to be right! The days which followed the Führer's final speech at the Party Congress did indeed seem to be uniting the whole world again, almost as in 1914-18, in the wish to destroy this increasingly strong Germany afresh. The depression and anxiety which weighed in the last few days on Germany arose perhaps not so much from the feeling that we were moving towards another great war, as from the feeling that in this war we should again be opposed by such an immensely superior enemy power. The "nightmare of coalitions" against Germany, which stopped Bismarck from sleeping peacefully, rose during these days once more before the German people. All that enabled the nerves of the people to stand this fearful test of endurance was their fervent confidence in the Führer, the knowledge that they had in the Duce a better ally than the tottering Imperial House of Hapsburg, and the knowledge of the fresh strengthening of the German defence forces.

In the night hours of the 29-30 September, this crisis was removed, the liberation of the Sudeten Germans accomplished, the young Great Germany Reich strengthened afresh by the accession of a considerable portion of its race, and its prestige in the eyes of the world increased to a fantastic extent. On the morning of the 30th September this was already clear to the German people. But by the evening of this same 30th September, the nightmare of coalitions began to disappear as well. By the frank conversation between Adolf Hitler and the British Premier, a breach was made in the post-war edifice of hate. Was this act an even greater one than that of the previous evening? It would be impossible to answer this question. But the German people believe that both together signify a deed which will be of the most immense importance for generations to come.

With this declaration the world of the Versailles Treaty sinks; and a new world shall rise in its place, the world of an honourable and true peace in Europe.

Germans and Englishmen hear this message. Will they believe it? We are convinced they will! In England, too, the people are longing for real peace. And after what has happened they will look with sincere respect and firm confidence on the man who brought this message, on "good old Neville!"

TOWARDS A NEW EUROPE

by DR. KARL SILEX (Editor)

From the "Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung," Berlin, 4.10.38

PEACE is now assured and the great political problems of the world are being attacked on a new basis. The *Temps* has immediately started examining a new French foreign policy from all angles. The Entente with England remains its basis; it has for us Germans no terrors, if only because it increases France's feeling of security, which is in any case a good thing. The value of France's Soviet alliance has been written off by history, and the Little Entente changed from the bottom up. In place of a vague, unsuccessful Geneva collectivism, France now envisages a "European directorate" in which our courageous neighbouring nation will play its part. In our leading article on Sunday, Professor Grimm reached conclusions which signify nothing less than a break with the unhappy tradition of a thousand-year old so-called "natural enmity" and

which justifies the most welcome hopes of Franco-German neighbourliness and co-operation. That French wishes are now turning also towards a settlement of differences with Italy fills their German friends with satisfaction.

The *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* need scarcely add anything to the announcement of the Hitler-Chamberlain declaration. To-day, many a letter from our readers confirms the particular understanding with which our unwavering attitude in this question has met. Yet we do not want to deceive ourselves as to the fact that it is not only in England that there are Duff Coopers. Memories of the pre-war era, of the unsuccessful

THE COM-
INTERN
IS WORRIED

"Damn, now peace
has broken out, and
we must start all
over again!"



"Simplicissimus,"
Munich

attempts which were constantly made to achieve a German-English *rapprochement*, of the grim outcome of these attempts, has certainly made many a good German sceptical. All too often in the post-war era we could not help gaining the impression that Germany met with English resistance in particular at every fresh attempt to demonstrate the life that was in her, however necessary and just. And on the other side the feeling persisted, which once expressed itself in the slogan of a German invasion and then in all sorts of other ways. It was the feeling that it was only Germany on the whole big earth which threatened England. It was a very unhistoric feeling. We have only to remember Waterloo, or the elder Pitt's remark that the English colonies had been conquered in Prussia, by the alliance with the great Prussian king. With the rise of the Second Reich, it is true, economic competition increased, but the English are a much too political people for their motives to be completely explained by the outworn phrase "trade jealousy." The Führer, with logic and foresight, brought realisation of political facts to the consciousness of both sides by the Naval Treaty, by his affirmation of the British Empire and by his claim to the Continental position due to us. That history has given him a foil in the son of old Joseph Chamberlain, who had to sacrifice his political career to his conviction of the rightness of this common goal, is historically as well as from the standpoint of humanity so happy a stroke of fate, that our mutual joy cannot be diminished by a Duff Cooper. But mutual efforts are still very necessary in future.

Armaments Without Arms Race?

If we consider the result of Munich as a whole, we see the common stock of European energy increased. Energies have been set free which have up to now been confined. A hint of this was given by the Führer a short time ago. He asked an English journalist whether he believed that he enjoyed withdrawing half a million workmen from the great German building programme and sending them digging at the frontier. Now reports are already coming in about the first steps towards reducing military measures. The feeling, however, that we are only at the beginning is expressed by the *Daily Telegraph*: "The moral for Britain is now to arm more strongly until a disarmament agreement is concluded, in particular to strengthen air armaments." All naturally depends on how the new common path will now be trodden further. It will be shown

whether unchanged claims of national security can be separated from the conception of an arms race. Everyone has the right to expect an economic upward turn; for the countries which are no longer living in suspicion of one another can now reap the fruits of their peaceful activity in greater measure.

That holds good for the new Czechoslovakia. One cannot, of course, compare the German suffering from Versailles with the necessary acts which the Czech people now have to carry out. For nothing will be torn from the body of the Czech nation; it will, on the contrary, be more homogeneous. But our own experiences make us absolutely capable of appreciating to their full extent the decisions which the Czechs have had to take to carry out the Munich agreement. In particular, the fact that Poland's claims have been met by Prague, and that the Hungarian will be, is a sign for us that Prague would like to make the new State guaranteeable and so help to pave the way for a neighbourly *modus vivendi*. For we have nothing, and never have had anything against the Czech people. It was only, as the Führer expressed it in classic words, that we could not believe that God had created 7,000,000 Czechs in order to oppress 3,500,000 Germans. That is now over and for the first time there are prospects for a real Czech future.

NOW FOR BETTER TRADE!

Germany in Danubia

From the "Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung," (Trade Section), 2.10.38

The article from which this is taken opened with the belief that the Munich Agreements would mean that German labour and capital could now be turned back into productive industry, particularly into building to meet the housing shortage—also that the terrific tempo of work might be slackened sufficiently for the worker to enjoy cultural pleasures

EXTERNALLY, too, German economic policy can now make a fresh start. The Munich Agreement has created an atmosphere in which all kinds of things which were formerly difficult, if not impossible, can be begun and accomplished. More favourable prospects now offer for a re-arrangement of the Central European economic area. The fulfilment of Germany's last territorial demand in Europe by means of peaceful

revision; the prospects of a satisfaction of Polish and Hungarian racial claims against Czechoslovakia, thus removing the poison from the body of the rump State, which now will be capable of living without disturbing its neighbours and thus of being guaranteed—all this creates a Central Europe, which will be unburdened to a previously unthinkable extent, and encouraged to peaceful collaboration, particularly in the economic field.

The way for this development has already been prepared by the dissolution of the "Balkan gendarmerie," which was supposed to help to guard Germany on behalf of the Versailles Powers, by the Balkan Entente, which reconciles former enemies like Greece and Turkey, by the reconciliation of Yugoslavia and Italy, and by the *rapprochement* between Bulgaria and Hungary on the one hand and Rumania and Yugoslavia on the other.

Danubian Mission

This preparatory work of appeasement has been welcomed and furthered by Germany; and now the Führer's initiative has put the finishing touch to the political pacification and re-arrangement of Danubia. We can note three great stages in the emancipation of South-East Europe: first, the formation of the Balkan nations into States; second, the collision with the Hapsburg monarchy, which in its unhappy combination of baroque political form with modern imperialism sought to dominate the Danube basin, succumbed in the attempt, and was partitioned; and now the third stage, the cleaning-up of this partition and the new cohesion of the Danube area in the form of clear-cut, strengthened nations, and in the sign of economic revival of the South-East. In this connection an important rôle falls to Germany, as a Central European Power, who conceives her mission to be above all a Continental one. The last remaining doubters who have been prophesying "Pangermanism" in the "Danube direction" have surely been shown by the Munich Agreements that this rôle is not one of expansion, but peaceful.

Now we shall be able, too, to enter into world trade again to a greater extent—although naturally remembering the lessons learnt in the great crisis and continuing work on defensive economy. But it is obvious that now, particularly in the sign of the German-British declaration of peace, previously non-existent possibilities offer. It may be imagined that the atmosphere will now be better for a clearing up of the remaining

German debts: and that the time is favourable for a new move towards extending German-British trade. The value of Germany's trade partnership, which lies in her stable industrial conditions and her big demand for raw materials, can now for the first time become fully and peacefully effective.


Just as in Munich the authoritarian and democratic Great Powers of Europe made peace and no war of ideologies broke out, so can the system of bilateral barter and that of "the most favoured nation" get on together. On the other hand, there is a possibility of improving the barter treaties and exchange clearing agreements in order to give more play to international credit. In this connection it may well be that the trade policy of the United States will come out of its corner and participate in the economic after-effects of the Peace of Munich.

In a word, the great countries now have a chance of cashing in sensibly on the removal of political uncertainty in Europe.

LITTLE SOMETHING THE KAISER HADN'T GOT

It is now definitely proved that Hitler is a better diplomat than the ex-Kaiser. Wilhelm probably never even dreamed of proposing that the World War be averted by giving Serbia to Austria and Belgium to Germany.—"*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*."

"Good morning, sir! Your bath is ready and war has not broken out to-day."



"*Dublin Opinion*"

CZECHOSLOVAKIA LOOKS AHEAD

LINE UP WITH GERMANY

For the first two of these extracts we are indebted to Mr. G. E. R. Gedye's reports to the "New York Times." The intense bitterness of the Czech Army is particularly stressed by Mr. Gedye, who reports the prominent staff officer who writes under the pseudonym of Stanislav Yester (see WORLD REVIEW, August, 1938) as vehemently advocating the necessity of good relations now with Germany

From the "Lidove Noviny," Prague

WE do not know what is coming next in Europe. We do know that near us is a mighty power, with which our State cannot afford to come into conflict. Long enough have we played for others the role of gendarme to keep Germany in check: when the decisive moment came we found ourselves abandoned—alone.

Very good. If the world is not to be ruled by justice but by force, then our place is with those possessing the greater force and the greater decision. There is nothing else left for us. Let us seek unity with Germany.

Let us, like Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, become one of her great suppliers and customers, and let us refuse to join any combination that would bring us into an anti-German front. Now let us think only of ourselves and henceforth be loyal to ourselves alone.

A FIG FOR YOUR SYMPATHY!

From the "Lidove Listy," Prague

WE have had more than enough of snivelling sympathy in Western States for "that gallant little nation." We cry across our frontiers:

"Make an end of your unwanted demonstrations of sympathy for Czechoslovakia. We realise finally what our situation is in Central Europe, and we will act in accordance with it, whether you like it or not. Our nation bears its defeat and humiliation not only with pain but with very great pride.

"We have backed the wrong horse and we understand how to draw the necessary consequences."

THE GREAT BATTLE TO COME

by WALTHER BARTZ (Prague Correspondent)

From "Die Neue Weltbühne," (German emigré journal), Paris, 6.10.38

Not all in Czechoslovakia follow the policy of despair. The left-wing supporters, whose opinion is voiced here, see hope in the belief that the final "show-down" is yet to come

FORMERLY it meant years, latterly only months, before golden dreams gave way to grim reality regarding new schemes of Nazi conquest. How long will it be this time? The question is easy to answer if one examines what Hitler has won by annexation of the Sudeten districts. The answer is simple: nothing. Two million sufferers from hunger; distressed areas which did not become distressed under Czechoslovakia, but had been since the time of the Emperor Franz Josef; industries which owed their life to the existence of the Czech market, and whose crisis was due above all to the growth of German competitive undertakings; mountainous districts in which no crops grow and no cattle find grazing; magnificent spas which flourished as long as they were visited by foreigners, and which the few Germans capable of paying the prices could maintain no better than they can the Austrian resorts, which a single summer under Hitler's rule has ruined. Perhaps a few coal-mines; but the gain which they represent certainly does not cover the cost of the army's occupation, and the establishment of German administration. What Czechoslovakia has lost cannot be expressed in figures; what Germany has won is not worth a row of beans. Hitler's economic gain can well and truly be put down as nil. What about his propagandist gain?

The Sudeten-German question has never been anything like as popular as the Austrian Union. The ballyhoo over the *Anschluss* diverted the German people at best for one month from its political and economic worries. The ballyhoo about the occupation of the Sudetenland can at best only last while German troops are marching in and plebiscite propaganda is going on. Then, by the end of November 1938, Hitler will stand economically, politically and as regards prestige, exactly on the same spot on which he stood before the 30th September. Can he make a halt there?

Anyone with a glimmering of knowledge of National Socialism must answer: no. One single reservation may be appropriate: if Hitler succeeds before that date in ripening the Four Power coalition of which the seeds were sown in Munich, into alliance against Soviet Russia, then he can call a halt. For reasons based particularly on the social structure of the European nations, which sets limits to the ambitions of their capitalist rulers, this development can be ruled out. This conclusion leads us to the certainty which is at the same time our consolation—that the events of this autumn are not the final stage of a development but only an episode. The goal at which Hitler aimed in his struggle against Czechoslovakia has not been achieved with the annexation of the Sudetenland: for this goal was—elimination of Czechoslovakia. Annexation of the Sudetenland is only the first step. . . .

It is a dark, an almost hopeless future facing Czechoslovakia; but it is by no means so dark and hopeless as the future which faces Europe if it continues on the path trodden on the 30th September in Munich. In Prague we still hope that Munich was only the first step on this path, that a return may still be possible, that the peoples of the West will rouse themselves from their lethargy. We still cling to symptoms like the speech by the First Lord of the Admiralty, Duff Cooper. If these hopes prove deceptive then only one consolation remains—that it may have been better to have saved up the forces which would have been sacrificed to-day in a struggle with unclear fronts, for the great decisive battle to come, in which there will be clear fronts and clear aims.

SELF-DETERMINATION FOR CZECHS

From the "Lidove Listy," 7.10.38

According to Czech statistics, the districts annexed by Germany contain 2,811,060 Germans and 725,904 Czechs. The territory was demarcated by the international commission on the basis of a pre-war census in order to disregard Czechs who had been settled in the Sudetenland when the big estates of the German aristocracy were broken up

THE latest ultimatum of the Ambassador's Conference exceeds our worst expectations. Self-determination has been turned upside down. Purely Czech towns in which not a single German lives, are being

separated from Czechoslovakia without consideration for justice or sense. Ancient territories which we maintained as living-space even in Austrian times are being taken from us, without which the nation cannot fully develop itself in future. This impossible dictate is tearing the traffic and economic structure of the Republic in two from Bohemia to Moravia. Chamberlain's promise is not being kept, according to which the Godesberg demands would be reduced, if Prague would accept the Munich Agreement.

It is unparalleled in history for frontier lines to be cut, in peace time, in the middle of Europe in such a way, at a speed which could be no quicker even in war, so that the economic and political life of a people is disregarded. Our Government must appeal to the Great Powers, which reserved the right to amend the frontier for economic, traffic, and defensive reasons.

To make decisions on the basis of the census of 1910 and of language is an injustice. Self-determination must apply to Czechs and Slovaks at least in their own homeland.

SERVES THEM RIGHT

With some malicious satisfaction Czechoslovak military circles were remarking to-night that in abandoning to-morrow, in accordance with the Munich dictation, the most vital section of the Czech fortifications so far surrendered—on the north-western part of the frontier—the Czechs will hand over to Germany some of the most closely guarded secrets of the French Maginot line, which were built into the Czechoslovak defences by French military engineers.

Even if they could, it is certain that Czechoslovak troops, smarting under a sense of betrayal, would not attempt to preserve these secrets by destroying the works.—*G. E. R. Gedye, Prague correspondent, "New York Times,"* 6.10.38.

THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING JEWISH

The Fascist Grand Council has just decided that Italian Jews may no longer do military service, either in time of peace or in time of war.

Since this news became known, hundreds of thousands of Italians have rushed to the synagogues after having converted themselves to the Hebrew religion. A despatch from Burgos announces that 98% of the Italian Volunteers ~~have~~ declared themselves to be Israelites. (*Report to be treated with reserve*).—"Le Canard Enchaîné," Paris.

CHAMBERLAIN'S VISITING CARD

Neville J'aime-Berlin.—"*Nebelspalter*," Switzerland.

MARIANNE, WHAT NOW ?

THE LESSON

by JEAN MISTLER

(President of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the French Senate)

From "Paris Soir," 3.10.38

Now that she has jilted her poor but faithful lover, the once all-conquering beauty, Marianne, is beginning nervously to wonder whether she may not after all be left on the shelf

THE judicial and administrative conception of international policy which was symbolised by the League of Nations now belongs to the past. Does the fault lie in lack of firmness in common action, or, on the contrary, in the fact that the safety-valve of treaty revision, provided for by Article 19 of the Covenant*, was not used in time? I do not know, but what is certain is that, after all the attacks suffered by the treaties in their judicial, financial and economic clauses, the territorial stipulations are now going in their turn; the frontier between Austria and Germany has been effaced, the German-Czech frontier has advanced towards Prague by 25 miles, to-morrow the frontiers between Poland and Czech Silesia and between Hungary and Slovakia will also be changed.

Meanwhile, the League of Nations devotes a macabre session to the announcement that Austria has not paid her contribution this year. And while the profound saying of Goethe's Faust on the prime importance of the *fait accompli* is being verified, our professors of law are giving lectures on the value of treaties of friendship and alliance on which no one thinks of calling. The fact that we have the same engagements to go to the assistance of both Poland and Czechoslovakia, who very nearly went to war with each other, shows the depressing grotesqueness of such treaties.

The first lesson to be drawn is that we must review very closely, on the map and not in the dust of chancelleries, the nature and extent of all our obligations, assess their debit and credit sides, discriminate between those which involve mutual and effective guarantees and those which merely represent risks, reinforce and make clear the former, denounce the latter, and in fact, instead of scattering our energies all over the earth,

* Article 19 of the League Covenant provides for frontier revision by treaty, but is dependent on a unanimous vote of the Council.—EDITOR.

determine the zones of vital interest for our country and apply all our forces at those points with strong determination.

In this choice, dictated by our national interest only, we would not be able to take considerations of internal policy into account. If we begin by prohibiting certain contacts in the name of an ideology, we must not be surprised to find conflicts becoming more bitter and the possibility of mediation delayed. I do not want to go back over our misunderstandings with Italy, that long quarrel with faults on both sides, but I doubt if anyone will contradict me if I say that the presence of a French ambassador in Rome would probably have brought about the Four Power conference a fortnight sooner, so sparing our wives and mothers much anguish and our Treasury many millions.

Bluff on Both Sides

There is a third lesson which I should like briefly to point out. We came very near war because on both sides bluff was trusted to. At home, dozens of articles on Hitler's bluff were written by people who have not and could not have any knowledge of Germany. Certain men of good faith whom I had been trying to convince since the beginning of September that Germany was determined to have what it wanted, evidently hoped to obtain its ends by pressure rather than by war, but would rather make war than renounce its goal, waited until Hitler's Sportpalast speech to admit that it was serious. Very fortunately, MM. Daladier and Bonnet saw things more clearly. On their side, the leaders in Germany for three weeks believed that France would never run the risk of an armed conflict. Our partial mobilisation measures opened their eyes. We must hope that from now on Germany will no longer speculate on our internal quarrels. In 1914 her great General Staff believed there would be a revolution in Paris in the event of mobilisation. In 1938 the National Socialist party was no doubt surprised by the calm courage shown by the men leaving for the Maginot Line, the women remaining in Paris, threatened with bombs. . . .

This leads me to my conclusion: despising those who yesterday made themselves the champions of national pride, after having been, the day before yesterday, the apostles of anti-militarism and disarmament. I said all through this crisis that the Sudeten affair should be decided by negotiation and not by force. I still consider that war to-morrow is not inevitable, but I repeat to the people of France that it remains

possible, and that if we want to prevent it we must strive for the means to do so. Last February, before the *Anschluss* which rendered Czechoslovakia strategically indefensible, I demanded the mobilisation of industry and labour camps. The lackeys of Bolshevism and anarchy attacked me; that is part of their game, for to them war is only the preface to revolution; but I repeat to-day more strongly than ever, a policy of public safety is the only way for us to live in honour. Beside an army which is the best in the world, our aviation is too slow in making up for its delays, our naval arsenals are working at excessive cost and too slowly, our industrial potential remains too low. Daladier has seen from his reception by the people of Paris that he has the power to act. France must be put back to work, and if those who were obstructionist last month remain so now, the Premier must make an appeal to the country on the question of peace and national security.

THE CHANGED COURSE

France's Suicide

From the Berlin correspondent of the "Nationalzeitung," Basle, 5.10.38

THE news that Germany and England had pledged themselves to do everything in future to avoid war with one another acted like a bombshell. "The news of the century" was how a well-known international journalist described it and among the foreign press representatives in Munich the conclusion was immediately drawn that it signified the partition of the world between England and Germany.

Such phrases, coined under the impression made by an overwhelming piece of news, are not always quite accurate; but they mostly contain some truth. Consider a moment; Chamberlain went to Munich after he had ordered the mobilisation of the British fleet. As England had nothing but the fleet, the British Premier had in fact made a much more far-reaching gesture than Daladier, who had not gone beyond partial mobilisation. That is to say, one might still faintly doubt France's intention of going to war, but no longer England's. Only a few hours later this same Chamberlain signed an official declaration that war would, as far as possible, never be waged with the very same country against which he had announced himself ready to declare war the day before.

What can have caused the British Government to reverse its course

so surprisingly? To-day, one can only guess, but developments in the coming months will show plainly, perhaps all too plainly. In any case, the Anglo-German declaration represents a perhaps even more colossal triumph for Hitler than the annexation of a few Sudeten German districts against the will, at first, of half Europe. It means that England is giving up as hopeless her policy of barring German hegemony in Europe, and prefers to come to an understanding with the German dictator, that is to say, to leave him a free hand on the Continent (and perhaps elsewhere, in the colonial question).

It did not escape the notice of a single foreign observer in Munich that this signifies an immense danger for France, which, thanks to a passivity unexampled in history, has lost one position after another, and to-day stands robbed of all her alliances but one, that with England. Even this last, since the Munich declaration, has acquired a completely new countenance: for France now relies on it entirely: she has no longer any choice. Furthermore, the Anglo-French alliance is practically valueless, since it protects France against an unprovoked German aggression—a case which can now no longer arise, as Berlin and London have decided never to go to war with one another. France has, therefore, every reason to regard this development with the greatest anxiety. For the time being,

CONCES-
SIONS BY
ALL



"Marianne,"
Paris

they are trying in Paris to deceive public opinion about the seriousness of the Anglo-German *rapprochement*, by means of vague phrases about the organisation of general peace to which this move is reputedly to be the overture. But in the long run these phrases will deceive nobody.

Berlin No Longer Worries

About the reasons for Britain's change of course we have to rely for the moment on guesses. But as France will obviously be the first to feel its effects, the reasons may probably be sought in French policy. We have often pointed out that, in Berlin's eyes, France has long ceased to be assessed as an equal partner on the European chessboard. The policy of systematic, almost suicidal renunciation, which has been followed by France for years, and which reached its climax in the slogan about only fighting if her own territory were attacked, has led the Third Reich for a long time past to cut such a country right out of its political speculations. Berlin has not cared a damn for years what France thought of its plans, as it no longer feared France. The division of French opinion over the Czechoslovak conflict, the refusal of a big minority (with spokesmen of the calibre of a former Premier such as Flandin) to fulfil France's written obligations seem now to have woken Britain up too. They are beginning, in London, to fear that a country which showed itself up to the last moment reluctant to fight for Czechoslovakia would act in a like manner if England required her help one day. With the sense of reality which characterises the English, they drew the consequences, only a few hours after the Czech crisis, which had, to say the least of it, been aggravated by France's indecision and weakness, had been happily liquidated.

This means a diametrical departure from traditional British policy, which aimed at creating a strong supporting base on the Continent against any one-sided hegemony. Britain acted thus against Napoleon and against Imperial Germany in 1914. To-day, after long years of practice, she has found that France no longer affords her this supporting base against Hitler Germany, because France will not or cannot do so.

So England has thrown the helm over; instead of opposing the dictator she is coming to an agreement with him. Let the others see for themselves how they come out of it.

MODERN IMPROVEMENTS

We are told that European atlases are to be bound henceforth in loose-leaf form, like international treaties.—"*Kansas City Star*."

EUROPE'S LARGEST MINORITY~

UKRAINIANS PROTEST

From a broadsheet issued by the Ukrainian Bureau in London

The wrangle over the tail-end of Czechoslovakia—Ruthenia, or Sub-Carpathian Russia—has brought protests from champions of Europe's most silent, as well as largest minority, the Ukrainians

THE strict censorship now imposed in Podkarpatska Rus* prevents the Ukrainian inhabitants from free expression of their views. It is, therefore, interesting to have an extract from *Dilo*, Lvov, of September 24th, on their relation to Czechoslovakia:

"Carpathian Ukraine has now been drawn into the cycle of events in Czechoslovakia. It is, of course, only natural that it should be so. The only cause for surprise is that up to the present all has revolved around the Sudeten Germans, and not around the only part of the Republic towards which the Czechs have direct obligations, based on a bilateral agreement, on the St. Germain Treaty, and on their own Constitution. *None of these obligations has been fulfilled.* Although the problem of Sudeten Germans has alarmed the whole world, the treatment received by them has been better than that received by other minorities, either in Czechoslovakia, or in Europe.

"After the World War, the population of Carpathian Ukraine decided to unite with the Ukrainian Republic. This was done at Khust, on January 21st, 1919. The defeats suffered by the Ukrainian Galician Army and the Army of the Ukrainian National Republic caused uncertainty as to the future of the free Ukrainian State and led to a change in the orientation of Carpathian Ukraine. As a result of the three National Councils, at Priashiv, Khust, and Uzhorod, on May 8th, 1919, it was decided to join Czechoslovakia, and this decision was conveyed to the Peace Conference at Paris by the Carpatho-Ukrainian delegates.

"The Czechs, true to their deep Russophil convictions, immediately introduced a policy supporting, not the Ukrainian National spirit, but the 'Ruthenian' policy of denationalisation. Carpatho-Ukraine was swamped with Russian political emigrés, who regarded the country as part of Russia, literally and ethnically. The Czechs, with their reputation for practicality, might have been supposed to have formed a true estimate

* Sub-Carpathian Russia.

of the situation, but they held tenaciously to the Russian fiction and even went to the length of terming the Ukrainian language 'Carpatho-Russian.' This policy was violently opposed by Ukrainians.

"At the same time we cannot forget that under Czechoslovakia, Carpatho-Ukrainians have had far wider opportunities for cultural development than they had under the Magyar regime.

"To-day the situation has changed. The question of a plebiscite of all nationalities in Czechoslovakia has been raised. Recent news from Carpathian Ukraine indicates that the population not only consents to a



THE UKRAINE, CONTAINING EUROPE'S RICHEST GRANARY:
AND THE FAMOUS DONETZ COALFIELD

World Review
1914

plebiscite but even demands it. We have no doubt as to the result of such a measure—if it were put into practice without outside pressure. But we must emphatically protest against attempts to make over Carpathian Ukraine to Hungary, without previously ascertaining whether those who form the overwhelming bulk of its population desire such a change. Polish newspapers are full of a demand for a common frontier with Hungary . . . but Ukrainians will never consent to the clamour of Poles for a change of boundaries in a territory where there is not one Pole, and in which Ukrainians alone have the right of determination. . . .”

UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

by BRENDAN A. FINN

From the "Commonweal," New York, 30.9.38

DURING the past few months articles and reviews concerning Ukraine have appeared in the world press. Ukraine has so long been neglected by political observers and writers that most of us who are interested in world affairs welcomed these articles and read them eagerly and thoroughly. But I, at least, was most distressed to find practically all of these writers approaching their subject from a single angle, to find them completely disregarding what I believe to be the most pertinent factors in the situation, and to observe with awe that their views practically coincide with the insidiously detrimental Soviet propaganda about Ukraine.

Almost without exception these writers describe Ukraine as a desirable "southwestern Russian country" which is the particular object of Nazi scheming and upon which the covetous eyes of other European governments are constantly focused. That is precisely the view which Moscow has taken so much pains to impress upon the world. Personally I suspect that most of these foreign political observers and writers, who were caught napping when Der Fuehrer quickly, quietly and directly seized Austria, are now writing something about every Eastern European country as a possible ground for German expansion in the hope that they will thus be ready for Hitler's next move.

As I have pointed out, most of the writers on Ukraine treat it merely as a "southwestern Russian country." They do not explain that there are formidable numbers of Ukrainians in Poland, Rumania and Czechoslovakia, more than 4,000,000 in Poland alone. They very carefully omit

to state that there are, all told, 50,000,000 Ukrainians, and that nearly one-quarter of these live outside the Soviet. Nowhere do they tell us that Ukraine is a national entity, that there is a definite and most articulate movement for freedom among the Ukrainian people, and that Ukraine is virtually an empire in itself.

The Ukrainians, in spite of their subjection by the Soviet and in spite of the shameful treatment they receive in other countries, or perhaps because of it, are definitely a factor when one considers the future of Europe. Fifty million people cannot forever be kept down. In a general European mêlée, or even during a period of lesser trouble, this land will quite probably come to the fore—a nation of first-class importance.

PURIFIED OIL INDUSTRY

Prospecting for oil has been speeded up in the vicinity of Romny, the Ukraine, where six new deep wells are being sunk and new equipment brought in. Prospecting done in recent years has fully proved that oil exists in the Ukraine.

The tapping of Ukrainian oil resources on an industrial scale was retarded for a long time by the Trotskyite-Bukharinite spies and wreckers who had crept into some of the leading posts in the oil industry. The consequences of this wrecking are now being energetically eliminated.—*"Moscow News."*

POLAND
AND
HUNGARY
TAKE
"DECISIVE
STEPS"



"Moscow News"

TURMOIL IN THE HOLY LAND

WHAT BRITAIN MAKES OUT OF IT

by ISRAEL COHEN

From "The Jewish Chronicle," London

THE continuance of the reign of terror in Palestine has provoked renewed criticism in certain quarters of England's connection with that country. "Why continue to waste British lives and treasure on that unhappy country?" is the question that has recently been asked in more than one English paper. The loss of British lives is certainly most deeply to be deplored; it would undoubtedly have been far less had prompt and drastic steps been taken to suppress the Arab revolt as soon as it began over two years ago, and, above all, if the Jewish Community had been allowed to play an adequate part in their own self-defence. But as for the allegation that there has been a monetary loss to Britain this is simply not true. Not only have the disorders not entailed any expense to the British Treasury, but both Treasury and Britain in general have continued to benefit financially from the British administration of the Mandate.

Let us first consider for a moment what the position was before the Arab revolt began. In the spring of 1936, the Palestine Government enjoyed an accumulated surplus of £6,500,000. Thanks to the large influx of both Jewish settlers and Jewish capital, and to the prosperity created by Jewish industry and enterprise, the Government had been able for several years not only to balance its budget but also to set aside a steadily increasing surplus. So far from Palestine having any need—as Transjordan desperately has need—of financial aid from England, it was even able to dispense with the loan of £2,000,000 which Parliament voted in 1934 for the resettlement of displaced Arabs and a variety of public works, as the money necessary was available out of the surplus. It was fortunate that the surplus was large, as the Government was thus able to defray the extra expenditure entailed by the additional measures necessary for the attempt to preserve order when the outrages broke out, although it seems hardly fair that the money that had been so largely provided by the Yishuv should be spent on a function for which the Administration itself should be responsible.

The Palestine Government, it must be pointed out, does not bear the entire cost of the maintenance of extra troops in the country, since they are part of the regular British Army; but, as has been explained in the House of Commons, it does defray the entire excess cost due to their being stationed in Palestine, as well as all the expense occasioned by the provision of military establishments. There is thus no ground for complaint that the dispatch of armed forces to Palestine is adding to the burden of the British taxpayer, since this is not the case at all. The result of this extra expenditure on Palestine, added to an increasing outlay on public works, has been that the surplus has now been reduced to about £2,375,000, i.e., to less than half of what it was before.

The Lion's Share of Trade

But while the British taxpayer has not paid a penny more on account of the troubles in Palestine, he is, in fact, benefiting from that country all the time, although, it must be admitted, not quite to the same extent as he would if there were peace. The principal source of benefit consists of the trade between England and Palestine, since the goods sold by this country to Palestine not only provide profits for the manufacturers and shippers but also a livelihood for the thousands of persons in Britain employed in their manufacture or otherwise engaged in their transport. The amount of Palestine's imports from England showed a steady increase from £1,200,000 in 1920 to £3,202,000 in 1935, with one or two setbacks due to passing crises. But unfortunately there has been a considerable decline to £2,518,000 in 1937, due partly to the reduced immigration and the troubled conditions of the past two years. A contributory cause is to be found in the increased imports from Germany, due to the operations of the "Haavarah" system in the interests of the Jewish settlers from that country, since they are unable to salvage part of their property by any other means but the export of goods to Palestine. The consequence has been that whereas England, before the beginning of the Hitler regime, contributed nearly 20 per cent of Palestine's imports, its share in 1937 declined to 15.84 per cent. Doubtless this proportion will improve as less and less use is made of "Haavarah" for the transfer of capital.

Now, taking the total amount of imports of Palestine from England from 1920 until 1937, we get the imposing figure of £28,650,000. There cannot be any doubt that this volume of trade is due primarily to the

fact that England administers Palestine. It is true that if England did not exercise the Mandate, there would still be a certain amount of trade with this country, but it would unquestionably not be as large as it is at present, partly because Palestine would probably not have made such economic progress under any other Mandatory, and partly because any other Mandatory would doubtless have taken care to enjoy the lion's share of the trade. If we compare the present volume of Palestine's imports from England with that before the War, we should, I believe, not go far wrong in estimating that at least twenty million pounds' worth of goods sold to Palestine since the War is the direct outcome of England's having the Mandate. . . .

Income Tax and Potash

In addition to the trade with Palestine there are various other sources of benefit to Britain. There are several Palestinian concerns that are registered in London, but although they are immune in Palestine from income tax, which does not exist there, they are subject to taxation as British companies. . . .

Thus we see that the four companies alone whose payments are known have together contributed to the British Treasury a total of about £360,000. So far as the Potash Company is concerned, it may be mentioned that it spent over £400,000 in the purchase of plant and machinery in this country, which, as already explained, is a source of material benefit both to the manufacturers and to the country in general. But there is a still further and inestimable benefit—the fact that the Empire will in future not be dependent upon foreign countries for its requisite supplies of potash.

Another important source of benefit consists of the loans given and investments made in Palestine by English banks and insurance companies. A few years ago, Lloyds Bank lent the Keren Hayesod the sum of £500,000 (of which the Anglo-Palestine Bank provided £50,000) at 4 per cent, repayable in fifteen years, and last year it gave an additional loan of £150,000. The interest which the Bank receives from the Keren Hayesod helps to augment its general profits and thus serves to increase the income tax that it has to pay. The same applies to English insurance companies.

A final source of benefit consists of the large number of positions held by British citizens in Palestine. It is difficult to ascertain the exact

number of such British officials from the published reports, as these divide the employees into Arabs, Jews, and "others." It is probably safe to assume that most of the "others" are British Christians, since we find (in the Palestine Blue Book for 1936) that in the classified establishment there are 1,245 Jews receiving in emoluments a total of £213,958, while 534 "others" earn a total of £296,742. There are, in addition, 2,058 "others" in the unclassified establishment receiving a total of £217,692. Now even if we deduct a certain number (which is hardly likely to be considerable) who are not British citizens, we still arrive at the result that over £400,000 a year is received in salaries and allowances by British subjects from the Palestine Government. If these officials were in England they would, to say the least, increase professional competition and probably cause a certain amount of unemployment; their presence in Palestine is no insignificant factor in the material benefits that Britain derives from that country.

This survey of the financial advantages, direct and substantial, that the Mandatory Government receives from Palestine is not exhaustive. It has not taken into account, for example, the carrying out of contracts with which British firms have been associated, such as the construction of the Haifa Port, nor the income tax presumably payable by the Palestine Government itself in respect of the substantial portfolio of securities in which its surplus is partly invested. But it should suffice to explode the falsity of the legend that England is pouring treasure into Palestine. The golden tide is flowing in the opposite direction.

BEHIND A BARBED WIRE FENCE

by BENN W. FELLER

From "The Crown Colonist," London, October

ONE hundred working days has brought the hundred kilometres of "Tegart's Wall"—the northern frontier barbed-wire fence designed to check arms smuggling and the movements of armed bands and terrorists across the Palestine-Syria and Palestine-Trans-Jordan boundaries—to the point of completion, at a cost of over £P.100,000. . . .

The fence is two metres in height throughout. In thickness it varies according to local conditions, but is in most places nearly six metres wide.

In the space between the sides, rabbit-wire criss-crosses through iron bars, and loose clumps of tangled barbed wire fill the lower part. Over 20,000,000 metres of wire, imported from England, were used in construction. In testing its effectiveness, sappers experienced in piercing such entanglements, and equipped with implements for the purpose, required fifteen minutes to clear a way through.

Provision has been made for the electrification of the barrier, if necessary. Electrical signalling apparatus is already installed, while "booby-traps" have been set by Army engineers in places where breaches are likely to be attempted. To tamper with the fence is therefore both difficult and dangerous.

The "wall" does not follow the boundary-lines between Palestine, Syria and Trans-Jordan, and many Arab villages, and some Jewish settlements, are outside. The need for urgency in construction, following the recommendations of Sir Charles Tegart, precluded efforts to define the exact boundaries in several areas. Thus, the distance from the fence to the existing borders varies from several feet to eight kilometres.

Twenty gates, to be guarded by police and supernumerary police, have been provided so as to afford entry and exit for villagers outside. Police frontier posts established along the military road have been found insufficient to patrol the area satisfactorily, because of the rugged country. Additional posts have therefore been set up at strategic points.

In addition, mobile patrols will reconnoitre from post to post, leaving no section "uncovered" for any length of time. Lewis-guns mounted on "pill-boxes" have been placed at the permanent stations, and searchlights set to towers will operate after the sun has set. During construction there have been several instances of sabotage, and engagements involving casualties to bandits, troops, police and Jewish workers, and other signs that the terrorist organisers were annoyed at this barrier. There was also a marked increase in attempted smuggling across the Jordan. Plans are under consideration to obstruct passage across this channel at some hundred fords.

Contracts for the work were let to Messrs. Solel-Boneh, of Haifa, who employed some 800 Jews on the job. For the most part in "enemy territory," and harassed by snipers, a special force of supernumerary police guarded the workers, who were escorted from and to camp by R.A.F. planes and were in constant communication with the authorities by radio, visual signalling, and telephone.

JAPAN IN THE QUAGMIRE

THE WEAPON OF SPACE

by WOLF SCHENKE

From the "Zeitschrift für Geopolitik," Heidelberg, September

This pessimistic view of Japan's chances in China is taken by a trained observer writing for a technical German journal

THE course of the Sino-Japanese war has surprised most people. For this there are the most varied reasons. The decisive one, however, is that the majority of those who are surprised, and one of the belligerent parties themselves, when forecasting at the beginning of the war and weighing up the opposing forces, forgot or wrongly estimated one decisive factor—space.

It was the general assumption (of those who expected a quick victory for Japan) that Japan's material resources were so immensely superior to Chinese military resistance that the space factor could be completely ignored. All of China that was seen was from Peking to the Yellow River, and from Shanghai to Nanking. That was, as has since become evident, a fundamental error.

As a result of this mistake in calculation we see that to-day the war is being waged far beyond these lines, in the interior of China, that after over a year there has been no decision, that the end is not in sight, and that a final victory is uncertain.

On the other side there were many people who took the space factor into account, who warned against a war with China and talked of a repetition of Napoleon's campaign against Moscow in 1812. Now, the view should be repudiated that any and every war by Japan against China must be damned as hopeless from the beginning. With right appreciation of the space factor by Japan from the start and correspondingly strong use of space-conquering forces, the war would have taken a quite different, and for the Japanese more favourable, course.

It may now be accepted as certain that the aim of the Japanese at the outbreak of the war was the conquest of the five provinces of North China—Chahar, Suiyan, Hopei, Shansi and Shantung. It was a question for Japan of getting in ahead of the ever-increasing extension to North China of Nanking's sphere of power. For the campaign for the conquest of the five Northern provinces, Japan placed fifteen divisions in the field,

who were to carry out the entire undertaking in a short time (one Japanese division at war strength consists of 20,000 men).

But the war did not develop according to the Japanese plan, by which North China was to be quickly occupied and then an end of hostilities reached. Shanghai came in between. As in 1932, a completely senseless war of attrition was waged in Shanghai. If the whole development of the war is examined, however, the Shanghai campaign gains great significance. Although the best Chinese divisions were lost in it, it must be assessed as a big item on the asset side for China, insofar as it threw the entire Japanese plan of campaign into complete confusion—and that is the very worst that can happen to a Japanese plan of campaign. It must to-day be regarded as a bad mistake on the part of the Japanese leaders that they allowed themselves to be drawn into the Shanghai war. True, it would have been necessary to withdraw the few thousand marines who were stationed in Shanghai, and in the Far East no one likes to lose face. So North China only four weeks after the outbreak of hostilities became merely a secondary centre of operations.

What did this mean? By letting themselves in for the long-drawn-out Shanghai enterprise the Japanese had left the space factor out of account.

Swift Destruction the Only Way

The following principles apply to this situation: the party attacking a spacious country must achieve a quick victory. This victory does not consist of forcing the enemy further and further back until the particular piece of land is occupied that one has in view. If one is content with that, the enemy is left time and opportunity to reorganise himself in the large parts of the country still remaining free, and to mobilise all his resources in this extensive territory for a long term prosecution of the war. A war against a big country can for this reason only be won by the quickest possible destruction of the enemy fighting forces.

On the Japanese side an energetic plan of destruction should have been applied (just as on our part in the World War), while salvation for the Chinese was naturally to be sought in a strategy of attrition.

Right from the beginning the Japanese have made the mistake of preferring to place small forces gradually in the field to throwing their entire resources into the scale. The result is that to-day there are in China double the number of the fifteen divisions originally provided for

liquidating the "China incident." One division after the other was brought over to strengthen the insufficient forces, one after the other lost itself in the immensity, its effect scarcely noticeable, another was sent to strengthen the already strengthened forces and so it went on over and over again. Salvation, on the other hand, could only have lain in a quick decision. If, realising this, all the troops which are now painfully moving across the vast landscape had been placed in the field right at the beginning for the purpose of achieving the energetic destruction, not the retreat, of the enemy, the war would in all human probability have been over long ago. As it is, however, in spite of the enormous losses of the Shanghai-Nanking campaign, and in spite of the loss of Suchowfu, China's military strength is by no means destroyed. On the contrary—believe it or not—it is greater than at the beginning of the war.

The lack of strategic will to destruction has been complemented by the lack of clarity in Japanese political aims.

When the original North China goal was first deviated from, and

A Contemporary Print describing the Japanese Campaign of 1938.



"New Masses,"
New York

the main forces were thrown against Shanghai, political speculations began which hindered the prosecution of a strategic plan of destruction, which might still have been possible, although at greater cost than before. When the Japanese at Shanghai came practically to a standstill, it was the general intention to remain fixed there, to reach a certain line in the north and then to negotiate about peace. When the Chinese front at Shanghai collapsed, then the slogan suddenly became: "On to Nanking!" Nobody thought further than Nanking, for it was the firm conviction in those Japanese circles which should have really been best informed about China that after the fall of Nanking, Chiang Kai-shek's government would collapse.

On account of this political hypothesis, the General Staff had no plan which went beyond Nanking. This was the last great opportunity for transferring to a strategic plan of destruction. Anyone who experienced the confusion and panic on the Chinese side after the retreat from Nanking must realise how easy it would have been for the Japanese army, by placing a few fresh divisions in the field at this point, to press through immediately to Hankow. The Chinese, from the Japanese standpoint, should not have been allowed a pause, they should have been continually attacked to the point of their complete destruction. But in consequence of the acceptance of the theory of Chiang Kai-shek's collapse and the hopes of peace arising out of it, nothing happened.

The Chinese Rally

The first pause occurred, so useful for the Chinese and so dangerous for the Japanese. The fact that the Japanese did not follow up reacted on the Chinese like the battle of the Marne on the French—like a miracle that could hardly be grasped. In December, I left Hankow, where Chinese officials reckoned that they would only be able to stay at the most four weeks before the Japanese would reach this town. The general flight to the west had at that time grown to such an extent that a "rendezvous at Lhasa" was all that one spoke about among friends. When I returned to Hankow, where the Chinese Government has now been sitting for over seven months, I noted that the Chinese had pulled themselves together. All at once, when the Japanese did not follow up with a knock-out blow, their eyes were opened to the great advantage their natural position gave them over an enemy who did not make use of his entire forces for quick destruction. From this moment, order and a consequential aim entered the Chinese leadership and the organisation of the hinterland.

In the battles since the middle of January, which reached their peak in May with the conquest of Suchowfu by the Japanese, the Chinese were able to use the weapon of space so that three of the offensives against Suchow came to a full stop, the fourth turned into a real defeat of the attacker, and even the great fifth offensive, although it led to the taking of Suchow, in no way fulfilled the ambitious Japanese aim. . . . So this phase of the war remained without a decision, and the same can be expected from the taking of Hankow. For gradually the war is in process of stretching so far into the interior of the country that a decision will be absolutely impossible. . . .

The loss of Hankow will be a bad blow for the Chinese. Nowhere else will they be able to find a point at which administration and trade, political leadership and command of the military operations can be concentrated in one place in so ideal a way. Hankow was the point where north and south could be united. In the west of China remaining to Chiang Kai-shek, two separate territories will in the nature of things

BOMBING OPEN TOWNS

"P.S.—Nevertheless we would be interested to know what bombs are the most effective."



"Nobelpolter"
Switzerland

appear—the north-west with Kansu, Shansi and Ninghsia, and the south-west with Yunnan, Kwangsi, Kweichow, Kwantung and Hunan. In between lies as a barrier to intercourse, Szechuan, which is from the south, but particularly from the north, extremely difficult of access.

To return to our outset, it is, however, obvious that after the taking of Hankow the Chinese army will indeed be forced back, but will be able to live on in these parts of the country undestroyed.

If the Japanese were now, at the last minute, to want to begin on a strategic plan of destruction, the fact would have to be noted that it is too late. On the far side of the line running from Peiping to Hankow they will find themselves in a territory where the great armies that would be necessary for such a plan could no longer operate. The forces necessary would be far in excess of those required up to now, and success would remain extremely doubtful. Space is permitting China to survive, and for that reason it would be best to conclude peace.

WHEN HANKOW FALLS Will Britain Change Sides ?

From the "Miyako," Tokyo, 14.9.38

THE special importance of the forthcoming fall of Hankow lies in the fact that the Chiang Kai-shek Administration will lose its position as the Central Government. General Chiang Kai-shek's popularity is steadily on the wane both among the Chinese military leaders and among the Chinese nation. If his orders are still obeyed by discontented military leaders, it is simply because his Administration still retains the form of a Central Government and disobedience exposes them to grave personal danger. After its degradation into a local regime, the Chiang Administration will find it difficult to hold them under control.

It is solely due to foreign aid that General Chiang Kai-shek has so far been able to maintain resistance against Japan, and it is interesting to watch how the fall of Hankow will affect the attitude of Britain, France, and America towards the Chiang Administration.

There will be no change in the attitude of Soviet Russia, as her purpose has all along been to Bolshevise China by taking advantage of the confused state of the country, but the forthcoming event must furnish some food for thought to Britain, America and France, whose chief

concern is to protect their rights and interests in China. They will surely realise then that any undertakings which they may exact from the Chiang Kai-shek Administration will be valueless after it has ceased to function as a Central Government, for all practical purposes. They may find it difficult to make a *volte face* the instant Hankow falls, but the event will afford them a good opportunity for altering the course they have hitherto pursued.

Anti-British feeling is running fairly strong in Japan. This is quite natural when the attitude which Britain has adopted towards this country since the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese conflict is taken into due consideration. Even Britons will not be surprised at the prevalence of hostile feeling against their country, if they are capable of taking a dispassionate view of the general attitude of their country towards Japan. It is true that there are some in Japan who are desirous of keeping on good terms with Britain, if possible, but there is not a single Japanese who does not resent Britain's attitude towards Japan. It depends on Britain's future attitude towards this country whether the present anti-British feeling among the Japanese will witness a further growth or gradually subside.

THE METAMORPHOSIS OF MUSSOLINI

Westbrook Pegler writes in the "*Cleveland Press*" of an Austrian football team from Innsbruck which beat a Fascist team from Milan early in the reign of the Duce in Italy. As a token of friendship and esteem the Milanese sent their conquerors an enormous cast-iron statue of Signor Mussolini shipped f.o.b. Milan.

Not only was the Innsbruck team too poor to pay the freight, which was considerable, but a statue of Mussolini, who had forbidden the native yodel among the captive Austrian peasants in Italian South Tyrol, was a thing which no Austrian particularly cared for. They therefore refused to accept the statue, which lay on a wagon in the freight yard, and wired the Milanese to send for it.

This threw the Milanese into a great fury, and it looked as though the Innsbruckers would have to load their cast-iron Mussolini into guns and shoot him back a little at a time, until a nameless peacemaker hit upon a lucky solution. A set of whiskers was cast for the statue, and the detested Mussolini was immediately transformed into the likeness of Gambrinus, the beloved inventor of beer.—"*Evening Standard*."

GHOSTS GO HUNGRY

Chinese ghosts, due for their annual big meal in the seventh moon, will have to go hungry again because the Sino-Japanese war has not yet ended.

With the approach of the festival of propitiating the spirits of the dead, which Chinese believe are set free to roam for a month, Singapore Chinese are remembering the appeal to forego similar observances and save their money for the China Relief Fund.—"*Straits Budget*," *Singapore*.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

The Editor welcomes letters from readers, which should be kept as short as possible E

PERFECT GENTLEMAN

SIR,—I had quite an interesting experience on a train from Milano to Rome the other night which I think you might like to hear about.

I had to sit up all night with a bad influenza cold. A high Italian officer was in the compartment with me. As I looked miserable (and was) he felt very sorry for me. He told me that at the League of Nations a Frenchman had said that all that interests an Italian is sex, and he was going to prove to me that this was a lie and that Italians were gentlemen. He proved to my entire satisfaction that this is true. He took out his watch and counted my pulse, got his bag down and gave me a tablet for the tightness in my chest, put some drops in my nose and at the first station he bought me a pillow. He suggested that I lay down and he covered me up and then he turned off the strong lights and pulled the curtain across the door, so that the lights from the corridor would not bother me.

After fixing me up he left the compartment, but the only "fly in the ointment," was that about every half hour he came back and woke me up to find out how I was feeling. Finally, I gave up the idea of sleep and decided to talk politics with him. This journey happened just at the beginning of the crises and he called my attention to a string of about thirty trucks, each one loaded with an army lorry, the kind used for transporting troops. He said it was ready to be sent wherever needed. He also said that Hitler was *stupido* for the attitude he was taking and that he would start a war in which he and his allies were bound to lose, as the

whole world would be against them.

I asked him if a war did come, as he was sure that it would in a week or ten days, if Italy would go on the side of Germany. He said that there would be nothing else for her to do after the Alliance Great Britain and France had driven Italy into, as she has no other friend but Germany. He said that Alliance is most unpopular in Italy, as the Italians dislike and mistrust the Germans. He also said that he is tired of fighting as he was in the Great War, the Ethiopian and the Spanish, but he shrugged his shoulders and said that "after fighting in three wars an extra one does not make much difference."

(Mrs.) I. E. W.

Athens.

MORE ABOUT FAIRIES

SIR,—After the shattering experience of the recent crisis, it was indeed a refreshing relief to turn to the article in your columns on "Fairies in Eire." It brought back to my memory a story that I heard on the little Hebridean island of Muck. In the autumn of 1912, three boys, the sons of a lobster fisherman, were playing on the shore, when all of a sudden they saw standing in front of them three little men in red. They had red eaked caps on their heads, red tunics and red boots. They spoke to the boys in Gaelic and asked them to come and see their boat. The boys followed them to where the neatest little boat was moored to the shore by a red thread, and in it was a little lady in green and a dog "the size of a rat which barked with a strange sound as they had heard no dog bark before." The little lady offered them

MORE ABOUT THE REFERENCE BOOK WHICH IS NEVER OUT-OF-DATE

In our recent announcement here we described briefly the ingenious reference-cum-news service called "Keesing's" which makes it possible for you to augment the information in your encyclopædia and similar books with facts and happenings as recent as last week, and to build up an invaluable reference book which never dates.

As a result of that announcement a number of "World Review" readers are now receiving each week-end the "Keesing's" bulletins which give the essential news items, with statistics and data, covering all the important Political, Economic and Social developments, in an orderly form.

This information is culled from the entire press of the world and translated from twenty-six languages, with the source of origin clearly stated.

The reports are issues in loose leaves, and slip into a binding case to form a permanent record. The "Living Index," which is supplied each week is cumulative, and enables you to put your finger, at a moment's notice, on any event whether it happened seven years, seven months or seven days ago. The service is neither costly nor clumsy. Its selection of news is absolutely unbiased. Designed for rapid reference it is as often used for leisured reading.

TO

KEESING'S

107 Fleet Street, London, E.C.4 (Central 3441)

Please give me full particulars of "Keesing's" without cost or obligation on my part.

NAME _____

ADDRESS _____

W.A.2

biscuits and the boys ate them, and said they were very good and "sweet to the taste." The little men then asked them to get into the boat and sail out to sea with them. One of the boys was stepping into the boat when suddenly he felt afraid and drew back. Then the little men said: "We'll meet you here tomorrow evening at the same hour," and with that the dog bit through the red thread that tied the boat to the shore, and away it sailed.

The boys' mother found them, sitting spell-bound, gazing out to sea, on a rock that had been cut off by the tide; so she roused them and made them wade ashore.

They were all examined separately by the schoolmaster afterwards, and all told the same tale; and for a long time afterwards, their mother told me, they were afraid to go near the place where they had seen the "Little People."

I have never myself seen the Fairy Folk with my physical eyes, but have often felt their presence near me; and once, in a kind of waking dream, I had a vision of the water spirits at the bottom of a Highland loch.

The other Fairy Folk whom I have contacted, among the hills and by the sea, are far from being unfriendly, but they want to be approached with kindly understanding and not with idle curiosity. They are living their lives, side by side with us, on this planet, and have as much right to their place in the Universe as we have; and it is only because we, for the most part, have not the sense organs suited to their range of vibrations, that they are a closed book to us.

I often wonder what they must think of us in these days of wars and rumours of wars, those Fairy Folk, whose other name is the "Sithe" or "People of Peace."

L. H. M. B.

Edinburgh.

INTERNATIONAL BOOKSHELF



The Editor reminds his readers that he does not necessarily share the opinions expressed by reviewers in this section. But this is a free country and knows no censorship

IMPERIAL FUTURES

THE CRUMBLING OF EMPIRE. By M. J. Bonn. Allen and Unwin. 15s.

Reviewed by LEONARD BARNES

DR. BONN has a theory that the age of Empire-making is giving way to one of Empire-breaking. Glancing over the last two centuries of human history, he distinguishes three major measures of what he calls counter-colonisation, the Declaration of Independence, the Monroe doctrine, and the Covenant of the League. The rise of the Spirit of Nationalism has not only brought into existence widespread movements of liberation in countries held in subjection by foreign masters; it has shaken the foundations of ascendancy in nearly every composite state. The world, Dr. Bonn ventures to say, has reached a point where no more new colonial possessions can be won, and where the exchange of old ones, whether by force or by agreement among great powers, is becoming increasingly difficult.

The colonial struggle for which the powers are girding or have girt their loins is thus "very much like the fight for the body of Patroclus"; even a victor cannot revive a corpse or reverse a fundamental tendency. The inequality of territory and resources which exists between various states at home can no longer be corrected by "vertical expansion." By

this term, Dr. Bonn signifies the subjugation of relatively primitive societies which stand at a lower level of social efficiency than their conqueror. But the conquest of territories contiguous to the homeland or the voluntary federation of neighbouring States of similar cultures—lateral expansion—can go on.

Dr. Bonn's sub-title is "The Disintegration of World Economy," and he chooses it because he thinks the world is faced by the following issue: can the unequal distribution of resources between various States be rationally compensated for by economic co-operation, and, ultimately, by some sort of federation? Or is a new period of violent territorial re-distribution beginning in which old Empires will be broken and new Empires formed on their ruins?

In his answer, which is not given with any great confidence, Dr. Bonn tends to adopt the midway position still fashionable among middle-class writers in this country—the position which treats "democracy" as a golden mean between the two vulgar extremes of fascism and communism. "The exponents of western ideas," he says, "are powerful enough to encounter assertive force with quiet strength, if they are but willing to uphold their own faith." Let us meet the aggressor, he seems to suggest, upstaying the sword of rearmament in our right hand and suspending the scales of econ-

omic justice and conciliation from our left.

Neither the theme nor the conclusion is new. Every school of political thought from Toryism to Pacifism or Communism would accept the general view that there are two essential components in any policy for dealing with aggression. Some resistance must be offered, and some economic adjustment made. Differences arise with definition, and get deeper as it gets clearer. What Dr. Bonn has to say may not do much to resolve them, but it is advanced persuasively with a wide sweep both of learning and of political comprehension. It is studded with penetrating comments ably and memorable expressed. Curiously enough, although his handling of the theme borrows at a number of points from the Marxian theory of imperialism, he gives us no critical estimate of that theory. On the contrary, he dismisses Marxism and all its works in a few scathing phrases, and seems to see no departure from objectivity or scholarship in doing so.

NOVELIST LOOKS ROUND

JOURNEYS BETWEEN WARS. By John dos Passos. *Constable*. 12s. 6d.

Reviewed by V. S. PRITCHETT

SPAIN 1919, Turkey, Damascus, the Black Sea, Russia 1928, Mexico and then Government Spain again in 1937; this is the course of the political travels of Mr. dos Passos. New material has been added to extracts from earlier books and the whole makes a substantial if confusing visual record of what the disorder of the post-war world means in terms of the lives of the common people. In Russia these had won; in Spain, at the end, they were still fighting. Mr. dos Passos assumes you know why and that you sympathise. His book is diffuse

and in some ways irritating, I think, because one is no longer interested in 1919 and 1928. No years could, for the moment, be more dead and gone than those, unless you are writing an elegy on the popular movement, and present events completely overshadow them. The anarchy of post-war has given place to a time of drilling for the present and coming ones.

One consequently tests him on Spain, and here he is a good impressionist. He knew the country before the war, which is a distinction in contemporary journalism. He felt the country. He knew that in their commonest speech the Spaniards always talk in universal terms, and that their present drama is understood by them to be human as well as political. His portraits of cynical members of the upper class before the war are not exaggerations. (How close he is to the real pulse may be seen in his early chapters on Madrid life, and particularly in the theatre.) From the time of Ford onwards, all travellers have been shocked and bored by the corruption, cynicism, and cultural rottenness of the Spanish upper classes. On the one side there have always been the Riviera-minded who were in touch with foreign capital. On the other there were what one may call the indigenous or provincial Spaniards, racy of the soil, simple, unspoiled. The group around General Miaja, described by Mr. dos Passos, is typical; and things like the co-operative fishing village of St. Pol in Catalonia, also described by him, are not eccentricities of a revolution but the instinctive constructions of a people which belong to a very early form of European society.

Mr. dos Passos writes with the accomplishment of the good novelist who gets vivid, brittle, cinematic pictures. And he knows enough to give them perspective and significance, though they would

BOOKS OF THE MOMENT

that are invaluable for reference

Over 4,000,000 Sold

MEIN KAMPF

(MY STRUGGLE)

ADOLF HITLER Of the utmost topical interest, this account by Herr Hitler himself of the Nazi Plan, and of his own aims and ambitions, is having a sensational sale. New revised edition. 5/- (HURST & BLACKETT).

GERMANY'S HITLER

HEINZ A. HEINZ The only authorised biography of the Führer, including an account of the Nazi occupation of Sudetenland. Completely revised. 5/- (HURST & BLACKETT).

MY PART in GERMANY'S FIGHT

DR. GOEBBELS An historical document of the utmost importance by Germany's Propaganda Minister giving the whole history of the Revolution which made Hitler Chancellor of the Reich. 3/6 (HURST & BLACKETT).

I KNEW HITLER

KURT LUDECKE The author, an ex-Nazi and Hitler's secret Ambassador-at-Large, is the only man who has dared to reveal the true inside story of Hitler and his ambitions in Europe. 10/6 (JARROLDS).

GÖRING: Iron Man of Germany

H. W. BLOOD-RYAN A powerful study of Hitler's second-in-command, written from *personal* records and containing many hitherto unpublished facts about the life of this remarkable man. Illustrated. 15/- (JOHN LONG).

GERMANY PUSHES SOUTHEAST

DR. GERHARD SCHACHER The roots of the Nazi foreign policy are fully disclosed in this book, together with much valuable and topical information about the future. 7/6 (HURST & BLACKETT).

HUTCHINSON'S ALLIED HOUSES

have been improved by more organised treatment. He has preferred the human, the chance encounter, the talk at the café. He has kept violent propagandist emotion out of his pages, and this is both an enormous relief and an enormous safeguard. There has been far too much lying about Spain, a lot of it unconscious and due to importing ready-made European notions into the tragedy.

CHINESE THEORY AND FACT

THE TRAGEDY OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION. By Harold R. Isaacs. *Secker and Warburg*. 18s.

CHINA FIGHTS FOR HER LIFE. By H. R. Ekins and Theon Wright. *McGraw-Hill*. 10s. 6d.

Reviewed by ROGER HOLLIS

IN his preface to Mr. Isaacs' book, Trotsky states that the catastrophe of the second Chinese revolution was prepared under the direct leadership of Moscow. "The politics of the Communist International in China," he adds, "showed convincingly what the Russian Revolution would have been converted into if the Mensheviks and the Social Revolutionaries had not been thrust aside in time by the Bolsheviks. In China, the conception of the permanent revolution was confirmed once more, this time not in the form of a victory, but of a catastrophe." Mr. Isaacs elaborates this when he writes:

"Borodin, as well as his mentors in Moscow and the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party, proceeded from the premise that the co-operation of the bourgeoisie was vital to the success of the revolution. To them the independent, and by that time mighty, organised strength of the workers and peasants never suggested the necessity for orienting on the direct interests of these classes, even and especially when they

clashed with those of the bourgeoisie. . . . Borodin thought he saw in Chiang Kai-shek the most reliable kind of 'ally' in the Kuomintang leadership."

Mr. Isaacs proceeds to develop a powerful attack upon Comintern policy in China, and upon Chiang Kai-shek, whom he describes as a man of ruthless cunning and utter lack of scruple.

The assumption on which Communist writers, whether they are followers of Stalin or Trotsky, base their arguments is that the Chinese proletariat is already politically conscious and ripe for revolution. Isaacs in the passage quoted above speaks of "the mighty organised strength of the workers and peasants." This assumption has never been borne out in fact, and the failure of the Communist revolution in China was due not to mis-handling by the Comintern, though undoubtedly it was badly bungled, but to a realistic appreciation of the situation by Chiang Kai-shek, who completely out-generalised the Russians and their followers from the outset. It is inevitable that Chiang Kai-shek should be harshly treated by a writer of Mr. Isaacs' views, but his attacks lose much of their force from their lack of reality. "Born with the aid of imperialist midwives, nurtured on imperialist support, the Kuomintang regime in a few short years brought the country to the brink of economic collapse and dismemberment. For a decade Chiang Kai-shek continued with impunity to hand large sections of the country, undefended, over to the Imperialist invaders." It needs but small acquaintanceship with recent Chinese history to see the falseness of these statements.

Unlike Mr. Isaacs, Messrs. Ekin and Wright in their book *China Fights for Her Life*, show little interest in ideologies. It is probable that Mr. Isaacs would regard the book with some scorn, but though it is free neither from historical inaccuracy nor from sentimentality, its handling of the Chinese situation is more

realistic, if only because it starts from no fixed premises.

The book has definite limitations, but is nevertheless valuable as a first-hand account of many incidents in recent Sino-Japanese relations.

CASSANDRA CHURCHILL

ARMS AND THE COVENANT. By

The Rt. Hon. Winston S. Churchill.

Harrap. 18s.

Reviewed by GEORGE MARTELLI

It was observed during the historic debate of September 28th, at the moment when Mr. Chamberlain read the message from Herr Hitler which brought the whole House to its feet in acclamation, that one solitary figure remained seated and grim amidst the universal jubilation. Alone in that crowded and cheering assembly, Mr. Churchill supplied the one ominous note of contrast. Since he expressed them then by his dour silence, his forebodings have come to be shared by others in this country. Mr. Churchill has been always the first to foresee the effects of our foreign policy; often he has occupied a unique position, refusing praise when all were applauding; but he has seldom remained for long in his wilderness, as events only too rapidly confirmed his predictions.

No prophet of doom has ever seen his fears so quickly justified. Mr. Churchill himself would only be human if he succumbed to the "I told you so" temptation; it is evidently too much to ask of his admirers to refrain from doing so. It has fallen to his son to perform the more than filial duty of presenting the evidence of this Cassandra's prescience. He has done this by compiling the most important speeches dealing with foreign policy delivered by his father in the last six years.

Running through all these varied speeches, and dominating them like the

surge of a rising sea, is one central theme. It is the revival of military power in Nazi Germany, and the need to organise defence against it. For this purpose Mr. Churchill opposed the disarmament of France and her allies, believing that only through their strength could Britain hope to achieve a measure of safe detachment from the Continent. At the same time he was pleading for a strongly armed Britain. By 1936, in which year a rearmed Germany occupied the Rhineland and started to fortify her western frontier, Mr. Churchill realised that the danger was imminent and began to plead for a collective alliance of non-aggressive nations as the only means by which a still partially disarmed Britain could hope to achieve security. Although one of the most ardent and bitter opponents of bolshevism, he did not make the mistake committed by so many conservatives of failing to realise the importance of Russia in any peaceful system. After the *Anschluss* he prayed for a firm stand with Czechoslovakia which would yet be in time to prevent the Nazification of the Danube States.

Nothing shows more clearly the direction in which we have been travelling for the last few years than these forty-odd speeches, each of which was a signpost ignored. Incidentally they make excellent reading, and prove that for all his merited literary fame Mr. Churchill is even better as orator than writer.

POONA FROM WITHIN

BRITISH SOCIAL LIFE IN INDIA.

By Dennis Kincaid. *Routledge.* 15s.

Reviewed by ALICE RITCHIE

EVER since the beginning of the British occupation India has proved attractive to the born letter-writer and diarist—that useful race which can pour out to

far-away correspondents detailed, readable descriptions of perils which at the time of writing they seem unlikely to survive, and keep their journals up-to-date even when this involves kneeling beside a packing-case in the bottom of a river-boat, by the light of a single candle, tortured by mosquitoes. For this reason, the sources for a history of British social life in India are particularly rich and full. The voices of our countrymen (and countrywomen, for many of the best are feminine) explaining, patronising, and enduring the strange conditions of their transplanted lives come down the centuries to us, unmuffled by the slightest self-consciousness.

And Dennis Kincaid—whose death by drowning cut short a brilliant career—was ideally equipped for writing such a history. Himself the third generation of his family to take service in India, he could speak of its society with the affectionate insight of an inner circle member, and he handles his mass of curious reading as lightly as if it were family gossip. At the same time, his keen historical sense enabled him to catch and preserve the special flavour of a particular period without any obvious effort. He does full justice to the many eccentric figures who have left still-living legends behind them in the districts they scandalised and delighted in their day, but it is in his presentation of ordinary "nice people" that his skill chiefly shows: Edwardian Poona is the high-water mark of the book. He has allowed the wit which made his conversation so remarkable freer play here than he did in his novels; based on rare qualities of sympathy and imagination, far from belittling its objects, it lifts them up from within, as it were, and makes them stand out as large as life; rousing, not sniggers, but the warm mirth of complete understanding. It is his great achievement to have shown, without caricature or bur-

lesque, the super-Englishness of the English in India, subtly mutated by the spirit of the times, from the seventeenth to the twentieth century.

INTERNATIONAL BOOK GUIDE

BRITAIN

Foundations of British Foreign Policy. Temperley & Penson. *Cambridge Univ. Press.* 25/-
Arrows of Desire. W. J. Blyton. *Hutchinson.* 10/6

CENTRAL EUROPE

In Czechoslovakia's Hinterland. Henry Baerlein. *Hutchinson.* 12/6
Czechoslovakia Within. Bertram de Colonna. *Thornton Butterworth.* 5/-
The Czechs and Their Minorities. Diplomaticus. *Thornton Butterworth.* 5/-
The Danube Flows Through Fascism. Van Til. *Scribners.* 10/6
What Next in Central Europe? V. Cornea. *Shakespeare Head Press.* 3/6

GERMANY

Germany and a Lightning War. Fritz Sternberg. *Faber.* 12/6
Göring, the Iron Man of Germany. H. W. Blood-Ryan. *Long.* 15/-

RUSSIA

Ride to Russia. Bernard Newman. *Jenkins.* 10/6
Everyday Life in Russia. Bertha Malnick. *Harap.* 12/6
G.P.U. Justice. Edelman. *Allen & Unwin.* 6/-

PALESTINE AND ARABIA

Fulfilment in the Promised Land, 1917-1937. Norman Bentwich. *Socino Press.* 8/6
No Ease in Zion. T. R. Feiwel. *Sicker & Warburg.* 12/6

THE FAR EAST

The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution. Harold R. Isaacs. *Sicker & Warburg.* 18/-
Affairs of China. Sir Eric Teichman. *Methuen.* 12/6
The Silk Road. Sven Hedin. *Routledge.* 18/-

UNITED STATES

U.S.A. John dos Passos. *Constable.* 10/-
Canoe Errant on the Mississippi. Major R. Raven-Hart. *Methuen.* 10/6

MEMOIRS AND BIOGRAPHY

A Servant of the Empire. Clara Boyle. *Methuen*. 12/6

The Memoirs of Caulaincourt. *Cassell*. 21/-

Assigned to Adventure. Irene Kuhn. *Harrop*. 10/6

Kingswell, War Correspondent. *Cassell*. 10/6

GENERAL

Scarred Background (Journal through Albania). Nigel Heseltine. *Loat Dickson*. 10/6

African Occasions. Leslie Blackwell. *Hutchinson*. 10/6

Revolutionary Portugal (1910-1936). V. de Bragança Cunha. *Clarke*. 7/6

Foreign Capital in Poland. Leopold Wellisz. *Allen & Unwin*. 7/6

Patagonian Year. Pedro Rubio. *Methuen*. 7/6

Christianity and Spain. Henry Brinton. *United Editorial*. 6d.

Democratic Sweden. Cole and Smith. *Routledge*. 12/6

The Spirit of India. Grant. *Batsford*. 10/6

News of the French. Belgion. *Faber*. 8/6

Everybody's Paris. John Brangwyn. *Methuen*. 7/6

Jamaican Interlude. G. F. Timpson. *Burrow*. 6/-

Refugees. Sir John Hope Simpson. *Royal Institute of International Affairs*. 3/6

United Christian Front. Symposium. *Heffer*. 3/6

The Coming Victory of Democracy. Thomas Mann. *Sacker & Warburg*. 2/6

Bio-Economics. Joseph Yahuda. *Pitman*. 7/6

The Will to Civilization. John Katz. *Sacker & Warburg*. 12/6

The Modern Historian. C. H. Williams. *Nelson*. 7/6

Gypsies and Their Customs. Martin Block. *Methuen*. 12/6

DIARY OF INTERNATIONAL EVENTS: SEPT. 15—OCT. 14

THE EUROPEAN CRISIS

ARRIVING at Berchtesgaden (September 15th), Mr. Chamberlain found Herr Hitler resolved that the Sudetens should be given self-determination at once, even at the cost of a world war. Everything was ready for an invasion which only Mr. Chamberlain's visit averted. The Führer now consented to wait until Mr. Chamberlain returned to seek agreement on the basis of self-determination, in which case he would be willing to discuss methods of carrying it out.

Meanwhile, in Czechoslovakia, Herr Henlein, after declaring openly for union with the Reich (September 15th), had organised a Freikorps of 40,000 Sudetens, whose frequent collisions with the Czech authorities were pictured in the Reich Press as acts of Czech terrorism. The Czech Government (September 16th) accused Herr Henlein of treason and dissolved the Sudeten party. Fugitives from the disputed districts began to crowd into Prague and over the Reich border.

Mr. Chamberlain returning to London (September 16th) was joined by Lord

Runciman. The latter, whose mission had ended when Herr Henlein broke off negotiations (September 13th), had reached the conclusion (as stated in his report of September 21st) that the mainly German districts should be ceded promptly to the Reich, and that certain mixed districts should have local autonomy. At a conference in London (September 18th) between the British ministers and MM. Daladier and Bonnet, the latter, reluctantly renouncing hope of a federal solution, agreed to put forward a plan whereby the mainly German districts should be ceded to the Reich at once, the new frontier being fixed by an international body, which would organise an exchange of populations in the mixed districts; Great Britain and France would join in a guarantee, which would replace Czechoslovakia's existing alliances. This plan was presented (September 19th) to Czechoslovakia, which was urged to accept it at once, since England and France could not aid her if she refused. After vainly referring to the German-Czech arbitration treaty

of 1925, Dr. Hodza's Government acceded (September 21st), under "unbelievable pressure," assuming, however, that England and France would guarantee the new frontiers "during their formation." It gave place next day to a new ministry under General Sirovy.

This sacrifice produced no appeasement. Claims by Hungary and Poland (September 19th, 20th) for like concessions further complicated the problem. The Reich Press called for the extinction of Czechoslovakia. Signor Mussolini, at Trieste (September 18th) declared "plebiscites for all who want them" to be the sole solution; in this and subsequent speeches (September 18th-26th) he made it clear that, if the conflict could not be localised, Italy would side with Germany. M. Litvinoff, on the other hand, stated at Geneva (September 21st) that, in spite of Czechoslovakia's consent to renounce her alliances, Russia had promised to aid her, if France did the same.

The British premier returned (September 22nd) to meet Herr Hitler at Godesberg, bearing plans, worked out with the French, for the transfer of the Sudeten districts. To his surprise, Herr Hitler now demanded the immediate occupation of the territory by his troops, before any discussion of the terms of cession, and without safeguards for inhabitants not wishing to join the Reich. Mr. Chamberlain found this attitude "unreasonable" and would only sponsor measures giving orderly effect to the principles accepted by Czechoslovakia, free from threats of force. After an unavailing exchange of letters (September 23rd) he decided to return to England next day. During these discussions (September 23rd), in view of numerous affrays with the Sudeten Freikorps, Czechoslovakia decreed mobilisation and moved troops to her frontiers.

A memorandum by Herr Hitler, which Mr. Chamberlain undertook to transmit to Prague, purely as an intermediary, required the Czech government to evacuate by October 1st the areas containing over 50 per cent Germans, as indicated on a map, without removing plant, rolling stock, foodstuffs, cattle or materials, details of the evacuation being

regulated by a German-Czech Commission; plebiscites would be held in other designated districts, certain of which would meanwhile be occupied by Reich troops. The Czech government replied (September 25th) rejecting the terms which, it held, far exceeded the Anglo-French plan and would reduce the evacuation to "a panic flight."

French opinion had hardened in view of Herr Hitler's attitude; partial mobilisation was effected (September 23rd) and some two million men were said to be under arms. MM. Daladier and Bonnet, who came again to London (September 25th) accompanied by General Gamelin, Chief of Staff, informed the British Ministers that, if Czechoslovakia were attacked, France would fulfil her pledges; they were assured, in return, that England would support France if hostilities ensued. With their concurrence Mr. Chamberlain wrote again (September 26th) by Sir H. Wilson to Herr Hitler, who was to speak that night in Berlin, urging that the "tragic consequences" of a conflict should not be incurred over a difference of method in carrying out an agreed principle, and proposing further discussions; but Herr Hitler, alleging distrust of the Czech government, maintained his ultimatum, failing acceptance of which—as he informed Sir H. Wilson—by 2 p.m. on September 28th mobilisation would follow.

In his speech at the Sportspalast (September 26th) the Führer was conciliatory to the Western Powers, representing the issue as one between himself and President Benes, whom he violently abused; but he insisted that the districts claimed should be handed over "immediately," otherwise he would take them.

On reading Herr Hitler's speech Mr. Chamberlain issued a statement offering to guarantee the execution of the Anglo-French plan. Decisive events followed on September 27th. The British fleet was mobilised, and naval forces concentrated in the North Sea and the Mediterranean. It was announced in London that if Czechoslovakia were attacked France was bound to aid her, and England and Russia would "certainly stand by France."

Paris and London began to evacuate civilians. Defining the larger issues Mr. Chamberlain stated, in a broadcast, that if any nation made up its mind to dominate the world by the fear of its force it must be resisted. Even in Italy, where war preparations were least apparent, Dr. Gayda wrote that "the days of peace are numbered."

On September 28th President Roosevelt, who had appealed two days before to all the parties to continue negotiating, cabled to Herr Hitler alone that to resort to force was unjustifiable, where only methods of execution were in issue, and suggested a conference of interested states. Mr. Chamberlain, persisting to the last in his efforts for peace, telegraphed a "last appeal" to Herr Hitler, offering to come at once to Berlin to discuss the transfer with representatives of France, Italy and Czechoslovakia, guaranteeing on behalf of France and England the execution of the agreed plan, and urging him not to cause a world war rather than delay a few days. M. Daladier caused compromise proposals for the transfer of territory to be submitted by the French ambassador to Herr Hitler, who gave a conciliatory reply; and he urged Great Britain to solicit Signor Mussolini's support with the Führer for an international conference. This step was indeed taken by Mr. Chamberlain the same day (28th) in a personal message to Signor Mussolini informing him of his latest proposal: Il Duce at once complied, and requested Herr Hitler to postpone action for 24 hours to allow him to seek a peaceful settlement. The request was granted. The same afternoon Herr Hitler invited Mr. Chamberlain, M. Daladier and Il Duce to meet him at Munich on September 29th. The crisis was once more postponed.

The Munich Conference, at which neither Russia nor Czechoslovakia were represented, reached an agreement (September 29th), by which the Czechs must evacuate the German districts, without destroying "installations," in five stages, during the period October 1st-10th, under the supervision of an inter-

national commission (England, France, Germany, Italy, Czechoslovakia); this body would also determine the plebiscite areas (which would be policed by an international force) and fix the new frontiers. England and France maintained their promise of an international guarantee, in which Germany and Italy would join when the Hungarian and Polish claims were settled. Failing such settlement within three months the Four Powers would again confer. The Prague government (September 30th) stoically accepted these conditions, fixed "without and against them." President Benes resigned (October 5th) in order not to block "an understanding with our neighbours," which, as General Sirovy said in a broadcast, must be "based on different premises."

The evacuation was carried out by the Czechs with characteristic self-discipline. When the International Commission, sitting at Berlin, had fixed the borders of the 5th zone (October 6th), subject to adjustments, on the basis of the 1910 census, in spite of Czech protests, Czechoslovakia had lost to the Reich some 12,000 square miles of territory, with her defensive lines and most of her heavy industries, with the exception of her arms factories. The two governments agreed (October 13th) to make final adjustments in the frontier by negotiation without resort to plebiscites, a right of option, supervised by a commission, being reserved for persons living on either side of the line.

The British Government granted (October 3rd) a loan of £10,000,000 to aid Czechoslovakia's economic reconstruction.

The Polish Claim

On learning of the Anglo-French plan of September 18th Poland denounced the Polish-Czech minorities agreement of 1925 and made demands (September 21st, 25th), backed with a display of force, for equal treatment for her minority in Teschen. A letter from President Benes offering to negotiate for the revision of the frontier was held to be unsatisfactory. The Polish pressure

was relaxed after receipt of a note from Russia (September 23rd) that if Teschen were invaded the Polish-Soviet non-aggression pact of 1932 would cease its effects; but on September 30th the Polish government, declaring itself not bound by the Munich agreement from which it had been excluded, sent an ultimatum to Prague requiring consent in 24 hours to the surrender of Teschen on October 2nd, and of a wider zone within ten days, and the delimitation of a further area for a plebiscite. Czechoslovakia yielded, under protest, (October 1st) and on the following days Polish troops occupied the Teschen coal basin and a zone comprising part of Frystat and the Bohumin railway junction.

The Hungarian Claim

Hungary also, on learning of the Anglo-French plan, claimed similar treatment for her minority. MM. de Imrédy and de Kanya, the premier and foreign minister, summoned to Berchtesgaden (September 20th) received encouragement from Herr Hitler, and from Italy on their return next day. Offers from Prague of concessions under the stillborn "Nationalities Statute" having been rejected, a peremptory demand for negotiations based on self-determination, accompanied by a "token" occupation of certain places, was made by Hungary (October 4th) and accepted. The discussions opened at Komarom (October 9th), when Hungary put forward far-reaching demands covering the southern cornlands of Slovakia and part of Ruthenia. The issue of self-determination had been, in part, anticipated by an agreement—viewed favourably in Berlin—reached at Prague on October 7th, giving autonomy on a federal basis to Slovakia and Ruthenia, with the result that a Slovak delegation under M. Tiso, head of the new Slovak Government, took over the negotiations with Hungary. A token occupation of some Magyar localities on the frontier was effected (October 10th). Meanwhile a plebiscite of the Ruthenians was being called for in Warsaw and Budapest, on grounds of

strategy rather than self-determination, with a view to Ruthenia's return to Hungary, which would thus obtain a common frontier with Poland. Italy was understood to favour this project, but Germany's attitude was reserved. Ruthenian delegates visited Belgrade (about October 7th) seeking support against a reunion with Hungary.

Owing to the "wide gulf" between the standpoints of the two delegations Hungary broke off negotiations (October 13th).

EUROPEAN RELATIONS

THE relief manifested in all countries at the Munich agreement gave hopes of improved European relations. At Godesberg (September 23rd) Herr Hitler had averred that he had no further territorial ambitions in Europe and would gladly resume conversations with England. After the Munich agreement he and Mr. Chamberlain signed a declaration, framed by the latter, resolving to deal with future disputes by consultation and to continue efforts for the removal of differences. That this policy did not imply "making new friends at the expense of old ones" was emphasised by Mr. Chamberlain in his speech on October 6th. That improved Franco-German relations should also result from the Munich meeting was intimated by Marshal Göring to the Havas correspondent (September 30th) and echoed by the *Koelnische Zeitung* (October 4th). France, in turn, showed her desire for an understanding with Italy by deciding (October 4th) to appoint an ambassador to Rome, accredited to the King as Emperor of Ethiopia. It was soon, however, evident that the question of Spain, where General Franco's victory was still a postulate of Italian policy, formed an obstacle. Negotiations for the implementing of the Anglo-Italian Pact of April 16th were resumed between Lord Perth and Count Ciano on October 4th; here again the problem of a "settlement" in Spain called for solution. A positive step in that direction had been

made by Dr. Negrin's declaration at Geneva (September 21st) that his government would immediately withdraw all non-Spanish combatants, and by the Council's consent (September 30th) to send a commission to verify their departure. A gesture in the same sense was Italy's decision (October 8th) to withdraw some 10,000 infantry "volunteers" who had served eighteen months in Spain. That the Munich agreement was not a prelude to an exclusive "Four Power Pact"—as feared in Poland—was made clear by Sir J. Simon (October 5th), who added that England did not wish to exclude Russia from a European settlement and hoped that she would join in guaranteeing Czechoslovakia's frontiers.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

The debates in the 19th Assembly of the League (September 12th-30th) showed general agreement that military sanctions under Article 16 of the Covenant were optional, while many States took the same view regarding economic sanctions. Norway and Holland reserved their right to refuse passage to troops. A British motion seeking to enable the Council, in disputes arising under Article 11 (mediation), to adopt a report or recommend measures without reckoning the votes of the parties was defeated in the Assembly (September 30th) by the votes of Hungary and Poland. The latter State did not renew its candidature for a seat on the Council. A resolution amending the Covenant, so as to separate it from the peace treaties, was adopted (September 30th). The protocol relating to it was signed next day by 27 States.

THE FAR EAST

A SUPREME COUNCIL to co-ordinate the work of the Peking and Nanking Governments was installed in Peking (September 22nd). The Japanese Cabinet approved, in outline (October 1st) plans

for a "China Board," designed to co-ordinate the activities of the different Japanese Ministries (except foreign affairs) in China during the war. General Ukagi, Foreign Minister, had resigned (September 24th); considering, it is believed, that the Army would have undue control over the Board's policy.

North of Hankow the Japanese columns were converging (October 10th) on the Peking-Hankow railway at Sinyang, which was being evacuated. In the Yangtse valley they had broken through the lines of Tienchiacheng (September 29th). In South China a new invasion was launched on October 12th, when an army landed in Bias Bay near Hongkong with the design—as announced—of "cutting the enemy's main supply route."

SOME VERY FROZEN BALANCES

It is good to note that our trade with the Frozen South is looking up. A few years ago our experts on trade relations were despairing of convincing customers in those regions that British goods are always best.

This year, however, our export merchants have been busy satisfying the demand of the South Pole.

To Australian Antarctic territory, for instance, goods to the value of £11 have already been exported this year against a mere £2 worth last year and a blank sheet in 1936.

The Ross Dependency has proved an even better customer with purchases to the value of £18 following an abrupt trade recession in 1937.

After such signs of prosperity in the Southern Hemisphere it is disappointing to find that at the other extreme our Arctic trade is conspicuously absent. No shipments have taken place in either direction.—*City Page*, "*Evening Standard*," London.

THE WORLD OF FINANCE

PEACE BUT NOT PLENTY

by "RAPIER"

WHEN I last wrote in these columns hopes of a peaceful solution of the European crisis had been raised by the Anglo-French plan for the re-drawing of the Czech frontier. Later these hopes were dashed by Hitler's Godesberg ultimatum and war was only averted at the eleventh hour by the Munich settlement. Markets all over the world were electrified by this sudden turn of events and within 24 hours the losses sustained during the weeks of crisis were wiped out. Subsequently developments have, however, dashed the hopes of those who looked for a "peace boom" as a resultant of Munich. The emotion of relief soon gave way to one of doubt and the debates in Parliament, in the Press, and among individuals, have so far failed to remove the confusion existing in the public mind. Everywhere the question is asked whether Mr. Chamberlain has only secured Europe a respite from war or whether the seeds of lasting peace have been planted. The acid test of peaceful intentions must be a measure of disarmament and of that consummation there are as yet no tangible signs. In fact, the first cold douche to market enthusiasm after the Munich rejoicings were the pronouncements by Cabinet Ministers that British rearmament must be pressed forward on a larger scale and at an increased speed. France has also found gaps in her armaments which must be filled and the Dictators show no signs of relaxing their

efforts to back their diplomacy with armed might. How then is the vicious circle to be broken?

It must be admitted that at the time of writing the omens are not very propitious. Hitler's Saarbrücken speech was a somewhat thorny olive branch and the comments in the German and Italian press upon British rearmament smack rather of the wolf rebuking the lamb. Nor have negotiations for the withdrawal of Italian volunteers from Spain reached a point where implementation of the Anglo-Italian agreement appears possible. On the other hand the manifest desire of all nations for peace revealed at Munich holds out hopes that further negotiations may yet yield fruitful results. Until, however, something more tangible is forthcoming, confidence must be lacking and something of a war mentality continue to affect markets.

The prospects of extended British rearmament with its concomitants of higher taxation and increased borrowing to meet growing budgetary deficits has had a depressing effect upon British Government securities and upon sterling exchange. If Britain is to concentrate its main effort upon rearmament this will mean larger imports of raw materials, a dislocation of export trade, and a worsening of Britain's balance of payments. These prospects, together with fears that Britain may again be involved in a European political crisis, have caused

nervous European capitalists to withdraw deposits on a large scale from London banks and to transfer them into dollars and gold. This movement has caused, and is likely to cause for some months, a depreciation of sterling in terms of dollars. The Exchange Equalisation Fund has had to operate on a considerable scale to cushion this fall and gold to a value of over £110,000,000 has been exported to New York over the last six weeks. The French franc has likewise felt the strain of the cost of mobilisation superimposed upon an already weakened domestic economy. It is probable that the franc will be allowed to depreciate together with sterling in terms of dollars. M. Daladier has been granted by the French Parliament plenary powers until November 15th to deal with the financial situation by decree.

It is hoped that his measures will be supplemented by further modifications of the 40 hour week and by fundamental reforms of the whole system of taxation. Now that M. Daladier is less dependent than formerly upon the left wing in the Chamber he should be in a stronger position to deal with these problems than when he had to placate the Popular Front. For France as for Britain the fundamental problem is one of armaments.

One of the most hopeful aspects of economic recovery is the growing trade revival in the United States. Steel production is now running at over 50% of

capacity and with automobile manufacturers getting into their stride on production of new models the demand for steel is expected to increase steel production to over 60% by the end of October.

The stockmarket is running well ahead of business indices in discounting trade recovery, and though it may advance even further in the next few months, reactions must be expected from time to time. Mr. Alfred P. Sloan, Chairman of General Motors, has recently expressed the opinion that "American business and industry are headed for a long upward pull." This judgment coming from one of the captains of industry is very heartening and it is to be hoped that it will not be reversed by further quarrels between the Administration and business or by labour troubles, both of which loom in the background. The American market certainly looks the most attractive to investors at the moment but trade recovery in America will also stimulate raw material prices which will favourably affect the shares of copper, tin and rubber companies situated in the Empire.

At the best, however, such a recovery in trade as has been visualised here can be only partial and peace and plenty must await the full realisation of Mr. Chamberlain's policy of appeasement. Then only, in the words of Shakespeare—"Every man shall eat in safety under his own vine what he plants, and sing the merry songs of peace to all his neighbours."



All Classes of Insurance Effected

Branches & Agencies
throughout the World

Chief Administration
7, CHANCERY LANE, LONDON

CLASSIFIED ADVERTISEMENTS

The rate for prepaid Classified announcements is 1s. 3d. per line, or 12s. 6d. per inch if displayed. Discounts for series are 2½% for six insertions or 5% for twelve. Instructions and copy with remittance should reach **WORLD REVIEW** office, 40 William IV Street, London, W.C.2, not later than the 14th of the month for the following month's issue.

BOOKS

FOYLES

Booksellers to the World

Enrolments Taken for
**THE TRAVEL
BOOK CLUB**

Members Buy Books Published at
10/6 12/6 15/- and 21/-
for 3/6 each

**119-125 CHARING CROSS ROAD
LONDON, W.C.2**
Telephone: Gerrard 5660 (14 lines)

GUEST HOUSES

MOUSEHOLE, PENZANCE. Small comfortable guest-house, quaint fishing village. Lovely view; near sea. Modern conveniences. Exceptional climate. Mount Pleasant Cottage.

HOSTEL

INTERNATIONAL HOSTEL. Ideally situated in six acres of woodland, and yet only 13 minutes from Victoria by Southern Electric. Especially suitable for permanent residents. Tennis, table tennis, discussions, etc. Visited by people from all over the world. Charges from 40/- per week. Leaflet free from Managers, "Hitherwood," 19, Sydenham Hill, London, S.E.26. Gipsy Hill 3600.

PERSONAL

DEAF NEW INVENTION

The **NATURTON** for Natural Hearing

The only instrument of its kind in Britain with two separate patented non-electric chambers. Inexpensive—no wires—no batteries—almost invisible. Excellent results—Head noises stopped. **WRITE or CALL** for our special home trial offer and full particulars. **CUT THIS OUT** and post it, with your name and address, **NOW.**

NATURTON CO. (WR3), 83 Pall Mall, S.W.1

Have you Cockroaches?

★ **THEN BUY "BLATTIS"**
★ UNION COCKROACH PASTE
Universally and successfully used in all parts of the Globe. **Extermination Guaranteed.**
From Chemists, including Boots Branches, Timothy Whites & Taylors Ltd., or Sole Makers:

HOWARTH, 473 Ockbrook Road, Sheffield 10
Tins—1/6, 2/6, 4/6 post free.

NURSERY SCHOOLS

RECOMMENDED.—The Misses Cooke, Little Swanborough, Nr. Lewes, Sussex. Princess Christian trained. Experienced. Take entire charge babies, small children; long or short periods. Delightful country life. Companionship. Care given diet and health. **Tel.: Lewes 757.**

CHILDREN'S FARM, Romansleigh, North Devon, for children from 3-12 years. Farm life combined with good education and home care. Entire charge or short periods. Norland and hospital-trained nurse. Prospectus, Mrs. Volkmer, B.A.

LANGUAGES

THE INSTITUTE OF LINGUISTS

Professional body for linguists
Membership consists of Fellows,
Associates, Registered Students.
Prospectus on application
10 & 12 Ludgate Hill, London, E.C.

Mankind needs a Common Language

Learn and Practice Esperanto at The
London Esperanto Club, 183 Drummond
Street, Euston, N.W.1

Full particulars of classes, etc., from
E. K. Osmotherly, 201 Ham Park Road, E.

LITERARY

WRITE FOR PROFIT.—Make a second income in spare time. Booklets free.—Regent Institute (40C) Palace Gate, W.8.

EDUCATIONAL

INTERNATIONAL HOUSE for Girl Students. Brighton Lodge Chesham Place, Brighton.
Miss Woodhead and Miss Cleare Recommended.

"**ABBREVIATA**"—using ordinary letters—simplest shorthand. Speed means efficiency. "Magnificent." "Delightful." "Most easily acquired."—Abbrevia (W.N.), 21 Donald Street, Cardiff.

FOR STUDENTS OF EUROPEAN POLITICS

An Ethnographical Map of Central Europe

with notes in French on the various races in each country and statistics of the peoples of Central Europe.

Size 23 x 18 in. Scale 1:2000,000 Coloured

Post free for 1/3

From **WILLIAM DAWSON & SONS, LTD.**
27 Pilgrim Street London, E.C.4

THE ROYAL YAKUTI A WONDERFUL TONIC RESTORATIVE

Yakuti will tone up the nervous system, strengthen the body and make the mind alert and retentive. It will make a new being of you! Fitness and energy will be yours!—and it is your safeguard against debility. Why let mental and physical ailments prevent you from enjoying life? Be strong, healthy and full of vitality! Yakuti will give you a fresh start and the effect is lasting. Yakuti is not a new idea, but an old and valuable Ayurvedic remedy—prepared only from the choicest and richest of vegetable ingredients. It is held in high esteem by Rajas, Maharajas and the aristocracy of India, and by others throughout the world. Send to-day for a tin of 40 pills, price 10s. including postage. C.O.D. orders cannot be executed, the full amount should be remitted by Money Order in advance.

Stocked by Messrs. Kemp and Co., Ltd., Bombay

**DR. KALIDAS MOTIRAM
RAJKOT KATHIAWAR, INDIA**

Don't forget to mention World Review

WORLD REVIEW

Volume VI No. 4 *Incorporating* 'REVIEW OF REVIEWS' and 'WORLD' December, 1938

40-42 WILLIAM IV STREET
LONDON, W.C.2

Telegrams: BOOKSTORE, LONDON
Telephone: TEMPLE BAR 0127-9

WORLD REVIEW is the only English monthly review giving an extensive selection of articles from publications all over the world. These articles are chosen with great care, since WORLD REVIEW can only be valuable as its sponsors want it to be, if it avoids all political bias. The Editor in his own article, and other signed contributors, express their opinions as frankly as they please. Otherwise the Review would lack force and colour. But the ultimate object of WORLD REVIEW is to perform a useful and progressive service by allowing

THE NATIONS TO SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES

The election at Bridgwater ended, as all will know by the time this appears, in a victory for Mr. Vernon Bartlett by a majority of 2,300, representing a turnover of 6,300 votes since the last election. We give below the address of our new M.P.-Editor to his constituents

VERNON BARTLETT'S ELECTION ADDRESS

To the Electors of the Bridgwater Division:

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I ask you to send me as your Representative to the House of Commons.

I am fighting this election as an Independent Progressive candidate—and, if elected, I shall not accept the whip of any party in the House of Commons—because we have no time for rivalry between the progressive parties while gas masks are being distributed in our homes.

If we are to have a National Service we want a National policy, and it is my belief that the policy adopted by the self-styled National Government since it came into office seven years ago is one which must divide, and not unite, the nation. This belief is shared by many members of all parties in the state, and it is to them that I appeal for support.

This letter deals mainly with foreign affairs, for two reasons. One is that the foreign crisis now overshadows every other question. Unless

10 VERNON BARTLETT'S ELECTION ADDRESS

we insist that our dealings with other countries have the same basis of justice and truth as we should expect in dealings between individuals, we must inevitably drift into another world war.

We only avoided a war a few weeks ago by throwing Czechoslovakia overboard—a state with a Parliament like our own, in which the German and other “minorities” had the same rights as the Czechs. Next time there may be no Czechoslovakia handy.

My other reason for concentrating on foreign affairs is that I can claim to know something about them. I have been at practically every international conference since the Armistice twenty years ago. For ten years I was the London Director of the League of Nations Secretariat. For six years I was the only regular broadcaster in this country on international affairs. I left the B.B.C. because I attacked Sir John Simon, then Foreign Secretary, for refusing to listen to Herr Hitler when he demanded an army of 300,000 men. To-day he has one of well over one million!

In the last twenty years all my small efforts have favoured generosity towards nations that were down and firmness towards nations that bullied and blackmailed. That, I believe, is the policy which gave Great Britain world leadership, but it has not been the policy of the present Government.

I must remind you of this because anybody who now insists that surrender to blackmail is a cowardly and stupid policy is treated as a “war-monger.” I do not wish to boast, but I may claim that very few people in this country have fought more consistently than I to replace murder on the battlefield by discussion round the conference table. I have seen too much of the effects of modern weapons in Spain and China to believe in war.

You are told in one breath that Mr. Chamberlain has brought back “peace for our time” from Munich, and in the next, that we must arm as no country has ever armed before in time of peace.

You are told that for months we have spent more than £1,000,000 a day on preparations for war, but that there were no anti-aircraft guns to defend this country if she had been attacked during the recent crisis.

You are told that we must have “national unity,” but you are not told what the policy is about which we are to be united. The men who have got us into this sort of muddle are not the men to get us out of it.

Even a member of the "National" Government in whom we had confidence, Anthony Eden, has been thrown out of office.

I was with Mr. Chamberlain at Berchtesgaden, Godesberg and Munich. I am convinced of his sincerity and his devotion to his country. But I cannot forget that, when the Labour Government went out of office in 1931 the prestige of this country and of the League of Nations stood at its peak, and that millions of people throughout the world now believe that the League is dead and the British Empire is dying.

I believe neither of these things, and it is certain that this election, coming when it does, will be looked upon in Europe and the United States as an important test of our vitality, of our ability to adapt our machinery of government to new issues.

This country should now, I believe, take the lead. It should try to persuade all colony-holding nations to agree to some form of international control which assures a fairer distribution of raw materials. Germany should have her share in this international control. Unless this were done a German demand for the return of her colonies might split the British Empire, since most of these colonies have gone as mandated territories to the Dominions.

This country should take the initiative in demanding a limitation of armaments. It still has such immense power to rearm that the demand would, I believe, meet with success.

This country should take the lead in reviving the collective system which the present Government's policy over Manchuria in 1931, Abyssinia in 1935, Spain in 1936, and Austria and Czechoslovakia in 1938, has done so much to destroy. Otherwise, the small neutral states of Europe will, unwittingly but inevitably, come under German control.

If the Government is to do any of these things, it will only do them because public opinion makes it clear that we, the people of Great Britain, are not decadent, not frightened, not unwilling to make sacrifices in the national interest.

It is too late to turn back the clock, but not too late to turn out the men who have brought its hands so perilously close to zero hour.

So much for foreign affairs. But the effect of the world crisis is also felt at home.

There has been disgraceful war profiteering even before the war has broken out. The puny little trenches in which the people were to be saved from enemy bombs are alarmingly inefficient. There are too many

12 VERNON BARTLETT'S ELECTION ADDRESS

uncomfortable rumours of attempts to prevent criticism and to withhold information. I want, and I believe you want, real national unity based, not on attempts to prevent you and me from speaking our minds, but on a policy we can all support.

And, despite the cost of defence precautions, I do not believe that a country with such reserves of wealth as Great Britain need lag behind others in its social services. I am anxious to do my share in building a better England. The best way to make a stronger nation is to feed it better. Agriculture should be treated as the foundation of a national service to give the people a decent standard of nutrition in peace or war.


That involves encouragement to the farmer but no rise of prices to the consumer. If the State gives serious assistance in the development of the selling side of agriculture, it should be possible to give the farmer and the farm worker their fair share of the £300,000,000 which lies between what the farmer gets and what the housewife pays for the same goods.

* * *

Voters of the Bridgwater Division, may I end with a few more words about myself? I am not entirely a stranger. My father was born in Thurloxton, where my grandfather was rector for 37 years. My mother spent her youth at Clevedon. I was born in Wiltshire, was at school at Tiverton, and spent most of my boyhood in Dorset.

So that my last reason for asking you to send me to Parliament is that there is nothing I would want more than to have the honour of representing there a West Country division!

Yours sincerely,



ELECTIONEERING IS FUN IN HAWAII

Politicians in Hawaii have their own methods of soliciting votes. One of the current office seekers is making the voters' hair stand on end with ghost stories, hoping to frighten them into the right frame of mind.

Another candidate for the Territorial House of Representatives confined her electioneering to song programmes.

Some candidates hold rallies at which they give their interpretation of the hula; others have flower girls who drape them with traditional lei garlands.—*"Evening Standard"* from Honolulu.

FOREIGN BODIES

by SPOTLIGHT

In these pages our roving "Spotlight" is fixed month by month on the figures of the moment, illuminating the personalities of the men who appear as disembodied names in our articles, and revealing the circumstances which lead them to their actions

In Czechoslovakia Today

I HAVE been here and there, casting my beam into dark places and on dark subjects and finding little enlightenment. Up to the annexation of the Sudeten German lands all was crystal clear. The shape of German things to come—evacuation of the Rhineland, cancellation of reparations, intensive rearmament, recovery of the Saar, reoccupation of the demilitarised Rhineland zone, annexation of Austria, seizure of the Sudeten territory—was for eight years as plain to read as a printed time-table. We who studied these things could all foretell it, and did.

But now, all is fog. In which direction will Germany strike next? To ensure a quick Franco victory in Spain? For the Colonies? For the Ukraine, and if so, with Poland against Russia or with Russia against Poland? Against France and England? Now, we are little children stumbling in the dark. Up to this point German policy was a soaring rocket, with a clearly foreseeable trajectory. Now it is a Chinese cracker, and none knows which way it will jump. But everybody knows that it will jump, and before very long.

In 1938, in the year of peace in our time, Europe has a new no-man's-land, the mile-wide strip which the Ambassadors in Berlin put between the German and Czechoslovak armies, until the frontier should be definitely fixed. When is it to be fixed? Nobody seems to know. At present there is no-man's-land and I have been there to see the Jews camping. In Prague Sir Robert Macleay and the Lord Mayor's Fund are slowly getting into their stride and have voted some money to make a disused factory furnishable for these people, so that the Czechoslovaks have now allowed them in. But the worst problem is that of the scores of thousands of Czechs and Slovaks from the surrendered districts, who are now living in trains and camps and have had their livelihoods suddenly taken from them, lost their houses and furniture.

Marianne in the Mud

In Prague bitter dejection has given way to apathy. Resentment remains against England, but mollified by the thought that one English Minister resigned, that some English people seemed to be ashamed, that England at least sought to assuage her conscience, as she always does, with a large tip. But France! The French Military Mission, that came here at the birth of the Republic, has stolen noiselessly away. I have heard Czech soldiers singing a song about the girl they left behind them and who betrayed them with someone else when they were away. But they have changed the girl's name, from Dolly or what not to Francie—France! I have heard the audience in a Prague theatre break into spontaneous applause when the German peasant in Romain Rolland's *Wolves* calls his French captors "You swine!"

Oh, France! That fire in Marseilles, where the murder was. Apparently these events were not without their deeper significance; apparently they were the signs of an inner rot. That is what people think in Danubian Europe. The fame of France lies in the mud. Contempt is the least of the sentiments you hear.

Czechoslovakia at the moment is an insoluble jigsaw-puzzle. The ultimate result is beyond doubt: an "authoritarian" regime becoming increasingly authoritarian under pressure from Germany, foreign policy hand-in-hand with Germany, suppression of all other parties than a Fascist-Conservative one, press, film and theatre control, abolition of the trades unions, restrictions on the Jews, *Kraft durch Freude*, labour conscription, the Skoda works working for Germany, marriage loans, and so on.

But, at the moment, what a tangle! In Slovakia a Catholic-Nazi regime, with only one party, Slovak and German Storm Troopers, smashed Jewish shop windows, victimisation of political opponents. In Ruthenia half-a-million peasants living in north-south valleys without a single east-west road or railway, with the arable plains and the towns and the markets cut off, without any communication with the rest of Czechoslovakia. In Prague and in the Czech provinces, Bohemia-Moravia, men still talking about parliamentary republicanism.

It was an impossible situation, with the menace of that still unfixed frontier and of German intervention looming over it. "If we don't put things in order soon" wrote *Venkov* "somebody will come and do it for

Dennis Kincaid's
last novel
**THE FINAL
IMAGE**

is to be published in the Spring
of next year

Order Form to your Bookseller

To

Please supply me with a copy of **BRITISH SOCIAL LIFE
IN INDIA** by **DENNIS KINCAID**, price 15s. net, for
which I enclose..... (postage 6d. extra)

From

Published by
GEORGE ROUTLEDGE & SONS LIMITED
68-74 CARTER LANE, LONDON, E.C.4

BRITISH SOCIAL LIFE IN INDIA

by

DENNIS KINCAID

author of *Durbar*, *Cactus Land*, etc.

DENNIS KINCAID met his death in a drowning accident in India in 1937. He was only thirty-one when he died, having served in the Indian Civil Service for eight years, but he had already in *Cactus Land* and his other novels of India shown great promise as a writer. By his death India has lost one of her most brilliant men of letters.

In this book he describes the ways in which the British have lived in India from the early adventurous period of the East India Company until to-day when modern means of travel and communication enable the sahibs to keep in close touch with home and eschew oriental influences. He describes their amusements and sports, their domestic arrangements, their relations with the native population. He provides a delicious period panorama of Simla in the 'eighties. He gives a careful historical account of the growth and fate of the Eurasian population. His treatment throughout is decorative, and his book forms a highly entertaining pageant of the British in India.

Demy 8vo 350 pages Illustrated 15s. net

us." There was an ultimatum from Slovakia, which virtually threatened the disruption of the infant State, still bleeding from the amputations. Parliament must be summoned at once, a new Constitution legalising Slovak autonomy passed at once, a new President elected at once.

By the time you read this, these things will probably have been done. Further delay is dangerous, the distasteful plunge into the depths of German domination, domestic and foreign, is inevitable, unless the Czechs prefer Hitler to sit in Prague.

President will almost certainly be Foreign Minister Dr. Franz Chvalkovsky, bald, studious, bespectacled, earnest. He was Minister in

DUFF
COOPER
SURVEYS
THE SEA

"What a beautiful grave all going to wastel"



"Die Brennessel,"
Berlin

Tokyo, Berlin, Rome, the three corners of the mighty Fascist triangle. From these posts, particularly from Rome, he "protested," he "warned," he "implored." He is going to table documents before Parliament to prove it. Only a man who "protested" is eligible, now, for President.

Benesh now lives in Putney, in close retreat. His policy was indubitably wrong, events have proved it, he should have ratted. But there is one fact to be remembered, and it will give you furiously to think, if you have already made up your mind about the wrongness of that policy. There is no other small State in Europe, there never was, where the army and the nation would have been willing, glad and clamant, given the ghost of a dog's chance, to go into battle against an enemy tenfold mightier than themselves. This spirit was the work of Benesh and Masaryk. Can such an achievement have been wrong? When the news of the Hungarian award came through I spoke with a hotel porter in Prague, a man in middle age, still suffering disability from wounds in the last war. He said, "We have only known one happy day in two months—the day of the mobilisation." On that day he left his desk and keys and rushed to the recruiting office.

Hero to Villain—And Back Again

Here is a man who may come into the spotlight. Consider Rudolf Geidl, now Radola Gajda, for names suggesting a German origin were not gladly worn by Czech national heroes at the birth of the Republic. Rudolf Geidl, like many other Czechs, deserted from the Austro-Hungarian army in 1914 and fought with the Serbs and Russians. Radola Gajda, in 1918, was a General of the Czech Legions in Russia, with them hacked a path through the Bolsheviks to Vladivostok in that epic Siberian campaign, in order to-enship for France and continue fighting there with France, but at the last moment turned back, offered his services to the White Russian commander, Koltschak, and led the Northern White Russian Army in its splendid initial victories. Forty-seven orders, including that of the Bath, the youngest general in Europe had when he returned to Czechoslovakia, and golden swords of honour, captured Bolshevik flags, valuable gifts from grateful Russian cities.

Gajda was the hero of the Czechs. He became deputy chief of the Czechoslovak General Staff, showed open sympathy for Fascist politics, was charged in 1926 with plotting to overthrow the Government and make himself dictator, degraded, deprived of his rank, became head of

a minute group of Czech Fascists. Seldom had the mighty fallen so far. Few men seemed so utterly finished as the hero Gajda.

Then came Munich. Now disillusioned Czechs are flocking to join the Fascists. Gajda's rehabilitation is at hand. His star is rising again. Like the sun-or-rain figures in the little Swiss weather houses, when one goes in another comes out. Exit Benesh. Enter Gajda.

Danubian Turmoil

This is only the beginning of turmoil in Danubia. In Hungary is a strong Nazi movement, with powerful affiliations in Germany. Hitler has helped the regime they detest, which has imprisoned their leader Szálasi, which they accuse of protecting the Jews in their powerful strongholds in Hungary, to a success beyond its dreams. Is it likely that Hitler, who has sent aeroplanes and artillery to Spain to help Franco, will leave matters there?

Behind Hungary, again, are Rumania and Yugoslavia, from both of whom Hungary claims territory. After the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, Prince Regent Paul hurried to Bucharest to consult with King Carol. They agreed to resist any Hungarian territorial demands. But what does Hitler want? He will decide. Meanwhile, the Hungarian minority in Rumania has presented the Government with a list of demands similar to those that Henlein laid before the Czechoslovak Government in the summer. In Yugoslavia Prime Minister Milan Stoyadinovitch, electioneering, declares that Yugoslavia will not yield an inch of land to anyone. Behind Yugoslavia and Rumania, again, is Bulgaria, which also has territorial claims on both. The first revisionist kites are being flown from there. Endless are the complications.

By the way, consider that Yugoslav election, which will be held in December. There you can see how the political figures go in and out of the little weather-house. It is an amazing mix-up.

Leader of the united Serbo-Croat opposition to lucky Milan Stoyadinovitch is Dr. Matchek, the Croat leader in Zagreb. He succeeded in the Croat leadership to Stepan Raditch, who was shot in the Belgrade Skupshtina by the angry enemies of "home rule for Croatia."

Supporting him is General Pera Zhivkovitch, who may be classed approximately as a Serb Fascist; he it was who, as Prime Minister during King Alexander's dictatorship, for which the murder of Raditch opened the door, interned Matchek for many years. An interesting figure, Pera

Zhivkovitch, nicknamed "The Door" because his fingers trembled on that night thirty-five years ago when he, officer of the guard, unlocked the palace gates and let in the officer conspirators come to kill the last of the Obrenovitch and put the Karageorgevitch on the throne. A pillar of the dynasty, he naturally imprisoned Croat separatists when Alexander the Unifier was King, but after the murder of Marseilles Prince Paul and Milan Stoyadinovitch thought him dangerous, dropped him from the Government. Now he is on the same opposition platform as his former captive; there is no other.

On that same platform is former Prime Minister Yeftitch, who in the last election, of 1935, exhausted the vocabulary of vituperation in his attacks on separatist Matchek. Yeftitch, stoutish, baldish, vindictive, is the man in the top hat you saw running from behind towards the motor-car in which King Alexander lay stricken at Marseilles. Then Foreign Minister, Prime Minister after that event, he held an election which, by manipulating the votes, gave him a majority, and he thought to remain long in office. Prince Paul thought otherwise, Yeftitch was dropped, and Stoyadinovitch brought in. Ever since, Yeftitch has been Stoyadinovitch's bitterest enemy, now joins with the hated Matchek to attack the hated Stoyadinovitch. In that same opposition camp are the old Serbian Radicals, who as the traditional representatives of the Great Serbian idea always hated Matchek like the devil himself.

A Yugoslav paradox! Croat Federalists, Serb unionists, Fascists, all fighting under Matchek's flag against Stoyadinovitch. But Stoyadinovitch holds the ace of trumps—"Look at Czechoslovakia, and look at Yugoslavia." He was not popular in the country and ruled it mainly through the police, together with his colleagues the Catholic priest Father Koroshetz, (interned at the same time as Matchek) for Slovenia, and the befezzed Mehmed Spaho for the Moslems of Bosnia. But Munich saved him, hoisted him on the pedestal of The Man Who Was Right.

A few hours ago I was on the northern Czechoslovakia frontier, watching a red glow in the sky. The synagogue at Reichenberg, taken over by the Germans a month ago, was burning. Dr. Goebbels has since explained his theory of the new spontaneous combustion. In Prague the Jewish politicians and journalists, who went from Berlin to Vienna between 1933 and 1937, came from Vienna to Prague this year, are packing their trunks and moving on again—this time to England.

The Czechs have to stay on their native acres. For them, no brave new world. Germany is advancing through Danubia.

PHEW !

Out of the nettle, Danger,
The flower Safety grew,
A hybrid species, stranger
Than gardener ever knew,
It burst on Europe's view.

The Munich Flower they named it,
A peace-plant frail and rare,
Officially acclaimed it
And took the greatest care
To shield it from the air.

They showed a spellbound nation
The Four Power evergreen,
Held up to admiration
Its influence serene,
Upon the murky scene.

Though dubiously rooted,
It shed a rosy glow
Most excellently suited
For purposes of show,
And must be made to grow.

They praised the blossom splendid
In Four Power gardening Talks,
And showed how it transcended
Shrubs in Geneva's walks,
Now withering on their stalks.

Its colour was perfection,
It looked extremely well—
But many, on inspection,
Remarked that truth to tell,
They did not like its smell.

REYNARD.

Zhivkovitch, nicknamed "The Door" because his fingers trembled on that night thirty-five years ago when he, officer of the guard, unlocked the palace gates and let in the officer conspirators come to kill the last of the Obrenovitch and put the Karageorgevitch on the throne. A pillar of the dynasty, he naturally imprisoned Croat separatists when Alexander the Unifier was King, but after the murder of Marseilles Prince Paul and Milan Stoyadinovitch thought him dangerous, dropped him from the Government. Now he is on the same opposition platform as his former captive; there is no other.

On that same platform is former Prime Minister Yeftitch, who in the last election, of 1935, exhausted the vocabulary of vituperation in his attacks on separatist Matchek. Yeftitch, stoutish, baldish, vindictive, is the man in the top hat you saw running from behind towards the motor-car in which King Alexander lay stricken at Marseilles. Then Foreign Minister, Prime Minister after that event, he held an election which, by manipulating the votes, gave him a majority, and he thought to remain long in office. Prince Paul thought otherwise, Yeftitch was dropped, and Stoyadinovitch brought in. Ever since, Yeftitch has been Stoyadinovitch's bitterest enemy, now joins with the hated Matchek to attack the hated Stoyadinovitch. In that same opposition camp are the old Serbian Radicals, who as the traditional representatives of the Great Serbian idea always hated Matchek like the devil himself.

A Yugoslav paradox! Croat Federalists, Serb unionists, Fascists, all fighting under Matchek's flag against Stoyadinovitch. But Stoyadinovitch holds the ace of trumps—"Look at Czechoslovakia, and look at Yugoslavia." He was not popular in the country and ruled it mainly through the police, together with his colleagues the Catholic priest Father Koroshetz, (interned at the same time as Matchek) for Slovenia, and the befezzed Mehmed Spaho for the Moslems of Bosnia. But Munich saved him, hoisted him on the pedestal of The Man Who Was Right.

A few hours ago I was on the northern Czechoslovakia frontier, watching a red glow in the sky. The synagogue at Reichenberg, taken over by the Germans a month ago, was burning. Dr. Goebbels has since explained his theory of the new spontaneous combustion. In Prague the Jewish politicians and journalists, who went from Berlin to Vienna between 1933 and 1937, came from Vienna to Prague this year, are packing their trunks and moving on again—this time to England.

The Czechs have to stay on their native acres. For them, no brave new world. Germany is advancing through Danubia.

PHEW !

Out of the nettle, Danger,
The flower Safety grew,
A hybrid species, stranger
Than gardener ever knew,
It burst on Europe's view.

The Munich Flower they named it,
A peace-plant frail and rare,
Officially acclaimed it
And took the greatest care
To shield it from the air.

They showed a spellbound nation
The Four Power evergreen,
Held up to admiration
Its influence serene,
Upon the murky scene.


Though dubiously rooted,
It shed a rosy glow
Most excellently suited
For purposes of show,
And must be made to grow.

They praised the blossom splendid
In Four Power gardening Talks,
And showed how it transcended
Shrubs in Geneva's walks,
Now withering on their stalks.

Its colour was perfection,
It looked extremely well—
But many, on inspection,
Remarked that truth to tell,
They did not like its smell.

REYNARD.

THE OPEN FORUM



BRITISH FREEDOM

Its Defence and Development

by CAPTAIN B. H. LIDDELL HART

In this section we print, without necessarily sharing the views they express, articles by men of international fame. This month our contributor is a distinguished military strategist and historian of war. That he is far more, a social philosopher with an appreciation of spiritual values which he can most eloquently express, is proved again by the following article. Here he gives a message of vital interest and importance for the future of Britain

AT Munich, the shape of Europe was plunged into the melting pot. It is still premature to gauge what may emerge, how Britain's situation will be affected, and what prospect there is of restoring the balance which it has been her policy to maintain for nearly three centuries. Much depends, undoubtedly, on whether Hitler will pursue a Bismarckian policy of profit at limited risk, or will be carried away by a Napoleonic dream of world domination.

Until Munich, it was a reasonable conclusion that Germany stood on bad strategic ground to face a European, as distinct from a local, war—because of the several-sided distraction which might be exerted to reduce her power of concentration, and because of her underlying economic weakness. Now the strategic balance has shifted in her favour. Politically, there may still be ways of preventing the dangers of a neo-Napoleonic preponderance. Psychologically, there is also a possibility that the desire for it may be assuaged. Tactically, Britain may, if allowed time, be able to develop such a power of air defence that a direct attack would be unlikely to have an effect adequate to its cost—and thereby at least achieve security for herself. But these redeeming aspects cannot be

estimated as more than hopeful possibilities, whereas the strategic picture hitherto represented what was almost a certainty—of ultimately successful resistance. Moreover, the tactical possibility is largely dependent on the non-fulfilment of Fascist designs in Spain and the preservation of the strategical balance in that zone.

Meantime Britain is faced with the problem of strengthening her immediate defences. While the Navy must be maintained, the value of increased expenditure on it has now to be weighed against the contingency that its offensive pressure value will diminish as Germany becomes economically stronger through Central European expansion. In any case, it would seem wise to economise on battleships, and put a larger proportion of money into light craft, which are necessary for the Navy's defensive purpose—of protecting the sea communications. As regards the Army, a considered decision has to be reached as to whether this shall be expanded in order to relieve the strain on the French in defending their frontiers, or whether we shall continue to economise on the Army as the only means of easing the financial strain. On balance, the latter still seems the wiser course.

"Mere Home Defence"

The one unquestionable need is to make Britain's air defence as strong as possible. This demands not only a sense of reality but a sense of proportion. The British have so long been accustomed to think of war as an issue which is fought out overseas that the phrase "home defence" has acquired among them a slighting tone which tends to its receiving too scanty attention. The bulk of professional interest and public money has been distributed "abroad." Even the Air Force, whose expansion has been largely dictated by the public's growing realisation of new dangers to its own hearthside, still concentrates its main effort on building bombers for defence by power of retaliation, without due regard to the increasing difficulty which they are likely to meet both in reaching and in finding targets in a hostile country adequately prepared for *defence*. Its bomber squadrons are twice as numerous as its protective fighter squadrons. Modern conditions suggest the wisdom of redressing the balance. Defence *from* the ground, by guns and other means, lies in the hands of the Army, which finds difficulty in shaking itself free from the traditional idea that an Army is a force which fights battles *on* the ground. An anti-aircraft "attitude" is something too new to be easily

assumed, and becomes all the less congenial when associated with "mere home defence." Thus the country's needs in guns and other equipment are likely to be fulfilled only by separating Britain's anti-aircraft forces from the rest of the Army, which has a function essentially different both in purpose and in tactical technique.

A still bigger change of proportions is demanded in regard to the civil side of air defence. Hitherto money devoted to this has been but a small fraction of that which is given to the "fighting forces." A far-reaching readjustment of proportionate expense is required in order to provide the scale of bomb-proof shelters and other civil precautions which are at least as necessary as aircraft and guns for minimising the danger which a hostile air attack threatens to the industrial centres of this thickly populated country. Any adequate readjustment, however, will depend on suitable machinery, and men, being found to overcome the conservatism of the services and the inherent inertia of the present system.

In the aftermath of the crisis there is a danger of this vital need being obscured by the press demand for the conscription, in some form, of the nation's man-power.

Why National Service is the Wrong Line

National Service is the wrong treatment for the present conditions. First, because the need is for brains and machines rather than numbers of men; it would be foolish to take great quantities of men even into the civil side of defence, before the organisation is capable of absorbing and using them effectively. Secondly, because of the spiritual folly of "going totalitarian" in the effort to stand against it. Thirdly, because the introduction of National Service is not likely to impress Germany very much, except in the form of military conscription. And it is quite likely that a British decision to build up a large Army might provoke her to anticipate it by an early war—as she contemplated before 1914—while Britain herself could hardly bear the strain of maintaining a large Army in addition to meeting her other defence needs.

She must realise that she cannot win a war against Germany except by economic pressure—and it is becoming doubtful whether this weapon will remain effective enough to produce victory. Her best chance of salvation seems to lie in making herself a tough morsel to chew—concentrating her own effort as far as possible so as to provide for the defence

of the possessions that matter most to her, while seeking to preserve the independent existence of countries which can, through their power of co-operation, diminish the power of an aggressor's concentration in any one direction—and thereby diminish the risks of war.

Her power of resistance will depend, above all, on rallying her own people. And that depends on a right lead. There is too complacent an assumption that the people are merely waiting to be told what they should do—"Their's not to reason why, their's but to do and die." If the people showed themselves in the mood to serve when the crisis developed, it does not follow that such a feeling still persists. The factor which makes this questionable is the difficulty of giving the right lead—one that will unite her people.

Marked as was the rally that took place during the crisis, it seems unrealistic to ignore the deepness of the division that has arisen over the settlement. The more that one section express satisfaction with it, the more they inevitably increase the cleavage between themselves and those who find the terms repugnant. This inevitably affects the prospects of agreement and the measures to be taken now that her people are no longer under the immediate shadow of war.

Unless there is confidence in the wisdom of policy and in its honesty of purpose, the co-operation that is essential is likely to be withheld. Nothing is likely to do more to aggravate the doubts than for one section to show no recognition of the reasons for doubt which exist in others, or of the depth of the feelings inspired by the conditions under which the present settlement was made.

For the past decade there have been too many signs in British policy of the same symptoms which marked the "Decline and Fall" of the Roman Empire. The parallel has become disturbingly suggestive as the tempo of events has accelerated. If the process is to be checked, there must be a change of attitude in our policy and in our people. We must face the problems of to-day not with a negative fatalism but with a positive faith. The idea of service loses its point unless it is directed to some ultimate end.

The Cause of Freedom

The history of mankind is the history of the human mind. All progress has been due to its activity. This is inspired by the desire for truth—for greater knowledge. The essential condition for the develop-

ment of the mind is freedom of thought. Here, therefore, is the cause we ought to maintain at all costs.

If there is one distinctive feature of Britain's history it is the love of freedom—the insistence on the rights of the individual; above all, to freedom of judgment and speech. This has been the source of our national vitality. For freedom breeds self-respect and self-reliance. In freedom, truth is perceived and justice promised. Here, therefore, is a true foundation for patriotism—which otherwise is no better than an animal instinct or a material interest. It is a tradition worth defence, because it is the mainspring of life.

If we appeal to nothing better than animal instinct, we risk being let down by the individual instinct of self-preservation at the expense of the community. If we appeal to material interest, we risk splitting the people because the interests of different classes and sections diverge. The defence and development of freedom is the one basis of patriotism on which we can hope to rally the people as a whole. This, therefore, should be the keynote of any call to service in the nation's defence.

But the call must be true to itself. In defending our tradition of freedom against dangers without we must beware of betraying it within. This requires a constant watch on every measure of defence, lest increased material efficiency be purchased at too heavy a spiritual price. It would be the supreme irony of our history if we sacrificed the essential elements of our life in the effort to defend it—or, even worse, in the mere preparation for defence. This would be like committing suicide to escape a fear. Anyone who does not put fidelity to our tradition of freedom ahead of all, is unfit, whatever his gifts, to be entrusted with a position of responsibility for Britain's fate.

Peace is but a means to an end. It is only of value in so far as it provides an atmosphere in which freedom and justice can grow; and these themselves are but the means to human progress. A "Peace Policy" or "Peace Movement" embodies the mistake of putting the lesser before the greater. What this country, and the world, needs to-day is a movement inspired by the idea, and ideal, of freedom.

First of all we must be clear as to the object—to assure freedom for the expression of thought, and to create conditions in which individuality can live and grow.

Totalitarianism aims to fuse individuals into a mass through the suppression of their individuality and the contraction of their thought.

But collective growth is only possible through the freedom and enlargement of individual minds. It is not the many, still less the mass, that count, but the *man*. Our idea should be the elevation of individuality to the plane of co-operation, not its subordination to the State.

To justify faith in democracy, the method must be constitutional. But our constitution has always had elasticity, and should not be treated as a strait-jacket. We should strive to revive and expand the power of Parliament in relation to the executive. The way to do this is not to restrict the initiative of executives—which needs increasing—but to make them bear more responsibility for their actions. We want a “free administration,” dynamic instead of static, to serve a free Parliament in making the people more free.

For greater efficiency—which is essential to compete with the totalitarian regimes—financial control should be less rigid, and financial responsibility should be more decentralised. Money should be rationed, and each official in his grade should be allowed a free hand in spending his allotment subject to accordance with general policy. But all executive officials should be held to account—afterwards—more closely than now. Thereby the encouragement of initiative might be better reconciled with a check on the abuse of power.

Towards Social Justice

Parliament should devote itself to a double task—that of removing existing restrictions on true freedom, and extending the conditions in which freedom can grow—i.e. social justice.

Even in this country, where the spirit of freedom is the life blood of its tradition, we are far from achieving a state of freedom. It is lacking in the press, in broadcasting, in the theatre, in literature, in education, in the law, and in industry. We need to make a searching study of all the spheres of national life, to clear our minds as to what measures should be taken towards creating conditions of freedom and justice—before any Movement is inaugurated. Not less should we take care to devise safeguards against the abuse by its own leaders of the power that they may gain. Thinking should come first; then movement.

The Movement would have to choose, if not necessarily at once, between: (a) general pressure exerted by readiness to give support to candidates of any party who will give adequate pledges of their belief in freedom; and (b) evolution into a Party, to run its own candidates. In

any case it is important to devise a *test* of sincerity of belief in freedom. For success is likely to depend on quality rather than quantity of membership, and on the solidarity of quality.

The keynote of such a Movement should be co-operation with anything that fosters freedom; non-co-operation with anything that fetters it. Its membership should demonstrate their capacity for service, and their unwillingness to be of any service save in a proper cause.

What, in particular, should be their attitude to National Defence? To co-operate in so far as it serves the cause of freedom. How, practically, could this distinction be fulfilled? By offering service as units, large or small, composed of members of the Movement. By refusing it, if this condition be not accepted. In the last war many specially enlisted units were recognised and accepted—not only units raised from a particular race or district, but of men drawn together by a particular interest or association. Even now there are units of public school men, etc., or units raised by a firm.

The obvious difficulty is that members of the Movement would require to be satisfied as to the rightness of the cause for which they were serving. It could be solved by accepting an obligation for home defence—civil or military, while retaining the right to volunteer or not for service outside. That would be a check on a wrongful foreign policy.

There is room to-day for a "New Model" of modern "Ironsides"—"Men who make some conscience of what they do."

Being dedicated to the promotion of the democratic system and of Parliamentary government, there would be no fear of their becoming a danger to the constitution. And the fact of their service being for conscience's sake would give them outstanding moral quality.

WHAT CADS SOLD THEM?

The fact that second-hand copies of Germany's best-seller, *Mein Kampf*, are sometimes offered for sale by second-hand booksellers is deprecated by the president of the Reich Chamber of Literature in a statement in which he says :—

Such offers are from a commercial standpoint fundamentally in order. On the other hand, every National-Socialist-thinking German is painfully affected by seeing the work of our Führer described in our time as "second-hand." It would be gratifying if this notice were sufficient to induce every bookseller to remove the copies offered as second-hand from his shelves. No antiquarian bookseller should be politically so antiquated as to be unable to assent cordially to this suggestion.—*"Times," Berlin correspondent.*



HITLER TRUMPS A TRICK~

UKRAINE AMBITIONS

by MAX WERNER

From "Die Neue Weltbühne," Paris, 3.11.38

Play at the European tables this month has all gone in favour of the Third Reich and the theories of "Mein Kampf." Herr Hitler won again when he foiled Poland's and Hungary's attempt (backed by Signor Mussolini and economic sense) to secure a common frontier through complete Hungarian absorption of Ruthenia (Carpatho-Ukraine), the tail-end of Czechoslovakia. Polish hints that this is not a final settlement are flatly contradicted in Berlin. Similarly, the suggestion discussed here of German plans for a deal with Poland over Lithuania has been denied by Colonel Beck, Poland's Foreign Minister. Nevertheless. . .

PAUL SKOROPADSKI, the Tsarist general who was appointed in 1917 Hetman of the Ukraine by the German army of occupation, sent a telegram of congratulations the other day to the new autonomous government of Carpathian Russia.* That telegram was in the nature

* The former name of the part of Czechoslovakia now called Carpathian Ukraine.

both of a reminiscence and of a significant announcement. Skoropadski has been living for a long time under Göring's special protection. Is he to play the part of Germany's man of straw for a second time in the Ukrainian game? . . .

If the Nazis have really got their eyes on the Ukraine again, they are overlooking the changes that have taken place in two decades. Numerically, economically and culturally the Ukrainian people now belong predominantly to the Soviet Union. . . .

The economic and social advance of Soviet Ukraine has been no less important than the cultural. Soviet Ukraine has profited from the Five Year Plan more than the rest of European Russia. Its industry has increased to four or five times that of pre-war days; in the Eastern Ukraine lies an industrial centre (electric power works, iron works, iron ore and coal production, machinery manufacture) which can only be compared in Europe with the Rhine-Westphalian industrial area.

As an industrial power Soviet Ukraine is to-day three to four times as strong as Poland, and has been developed militarily to a first-class standard; the most powerful troop concentrations of the Red Army are stationed there.

The German Press is calling Carpathian Russia, "Carpathian Ukraine" and is giving us to understand that the Third Reich is the father of the autonomous Carpathian Ukraine State. So they want to foster a Ukrainian *irredenta*. Curious: Poland, with her 7,000,000 Ukrainians, has given up any Greater-Ukraine plans; Germany, on the other hand, is trying out a Greater-Ukraine policy. Why? In the long run, it is certainly directed against Soviet Ukraine. But Soviet Ukraine, which has become itself a Great Power, is quite unreceptive to any *irredenta* policy. It is sheer lunacy to believe that the Carpathian Ukraine position suffices for a conquest at some future date of Soviet Ukraine.

Awkward for Poland

On the other hand, Poland's Ukrainian territories are seriously threatened. And this means that German-Polish relations are taking on a new aspect.

Since the beginning of 1938 Polish-Ukrainian relations have been getting worse. The great Galician opposition party U.N.D.O., at its last congress demanded complete territorial autonomy for the Ukrainians—

and the U.N.D.O. is by no means the most radical of the Ukrainian national parties. The fact that an autonomous Carpathian Russian (Carpatho-Ukraine) Republic has now arisen on Poland's southern frontier has electrified, not Soviet Ukraine, but Polish Ukraine.

The German Press has been following the growth of the Ukrainian opposition in Poland with benevolent eyes. Now the Third Reich is gaining a much stronger means of pressure on Poland. Is the Ukrainian whip perhaps to be used to help Germany to demand from Poland the "exchange" of the Corridor for Lithuania? The Third Reich's active Ukrainian policy and the idea of exchanging the Polish Corridor against Lithuania has its strongest protagonist in Göring. Since 1933 Göring has been trying to use Ukrainian nationalism for the expansion of Germany.

With the formation of an autonomous Carpathian Ukraine State it becomes evident that Poland is a "Nationalities State,"* with several strong minorities. The slogan of national self-determination, used as desired by the Third Reich, is turning to dynamite in Poland. Germany's Greater-Ukraine policy will not touch Soviet Ukraine, but will considerably weaken Poland, with the object of making her a docile ally.

UNNOTICED POGROM

Report received by the Ukrainian Bureau in London

The news of this pogrom in Polish Ukraine, the Bureau states, was suppressed in the Polish press, and has scarcely been mentioned in England


FOLLOWING the establishment of an independent State in Ruthenia—now officially known as Carpathian Ukraine—the seven million Ukrainians of Poland have renewed their long-standing demand for autonomy. Ukrainians crossing from Poland to Carpathian Ukraine have been met with a concentration of Polish military and police in the mountain districts; demonstrations of Ukrainian solidarity in Poland have been suppressed, and now there has been reported a large-scale "pogrom" of the Ukrainians of Lwow, news of which has spread through all Polish Ukraine, and roused the inhabitants to fever-pitch.

The worst "pogrom" took place on November 3rd and 4th. A mob, led by the Polish Nationalist students, with the tacit consent of the police,

* This term was applied by Germany to Czechoslovakia, in contradistinction to a "National State," consisting of one nationality only. Poland's population is one-third non-Polish.

attacked practically every Ukrainian house and institution in Lwow, and demolished, or severely damaged, most of them. The Ukrainians organised in self-defence, knowing they could not rely on police support, and were, in a few cases, successful.

Polish students attacked the Home of the Ukrainian Disabled Soldiers, smashing all the windows, even those of the rooms of helpless invalids. In the same building a Ukrainian kindergarten was attacked and its contents destroyed. During the afternoon a mob attacked the premises of the Ukrainian Students Aid Association, which caters for the poorest class, and destroyed all the contents. In none of these classes was there any intervention by the police.



SPIRITUAL LEADER OF THE UKRAINIANS IN POLAND
The Metropolitan Archbishop Count Sheptytsky, whose cathedral and palace in Lwow (Lemberg) were attacked by a Polish mob, led by students.

On November 4th, the work continued with unabated fury—and the police looked on. All branches of the MASLO-SOYUS (Dairy Co-operatives) were attacked, destroyed, or plundered. A bomb demolished the whole interior of one branch. Several Ukrainians were seriously wounded with revolver shots. The premises of *Prosvita* ("Enlightenment") the oldest Ukrainian educational society, were attacked, the shaft of a wagon

being commandeered for a battering ram, but the staff were able to resist successfully—until the police arrived.

Attacks on Ukrainians, their homes and institutions, lasted practically the whole week, and the full extent of the damage and casualties is very great, scarcely a single Ukrainian house or institution having escaped. Even the Ukrainian Catholic seminary was attacked, though the destruction was confined to the ground floor by the students who hurled missiles at their adversaries, such as flower pots and anything on which they could lay their hands.



SOVIET RUSSIAN, POLISH AND CARPATHO-UKRAINE
(This map does not show the adjusted frontier of Czechoslovakia)

IN GERMAN MEMEL

Struggle for Rights

From the "Neue Freie Presse," Vienna, 29.10.38

There are only about 150,000 people in the Memel Territory in all, but as most of them are Germans, the little strip may one day represent a full-size European problem. Here is the history of it. Immediately after this article appeared the Lithuanian Government gave way to representations made by the Reich Minister at Kaunas (Kovno), and repealed martial law, without waiting for the passing of the Law for the Protection of the State. Simultaneously, a new German-Lithuanian Trade Agreement was concluded

THE so-called Memel Territory dates from the Great War. When, in accordance with Article 99 of the Versailles Dictate, this former part of East Prussia was placed at the disposal of the Allied and Associated Powers, it seems they did not quite know what to do with it. A French army of occupation marched in; but there was no talk of its being handed over to Lithuania. Lithuania first seized the Memel Territory by an invasion with armed forces, at the same moment (January, 1923) as France marched into the Ruhr. Lithuania thus took advantage of the world's attention being fastened on Western Germany forcibly to create a *fait accompli*. The French army of occupation in the Memel Territory retired under protest. The Powers subsequently recognised Lithuanian sovereignty over the Territory, on condition that the "traditional rights and culture of the inhabitants" were to be assured by territorial autonomy. Significantly, the International Commission (consisting of Lithuania, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan.—*Editor*) which in 1923 accorded this autonomy gave as its reason "that Memel lies on the dividing wall between two worlds, on the boundary between Europe and Asia." Ever since, and right up to the present moment, the native inhabitants have fought for the maintenance and execution of this solemnly guaranteed autonomy. They have testified to their German race and culture by an overwhelming majority in every election, held partly under the severest pressure and the most impossible voting conditions, and in spite of the introduction of foreign elements.


In 1938, 81.7 per cent voted for the Memelland joint list.

The protest now being made by the Memel provincial government, which was elected in 1935, is once again directing attention to the fate of

this frontier land which was separated from the Reich. The immediate cause of the protest is the Lithuanian attempt to abolish the fundamental rights accorded by the internationally guaranteed Memel Convention, by means of a so-called Law for the Protection of the State, and by means of the veto of the Lithuanian Governor of the Territory.

According to the Memel Convention, the Government (the *Landtag* and Directory) are the organs of Memelland's autonomy, while the Governor, as representative of the Central Government of Lithuania, has the task of guaranteeing the frictionless execution of this autonomy. In reality the Lithuanian Central Government, by misuse of the so-called right of veto, and even by means of special laws, has sought to restrict Memelland's self-government. This restriction of autonomy, which at times has amounted to complete abolition, has now been proceeding for twelve years. In December, 1926, Lithuania introduced martial law.

Even though the extreme severity of the attacks on self-government, schools and German language has latterly been somewhat relaxed, the methods of the Governor, who regards himself as a foreign dictator, and the proposed law aiming at a perpetuation of the state of emergency, show that Kovno still will not grasp how the resistance of a population is only strengthened by restrictions on self-government. The rights of Germans in Memelland are so clearly defined that all they need do in Kovno is to act in accordance with the spirit and letter of the Memel Statute. That and no more is the demand of the representatives of the Memel people.



"Le Canard Enchaîné"

KING OF PAINLESS EXTRACTORS

"Step this way, please."



"L'Ordre," Paris

ELECTION IN POLAND

"What a success! Two votes, of which 50% are for the Government!"

IS SCANDINAVIA THREATENED ? ~

SWEDEN'S NEED FOR GERMAN AID

by HERMANN LUFFT

From "Zeitschrift für Geopolitik," Heidelberg

Here the position of Scandinavia is described according to their different lights, by German and Russian writers. Whereas the German sees North Sweden threatened with seizure by the Soviet Union, the latter records a subtle move towards submission to Nazi demands cloaked under the term "neutrality." Both are united as regards the importance of Scandinavia in the struggle they appear to regard as inevitable

SWEDEN'S only imaginable opponent is Russia. But this opponent is really threatening. Russia's position in the Arctic Ocean is being very quickly developed. The path to the Atlantic stands open, not through the Baltic, but through the Arctic. The Atlantic is reached as soon as Russia possesses the northern part of Sweden. There are excellent natural harbours in the numerous fjords; Narvik, the Norwegian terminus of the Swedish railway line Lulea-Gällivare-Kiruna is the most important. But Narvik, or any other base on the Norwegian coast is only of uncertain use to Russia as long as the land connection is not in Russian hands.

No less important for Russia is the following consideration: the iron ore deposits of North Sweden are by far the largest in all Europe, and are unsurpassed in the whole world as regards quality. In addition there are the mineral deposits at Boliden. Boliden contains the greatest arsenic deposits in the world; further, very considerable quantities of gold, silver, copper, selenium and sulphur, and, in smaller quantities, antimony, lead and some metals in the platinum group.

Probably Russia is not so very interested in securing these rich ore deposits for herself, for she is too amply equipped with all minerals, and has developed her own deposits on a large scale with defence objects in view. But she is interested in keeping other people from using them. Without Swedish iron ore we should hardly have been able in the World War to hold out till 1918. The Hermann Göring Works in a future war will make the supply of Swedish iron ore no longer a vital question for Germany; but that does not mean it will be unimportant for us.

Another factor which draws Russia towards North Sweden is Swedish timber. By uniting Swedish with Russian timber supplies, Russia would secure a kind of monopoly, at least for Europe, in the supply of this extremely important raw material. This would not only mean great economic power—Russia's foreign exchange difficulties would be removed at one blow—but great political power. . . .

* * *

Two countries are of supreme importance for Sweden's trade—Germany and England. Nearly half Sweden's total imports, and nearly two-fifths of her exports are accounted for by these two countries.

Swedish relationships with Germany and with England differ, however, considerably. In the first place, her trade with Germany shews a big adverse balance: Germany took, in 1936, 15.8% of total Swedish exports and supplied Sweden with 23.7% of her imports. As regards England the position is reversed. England takes about 26% of Sweden's exports and supplies 20% of her imports. Further, and more important still, the goods which Germany supplies could be secured by Sweden from England or other countries. On the other hand, Sweden obtains from England a very large part of the overseas materials and luxury goods which are necessary for a high standard of living. In case of war, in particular, Sweden would only be able to obtain these overseas goods, whether of Empire origin or not, with England's consent.

If, therefore, Sweden had to choose between England and Germany, she would choose England, having regard to her internal needs. . . .

Sweden's hope of being able to rely on the League of Nations to safeguard her integrity has collapsed with the League itself. The Swedes are angry with us for having destroyed their League dream. They are doing us an injustice; we have only led them back in good time to realities out of a mirage. The League would neither have been able, nor have even wanted, to help them.

The Russian problem is, all in all, more threatening to-day than ever with the development of the Russian position in the Arctic Ocean (an outstanding achievement). North Sweden, in part together with Norway and North Finland, in part on account of her own extremely rich natural treasures, has achieved an importance for Russia far in excess of the Baltic. The Russian menace is for Sweden rapidly increasing. The numerous occasions on which Russian flyers have violated Swedish

territory, the latest spy cases, the development of the Russian railway network towards North Finland, seem gradually to be making an impression in Sweden; the method of not seeing what you don't want to see, the view that the lack of any wish to attack Russia is a guarantee of peace with her, is on the wane.

But Sweden cannot in the long run defend herself against Russia. Recognition of this fact was at the base of Sweden's League policy. Only, the League was not suited for this task. In the long run, Sweden's security against Russia can only be obtained with German or English help. From the economic standpoint English help would appear more valuable to Sweden, quite apart from sympathies. But economic help, which England doubtless could supply to a greater extent than Germany, would by no means suffice in a war against Russia. Sweden's chief weakness lies in her small population, which is not even sufficiently educated militarily. Here only Germany could help. For England will in future as in the past take the view that her task in a war is practically limited to economic help to the party she supports. In this connection it would be best to-day to watch the Swedish Army, rather than political circles. . . .

Sweden's one-sided attitude of friendship for England (rather than Germany) is obviously not in accordance with her real interests. If England's help in a Russian-North European war is valuable, that of Germany is simply essential. Sweden has, rather, a very great interest, almost a vital interest, in having both Germany *and* England as close friends. She has consequently an extremely strong interest in bringing England and Germany as close together as possible.

HITLER'S NORTHERN TREASURY

From "Izvestia," Moscow

OBJECTIVE neutrality, which all but binds the Scandinavian countries to "free" trade and navigation in time of war, has become the dogma of Scandinavian foreign policy to-day.

One and a half years ago, it was dangerous to speak of the "neutrality" of Scandinavia in the capitals of Sweden and Norway. It seemed quite natural that only the system of collective security and loyalty to the principles of the League of Nations could guarantee universal peace.

Berlin conducted an extensive campaign there against the system of collective security through all its diversionist-espionage, commercial, political and other channels, beginning with the purchase of shares in big firms and ending with the reading of suitable psalms at the Sunday meetings of the peace-loving Salvation Army. Finally, Colonel Beck was sent into the ring. His private and official visits to the Scandinavian capital during the past two years have become the principal features of the yellow and Germanophile press.

As a result of the subversive activities of Berlin, the foreign policy of the Scandinavian countries has undergone a radical change, and these countries have passed over from the camp of collective security's supporters to the camp of the aggressor's accomplices.

J. L. Mowinkel, former Norwegian premier and a wealthy ship-owner, who is actually the initiator of this whole fuss about "objective neutrality," once formulated the Scandinavian understanding of this term quite clearly:

"If Sweden refuses to sell iron ore to Germany during wartime, the latter will have the right to consider this a breach of neutrality."

His hearers understood that this applied also to Norwegian fish and Danish bacon.

Sweden exported nine-tenths of her iron ore to Germany in 1914-16. Deprived of Alsace-Lorraine, Germany lays claim to all of Sweden's ore, all her woodpulp, all her ball bearings and all the Bofors guns during the new imperialist war. The Ruhr is already working chiefly on Swedish ore to-day.

It is easy to understand Germany's touching concern about the fortification of the Aland Islands for the protection of Sweden's "freedom of navigation." This solicitude extends also to Lulea, a port on the Gulf of Bothnia, which is likewise important for the export of ore.

During the period between 1914 and 1918, little Norway earned more than 2,000 million kroner from her "objective neutrality." Denmark was Germany's dairy and meat shop. It is not surprising that such "free neutrality" finds such solid backers in the kingdom of Denmark.

The Masses Protest

The inclusion of the Scandinavian countries within the orbit of the Third Reich is, however, a source of uneasiness to the masses of these countries.

The masses, as well as wide circles of the democratic public, instinctively feel that they may have to forfeit the independence of their countries for this "neutrality" and the war profits of their bourgeoisie. "Objective neutrality" may prove to be one more link in the chain for the fascist seizure of Scandinavia, "its next of kin," just as the agreement of July 11th, 1936, led to the Austrian *Anschluss* and Henlein's Carlsbad programme to the destruction of Czechoslovakia.

A BALTIC MALTA

Fortification of the Aland Islands

From "Izvestia," Moscow

SWEDISH and Finnish reactionaries have drawn up a plan to fortify the Aland Archipelago in the Gulf of Bothnia, for the benefit of German fascism.

According to existing international agreements, this archipelago was to remain unfortified and Sweden has insisted on this particularly during the last century, since she could be shelled directly from the fortified islands. To-day the financial oligarchy in Sweden, the Wallenbergs, Kreugers and other magnates who are guiding their country's foreign policy on to "neutrality" rails against the will of the people, are seeking to effect the re-fortification of the Alands, ostensibly for the sake of "safeguarding" Swedish and Finnish navigation in wartime, but actually to guarantee an uninterrupted supply of war materials to the German aggressors.

The Finnish fascists and German politicians have long been toying with the idea of turning the Alands into a naval base for the Third Reich, to make the Alands a Baltic Malta for German imperialism.

Finland has been secretly preparing for the revision of treaties, so much in vogue these days. For two years, the Finnish government press has denied all rumours of the coming fortification of the Alands, ascribing these "malicious rumours" to the dishonest enemies of Finnish peaceableness.

Much water has flowed through the Gulf of Bothnia since then. It has washed away the fig-leaf of innocence from the Finnish-German plans. In August Sweden gave Finland her consent to the remilitarisation of the archipelago.

The present Finnish government coalition of Social-Democrats and agrarians is a camouflage for the consolidation of Germanophile forces that is going on in the country. These forces are awaiting a favourable opportunity to compel the Cajander-Tanner government to resign. The Finnish Social-Democrats themselves are conscious of the ephemeral nature of their power. Did not the Social-Democrat Kai Sundstrom, one of the leaders of the foreign commission of the Diet, say that the parliamentary elections in 1939 may strengthen Finnish fascism?

The Finnish fascists and German agents can remove Sundstrom and his friends from power prior to the elections, "carry through the elections" themselves, and later on offer up their thanks for the creation of a German naval base in the Baltic.

It is said in Stockholm that the Aland Archipelago is a "pistol pointed at Sweden's breast." For eighty years this pistol has been a harmless plaything. To-day, the Swedish and Finnish reactionaries are beginning to load it with powder so strong that the first shot may blow up the integrity and political independence of Sweden.

ANOTHER LINDBERGH

A most informative report on air power and the part it might play in a major war has been made in the three articles by Major Al Williams. Williams, who won fame as a speed, test and acrobatic pilot and also was a flight Lieutenant in the United States Navy, made a two-month tour of Europe this summer in his own plane. His observations, as a result of his background, are of great technical value.


He tells convincingly how Germany and Italy, pressed for aircraft materials, showed ingenuity in solving their difficulties and also revealed startling ability in the development and manufacture of planes superior to those of Great Britain, France and Russia. Among his interesting conclusions are : the Russian air force is far behind its big reputation, Great Britain is muddling along, and France just can't get its training programme started. Perhaps these points have played important parts in the events that have just taken place in Europe.—"*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*," *U.S.A.*

DISQUALIFIED

The new edition of the *Enciclopedia Italiana* has managed to get itself out-of-date on publishing day. In its explanation of Fascismo it has this to say of the British Fascist movement :—

"... because of their anti-Semitic tendencies, and similarly because of their admiration for Adolf Hitler, of whom they are more faithful imitators than they are of Benito Mussolini, they cannot, despite their name, consider themselves the most genuine representatives of the ideals of Fascism in England."

Benito Mussolini, it is much to be feared, himself is no longer a Fascist if anti-Semitic tendencies and an admiration of Adolf Hitler earn disqualification.—"*Japan Chronicle*," *Kobe*.



"Die Bräutal," Berlin

GAU, GAU, EVERYWHERE

A map of the "Very-Great-German-Reich," dedicated by the artist to the journalists of the world who are "always inventing new fairy-stories about Germany's just for expansion." *Gau*, it will be remembered, is the Nazi term for an administrative district.

UMBRELLAS WAVE OVER FRANCE

Our New Dominion

by ANDRE GUERIN

From "*Le Canard Enchaîné*," Paris, 9.11.38

TOO many rumours have been circulated recently by the many enemies of M. Georges Bonnet concerning the supposed reduction of France to the rank of a second-class power, or even some sort of colony.

Whose colony?

Even the least patriotic have begun to get rattled. It is high time to make everything plain by nipping all ambiguity in the bud.

Now, the approaching visit of Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Halifax is being awaited in Paris with an enthusiasm rarely equalled since the coronation at Notre Dame in 1430 of Henry VI, King of England and of France.

With a highly appreciated sense of delicacy His Majesty's two ministers have, moreover, decided to formulate certain measures of appeasement at once.

"There can be no question of *colonisation* between France and England," they declared. "That word has, between us, been banished from the dictionary. It is no more possible as regards France, let us not hesitate to proclaim, than as regards Canada or New Zealand!"

And, after three cheers for the Dominions in general, Messrs. Chamberlain and Halifax added genially:

"You will see how much nicer it will be our way."

The two ministers then emphasised that England had absolutely no intention of changing the policy of France, which remains, as in the past, the mistress of her destiny. At the very most, M. Daladier will be asked to break the Franco-Soviet pact within twenty-four hours, to give Grenoble back to Italy, to intervene in Spain on Franco's side, to replace the Bank of France by a branch of the Bank of England and to make peace at Saturday psalm-singing obligatory.

But these are all tiny symbolic gestures which could not possibly become matters for discussion.

In return, it is pointed out in the best European circles that recognition of France as a Dominion will immediately ensure her having certain rights which she has not enjoyed for a long time past.

The right, in the first place, not to mobilise or make war unless the conditions seem to her particularly suitable. And to make it known once and for all, that public opinion cannot bear the thought of military service.

And then the right, like New Zealand, to have a Socialist government if she wants to, and to apply social laws without England's being able to object.

The right, again, to give Togoland, the Cameroons, and even, if need be, French Equatorial Africa and Morocco to Herr Adolf Hitler without hearing ourselves accused of having been made a fool of by England. For England would be *us*.

Even the right, on occasion, just like Ireland, to tell the aforesaid England to go to blazes; with all the politeness, of course, which is the rule between gentlemen. But, still, to tell her to go to blazes.

These examples alone are enough to show that, all things considered, the position of a Dominion is more advantageous than that of an independent and sovereign Great Power.

And these advantages will rapidly make us forget small annoyances which will consist in M. Albert Lebrun's having to wear a kilt with an umbrella, in Mgr. Verdier (Cardinal Archbishop of Paris) having to play polo with his colleague from Westminster, and in every one of us having to drink port in the evenings as a digestive.

It is a matter of adaptation and nothing more. Our admirable national genius will do the rest.

SOVIET PALACE IN PRECIOUS STONES

The huge five-metre model of the Palace of Soviets, now under construction in Moscow, which is to be exhibited in the Soviet pavilion at the forthcoming international exhibition in New York, was discussed recently at a conference in the offices of the Russian Precious Stones Trust in Leningrad.

The metal framework of the model is to be faced with Ural jasper, Beloretsk quartz, emeralds, rubies, golden topaz and other precious stones. Topping the model will be a figure of Lenin in stainless steel. One of the sides of the model will be revealing the palace's large hall.

A 200-sq.-m. mosaic panel depicting the Stalinist Constitution is also being constructed for the exhibition. The text of the principal articles of the Constitution will be inscribed in precious stones on a mosaic background made from Ural stones. Other compositions in preparation by the trust are a large emblem of the Soviet Union and eleven emblems of the Union republics from topaz, rubies, sapphires and emeralds, as well as a bas-relief of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin.---"*Moscow News*."

EUROPE'S NEW HIGHWAY

Czechoslovakian Enterprise

From the "Prager Presse," Prague, 30.10.38

News in the Prague papers these days consists largely of announcements of energetic measures which are being taken to develop the brave little country within its curtailed frontiers. New tourist districts are being opened up, industries set upon a new footing. One of the biggest enterprises is the motor highway here described, which will form part of a continuous link from Berlin to the Bosphorus

THE energetic measures which the Government is taking in the field of transport have already found expression in the regulations for furthering motor traffic, and in the announcement that a new railway axis from Prague to Slovakia will be built. These measures are logically completed by the project, which is now to be taken up with determination, for building a long-distance motor highway from west to east, linking up the economic and cultural interests of the State of Czechs, Slovaks and Carpathian Russians.

The political common denominator of all these measures lies in the determination of the whole people to give an aim to the energies of millions in coping with the economic tasks which fall to the State within its new frontiers.

Practical optimism, the only kind that to-day has any hope of striking root in the people, is expressed by the government's measures in the field of transport.

The new frontiers have so affected the railway and road system that the construction of the new motor highway has become a basic element in our national economy. The second motive for its construction lies in the necessity of undertaking large-scale public works under all circumstances, in order to avert the danger of a catastrophic increase in unemployment figures. The construction of the motor highway assures the whole of what the Americans term prosperity. For it will be the main traffic artery of the Republic, and will be the key to districts which, owing to deficient connections, have remained backward in development.

The favourable results of this traffic policy are principally important for agriculture and industry. It is calculated that the motor highway will

require at first 50,000 labourers, and then gradually up to 100,000. The number to whom it will give employment, however, will reach many times this figure. It will mean no fresh burden on our balance of payments internationally as, with the exception of iron ore, the whole of the construction material is available internally.

The highway will be reserved for motor traffic. The prospects which it opens for export and import trade cannot as yet be expressed in figures. Experts reckon with a construction period of from five to six years, but individual stretches of the road will be opened to traffic as soon as completed.

The first steps to execution of the project, which are being taken immediately, show the path which the Second Republic wishes to tread. For the new highway from west to east will be the first big modern motor road in Central Europe, and will thus link up the Republic with the great traffic network which surrounds it.

FROM BERLIN TO BOSPHORUS

From the Balkan Correspondent of "Great Britain and the East,"

London, 27.10.38

TOO much should not be made of the interesting series of commercial agreements concluded between Germany and various States in South-Eastern Europe as the result of the tour of Dr. Walter Funk, the Reich Minister of Economics.

HE KNOWS
THE
METHOD

"You put up the price, and then I'll make them a great anti-Communist speech."

"Le Canard
Enchaîné," Paris



Dr. Funk would be the last person to claim an exaggerated success as the result of his visits. Only one agreement, that with Turkey, has actually been concluded, although the foundations have been laid for conventions on similar lines with the other Balkan countries. These countries are undeveloped, with very low standards of life; their potentialities are, however, great in minerals and raw materials, but nearly all of them are hampered with internal political difficulties and backward populations.

For these reasons the amount of additional trade that Germany could hope to secure in the Balkans would not be comparable with what she could obtain from a revival of her commerce with the United States or Great Britain.

Turkey is the country especially favoured by the Third Reich because its people are ruled by an iron dictatorship, facilitating trade on the barter principle, which is the most substantial commercial achievement of the Third Reich.

Even on such a basis German trade with the Balkans is heavily handicapped. The eighty million inhabitants of the Third Reich require cotton, wool, rubber, oil, wheat and fats in abundance, to mention only a few of their more pressing needs, but the difficulty is to find suitable objects to exchange. It is not much use offering Turks or Bulgarians Leica cameras or motor-cars; nor are the prospects for wireless sets and electrical appliances much brighter.

Dr. Funk has, however, made one hopeful proposal; it is that the Balkan countries with their adequate man-power and material should construct motor highways on the model of the German *Autobahn* to link the Bosphorus with Berlin. Germany offers to supply the road-making machines and later the motor-cars. In the twentieth century trade follows the road, and in making this suggestion the Germans have perhaps found the key which may open a new era for the Balkans.

VOICE OF REASON

But we Germans are not alone in this world. Round us live peoples of other kinds, who also claim the right to live, and to live in accordance with other ideas. To recognise this, to check our own value again and again against what we see among other peoples, and to be free from the fatal attitude of mind, which leads one to think that what is right for us is necessarily right for others, can only be achieved by personal examination of foreign conditions."—*Admiral Raeder, head of the German Navy, at Stuttgart.*

BRITISH MIGRANTS RETURN

From the "Melbourne Herald," 21.7.38

Of all Empire countries Australia is the one to which the persecuted Jewish refugees from Germany most hopefully look. In one influential daily, "The Sydney Morning Herald," to which Professor Roberts, author of "The House that Hitler Built" contributes, their case for admittance has been discussed in a liberal spirit. The "Sydney Bulletin," on the other hand, is of the most "die-hard" persuasion, but representative of a large section of Australian opinion

WHILE permanent new arrivals of alien migrants to Australia during the year ended last May exceeded departures by 6,471, British migrants permanently leaving the Commonwealth were 667 in excess of new arrivals.

Permanent arrivals for the year totalled 17,559, of whom 8,764 were British immigrants. Departures totalled 11,088, of whom 9,441 were British.

Italians again headed the list among the influx of foreigners with a total of 3,094 permanent arrivals, as against only 312 departures, a nett gain of 2,782.

Greek arrivals were 1,264 and departures only 111.

Excess of arrivals over departures of other major groups of European nationals were: Yugoslavs 641, Poles 587, German 508, Albanians 316, and Russians 117.

THE SETTLERS WE WANT

From the "Sydney Bulletin," 10.8.38

IMMIGRATION is one of the matters attended to by Mr. Thompson, the lone Minister at Canberra. Alarm having been expressed at the disclosure that the "net" migrant is a foreigner, Mr. Thompson replied in effect that there was nothing to worry about. If the 6,000 who arrived in 11 months went on the dole the effect would be trifling. He added

blithely that the Department of the Interior was being snowed under by applications from European refugees, "far more than it can possibly grant"; that he anticipated a boom in migration of Britons, and that if it didn't happen his Government would have to undertake a "special investigation," and so on.

Mr. Thompson was fallen on heavily from several quarters. Mr. Curtin told him that in every State recent arrivals had increased the worries of Ministers who had to find relief work or "sustenance." Mr. Forgan-Smith declared that landing money was sent to the alien when he had set out on his voyage, perhaps to Colombo, being transmitted by bank draft made negotiable at the point of destination. The Canberra correspondent of the Melbourne *Herald* group of newspapers, hitherto kind to the Government, took up the parable.

"The landing-money requirements have been virtually discarded. The department has admitted that it permits guarantors of alien migrants to provide their nominees with the required £50 because of the difficulty of taking money out of Italy and certain other European countries.

"Such a migrant does not enter Australia as a man proved to be of good record and industrious habits. He can be penniless, and, in such a case, he is a vassal of those to whom he owes his admission, bound to their service to work for little or nothing until he has cleared himself of the obligation."

Wage-Cutters Feared

About the same time trade-union leaders in Melbourne and the Chief Industrial Magistrate in Sydney held forth pertinently on the violation of industrial standards by aliens, employers and employees, in city and country. The industrial magistrate declared that "honest Australians" had been "pushed out of many industries" because of their inability to compete with foreigners who broke awards.

In brief, this whole business of alien immigration has ugly and aspects. Ministers' own statements raise doubts whether the central Government can be relied upon to keep undesirables out or local Governments to protect Australian standards when undesirables are let in. And there is nothing to warrant the belief of Mr. Thompson that Britons will come thronging to Australia; nor will there be any occasion for a "special investigation" or any other sort of inquiry if the statistician

reports a year hence that there has been another loss of population of absolutely the best sort.

Australia could get and keep people from Britain if its Governments adopted commonsense measures touched with imagination. In particular it could get numbers of elderly and not-so-elderly men retired on pensions from the Royal Navy, the British Army, the Army in India and the colonial services. The climate suits such Britons, and those who come here, as some have done, find country and conditions, food and people congenial. And to persons whose income is round £300 p.a. sterling the favourable exchange should be an attraction; and an attraction it would be if they were allowed the whole benefit of it in a large-minded way. But they have first to reckon with the fact that £375 Australian will go no farther here than £300 sterling will go in Britain—for one reason, because cost of living in Britain is not increased by sales tax.

If Governments went the right way about it, Australia could get plenty of sturdy Britons who could make things that the nation wants and must have. It needs, for example, ships of all kinds, from launches and trawlers to cruisers and passenger steamers for the Pacific trade; and on the Tyne there are unemployed thousands, of the tough and enduring North Country breed, who know how to build them. Ineffectual attempts have been made by kind-hearted southrons to alleviate the misery of those stout-hearted Geordies. Melbourne adopted Villers-Bret. Why shouldn't Australia adopt Jarrow, and bring its whole body of Geordies out to Newcastle or Port Kembla or Portland or Bowen or Port Pirie or Albany or the Derwent to build ships for the Government on contracts that would keep them occupied for at least four years? It would mean a wonderful new life for those stricken people and for Australia a material addition to its population and its industrial strength. The British Government would assuredly help, and active assistance could be expected from the eminently efficient Australian companies which are contributing to the manufacture of aeroplanes.

THERE'S A MORAL SOMEWHERE

The little island Grimsey in Iceland owes its prosperity to the enthusiastic support of chess by its inhabitants. Almost every man among the peasants and fishermen plays chess and when an American globe trotter who professed himself a chess champion came there to play against the village champion he lost forty-seven out of fifty games and three ended in a draw. So enthusiastic was he about this feat that he left his whole fortune to the village.—*"Evening Standard."*

AUSTRALIA

Life in the out-back,
famous *Sydney Baller*
a well-known cartoonist




"Yairs, I kin remember the time when all this country
was as bare as y'r 'and."

"Careful, Ma; don't
frighten 'em!"




"After you with the
dawg, Ma; me feet're
like ice."



SMILES

en by artists in the
th has trained many

"Be careful, Joe, I
only want 'em
trimmed."



"Wish you'd get
something for those
hiccups, mum!"

"Shun!"

(The head of the Australian navy is
English, the head of the Australian
army is English, and it is expected that
the head of the Australian air force
will be English.)



IF GERMANY HAD WON

IT WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN WORSE

by OSWALD GARRISON VILLARD

From "The Nation," New York

Dear Mr. Villard: In view of what is happening in Europe, and I agree with what you have recently written in "The Nation" regarding it, has it occurred to you that the world would be a better place to-day if the Germans had won the Battle of the Marne? Think it over, and perhaps you will do a piece on what you think the state of the world would be to-day if that had been the case instead of the Allies having been the "victors"—if victors they were.

E. Y. (Formerly of Prague).

THROUGH the mail has come this letter. I confess the thought in it has occurred to me more than once, when I have had a rare moment to think of what might have been.

I suppose I rejoiced as much as any spectator at a distance that the French won the Battle of the Marne. We none of us had any idea that that meant the war would last for four years. We were as heartily glad that Paris was spared bombardment as the world is relieved now that for the moment Berlin, London and Paris have escaped aerial attack.

When we consider the present situation of the world, however, it is hard not to admit that the world would be far better off had the Germans won at the Marne.

Here are the facts: Had the Germans won at the Marne, they would have taken Paris within a few days. Their advance guard had already seen the Eiffel Tower, and the Government of France had moved from Paris to Bordeaux. With Paris in German hands, it is difficult to believe that France could have held out or England could have resisted until Kitchener had raised and drilled his millions.

Paris is the heart of France, but the Germans would not have stopped there. They would have swept westward to the sea and mopped up all the northern part of France at their leisure; it would then have taken only a small force to capture the Channel ports. Had the war ended then with Germany the victor, no less than 9,500,000 lives would have been saved and an amount of human misery and suffering prevented

which no words and no figures can possibly describe. This is the one great outstanding thing.

Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Turkey, Greece and the United States would not have entered the war, to say nothing of China, Japan, Cuba, Haiti and other countries. As a result, there would be no Fascism to-day and certainly no Bolshevism in Russia—if Russia had made peace immediately after the surrender of France. There would be no Nazis, no Hitler, no Mussolini. There would have been no Lusitania case and none of the thousand sinkings without warning of cargo and passenger ships.

While the great economic shock of the war would have been great, if it had lasted only three months the present economic prostration of the world would never have come to pass. There would not have been the millions of unemployed all over the globe. We should not have seen the rise of the intense nationalist movement or the drift toward autarchy, or the rising of tariffs everywhere. The world, for better or worse, would probably still be on the gold standard. The Austrian monarchy would perhaps still exist, and the pitiful old Kaiser, with all his stupidity intact, would doubtless still be reigning.

The Debit Side

So much for the credit side. On the debit side we should have an overbearing Germany—just what we have now—a Germany dominant in Europe, with France in its power—exactly as is the case to-day. The individual German would be so puffed up with pride and arrogance as to be just as unbearable to all civilised people as the Nazis are to-day.

Germany would still be misgoverning its colonies; it would undoubtedly have grabbed a piece of Belgium and added more French territory to German Alsace-Lorraine. Poland would not have been reconstituted, and the Kaiser would probably have helped himself to a good bit of the Ukraine.

Undoubtedly, military limitations would have been put upon France, its fleet would have been reduced to insignificance, its people condemned to the paying of indemnities which would probably approximate the first sums they are now paying for their Maginot lines, their ~~inferior~~ fleet, their greatly enlarged army and their huge air force.

Europe would be an extremely unpleasant place to live in—just as it is to-day; and everybody would be wondering where the Kaiser would strike next—just as we are all wondering whether Belgium or Denmark

or what is left of Czechoslovakia will be Hitler's next objective. Germany would be well on the road to Bagdad, precisely as it is to-day.

So there is the picture. I have honestly presented it as I see it. If I have omitted unintentionally any factors on the debit side, I hope readers will point them out to me, for I want to be absolutely just.


Finally, I want to stress the fact that evil comes with every war, and that the lot of humanity would have been adversely affected whoever had won the World War. Militarism breeds militarism, and mass murder entails more mass murder. It is a pressing question whether who took up the sword will not perish by it.

WHAT IS LEFT OF VERSAILLES?

From the "New York Times," 6.10.38

IT is an understandable mood which speaks of night settling down on Versailles, or the Treaty of Versailles completely unwritten. But, after all, it is a mood. The facts, even after Czechoslovakia, do not justify it. Large pieces have been torn out of the peace settlements of 1919, but the documents are by no means in fragments. A few major points may be cited for the record and as a possible aid to occasional second-thought.

The territory which Germany lost in 1919 is still in the hands of its new owners. Alsace-Lorraine is part of France, and the so-called Polish Corridor is part of a new independent Poland. The map of Central and



MARS-
PHOBIA
IN
AMERICA

Protection
Against
Further
Threats from
the Other
Planet.

"Kladderadatsch,"
Berlin

Eastern Europe has been changed since 1919 by the disappearance of Austria and the new raid on Czechoslovakia; but the map as a whole resembles the Versailles picture much more than it does the 1914 picture.

As a result of the peace settlements, there is an independent Poland of some thirty-five million people formerly divided among three empires. The Czech State was a part of the defunct Austria-Hungary. Rumania and Yugoslavia are, roughly speaking, twice their pre-Versailles size; the additions came from Habsburg monarchy, plus a piece of Russia for Rumania. The string of small independent States near the Baltic, formerly part of Russia, are of minor consequence—Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia. But there is a different feeling about Finland on the other side of the Baltic.

Strictly speaking, these Baltic changes were not part of the Paris treaties, but we are thinking now of the post-war settlements as a unit and as determined in the last resort by the allied victory. Sometimes the connection is close. If not for allied victory Russia to-day would be without its richest section, the Ukraine. That country, with something like forty million people, was separated from Russia in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, imposed on her by Germany. In the Paris settlements Germany was compelled to renounce her Brest-Litovsk gains.

It depends, of course, on what one considers the principal achievement of Versailles. If we think in maps and peoples, in terms of self-determination, then the changes wrought by the peace treaties in Europe have with some exceptions persisted. We may sum it up by saying that if the map of Central and Eastern Europe were to-day what it was in 1914, something like sixty million people would now be living under what they called an alien rule. To-day's minorities are perhaps one-third that number. (This does not reckon the Ukrainians in Russia as a minority—*Editor*).

The new Poland has a minority population of something like ten million souls—Ukrainians, Jews, etc. Under the 1914 set-up there would be to-day between twenty and twenty-five million Poles under Russian, Austrian and German rule. Czechoslovakia had ten million Germans and nearly five million others. In 1914 these ten million Slavs were a minority under the Habsburgs.

To be sure, the chief meaning of Versailles may well be sought in broader considerations. If we think of the World War as primarily fought to prevent the domination of Europe by German militarism, and

think of the peace treaties as signalling the attainment of that aim, then it is much easier to speak of the Versailles settlements as to-day virtually defunct. If the purpose of the peace settlements was to remove forever German militarism as a threat to the free peoples, then the old bitter jests about the war to make the world safe for democracy take on added sting.

Still worse is the taste in the mouth if we find the chief meaning of the peace settlements, as a good many people everywhere did find, in the promise of a leagued world where reason, backed by the collective will of the nations, would take the place of war.

But our answer about Versailles does depend on the criterion we apply. When the peace settlements were made, nearly twenty years ago, the self-determination of peoples had its tremendous appeal. It is irony that in the name of self-determination the Allies should have broken up the Habsburg empire, and so given Hitler his chance. It is bitter irony that Hitler should actually be citing the sacred right of self-determination to justify a policy of international blackmail and terrorism. But whether Hitler means it or not, it is certain that the peoples of Europe believe in self-determination, and in the long run this must be the sufficient answer to Nazi dreams of empire.

FREE SPEECH AND MR. STRACHEY

John Strachey, in 1935 and again at the present time, wants to enter this country to lecture to the American people and uses the great democratic principle of free speech as an argument. It goes without saying that we favour letting him in. The country has survived war, cyclones and the boll weevil. It will survive Strachey.

What is hard on the cracked lip is Strachey's statement that Communists are "exceedingly anxious" for examination of their doctrines; that they "ask for the very maximum of open discussion and debate." It is our recollection that Trotsky once embarked on a discussion of Marxian doctrines in Russia. His present address is Mexico, D. F. Other brave souls have followed his example, to be "liquidated" or "purged," to use the charmingly mild Marxian terms.

Let Strachey come and tell us all about the evils of capitalistic democracy, under the protection of free speech, if he will, but Mrs. Strachey's little boy would be wise not to ask for "open discussion and debate" of Marxian principles in the neighbourhood of Stalin's Kremlin.—*St. Louis Post Dispatch*, U.S.A.

MAN OF IRON¹⁷

The British Prime Minister will call on Hitler tomorrow, grimly determined not to hand over the title to Buckingham Palace, unless the Führer asks for it.—*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, U.S.A.

AN ATTACK

From a leader in the "Saturday Evening Post"

THERE are signs that Great Britain is about to set in motion a new propaganda for the partial cancellation of her war debt to the United States Treasury; and lest it be received in this country at first with a kind of weary silence, which might mislead the British mind, we take leave now to suggest to the British Government that it conserve the money such propaganda would cost and either post it anonymously to the United States Treasury's conscience fund or spend it on armaments.

Thus we should be spared the embarrassment of again beholding the British mind in fatuous behaviour. The explanation we think of is that it is without experience in the unpleasant business of defaulting and has no face for it. The French do it much better; but in the case of Great Britain it involves a contradiction of character.

We lent to the Allied Governments, separately, more than ten billions of dollars. In each case the Treasury was very particular to say that as soon as possible formal bonds should be substituted for the I.O.U.'s, and that the bonds should bear the same rate of interest as the Liberty Bonds the American Government sold to the American people to raise the money in the first place.

When the war was over, the United States Treasury held more than four and one half billions of Great Britain's I.O.U.'s, and Great Britain let them lie there—all our other debtors waiting to see what she was going to do—until the United States Treasury began to ask for a settlement.

The Mr. Lloyd George wrote a letter to President Wilson to say that the British Government was not unmindful of its I.O.U.'s nor forgetful of its obligations to substitute in place of them its interest-bearing bond. Not at all that. The only thing was that a hasty settlement according to the contract might prejudice a beautiful scheme they were working out together in Europe, one he was certain would make the altruistic American people very happy. The scheme was that the war debts of the Allied Governments to one another and the debts of all the Allied Governments to the United States should be wiped out all around, in

order that the Allies might make a favourable settlement with Germany. This was nothing less than a scheme to make the United States pay German reparations.

President Wilson answered Mr. Lloyd George very sharply. This country was not going to pay German reparations. And he added that the failure of the British Government to take care of its I.O.U.'s at the United States Treasury was beginning to be a matter of serious misunderstanding.

"Shylock" Propaganda

The effect of this was to release the Shylock propaganda. British newspapers, British statesmen, British propagandists and the British people, all with one voice, began to say America was the Shylock of the world; the American Government was demanding its pound of flesh out of prostrate Europe. This was supplemented by the intolerable theme that it was our war from the beginning, that we were late to come in because we wanted first to reap the profit, and that now we ought to be made to pay for it. Thus, British stupidity killed what cancellationist sentiment did exist in this country, and it had been a great deal at first.

They did nothing at all but this about their debt until the time came when they wanted to restore their pound sterling to a gold basis, against the American gold dollar. They couldn't very well do it with an open debt like that in utter default. So they came over to settle. The settlement was in this wise: We said, "How much can you afford to pay?" They said, "So much." We said, "All right. Give us your bond for that much and take back your I.O.U.'s." And the settlement was at 83 cents on the dollar, payments to be spread over 62 years to make it easy.

But no sooner had this settlement been made, freely and sincerely as we supposed, than the British began to attack it in a treacherous manner. The British Government sent a note to its own war debtors saying it had been obliged to settle with the United States and for that reason, and for that reason only, Great Britain was under the painful necessity of asking her debtors to pay, as she had never intended to do. It was a mean shame. To make finance out of blood and sacrifice was horrible. Nevertheless, the United States would have it so. The British Government said it would ask its debtors to pay only enough to enable it to pay its debt to the United States, and after that all people might see what was happening and reflect upon it—a stream of gold going

continually out of ruined Europe, across the Atlantic, to the richest and most selfish nation in the world.

That was the infamous Balfour Note. The intent of it was to raise feeling in Europe against the United States, and it had that effect. It was written at a time when we were lending Europe at least five dollars for each dollar we received in payment of war debts. We were lending Germany the money to make her reparation payments to the Allies. Indeed, roughly stated, the only reparation money the Allies ever got out of Germany was American money, and we lost it.

A few years later came the great depression. Great Britain stopped her payments. Recovery came and she did not resume them. She has defaulted on her bond. There the history rests.

A DEFENCE

Why Britain Can't Pay

From the "Argonaut," San Francisco

THOUGHTLESS people, among them a number of journalists whose understanding of world economics should be of much better calibre, continue to belabour the Government for its failure to collect the war debts owed to the United States by practically every Allied nation, as well as the vanquished countries.

These critics assert that instead of armament buying, Europe should pay its debts. Often an analogy is drawn comparing a debt a private individual owes to his neighbour, citing the unethical behaviour of such a debtor who would purchase an automobile or take a world cruise instead of settling his obligation.

Based on such comments, a great deal of bitterness and misunderstanding has grown up in the United States because of the unpaid war debts. Some clarification of the subject may be worthwhile.

One could fairly say that Europe has not paid its war debts because we do not permit it to do so. This may sound unbelievable, but what are the facts?

In the first place, there are three methods—and only three—by which the war debts to the United States can be paid. One is by the transfer of gold by the debtor to the creditor. But this method cannot be used for the very simple reason that we already own, together with

France, more than two-thirds of all the gold in the world. The balance remaining in debtor treasuries is insufficient even to protect their currencies adequately in foreign exchange markets, as witness the periodic "flights of capital" from those countries.

A second method of payment is by accepting goods and products from the defaulting nations. But we refuse to do this because we already have a surplus of American-produced goods and products; to permit huge imports of such competitive products would bring an immediate and sharp break in domestic prices. Therefore, this method of paying the war debt is, of course, out of the question.

A third method remains, but it is even more impracticable (if not entirely unworkable) than are the other two. This remaining means of settling is for the debtor nations to acquire, in the foreign exchange



THE SHAPE
OF THINGS
TO COME

"St. Louis
Post-Dispatch"

markets, sufficient American dollars to hand over to the United States Treasury in settlement of the debts.

But the only available dollars in foreign exchange channels (apart from a negligible amount of speculative funds) are funds moving to balance commercial and financial transactions in the orderly course of international trade and commerce. The total amount of such floating dollars is as a gnat's eyebrow as compared with the total war debts.

Moreover, if a debtor nation attempted to bid for huge amounts of American currency in foreign exchange markets, the dollar would promptly rise to abnormally high levels, which in turn would result in huge losses to American exporters, whose world markets would at once be gobbled up by competing nations.

These being the facts, it is readily understood why the war debts are in an entirely different category than is a debt owed by one individual to another residing in the same country. If there were only one world currency, if all international monetary boundaries were eliminated and all trade barriers wiped away, then the war debts could be paid as individual debts are paid, but not otherwise.

THERE'LL BE PIE IN THE SKY, BY-AND-BY

Some people in the past few weeks have been disturbed about property values in the London area. This has been accentuated by the recent evacuation discussions and the feeling that London is an undefended city.

The uncertainty is, of course, natural in the circumstances that have arisen recently. It seems, however, that the feeling of depression has in many respects been much overdone.

It is likely that as time goes on London will become the most strongly defended city in the world. And when that happens, instead of people wanting to evacuate the city, they will want to come into its area for protection.

That is what should happen.—*City Editor, "Evening Standard."*

BRIGHT DREAM

Lotte Lehmann, the opera singer, was always an ambitious woman, but her aspirations have soared to a new height. Taking out her first papers for American citizenship recently, she remarked: "I don't want to remember anything about Germany."

Lotte, you said a mouthful. Messrs. Chamberlain and Daladier are two of the great who are right with you in that, while millions of the living are who have no taste for serving in the infantry, have every reason to wish fervently that they could forget Germany. Unfortunately, though, none of us will accomplish it. Forgetting Germany must be filed under the category of bright dreams.—*"Baltimore Evening Sun."*

U.S. CRISIS BROADCASTS

by GEORGE SCOTT

From "New Masses," New York

RADIO scored a knockdown, if not a knockout, in its ten-year-old battle with the press during the crisis. Newspapers found themselves reduced to mere printed footnotes to broadcasts and are likely to remain so in future emergencies.

Way back in 1928 or thereabouts Kid Radio hopped into the ring and proceeded to batter his ageing opponent to a pulp. Strategy won the second round for the newspapers, however. They threatened to boycott the radio by refusing to list its programs. So the broadcasters, who were in desperate need of publicity at that time, agreed to disband their nascent news-gathering organisations and confine themselves to purveying entertainment except for occasional bulletins postscripted by the familiar line: "Further details will be found in your newspapers."

The third round started about a year ago when the press—including a number of national magazines—came to the realisation that their advertisers were deserting them in favour of sponsored broadcasts. Immediately a campaign of vilification was started, while more than one hundred large newspapers broke their previous agreement by dropping all mention of radio programmes.

In spite of all this, the networks alone signed up around \$25,000,000 in new business for the 1938-39 season while newspaper and magazine advertising continued to slip.

The climax came, however, when Hitler began screaming.. From the moment that the Sudeten question became acute, newspapers went completely out of the running as far as spot coverage was concerned. Events changed so rapidly that their editions became stale before they reached the streets.

So the American public, which previously had turned on its radio to ease the monotony of housework or as a background for bridge, suddenly woke up to the fact that here was the only medium which could make any pretence of keeping them abreast of events.

And immediately they took the Columbia network's venerable commentator, H. V. Kaltenborn, to their bosoms. Here was a man who

talked their own staccato language, who clung to the nineteenth-century liberal tradition that Chamberlain, Hitler, and the rest of the gang were all honourable men, who taught them bits of history, world politics, and classical economics in words of one syllable, and who repeated himself endlessly so that his words might have a chance to penetrate the skulls of millions of people who had just begun to realise that something had gone horribly wrong.

As a result of this affection for Kaltenborn a strange thing seems to have happened. Columbia, which, since its inception, has been to the National Broadcasting Co. as the United Press is to the all-powerful Associated Press, climbed almost overnight into a pre-eminent position.

The red tape of the larger and older network prevented its acting as quickly as its rival. It turned up its aristocratic Rockefeller nose at the idea of using a commentator on the American side and picked up almost all of its programmes abroad. Moreover, it failed to realise its listeners' hunger for an elementary explanation of the cause of it all.

As a result listeners turned out by the millions in favour of C.B.S., while even the relatively insignificant Mutual Broadcasting System showed itself more resourceful than N.B.C. by inaugurating its spectacular nightly practice of rebroadcasting records of short-wave commentaries made in English from stations in Germany, Great Britain, Italy, France, and Czechoslovakia.

Personal Touches from Europe

Columbia signed up Maurice Hindus, author of *Humanity Uprooted* and *Green Worlds*, as its Prague commentator; gave Vincent Sheean of *Personal History* fame a roving assignment throughout Czechoslovakia, and, in addition to the usual "experts," presented men like Herbert Hodge, a London taxi driver, who made one of the most accurate analyses of the Czech sell-out yet to be heard.

Broadcasts such as that by Hodge were especially significant in America because of the fact that Britishers were not allowed to hear them. The British Broadcasting Corporation had clapped down a rigid censorship.

The most obvious weakness in the coverage by all these networks was their preoccupation with events abroad and their almost complete failure to allow American public opinion to express itself on the crisis. Then there was the fact that when static (some of it undoubtedly made in

Germany) interfered with broadcasts from Czechoslovakia and France, the radio was left badly out on a limb. And finally, Columbia's New York office showed a predilection for putting on International News Service (Hearst) correspondents from Germany and Italy. As might have been expected these men invariably made pro-fascist speeches.

This leads up to one of the most cheerful things about the whole mad scramble: American public opinion *was* aroused to a high pitch. Telephone switchboards of the networks were swamped from morning until late at night with requests for information about broadcasting schedules from Europe, with suggestions for subjects to be discussed and with demands for fuller information.

When Kaltenborn made his one big slip by interpreting Hitler's second broadcast as a promise of peace instead of further provocation, the commentator's most loyal followers protested vigorously and intelligently.

There were, of course, the usual percentage of "nut" phone calls, but most of these had an unmistakable Nazi snarl in them, and many were outright threats against the "Jew-controlled" networks.

One other point remains to be cleared up: What will radio do if there actually is a war? The most logical answer is "Nothing." The networks long ago have abandoned all hope of putting on broadcasts from the battlefields, although Kaltenborn once succeeded in doing just that during the battle for Irun in Spain. In a major conflict, however, it is felt that censorship will be so strict that commentators will have to depend mainly on propaganda handouts from the various governments. A portable transmitter can't be hidden as a correspondent's notebook can, and this may be the final salvation of the newspapers.

CENSORSHIP CREEPS IN

From the "Living Age," New York.

IN principle, the International Convention Concerning the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace appears to be admirable and worthy the support of all peace-loving nations. In practice, however, it is defeated by the method by which censorship on comment on international affairs sneaks in through the back door, for each signatory Power must censor the scripts of its broadcasters to eliminate any unfavourable comment on the policies of the other signatories.

Nine nations have already signed this pact, including Great Britain, France, Norway, Denmark, Luxemburg, Brazil, India, Australia and New Zealand. Germany, Italy, Japan and the United States have thus far refused to sign.

Naturally, someone must wield the censor's blue pencil, and in the democracies which have adhered to the pact, this function has been given to the Postmaster-General's department, to be performed by persons without special qualifications as political censors.

How the system works is illustrated by the fact that when Judge Foster, president of the Australian League of Nations Union and of the Dominion's International Peace Council, was to deliver an address recently on freedom of speech, he found that three quarters of his script had been cut. He was advised to rewrite his address and conceal some of his meanings. Comment on domestic affairs unfavourable to the present Government, as well as that on foreign affairs, was blue-pencilled.

Australian censorship is, in fact, being imposed on radio, platform and press to an extent that is probably unequalled outside of the totalitarian states. The official banning of "attacks on parties and persons" does not seem to apply to attacks on the opposition parties and their leaders. Control has been assumed even over books and films—the sale of Aldous Huxley's "Eyeless in Gaza" was prohibited and the screen version of Remarque's "The Road Back" was drastically cut. Australian editors and broadcasting stations are reported to be marshalling resistance against the censorship.

The United States should remain outside the high-sounding convention on broadcasting. Certainly nothing should be done which might hamper the educational work of our radio news interpreters, thanks to whom we believe American listeners to be the best informed in the world about international affairs. Once political censorship gains a foothold, even in a limited field, it is sure to become the fungus-like growth suffered by Australia.

CHICAGO, GERMANY

The question of colonies is not now before the house, but it is the course Hitler's eye is sure to detect Chicago, which Big Bill Thompson used to call "the fourth largest German city in the world."—"St. Louis Post-Dispatch," U.S.A.

HOLLAND'S MODEL COLONY

Contrasts with British Methods

by TAKEJIRO HARAGUCHI

From "Contemporary Japan," Tokyo

The writer is described as adviser to several big Japanese commercial corporations. There is no hope, he reports, of Holland's native subjects looking to Japan for championship. They are too well off—in contrast to Britain's coloured "lower orders"

IT was Miss Ireland, I think, who described in her book on travels in Java that there were no women on earth lazier or more indolent than the Dutch housewives there. It is their habit to have a siesta after lunch for two long hours, after which they would don loose clothes resembling nightdress, while the men would wear pyjamas. They would sip coffee on the verandah and then stroll along the streets. The Dutch women in Java, the author's indictment continues, had lost every trace of decency, while the men were flabby, having no interest in keeping themselves in training through outdoor sports.

On my recent trip I found that the mode of life among them had undergone a radical change from that described above. All kinds of athletics were being enthusiastically carried on both by men and women. Tennis, for example, is everywhere observable. Swimming, golf, cycling, football, mountain-climbing—these are some of the activities now commonly observed. It is not unusual to see the boys and girls enjoying sculling. The general atmosphere is one of vigour and vitality.

Such a change in the attitude of the Dutch people in Java toward everyday life cannot fail to attract the notice of any one making a trip to that territory. They have obviously been revitalised with the spirit which distinguished their forebears who planted the Dutch flag not only in the Orient but in the New World.

The new attitude of the Dutch certainly cannot but find corresponding expression in their attitude toward the natives. Eighteen years ago the Dutch seemed as if they were not confident of their own ability to deal with the natives and their organised movements, especially those of a political character. When native political movements, such as the Serekat Islam, increased in vigour and there occurred in succession such

threatening affairs as the Goroet Incidents in the Residency of Preanger, and the murder of the District Officer of Toli-Toli, the Dutch authorities were hesitant to take decisive measures to apprehend the leading wire-pullers behind the incidents.

In contrast to such former unsettled conditions, mutual antagonism between the Dutch and the natives is at present negligible, if it exists at all. In the words of a high official of the government in the Indies with whom I had interviews on several occasions: "It can be definitely stated that the relations between the Dutch and the natives in the Netherlands Indies are much better than those existing between the British authorities and the natives in the British possessions." This is a statement which I can endorse without any hesitation. Apropos, it is my conviction that the people of Japan would do well to be aware of the existence of this friendly relationship between the Dutch rulers and the natives. For among our people there are some who, for reasons difficult to understand, have spread rumours to the effect that on their visits to the Dutch Indies an influential native called on them and, describing the oppression of the Dutch, asked if it were not possible for Japan to extend help in liberating the natives from their oppressors. Other irresponsible gossip of similar nature was noised abroad after my return.

Happy Relations With Natives

Of the various reasons for this remarkable improvement, the most important one is, I venture to think, the feeling of intimacy which the Hollanders entertain toward the natives, who, in turn, are naturally well disposed toward the Dutch. They respect their alien rulers, not out of fear but out of sincere appreciation of the friendly treatment accorded them by both officials and civilians. This happy relationship between the rulers and the ruled can be compared to that existing in the Philippines between Americans and Filipinos. In both the Netherlands Indies and the Philippines, there is no discrimination against the natives as in the British possessions. Unlike the English, the Dutch and Americans do not assume a nervously discriminating attitude toward the natives. They live amongst the natives, freely intermingling with them. Count van Stirim, who was the Governor-General of the Dutch Indies twenty years ago and who was responsible for the establishment of the present parliamentary form of government, was once severely criticised for his lenient policy toward the natives, but his firm conviction that the secret of good

colonial administration lay not in discrimination but in mutual help must be recognised as having served as a constant pointer for the Netherlands Government in its dealings with these Eastern possessions.

It seems that the outbreak of the present Sino-Japanese Affair has to no small degree stimulated the closer understanding between the Dutch and the natives. The natives in the South Seas, regardless of whether they are Indian or Indonesian, have for a long time entertained hopes of freedom and looked to the Japanese for some help in attaining this end. But the overwhelming power of the Japanese forces as demonstrated in China appears to have caused not a little apprehension among the South Seas peoples, despite the rightful cause for which Japan is fighting. Participation of Indians in anti-Japanese demonstrations held in Singapore instigated by Chinese have been frequent and the slogan "All nations should get together to destroy the Oriental mad dogs" has caught the popular minds.

In the Dutch colonies such demonstrations are not held, thanks to the strict vigilance of the Dutch authorities. However, the extent of publicity given by the native press to anti-Japanese reports distributed by such pro-Chinese news agencies as Reuters and Transocean, not to speak of the China News Agency specially established for Chinese propaganda following the Lukouchiao Incident, is really amazing, and the feeling among the natives who are fed on such coloured news may easily be imagined.

**The Uncompromising British*

Whatever may be the other factors which have contributed to the betterment of the relations between the Dutch and the native populace, the most important is the conciliatory policy of the Dutch themselves. Generally speaking, the colonial policy of a country is determined by internal conditions of that country, especially its national strength and its distance from the colonies in question. Britain is far away from her colonies in the East, but in her case her great strength as well as the confidence of her people in the might of their country leads the colonial policy of the Government to be uncompromising.

The situation of the Netherlands Indies is far more favourable to the native population and is almost analogous to that of a British Dominion. The reason for this is not only that Holland is far from the East Indies but also because her own land and population are small, rendering it

extremely difficult, if not impossible, for her to assume an uncompromising attitude like that of Britain toward her colonies.

In these circumstances may be found the real reason for her moderate and co-operative colonial policy. She has, of course, tried to overcome the hardship represented by the geographical distance of her colonies by maintaining a disproportionately large navy and fleet of merchantmen, and in the early part of this century she established a great wireless station at Malabaar in Preanger and inaugurated telegraphic and telephone services at a very low rate. She also opened a regular aeroplane service to facilitate her colonial administration. But these attempts have not proved wholly satisfactory, and the result has been the present policy of conciliation.

Inter-Marriage Approved

This policy is observable also in the ordinary social conduct of the Dutch in Java. They are prone to marry women of the Indonesian race. In Bandoeng, where the army headquarters is located, the majority of the Dutch soldiers are married to native women, whom they treat well. Children of these intermarriages are numerous, and there are rarely cases of discrimination against such Eurasians even by newcomers from the Netherlands. Moreover, those of upright character and ability can get important positions in both government and civilian establishments.

Thus the Dutch and the natives are cousins, so to speak, through such intermarriages. Consequently, they are on familiar terms with each other, and no such discrimination as is scrupulously exercised by the British in their colonies is observable in the Netherlands Indies. If these facts are grasped, other things in this colony which may have puzzled people outside will no doubt be clearly comprehended. A passage in the administrative codes of the colony to the effect that the Dutch officials should treat the natives as they would treat their own brothers well expresses the sentiment of the Dutch people at home.

In order to understand fully various phases of Indonesian social conditions, it is important to see how peace and order are maintained in these regions. I can safely state that this Dutch colony has never before witnessed such perfect tranquillity and good order as at present. The communistic movement which was once rampant at Batavia and in some parts of Sumatra has subsided entirely and the nationalistic leaders have already been exiled, and their followers are only a very feeble few.

What is now worrying the government is not the independence movement, but a fascist movement.

It is my belief that Japan, whose economic relations with the South Seas region, especially the Dutch colony, are bound to develop along mutually profitable lines, must devote more careful attention and try to grasp the realities, political or otherwise, because, as it was evident at the trade conference in 1933 between Japan and the Netherland Indies, politics are inextricably intertwined with economic problems.

CONSCIENCE MONEY

The amortisation department of the Treasury has received a sum of Frs. 15 from an anonymous source. It is believed that these fifteen francs have been sent by Marshal Rysz-Smigly as the first instalment towards repayment of the milliards which France generously lent Poland.—*"Le Canard Enchaîné," Paris.*



THE
THREE
DEMO-
CRACIES
THROUGH
GERMAN
EYES

"Perhaps we shall have to get used to other States making their own internal arrangements."

"Simplicissimus,"
Munch

A DEFENCE OF BOMBING

From "The Oriental Economist," Tokyo, July, 1938

For many years managing editor of "The Jiji Shimpō," Mr. Ito, author of this plea for the bomb, is an authority on naval affairs and a widely known writer on political and economic subjects. He was one of Japan's envoys to Europe this year in connection with the Sino-Japanese war

IMMEDIATELY after the aerial bombing of Canton, Great Britain and the United States made a representation to the Japanese Government, calling attention to the inhumanity of killing and wounding non-combatants. In spirit the note was unmistakably a protest, although the expressions used were apparently intended to convey the idea that it was not.

In January of this year, Mr. Anthony Eden, then the British Foreign Secretary, stated that the need existed to prohibit, through an international agreement, aerial bombings undertaken for the above purpose; and he intimated that he was contemplating the summoning of a world conference to discuss such an agreement. Mr. Eden resigned shortly afterward, and Great Britain has since been too busily occupied with many diplomatic problems to spare much attention for an international agreement prohibiting inhuman aerial attacks. It can be reasonably assumed that the British Government's proposal to send an international commission to Spain and its representation to Japan were both based upon a policy embracing the idea expressed by Mr. Eden.

Opinion the world over agrees that the mercilessly cruel killing and wounding of innocent human beings with terrible bombs is an atrocity unforgivable before God and man. Christianity need not be invoked against it; all peoples are unanimous in hating such cruelty. Hence all inhuman aerial bombardment should be prohibited as far as possible, and the Japanese are as willing and ready as any other people to co-operate in an international aerial agreement.

Nevertheless, in my opinion such an agreement, or the condemnation of aerial attacks in general, is a problem requiring much investigation, because either one involves several important and complex aspects of present-day warfare. First, war is regarded to-day in the "totalitarian" sense, that is, as involving the entire people of a country, and consequently

it is extremely difficult to draw a line of demarcation between the combatants and the non-combatants. Second, from present-day standpoints, all enemy cities, towns and villages without exception are viewed as defence bases. And third, it can be contended that, since war is inhuman, humanity can be protected only by peaceful means, and therefore it is inconsistent from the logical standpoint to restrict the use of certain weapons while failing to restrict the use of others.

Within two weeks the Spanish city of Alicante was recently subjected to 32 aerial attacks in which five non-combatants were killed, more than 2,000 civilians were wounded, and three English vessels in the harbour were sunk. The English people were naturally enraged, but before condemning the attacks as inhuman and contrary to all codes, it is only fair to consider both sides. When this is done, important evidence is found in favour of General Franco's army, namely that the city—a port—was furnishing needed supplies to the enemy and that it was being used as a genuine base for enemy military operations. Therefore General Franco's attacks were entirely reasonable. And while aerial attacks are usually directed only against the enemy's military establishments, the very nature of the airplane makes it impossible to avoid all danger to ordinary inhabitants in the vicinity of those establishments.

It's the Bombees' Fault

Thus responsibility for the Alicante disaster rests primarily with the defenders' military equipment, but in part it rests also with the inhabitants who refused to seek refuge outside the city. Had Alicante not been used for military purposes, no aerial attack would have been made; and once the attack started, the people should have fled from the city. In land warfare when an enemy advances upon a city the dwellers usually seek safety elsewhere. A city is used for identically the same military purposes in both land and aerial warfare, so if the inhabitants, who flee before a land attack, refuse to flee before an attack from the air, they themselves are responsible for the consequences. This is all the more true when, as is claimed by a body attacking from the air with bombs, warning is given from the air before the raid begins.

The next question is, when does a city become a fortified city? When the Japanese Navy air forces raided Canton, Great Britain and the United States resented the killing and wounding of some civilians. To this the Japanese Government replied that Canton was a fully fortified

city. At many strategic points there are anti-aircraft batteries ever ready to open fire against any Japanese planes that may appear. Guns of all kinds and sizes are mounted not only outside of the city but in its residential and business sections as well. Canton, in short, is militarily equipped to resist the approach of an enemy. These preparations have made it an important base for military operations, and consequently its citizens have been drawn into the conflict as participants. This military condition at Canton was created by China herself, and it was only natural for the Japanese aerial forces to make the assaults. Nevertheless, the Japanese attacks were limited to the military establishments in the city and those places which could be used for military purposes. The civilians were killed and wounded by bombs which went astray, entirely against the

"We
recommend
this type
for baby-
carriages
and school
children."



"St. Louis
Post-Dispatch,"
U.S.A.

intention or desire of the Japanese aviators, because they were released from high altitudes to which the Japanese planes were forced to rise in order to escape the fire of anti-aircraft batteries. It might even be possible to establish as a fact that a bomb which kills only non-combatants, even though it kill a thousand, is unprofitable from the economic standpoint.

The above statements are made simply to furnish data for this discussion and not for the purpose of defending the attacks made by the Japanese air forces. Nevertheless, I believe that the Japanese air raids were legitimate from the military standpoint, and that if Great Britain or the United States had been in Japan's present situation, they would have resorted to similar action long ago. Military experts in Europe and America think that Japan, primarily for diplomatic reasons, delayed her thoroughgoing attack against this important Chinese base, although from the beginning of the Sino-Japanese affair the experts considered such an attack possible from the standpoint of military operations. Says a rule which may not be general but is accepted by most military men: "A preliminary air stroke against an enemy, if well conceived and determinedly enforced, would have a decisive influence on the outcome of the war." And as this rule was enunciated by a military man of a nation which is condemning aerial attacks, it is far more eloquent than any explanation made in thousands of Japanese words.

When London was being attacked by German aircraft, the English people recognised the foolishness of making angry protests, and instead they strenuously endeavoured to protect the city. If English aircraft at that time had been powerful enough to reach Berlin and return, there is no doubt but that the English would have made retaliatory raids on the German capital. In fact, much the same thing was actually done in the later stages of the war when the English air force became superior to that of Germany and made vigorous retaliatory raids on the Rhine cities. "Destroy as was destroyed" became the watchword, and Cologne, Mainz, etc., were subjected to terrific aerial bombardments in which it is a matter of record that thousands of citizens were killed and wounded. Do England and France contemplate making a written statement guaranteeing that they will not perpetrate such acts in a future war? I think not. I presume that if Germany is again their enemy in a future war, they will repeatedly make great raids on Berlin and other important German cities. Marshal Goering, the German Air Minister, would of course retaliate on a large scale, but there is every reason to believe that England would again show herself to be a mighty master of the air.

INTERNATIONAL BOOKSHELF



The Editor reminds his readers that he does not necessarily share the opinions expressed by reviewers in this section. But this is a free country and knows no censorship

THE ARCHITECTS OF VERSAILLES

THE TRUTH ABOUT THE PEACE TREATIES. Vol. I. By David Lloyd George. Gollancz. 18s.

Reviewed by AYLMER VALLANCE

THE Treaty of Versailles has had a peculiar history. For the better part of twenty years liberal-minded people in the victorious countries, and particularly in Britain, assailed its terms as harsh and contrary to the Armistice pledges given to Germany. They demanded its revision in the name of justice and prophesied that an attempt to perpetuate its provisions would lead to a day of reckoning. The day of reckoning came with Hitlerism—the creation partly (it may be) of Germany's indigenous social forces, but mainly, beyond dispute, of the spirit which characterised the framing and, still more, the future application of the Versailles Treaty. To-day, with the Versailles system in ruins and the revision of the Treaty's few remaining intact clauses in progress at the point of the re-forged German sword, it is well worth looking back to see what the architects of Versailles tried to build and succeeded in building. Mr. Lloyd George's interesting, vivid and fully documented book is timely and valuable.

The picture which emerges is not one of a set of conquerors intent on a

Carthaginian peace which would wipe Germany off the map of Europe. Clemenceau was implacable in his demands both for reparations and future security for France, but even he recognised that Germany must live. Indeed, the French—notably General Foch—were greatly impressed with the danger of Germany's going Bolshevik if the victors imposed too great hardships and humiliations. The important part thus played by the terror of world Communism in the making of the Treaties is perhaps the chief "revelation" in Mr. Lloyd George's story. But it was not sufficient to secure a peace of conciliation and co-operation with the democratic Germany which was born at the Armistice—for such a brief destined period of life. Between dread of Bolshevism, fear of the Junker's resurgence, greed for reparation payments, determination that Germany should not turn colonies into armed bases of aggression or out-compete the products of the Allies' war-crippled industries in the world markets, the peace which emerged was a stupid and hurtful compromise. Concerned ferociously with the narrow interests of their own countries, blind to the possibility of a united Europe, largely ignorant of the economic consequences of their decisions—the Allied statesmen under President Wilson's incompetent chairmanship made a fatal mistake: they

wounded Germany without killing German militarism.

In that deplorable atmosphere of war hatred, narrow nationalism and ignorance, Mr. Lloyd George can fairly claim that he was a wiser and clearer-sighted man than the rest. He stood firm against a war to recapture Russia from Bolshevism; his warning to France against the danger of retribution for the oppression of Germany was couched in noble words. He even adduces impressive evidence to show that he fought against the more ludicrously exaggerated estimates of Germany's capacity to pay. Yet, instructive as is the picture which he gives of Versailles "in the round," the reader is left with an uneasy feeling that there is something wrong with the self-portrait. The feeling is strengthened by two facts. Mr. Lloyd George fails to explain why he appointed to the Reparations Commission the men whose estimates of probable receipts, he now says, outraged his sense of proportion. Still more significant, he grossly misrepresents the advice tendered by Mr. J. M. Keynes, and gets almost so far as to imply that he was the real author of the fantastic reparations scheme devised. This is a serious blemish, and impairs the authority of the book. Self-vindication is no justification for misrepresenting others. Mr. Lloyd George's misfortune is that his stature has never equalled his achievements.

ON THE TRAIL OF THE NEW CAESAR

WHOSE SEA? By George Martelli.

Chatto and Windus. 12s. 6d.

Reviewed by C. SPRIGGE

MR. GEORGE MARTELLI, author of an excellent book on the conflict in and about Abyssinia, now gives us his notes on a quick journey round North Africa and the Levant. Shrewdly and sym-

pathetically he sketches the urbane, distracted French, the Italians keyed up to serve their country with self-sacrifice and double dealing, the British cheerfully doing their duty and neglecting the extra effort which might make British policy attractive and effective. From dinner with an Italian diplomat in London (the diplomat, like most superior Italians, knew how to season political dogma with philosophic doubt), Mr. Martelli passed on to the tapestries and porcelain of the Quai d'Orsay where an "haute personnalité" in black gloves was cheerlessly realistic about Italy's Mediterranean game. Thence to Tunis where an exquisitely civilised Resident General sent by the Popular Front to speed up democratic development confronts ungrateful sedition among the natives, irritation among his resident countrymen, and preparations for rebellion and secession among 100,000 Italians who are already half-ruled from Rome. Across the desert frontier Mr. Martelli finds Italian Libya tidily cultivated (where cultivable) along the highway: the capital, a well-planned complex of good stone buildings: the garrison tensely set on tasks to come: no native problem (as the Governor tells him) because Italians are in their colonies to dominate, not to lead their subjects towards self-government (a native "intellectual" in Libya, Mr. Martelli comments, would be unthinkable). So to Malta, where British civilisation blossoms in dear and comfortable hotels, while under-educated minor representatives of the Home Country are apt to undo the good work of admirable senior officials.

In Egypt British policy has now found some sort of compromise between progressive abdication for the benefit of natives supposedly growing towards political responsibility, and the planting of a dominion intended to be permanent. The Italians disseminate anti-British

The BOOK of the MOMENT

The epic story of the man
who created modern Turkey

KEMEL ATATURK

Now that Kemal Ataturk is
dead the foreign policy which
Turkey adopts may have
serious consequences on world
peace and domination.

"A capital story of Ataturk's im-
mense achievement"—*Times*

"His amazing career is ably and
graphically described"—*Daily Mail*

CHEAP **5/-** 20
EDITION NET ILLUSTRATIONS

JARROLD'S - LONDON



"The series, when completed,
should be a compendium of mili-
tary knowledge bearing an un-
mistakeable hall-mark."—EDWARD SHANKS
in *The Sunday Times*.

The Next War Series

Edited by

Captain LIDDELL HART

Military Correspondent of *The Times*.

The first four volumes are :—

Sea Power

By Commander RUSSELL GRENFELL

Air Power

By J. M. SPAIGHT, C.B., C.B.E.

Tanks

By Major E. W. SHEPPARD, O.B.E.

Propaganda

By SIDNEY ROGERSON

5s. net each.

GEOFFREY BLES

J. W. Wheeler-Bennett Brest-Litovsk

The Forgotten Peace, March 1918.
The story of the peace treaty between
Germany and Russia.

"A book fascinating as a tale, complete
as a record, and convincing as an inter-
pretation."—*Manchester Guardian*.

Illustrated.

21s. net

L. E. Hubbard Soviet Trade and Distribution

"An invaluable book for those who
want to understand how a planned
economy really works." — *World
Review*.

12s. 6d. net

Gertrude Bone Days in Old Spain

Illustrated by MUIRHEAD BONE

A memorable picture of pre-war Spain.
With 16 plates in collotype and over
fifty other illustrations specially designed
for this work.

12s. 6d. net.

David Horner Through French Windows

"The delights and humours of French
life are beautifully rendered."—*New
Statesman*.

8s. 6d. net.

MACMILLAN & CO. LTD.
St. Martin's Street, London, W.C.2

propaganda by methods which even British interests sometimes unwittingly assist. The British Army is cheerful and high spirited, with too much room for numbskulls in high rank. But Mr. Martelli, in a rather metaphysical musing, wonders just what British effort in Egypt is all for. Now for Palestine: here the British officials are gravely conscious of their difficult task, and stoically await still further difficulties of which the origin in the last resort seems to be paralysis of the organs of decision in Whitehall. Until the British Government has a plan and shows determination to stick to it, neither Arab nor Jew dares show readiness to accept anything short of the impracticable ideal—pan-Arabism for the one, pan-Zionism for the other. Transjordan is an oasis in the Middle East under the loving unofficial dictatorship of Sir Henry Cox (unfortunately due to retire) while in Syria the French seem to have carried to ultimate absurdity the business of forcing Orientals to try and rule themselves by means of Senates, Chambers of Deputies, etc., (all the Opposition were locked up during Mr. Martelli's presence). Mr. Martelli finishes up in Cyprus, where Great Britain has ruled for sixty years in the spirit of justice and mediocrity, failing to touch the imagination of the Cypriots or to give them any sense of belonging to a great imperial community.

Whose sea is it then? The question is rather like that whether Mansion House Place belongs to the City of London or to the London Transport Board. The Mediterranean is a sea which Italy (and France, too) might for a time block to our British traffic. It would not be the end of the world for us to have to send our ships round Cape, but it would be awkward and humiliating, and as we could retort by blocking the exits, Italy and France would in turn suffer. The Mediterranean

to be much use to anybody must be Everybody's Sea. Our presence there guarantees this and we shall not be the less liked there for showing that we are there for good.

THE TWICE-PROMISED LAND

FULFILMENT IN THE PROMISED LAND. 1917-1937. By Norman Bentwich. *Soncino Press*. 8s. 6d.

NO EASE IN ZION. By T. R. Feiwel. *Secker and Warburg*. 12s. 6d.

Reviewed by GEORGE MARTELLI

OF these two books Mr. Bentwich's, the more important and the better written, is also the more optimistic. *Fulfilment In The Promised Land* is an account of the development of the Jewish National Home since the Balfour Declaration. It covers the twenty years which culminated in the declaration of the British Government adopting in principle the report of the Palestine Royal Commission. That period, as Mr. Bentwich says in his foreword, marks an epoch in four thousand years of the history of the Jews. It was a period of unparalleled activity and enthusiasm which not only changed the face of a large part of Palestine but also brought new hope and inspiration to millions of Jews dispersed throughout the world. It has come to a tragic end at a moment when it is difficult to see how, and in what direction, a new start can be made, and the question is whether anything can be saved from that tremendous first essay in Zionism.

To describe that effort Mr. Bentwich divides his book into chapters, each of which deals with one aspect of the Jewish enterprise in Palestine since the War. There are admirable accounts of agriculture and industry, labour and socialism, creation of new towns at Jerusalem

and Tel Aviv, the Hebrew revival and education. Mr. Bentwich is an enthusiast for the work accomplished in these fields, and nobody who has seen its results will question the achievement. It is, as he says, one of the great creative achievements of our time, and he is justified in his appeal that it should be so regarded, and a distinction made between the temporary set-back and the permanent values.

As regards the political problem, the author feels there can be no solution except on the basis of understanding between Jew and Arab. Both races, he declares, have a right to be in Palestine, and the British Mandate should be terminated as soon as the League is satisfied that the two are fitted for independence. This independence should take the form neither of an Arab nor a Jewish State, but a bi-national State, looking to England as an ally for protection against external foes, looking to the adjoining Arab peoples for a confederation and an economic union. The crux of the problem is to agree on a measure of immigration during the initial period, while the two peoples are adjusting their relations and learning to trust each other. "It is of less importance that Palestine should immediately take the greatest number of Jews from countries of oppression than that the foundation of understanding with the Arabs should be laid."

No Ease in Zion is mainly historical. It gives an account of how the Jews came to Europe, their subsequent encloement in the Ghetto, their growth under capitalism, the revival of anti-semitism and the dawn of Zionism. The Palestine experiment is described without enthusiasm. Mr. Feiwel seems to harbour an equal distaste for Jew, Arab and British Official. The latter is repeatedly accused of sabotaging both the Mandate and the good intentions of his own Government. There is an underlying suggestion that

the whole thing is a capitalist racket. Nevertheless, for one who comes fresh to the subject, the book contains much of interest. Some of its statements, however, are at least open to question, and it should be read in conjunction with other works rather than as the last word on Palestine.

THE BASIS OF UNREST

THE GOVERNMENT OF MANKIND. By J. A. Spender. *Cassell*. 12s. 6d.

HUMAN HANDS IN MODERN SOCIETY. By B. T. Reynolds and R. B. Coulson. *Cape*. 10s. 6d.

Reviewed by H. POWYS GREENWOOD

HERE are two major works, each equally remarkable in its own way, but so different in scope and approach that it seems at first sight difficult to review them together.

Mr. Spender treats of the whole science of human government. Starting from its early beginnings in pre-history he ranges through the milleniums and the centuries, giving us the amazing political and social maxims of a wiser Egyptian Lord Chesterfield, discoursing on Hammurabi of Sumer and his code, digesting for us and presenting with simple lucidity the great Greeks and Romans, passing in review the fall of Rome and the rise of Christianity, showing the birth of Parliament in the Middle Ages, following its development through the revolutions of the seventeenth century, showing the impact on it of men like Hobbes and Locke and Burke, and its evolution into modern democracy, and finally tracing the totalitarian system from its origins in Hegel and Marx to its earlier, to its astonishing—and at first sight—elaboration to-day.

Throughout, Mr. Spender is at pains to relate the lessons and opinions of the past to modern conditions, and he is, of

course, preoccupied above all by the all-absorbing problem of the relations of democracy and dictatorship. One of his main conclusions is that government is an art and not a science—an idea abhorrent to Plato incidentally, and he humorously suggests that Plato would choose the modern journalist as his type of the "democratic" busybody.

Yet, if Mr. Spender had not been a journalist, he could never have written this very valuable book.

Major Reynolds and Captain Coulson start from the other end, from one of the latest developments of human thought—modern psychology. At least, the book being the result of a wise division of labour, it is Captain Coulson who does this. Drawing largely from the work of the "Hormic" psychologists, McDougall and Shand, he analyses the fundamental essentials to human well-being. His conclusions remind me of the German Professor who was giving a parting lecture to his students. "Gentlemen," he said, "in my experience of life there are three things to look out for, three things which give you a lot of trouble. The first is the instinct to get nourishment and keep alive generally. I expect you will manage to handle that. The second is the sex instinct, and you will have a great deal more difficulty with that. But the third thing, which is likely to plague you and harass you all your lives unless you can satisfy or control it is the instinct of self-assertion, the urge to be somebody and to do something."

The authors (for Major Reynolds comes in here) maintain that that instinct to be "somebody" and to do something satisfying is the essential urge behind what is probably the central problem of our age—the struggle upwards of the "lower" classes, or the "revolt of the masses" as Ortega y Gasset puts it. I am reminded of sitting beside Mr. G. D. H. Cole at an Oxford dinner some years

ago and having him explain what in his view was the principal fallacy in the Marxian doctrine. Marx, he said as far as I remember, maintained that the revolution would come through increasing pressure on the proletariat—that is to say, when the workers were downtrodden and hungry and miserable. But in fact when in that condition they had no energy for anything of the kind. The "bourgeois" revolution in England in the seventeenth century, and later in France, showed that it was the class that was going ahead economically and was anxious for corresponding political and social status which led the revolution and secured the power.

The remedy, according to Major Reynolds and Captain Coulson, is for the better-situated classes to make a great effort to achieve a new relationship on a basis of fellowship and genuine equality with the workers. And the most interesting part of the book is the description

Hitler's Magician:

SCHACHT

NORBERT MÜHLEN

The Life and Loans of Mr. Hjalmar Schacht, depicting him as the pioneer of the re-introduction of barter into international trade. A biography, inevitably too, a commentary on post-war German commercial policy, the most vital factor in world politics to-day. 10s. 6d. net

PUBLISHED BY ROUTLEDGE

of how they tried this out themselves. It can be done; in fact it is being done to a very large extent in the totalitarian states of all denominations.

But who is to lead? Surely in England there is a tradition upon which we can fall back with assurance of success—the tradition of the “gentleman.” The English gentleman may have been a member of a privileged caste, but within that caste there was an equality not based on wealth. The poor gentleman could meet a rich one without embarrassment. Do the gentlemen of England think it worth while to try to extend their tradition throughout their fellow countrymen?

ON REVIENT TOUJOURS

GUNS OR BUTTER. By Bruce Lockhart. Putnam. 10s. 6d.

Reviewed by DOUGLAS REED

MR. LOCKHART always returns to his loves. First was that romantic but disappointing reunion in Vienna. Then the romantic expedition to Malaya. Now comes the return to Mr. Lockhart's first love of all—Danubian Europe.

Before 1929 Mr. Lockhart spent twenty years in Europe. Then, until 1937, he was in Fleet Street, “nailed to a desk” by Lord Beaverbrook. He did not “adapt himself readily to the restrictions of life in England,” and how I sympathise with him in this.

At the end of 1936 he felt the strain of days filled with journalism and nights filled with book-writing. He went to a doctor who said, “If you want to commit suicide lead the life you are living. You can't go on writing books and doing daily journalism. One will have to go or you'll go.”

Again, how I sympathise with Mr. Lockhart. He has saved me the trouble of asking myself one day if I should go to a specialist and telling myself, No.

Anyway, Mr. Lockhart took leave of Lord Beaverbrook, left Fleet Street, “I hope for ever,” in 1937, and returned to his first love.

I think I have exhausted my sympathies for Mr. Lockhart now. I suppose there are two tests of a book—its content, and the standard of writing. The goods in the shop window, and the way they are arranged. In the point of quality, I hope the general level is higher than that shown in a reference to myself and an experience of mine which unexpectedly leapt at me out of one of the pages. Nobody but myself knows the facts about that incident. Mr. Lockhart's guess happens to be wrong. It is of the stuff that paragraphs are made of.

Incidentally Mr. Lockhart, having left the profession to which he retreated on clouds of glory in 1929, is not kind about journalists. It is fortunate for them, he says, that “their mistakes are so soon

CHINA FIGHTS FOR HER LIFE:

By H. R. EKINS and THEON WRIGHT

335 pages, 8 x 5½. Illustrated. 10/6 net

Here is one of the few books on Oriental politics, that maze of international intrigue, imperialistic ambitions, and diverse racial psychologies, that is not written from a preconceived viewpoint or with propaganda as its motive. It is essentially a reporter's analysis of what is going on, a living pattern of history being made.

GOVERNMENT IN REPUBLICAN CHINA

By PAUL LINEBARGER

203 pages, 9 x 6. 8/6 net

As a result of Japan's advance, the Government in China has become migratory, and a mere description of its previous structure and functions would to-day have little relevance. Linebarger has probed deeply enough to find the foundations of Chinese political life to discover with unerring discernment between the ephemeral and the durable. His long-range position, in the exigencies of the hour and delineating the issues of China's future.

McGraw-Hill

ALDWYCH HOUSE, LONDON, W.C.2

buried in the columns of forgotten yesterday." I do not think very many journalists—and I mean journalists—would have published one particular sentence that appears in that paragraph about me, who have not Mr. Lockhart's acquaintance. He claims to have heard in confidence from a British agent of a private measure that I took for my own safety—and publishes it, and this, I think, is a bit thick. In Fleet Street they don't do that kind of thing.

Then the standard of writing, the arrangement of the wares. Mr. Lockhart's style combines the style of the diarist, the gossip-page columnist, and the globe-trotter, and if you like it you like it.

His method is an impressive one. Usually it is to be met at the station by the British Minister's car, to be driven to the British Legation, where he is an honoured guest and has met the household at other places and times, generally in the glorious age before Fleet Street, to interview the King and the Prime Minister, in the evening to go to a bar or two, and from time to time, when he revisits familiar scenes, to discover that he is not so young as he was.

So Mr. Lockhart visits or revisits the Scandinavian countries, the Danubian and Balkan countries (Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and a dash to Austria to see Hitler march in) and Germany. He finds, after his nine years' absence, save for brief visits, a Germany reinvigorated, throwing its chest out, feeling its biceps: he finds British prestige on the wane everywhere; he finds the small countries, will-they-won't-they, looking respectfully and fearfully toward Germany.

The book tells you how King Carol takes his cigarettes and how the British Minister in Bucharest fell over Queen Marie's Pekinese and how the Queen of Yugoslavia said, "Mamma is not very pleased with Mr. Lockhart."

ANTI-EXTREMISTS

EUROPE IN THE MELTING POT. By Vladimir de Korostovetz. Hutchinson. 10s. 6d.

MAN IN EUROPE STREET. By Rupert Croft-Cooke. Rich and Cowan. 10s. 6d.

Reviewed by R. H. S. CROSSMAN

THESE books have two points of semblance; both authors discuss Europe and dislike extremists, particularly of the left. But whereas Mr. Cooke is worth reading for the information he gives, M. de Korostovetz is illuminating chiefly for the degree of sheer untruthfulness (or inaccuracy?) which he achieves.

The Man in Europe Street should be called *The Man in the Street in Europe*. It is the unaffected story of a journey undertaken in the winter of 1937 through the Low Countries, Germany, Czechoslovakia, the Balkans and Italy. Mr. Croft-Cooke chose an old motor-bus as his vehicle and two acrobats as his companions; and too much of a short book is concerned not with Europe but with these incidentals. Nevertheless, he does manage to give an excellent impression of the average fair-minded Englishman abroad, listening to chance acquaintances in the café or the restaurant. His pictures of Sudetenland, Hungary and Fascist Italy are excellently done, and he rightly stresses the contrast between public opinion in Italy and Germany, and the far greater freedom of expression permitted in the former country. A lightweight book but good of its kind.

It is impossible to review *Europe in the Melting Pot*. Mr. Korostovetz is a White emigré from the Ukraine. Before the Revolution he held a post in the Russian Foreign Office; now he is a self-appointed propagandist of the Anti-Commintern. The propaganda, however, is devoid either of construction or style.

THE WORLD OF *FINANCE*



APPEASEMENT OR ARMAMENT ?

by "RAPIER"

UP to the middle of November there were signs that confidence was gradually returning and that the reverberations of the pre-Munich crisis were beginning to die away. In America the business community was elated at the set-back to the New Deal which was registered in the unexpectedly large Republican gains at the Congressional elections on November 8th. In Britain the Government's decision to fill the gaps disclosed by the crisis in its rearmament programme without creating a Ministry of Supply removed the threat of industry being placed upon a war footing with consequent dislocation of export trade, and also limited the size of the additional expenditure to be met by borrowing and taxation. Moreover, Mr. Chamberlain in his speeches again emphasised his determination to be a "Go Getter" for peace and implied that the emphasis of his policy would be upon appeasement and not upon rearmament. In France, hopes of a successful tackling of the perennial financial problem were raised by the appointment of M. Paul Reynaud to the portfolio of Finance Minister. The decision to implement the Anglo-Italian agreement, however distasteful its corollaries in certain directions, held out hopes of a further lessening of friction in the Mediterranean and the Near East. The boundaries of the new Czech State were also taking shape without undue friction and an appearance

of, at any rate, temporary stability was emerging in Central Europe.

True, the Sino-Japanese war and the Spanish civil war were dragging on with no immediate prospect of peace and the Palestine problem was again thrown into the melting pot by the Government's decision to abandon the policy of partition. But by this time nerves have got accustomed to these ever present evils and hopes were concentrated upon the favourable aspects of world politics. In the economic sphere there were, too, some signs of a gradual emergence from the trade recession under the leadership of American recovery.

But these slight signs of returning confidence were rudely shaken by Germany's savage outburst against the Jews. Apart from the moral aspect of Germany's action its psychological effects were profoundly disturbing. Prospects of a peaceful solution by negotiation of outstanding problems between Germany and the rest of Europe appeared to be fading into the background in face of the intransigent attitude of the Nazi regime. The emphasis was at once shifted from appeasement to rearmament with a resurgence of the crisis phenomena on a small scale. Buyers withdrew from the stock market and there was a general marking off of quotations, especially of British Funds. Foreigners distrustful of the future resumed the withdrawal of their bank

deposits from London and transferred them into dollars with a consequent sharp fall in the value of sterling in terms of dollars despite intervention by the British Equalisation Fund. Even Wall Street lost its resilience and quotations sagged. How long this movement will continue, and how far it will go before it is checked, depends upon subsequent political developments, but those who looked for a long period of tranquillity as a result of the Munich settlement have received a shock of disillusionment from which, at the best, it will take them some time to recover, while those who expected no assuagement have been confirmed in their pessimism.

France's Troubles

This disturbance to confidence came at a most unfortunate time for France at the moment when M. Reynaud launched his new decrees, and though they immediately led to some bear covering of francs the repatriation of French balances abroad was to some extent retarded by a parallel movement into dollars. M. Reynaud's programme, timed to operate over a three-year period, involves a revaluation of France's gold reserves and a consequent reduction of the Treasury's debt to the Bank of France, heavy increases in taxation and drastic economies in expenditure, together with longer working hours. These measures are estimated to produce a balanced budget on ordinary expenditure of £360 millions. But the extraordinary budget, mainly devoted to armament expenditure, estimated next year at £170 millions will still have to be met by borrowing. The success of M. Reynaud's plans will depend upon the extent to which the revival of French industrial production and to a repatriation of fugitive capital. If this plan fails there appears to be no alternative for France but foreign exchange control and a closed economy.

With regard to the United States, although business activity is growing, its expansion is somewhat irregular and the margin of profit very small. The stock-market has generously discounted the trade revival and although quotations are likely to go higher within a few months there will probably be intermediate reactions.

U. S. Doubts

There is every prospect of increased taxation being imposed in the next Congressional session and this causes selling of securities by those who have large demands to meet. Another adverse factor is the low level of farming income owing to the fall in price of agricultural products which was one of the causes of the setback in the Democratic party's vote at the recent elections. The American government is doing everything in its power to raise these prices by subsidies, etc., and is also trying to force Argentina to come into a world agreement to restrict exports of wheat but so far unsuccessfully. Again, though the President has had a setback in the elections his prestige is still high and he still has a majority in both Houses of Congress. The strength of the opposition may be able to curb the New Dealers but it cannot kill them. The President is a tenacious man and will not easily be diverted from his programme and there may yet be further friction between business and the Administration. The real test of the pump-priming experiment at present operating towards American recovery will be the extent to which it generates the revival of private enterprise and allows Government expenditure to subside.

In contrast to the other developments this month, it is good to record one constructive measure. The signing of the Anglo-American Trade Treaty (Nov. 18th) marks an important step in the political and economic relations of the United States and the British Empire.

DIARY OF INTERNATIONAL EVENTS: OCT. 15—NOV. 16

READJUSTMENTS OF FRONTIERS

THE Ambassadors' Commission in Berlin made various adjustments during October in the new Czechoslovak frontiers. Some fifteen predominantly Czech villages in Moravia were restored to Czechoslovakia; the latter also regained certain moveable property, but had to cede a proportion of rolling stock. The nett gain to the Reich was some 10,800 square miles of territory and 3,600,000 inhabitants; 250,000 Germans were left in Bohemia and 580,000 Czechs in the Reich. As regards opting, the German-Czech commission was awaiting detailed proposals by the Reich.

A condition for good German-Czech relations was explained by the *Dipl. Korrespondenz* (October 14th) to be the avoidance by Prague of policies prejudicial to the Reich. The same day the new Czech foreign minister assured Herr Hitler of his country's "loyal attitude"; her non-aggression pact with Russia was denounced (October 21st), and the Czech communist party was dissolved (October 20th). Germany, for her part, withdrew (October 17th) her claim to Bratislava, Czechoslovakia's only Danubian port, which has more German than Magyar citizens, and re-opened traffic with Czechoslovakia on the Elbe and Danube (October 21st, 22nd). Railway agreements (October 26th) enabled trains to run on thirteen lines cut by the new frontiers while German transit traffic from Silesia to Austria was exempted from Czech customs control. Herr von Ribbentrop indicated (November 7th) that "a complete re-orientation of Czech policy towards Germany" would bring final appeasement.

Unable to impose her demands on Slovakia without German support or to abate them in face of nationalist clamour, the Hungarian Government had broken off the Komarom conference (October 13th) and, after proposing an appeal to

the four Munich Powers, had mobilised additional troops, and reinforced the frontier which was strongly guarded on the Slovak side. The Slovak and Hungarian ministers were received (October 14th) by Herr Hitler who advised diplomatic negotiations. Hungary was counselled by the *Dipl. Korrespondenz* (October 20th) to confine herself to ethnographic claims. In Rome, where Hungary had also sent an emissary (October 14th), more sympathy was shown for her hopes of securing Ruthenia by a plebiscite; the "Czech Republic" was advised in the Italian Press to allow popular votes in all disputed districts.

Meanwhile Poland, fearful of isolation and of the effects of Ruthenian autonomy on her Ukrainian subjects, had declared openly for the cession of Ruthenia to Hungary. A visit paid by Col. Beck to Galatz (October 18th) failed to win King Carol to these views. The inspired Bucharest press (October 24th) showed opposition to the further aggrandisement of Hungary, to the loss of contact with Czechoslovakia, and to the idea of a Polish-Hungarian-Rumanian bloc. The Ruthenian National Council declared (October 25th) for continuance in the Czechoslovakian federation; Dr. Brody, the premier, who had advocated a plebiscite, resigned (October 26th) and was indicted for treason and for receiving funds from an adjacent state. Disturbances organised by Hungarian volunteers in Ruthenia were suppressed by Czech troops at the end of October.

After a succession of bargaining offers between Prague and Budapest, and the refusal (October 24th) of Hungarian demand for the immediate transfer of the "undisputed" Magyar areas and for plebiscites in eight disputed districts, it was agreed to invite the arbitration of Germany and Italy. Hungary's hope of including Poland as an arbitrator was foiled by Czechoslovakia's insistence, in

that case, on the inclusion of Rumania. On October 30th Germany and Italy consented to arbitrate, a step which the *Gazzeta del Popolo* regarded as establishing the Axis Powers as "supreme arbiters" in Central Europe.

After first conferring at Rome (October 27th-29th) Herr von Ribbentrop and Count Ciano met at Vienna (November 2nd) to decide on "a just ethnographic frontier." Their award, based on the 1910 census, satisfied Hungarian racial claims, except in regard to Bratislava, which was assigned to Czechoslovakia. It gave Hungary 4,200 square miles of territory with the towns of Lucenec and Kosice; Ruthenia—suggestively renamed Carpatho-Ukraine—lost her capital, Uzhorod, and her direct railway contact with Slovakia; this disability Hungary was required to mitigate by traffic agreements. The ceded territory was to be evacuated by stages (November 5th-11th), under a joint commission, with a right of appeal to the arbitrators. The award, which was punctually executed, was described by Herr von Ribbentrop (November 7th) as having "definitely established the frontier on an ethnic basis." Polish inspired forecasts that the remaining portion of Ruthenia must finally be absorbed by Hungary, on economic grounds, were contradicted in Berlin.

Another agreement (November 1st), between Czechoslovakia and Poland, provided for the cession of the predominantly Polish parts of Orava-Javarina (Tatra region); a mixed commission was to fix the Teschen-Silesia frontier by November 15th and other frontiers by November 30th. Poland's nett gain was about 770 square miles and 240,000 inhabitants.

Czechoslovakia's aggregate loss by these readjustments was roughly one-third of her area and population.

APPEASEMENT AND ARMAMENTS

Hopes that the Munich agreement would induce general appeasement were not at once realised. The "Axis" Powers were mistrustful at the continued arming

of the democracies, as they believed, "far beyond their defensive needs." In speeches at Saarbrücken and Weimar (October 9th, November 6th) Herr Hitler attacked the "war agitators" in the British parliament, whose possible advent to power precluded, he said, any weakening of Germany's defences. M. Bonnet (October 29th) and Mr. Chamberlain (November 1st), for their part, maintained that their nations must be strong enough to speak with others on equal terms. President Roosevelt, after hearing Mr. Baruch's report on the designs of totalitarian states in South America, declared that he must ensure the freedom of the Western Hemisphere to work out its own salvation. Measures were foreshadowed (November 6th) to provide ultimately 10,000 aeroplanes and a reserve of 1,000,000 men.

A widening "break in the clouds" was seen by Signor Mussolini in the agreement (October 27th) for the coming into force of the Anglo-Italian Pact, and the consequent recognition by England of Italy's sovereignty over Abyssinia—a step already taken by all other states, except Russia. Defending this policy in Parliament (November 2nd) Mr. Chamberlain instanced the repatriation (see below) of 10,000 Legionaries on October 16th and General Franco's declaration of neutrality (September 27th) during the crisis, as evidence that the situation in Spain no longer menaced European peace. He also recalled Il Duce's powerful intervention in favour of peace on September 28th, which was only obtainable owing to the existence of the Pact. The House of Commons approved the government's policy (November 2nd, 3rd). The Pact came into force on November 16th.

At Marseilles, in the Radical-Socialist Congress M. Daladier said (October 27th) that an accord was possible, both with Germany and with Italy, if each side were content to defend its national interests, chief of which, for France, was the security not only of her frontiers but of communications with her Empire. Italy, though rejoicing that M. Francois Poncet had been accredited as Ambassador

(October 12th) to the King of Italy as Emperor of Ethiopia, appeared sceptical regarding an agreement with France. Her press hinted that French policy must first be revised in regard, *inter alia*, to Russia, and Spain. Mr. Chamberlain, in Parliament (November 1st), urged that democracies and totalitarian states should co-operate in regulating international relations. He recognised that Germany must be geographically dominant in Central and South-Eastern Europe, and deprecated fears that her commercial policy in those regions (whence Dr. Funk had returned on October 17th with important trade agreements) must lead to economic war.

That the overtures to the Axis Powers did not imply the neglect of old friendships was shown by the French Government's invitation to British Ministers to visit Paris on November 28th, by the King's invitation to President Lebrun to visit London next spring, and by Mr. Chamberlain's rebuke (November 9th) to those who saw in the Anglo-German declaration of September 30th a weakening of England's ties with France. Significant also was the announcement (November 7th) that the King and Queen had accepted President Roosevelt's invitation to visit the United States during their Canadian tour.

Germany's own attitude as stated by Herr von Ribbentrop (November 7th) was that the Rome-Berlin axis, linked with Japan, was the guarantee of order in Europe and the world. To the French and British overtures Herr Hitler's response was, as he said at Munich (November 8th) "very cool." He professed in that speech not to know "what they should come to an understanding about," and implied once more that limitation of arms—which Mr. Chamberlain had called (November 1st) the first aim of his policy of understandings—was unthinkable till "war agitation" against Germany ceased. Germany wanted nothing except her colonies.

In regard to the latter question Germany's position, as expressed by General von Epp (October 29th) was that she

claimed the colonies back as "stolen property"; that Herr Hitler had opened the negotiations by stating at Godesberg that the colonies remained a problem; that the initiative now lay with the Mandatory States, that the demand was not at the moment an "actual" diplomatic issue, but that Germany would not accept dictation as to when it should be solved.

LITHUANIA AND GERMANY

Relations between Germany and Lithuania were strained in October owing to the restrictions imposed under martial law on the autonomy of Memel under the Statute of 1924, and to the refusal of electoral rights to Dr. Neumann, the Nazi leader, sentenced for treason in 1935.

The Memel Diet, rejecting (October 18th) concessions offered by the government which reserved wide powers to the Governor, demanded full autonomy, and even questioned Lithuania's title to Memel. The German semi-official *Angriff* (October 24th) warned Lithuania that Herr Hitler's recent disavowal of further territorial claims in Europe did not imply indifference to the treatment of Germans abroad, and recalled the dangers of a policy like that of Dr. Benes. Lithuania, no longer relying on Russian support or on the signatories of the Memel Statute, gave way (October 29th) and repealed martial law unconditionally. At the same time an agreement was reached with the German minister regulating German-Lithuanian relations.

SPAIN

General Franco renewed his offensive on the Ebro front (October 30th) and, after a week's stubborn fighting, had captured key positions threatening the Republican bridges over the river. The Italian Press emphasised the strength of the Legionary troops and aircraft in this success.

A surprise attack by the Republicans across the Segre river south-west of

Lerida (November 7th) gained some initial successes.

The evacuation of the international volunteers with the Republican army proceeded, under the supervision of a League Commission which reached Barcelona on October 17th.

The 10,000 Italian "volunteers" to be repatriated left Spain (October 16th). Il Duce telegraphed on this occasion to General Franco that Italy would be linked to him till his final victory. General Franco's Press declared (October 21st) that he had now become entitled to belligerent rights, and it was understood that he would not facilitate the withdrawal of volunteers under the Non-Intervention plan till these rights were accorded. Nationalist armed vessels sank a Republican merchant ship in the North Sea (November 2nd) and took another as a prize to Emden (November 7th). The British courts ruled, in a shipping case (November 1st), that General Franco's government must be considered as that of a sovereign state.

THE FAR EAST

The Japanese troops that landed in Bias Bay on October 12th, advancing very rapidly, met with little opposition, and entered Canton on October 21st.

The impression caused by this disaster, and the advance of the Japanese right and left wings north and south of Hankow, led General Chiang Kai-shek to withdraw to Changsha, renouncing the defence of the Wuhan cities (Hankow, Hanyang, Wuchang), and to remove the government to Chungking on the Upper Yangtse. His troops retreated relatively intact. The Japanese pressing rapidly on, occupied Hankow on October 25th.

The Chinese troops that had held Teian stubbornly for three months were forced to withdraw (about October 29th).

These successes brought about one-sixth of China prostrate within the Japanese military zone. Opiumism was, however, discouraged in Japan. The War Minister declared (October 27th) that the conflict had only begun. Statements by Prince

Konoye (November 2nd, 3rd) showed that his Government envisaged a political-economic bloc, comprising Japan, China and Manchukuo; even the Kuomintang—now described as a local regime—might participate if it discarded General Chiang Kai-shek; foreign Powers should adapt themselves to the new conditions. Other statements indicated that the Nine Power Treaty would be allowed to lapse, and that Japan would organise the new China as a federation, embracing the different regional governments.

In regard to such projects it was stated in Parliament (November 9th) that Great Britain could not admit the alteration of positions established by treaty.

The Chinese government at Chungking declared (October 25th) its confidence in Chiang Kai-shek and its resolve to continue the struggle, basing its resistance on the provinces of Hunan, Szechuan and Yunnan. Dr. Kung, Finance Minister, stated (October 30th) that ammunition supplies were assured for two years. Japan protested (about October 28th) to France concerning the alleged supply of ammunition through Indo-China.

The fall of Hankow was followed by rumours of negotiations. Members of the Peking government went to Nanking (October 31st) to frame peace terms, said to be on the lines of those demanded in January last (see March number p. 78)—which China would be urged to accept.

In a note of October 6th (published October 27th) the United States, recalling Japan's frequent promises to respect the "open door," demanded the ending of "unwarrantable interference" with rights of Americans and of discrimination against them in regard to exchange, control, shipping, access to property, etc. The American Press hinted that, failing satisfaction, Japan would cease to enjoy the tariff abatements accorded by the United States to non-discriminating states. It was announced (November 13th, that Great Britain, France and the United States had protested to Japan concerning discrimination against their merchant shipping on the Yangtse.

